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PART 42.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF MOROCCO.

54

January to June 1911.

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109*	Mr. Lister.. ..	20 Tel.	3,	Loan convention. Refers to No. 97 (see No. 133). Views on Spanish objections to convention	93*
110	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	7 Tel. Confidential	5,	Moorish revolt. French Ambassador thinks French troops will advance on Fez at an early date. French Ambassador has warned his Government that this will certainly rouse apprehensions of Spain ..	93
111	To Sir F. Bertie .	53 Tel.	5,	Doyen. Refers to No. 108. He should enquire whether French Government remain of same opinion; if so, he should inform them that to accept Portuguese Minister as doyen would be irregular, and might create inconvenient precedent, but His Majesty's Government will agree if German and Spanish objections can be overcome	94
112	Mr. Lister.. ..	2 Treaty	Mar. 31,	Moorish mission to Coronation. Refers to No. 75. Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod, reporting that Sultan has designated Sid Taib Mokri as special envoy. Choice not very satisfactory	94
113	To Sir F. Bertie ..	120	Apr. 6,	Revolt of tribes. French Ambassador has communicated telegram from M. Cruppi to the effect that, unless there was an improvement in situation, French Government might have to dispatch a column to Fez. They were consulting Spanish Government on subject. Sir A. Nicolson pointed out to Ambassador danger of a fierce agitation ensuing throughout Morocco	95
114	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	8 Tel.	7,	Moorish revolt. Refers to No. 110. M. Cruppi has informed Spanish Ambassador in Paris that, if French had to advance on Fez, Government desired this should take place in agreement with Spain, who would be at liberty to take measures for protection of her fortresses. Germany is not entirely satisfied with explanations given to her as to possible French advance on Fez..	96
115	To Admiralty ..	..	7,	Lighthouses. Refers to No. 98. It has been agreed that lighthouses shall be under control of Moorish Government, subject to supervision of Comité spécial des Travaux publics	96

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117	„ „	65	Apr. 2.	Revolt of tribes. Reports reverse of mehalla in Fez on 26th March. Success of rebels may induce other tribes to join them. Situation very serious. It is reported that Moulai Sliman, a cousin of Mulai Hafid, has been proclaimed Sultan at Mequinez, but there is no confirmation of this ..	97
118	„ „	69 Confidential	3,	Revolt of tribes. Reports arrangements made by French chargé d'affaires for payment of Shereefian mehalla. At latter's suggestion, he has seen Menebhi, who has promised to write to personal friends in the Gharb and urge them to keep quiet. Reports Menebhi's views on situation ..	97
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120	„ „	71 Confidential	3,	Ifni. Spanish gun-boat anchored at Ifni on 18th March, and announced they had come with letter from Sultan to open a port. They asked that Shereef of Tazeroualt should be informed. They did not land, and left same night	102
120*	Sir F. Bertie ..	28 Tel.	8,	Doyen. Refers to No. 111. French Government think diplomatic body at Tangier should decide who should be doyen ..	102*
121	„ „ ..	30 Tel.	8,	Moorish revolt. Refers to No. 114. Has warned M. Cruppi of danger of Germany taking advantage of any French entanglement arising from a military expedition to Fez. M. Cruppi said French Government would do their utmost to avoid expedition	102
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122*	Mr. Lister.. ..	23 Tel.	11,	Doyen (see No. 120*). German, Spanish, and Italian Governments consider Portuguese representative cannot act as doyen. French chargé d'affaires states that, as unanimity is essential, solution of matter must be adjourned. He has agreed with this view	102*
123	To Sir M. de Bunsen	24	11,	France and Spain. Conversation with Spanish Ambassador, who said that German Government had informed French Government there was no cause for anxiety in situation. Sir E. Grey urged that there was no reason for Spain to take action in places where there was no trouble simply because French were taking action elsewhere	102

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127	„ „ ..	40 Confidential	9,	France and Spain. Refers to No. 126. Conversation with French Ambassador, who communicated copy of French note dealing in detail with Spanish protests against loan convention, and including police and public works questions	105
128	Mr. Lister	26 Tel.	13,	Loan convention (see No. 133). Sultan has ratified convention, and Ben Ghabreet is returning from Fez at once	106
129	To Sir M. de Bunsen	8 Tel.	13,	France and Spain. Refers to Nos. 122 and 125. He should inform Spanish Government that His Majesty's Government think it would be a grave mistake to publish secret convention	106
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131	Mr. Lister	73	6,	Tangier municipality regulations. Refers to No. 18. Transmits *procès-verbaux* of meetings of sub-commission to examine draft of regulations. Discusses various amendments, and requests instructions relative to voting power of technical advisers on Commission administrative ..	107
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139	Sir F. Bertie ..	168 Secret	13,	Spain and France. Refers to No. 122. M. Cruppi intends to refuse categorically to publish secret agreement of 1904. He considered Spanish Government were acting in a provocative and foolish manner. He did not think German Government intended to make difficulties about Morocco	126
140	To Sir M. de Bunsen	25	15,	Moorish revolt. Spanish Ambassador states that if France found it necessary to occupy Taza and Fez, Spain would be compelled to take certain measures in her sphere. Sir A. Nicolson pointed out unreasonableness of Spanish attitude, as Spanish sphere was quiet and in no danger. Ambassador communicated memorandum of substance of Spanish reply to French commissioner..	127
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167	Mr. Rattigan ..	35 Tel.	25,	Moorish revolt. Fez still quiet on 20th. Mehalla completely surrounded by hostile tribes, and ammunition badly needed. French consular agent has left Alcazar with convoys for army, and is having great difficulty in getting through ..	145
168	„ „ ..	36 Tel.	25,	Moorish revolt. Consuls at Fez have decided that all Europeans who are willing to leave should start at once if road is open. Remaining British subjects will, if necessary, take refuge in Menebhi's house, which will be guarded by Aissa-ben-Omar	145
169	Sir F. Bertie ..	42 Tel. Secret	25,	German attitude. Refers to No. 160. Conversation with M. Cruppi, who said German Government had raised no objections to French preparations for relief of Fez, but he is aware they are instigating Austrian and Spanish Governments to make difficulties. French Government hope His Majesty's Government will continue to exert their influence at Madrid to prevent Spain embarking on imprudent action	145
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172	Mr. Rattigan ..	87	18,	Moorish revolt. At request of French chargé d'affaires, Menebhi has again written to friends in the Gharb, asking them to urge tribes to remain quiet. Latest news from Fez is that the mehalla has gained an important victory. Raisuli has agreed to advance to Alcazar, and is being supplied with ammunition ..	147
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177	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	14 Tel.	26,	Moorish revolt. French Ambassador has informed Spanish Government that in view of unfavourable reports, French Government have dispatched additional troops to Casa Blanca, and that Shawia mehalla is to proceed at once to Fez ..	151
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179	Sir F. Bertie ..	43 Tel.	27,	Moorish revolt. M. Cruppi has received further disquieting news from Morocco. Major Brémond has been violently attacked by tribes. Consul Boisset's relief expedition has been obliged to withdraw to Souk-el-Arba	152
180	„ „ ..	44 Tel. Confidential	27,	Spain and France. Spanish officers and men have landed at Laraiche from Spanish cruiser, and Spanish action at Tetuan is also rumoured. M. Cruppi thinks Spain is determined to create an incident as a pretext for occupation of Moorish territory, and he hopes His Majesty's Government will use their influence to dissuade Spain from any forward action	152
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184	„ „ ..	4	9,	Situation at Fez. Fighting amongst Beni Warain, who have now joined Ait Yusi "harka," 6 miles from Fez	159
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188	„ „ ..	89	22,	Tour in the south of Spanish commandant of police at Casa Blanca (see No. 143). Transmits two despatches from Consul Madden, reporting French chargé d'affaires very much annoyed at Colonel Silvestre and escort of twenty having gone to Marrakesh in uniform, and thereby caused excitement. Alleged object of tour was to buy horses	161
189	„ „ ..	90	22,	Cession to French of certain lands in Shawia. Transmits despatch from Consul Madden, reporting. Object is to prevent foreigners other than French obtaining too much land in province	163
190	„ „ ..	91	23,	Moorish revolt. Details of actions fought by Major Brémond's mehalla. Attack on Fez on 12th April. Has instructed Consul MacLeod not to arrange for departure of British subjects till they are in actual danger. It is very unlikely town will be captured by the Berbers	163
191	„ „ ..	92	23,	Moorish revolt. Transmits despatch from Consul Madden, reporting dispatch of Moorish "harka" from Casa Blanca under Mulai-el-Amrani, Viceroy of Shawia, to the relief of Fez. French chargé d'affaires states no French troops will be employed unless situation at Fez becomes desperate	164
192	Sir F. Bertie ..	188 Confidential	26,	Moorish revolt. Conversation with M. Cruppi, who hoped it would not be necessary for French troops to go as far as Fez. German Government were endeavouring to inspire distrust in Spanish Government, and His Majesty's Government could be of great assistance at Madrid. French policy was perfectly straightforward, and they would keep strictly to terms of Act of Algeciras ..	165
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199	Sir F. Bertie ..	191 Confidential	26,	Spanish grievances. Refers to No. 195. Transmits communication made to French Minister for Foreign Affairs by Spanish Ambassador, containing Spanish proposals for future arrangements respecting police, finance, and railways in Morocco ..	168
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201	„ „ ..	43 Tel.	28,	Moorish revolt. Shawia "harka" under Amrani arrives at Kenitra on 28th. French column should be there on 29th ..	170
202	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	15 Tel.	28,	Moorish revolt. Minister for Foreign Affairs has assured French Ambassador and himself that no movement of Spanish troops is contemplated at present. He has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs, as authorised in No. 181, of assurances given by M. Cruppi to respect Algeciras Act	170
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204	„ „ ..	46 Tel.	29,	Moorish revolt. Tribal meeting held at Mequinez has decided to depose Mulai Hafid and restore Abd-el-Aziz under protection of Great Britain and Germany ..	171
205	Sir F. Bertie ..	47 Tel. Confidential	29,	German attitude. Has conveyed substance of No. 198 to M. Cruppi. German and Austrian Ambassadors have not yet made any communication to latter. French Embassy in London has been instructed to communicate interviews between German Chancellor and French Ambassador in Berlin. Result of these interviews is that assurances of French Government have satisfied German Government for the moment, but they will resume full liberty of action if French occupation of Fez is more than temporary	171

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207	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	16 Tel.	30,	Spain and France (see No. 195). Spanish Ambassador in Paris appears to have used violent language, and Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has telegraphed to him that he has exceeded his instructions. French Ambassador is suggesting to his Government that His Majesty's Ambassador should be associated with him in discussing fully Moorish affairs. French Ambassador is about to inform Spanish Government that, though France cannot agree to a general modification of secret convention, she is prepared to meet Spanish grievances handsomely.. ..	172
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209	Sir E. Goschen ..	112 Very Conf.	28,	Attitude of Germany. French Ambassador has communicated to Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs assurances of French Government with regard to expedition to Fez. Minister for Foreign Affairs, while confident of good faith of French Government, expressed doubts as to whether force would be able to leave Fez in a short time. If occupation was indefinitely prolonged, Algeciras Act would be at an end and Germany would resume her liberty of action ..	173
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215	To Sir M. de Bunsen	33 Tel.	1.	Spain and France. He should inform Spanish Government that His Majesty's Government consider it would be quite premature for Spain to act as if France were threatening independence and integrity of Morocco, and that it would be most unwise of her to precipitate partition of Morocco	176
216	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	55	Apr. 29,	Spain and France. Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, who alluded to state of unrest between Ceuta and Tetuan. Ambassador conveyed to Minister for Foreign Affairs substance of M. Cruppi's declaration, which Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to communicate to King Alfonso	176
217	Sir F. Bertie ..	195 Confidential	28,	German and Austrian attitude. Conversation with Austrian Ambassador, to whom Sir F. Bertie explained situation and emphasised correctness and good faith of French action. M. Cruppi has not received any representations from German and Austrian Ambassadors	177
218	To Sir M. de Bunsen	32	May 2,	Spain and France. Conversation with Spanish Ambassador, who stated that German Ambassador in Paris had suggested that France and Spain should come to an agreement respecting Morocco and then communicate it to the other Powers. Spanish Government entirely approved suggestion, and were enquiring at Berlin whether German Government supported it	180
219	To Sir R. Rodd ..	67	2.	General situation. Conversation with Italian Ambassador, who was informed that His Majesty's Government considered it most undesirable that any Power should construe French action as contrary to Algeciras Act, and that France did not desire to reopen Morocco question ..	181
220	Mr. Lister	49 Tel.	3,	Situation at Fez. Sherarda mehalla has entered Fez. Town quiet, but complete anarchy outside	181
221	Sir F. Bertie ..	53 Tel. Confidential	3,	Austrian attitude (see No. 214). French Ambassador learns that Austrian Government are well disposed towards French Government, and are prepared to act as intermediaries between France and Germany. Austrian Ambassador in Paris has been urging his Spanish colleague to make difficulties	181

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224	Mr. Lister.. ..	51 Tel.	4,	Situation at Fez. German Minister has telegraphed to Berlin report from German consul at Fez that there is now no danger to Europeans, but that there may be danger if a French force is sent. Similar impression is given by letter from Consul MacLeod, and it would therefore be desirable to stop advance of French column ..	182
225	Sir E. Goschen ..	21 Tel. Confidential	4,	Russian attitude. Russian representative has been instructed to inform German Government that Russia is in complete agreement with France about Morocco, and has no objection to steps taken by France ..	183
226	To Sir M. de Bunsen	40 Tel.	4,	Spain and France (see No. 218). French Government understand that what Spain proposes is not a Franco-Spanish understanding as suggested by German Ambassador in Paris, but a discussion between the four Powers, which would be undesirable. He should impress on Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs that France would be willing to satisfy chief Spanish objections	183
227	To Sir F. Bertie ..	156	4,	Spain and France (see No. 226). Conversation with French Ambassador respecting Spanish proposal for a discussion of Moorish affairs. French Government view with great apprehension Germany being brought into the discussion. M. Cambon's views as to concessions which might satisfy Spain..	184
227*	Mr. Lister	53 Tel.	5,	Situation at Fez. Situation has taken a serious turn. Sultan is in despair, and has entreated France to come to his rescue. Food is being sold at famine prices and money is scarce	184*
228	Sir F. Cartwright ..	39 Tel. Most Conf.	5,	Russian attitude (see No. 225). French Ambassador in St. Petersburgh has been shown draft telegram instructing Russian Ambassador in Berlin to inform German Government that Russia would support France. Acting Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs added that France could always be sure of Russian support in serious matters. This may have moderated German attitude. A violently anti-French article purporting to give views of German Government has appeared in a daily paper	185
229	Sir E. Goschen ..	23 Tel.	5,	German attitude. Herr von Kiderlen stated that attitude of Germany was known, and he had nothing to add. Were France to precipitate matters, Germany would reap the advantage. Herr von Kiderlen stated he was going to take a month's leave ..	185

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231	„ „ ..	19 Tel.	5,	Spain and France. Refers to No. 226. He has impressed on Minister for Foreign Affairs expediency of coming to an arrangement with France. Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would send French Ambassador a memorandum of Spanish demands, and he would rely greatly on British support. His chief points were insecurity round Ceuta and alleged presence of 100 French officers at Alcazar	186
232	To Sir F. Bertie ..	95 Tel.	5,	Spain and France. Impression gathered from interviews with French and Spanish Ambassadors is that Spain would be ready to come to an agreement with France if she could be satisfied as to control in Spanish sphere and limitation of her action under 1904 agreement. It is very desirable that France should meet Spanish wishes on these points	186
233	To Sir M. de Bunsen	34	5,	Spain and France (see No. 226). Spanish Ambassador confirms his original statement that his Government were first going to find out whether German Government endorsed suggestion of their Ambassador in Paris and then come to an agreement with France, and that they did not contemplate a discussion *à quatre*. Ambassador confirmed view that chief Spanish complaints were as stated in No. 232 ..	187
234	Mr. Rattigan ..	93	Apr. 27,	Kaïd Maclean. Maclean has offered his services to the French for expedition to Fez. French chargé d'affaires has declined politely	187
235	„ „ ..	95 Confidential	27,	Spanish activity in Ceuta–Tetuan district. Storm of protest in Spanish press against Mr. Harris's accounts of Spanish provocative action, such as military promenades. No doubt that Spanish military and civil authorities are at cross-purposes, and that Spanish Government cannot control their military authorities	188
236	„ „ .	96	29,	Spanish activity in Ceuta–Tetuan district. Refers to No. 235. Incident at Tetuan when Spanish-protected notable created disturbance and Spanish consul refused to intervene	189
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240	„ „ ..	100 Confidential	30,	Spanish activity. Refers to No. 235. Provocative Spanish action at Laraiche, where Spanish war-ship "Rio de la Plata" has landed a colonel and five officers. Spanish police commandant, with all his mounted men, rode over to Alcazar, and a panic nearly ensued	192
241	„ „ ..	103	May 1,	Moorish revolt. Hadj Thami Glawi has sent reinforcements to Fez from Marrakesh. The French have authorised their passage through Shawia	193
242	Sir F. Bertie ..	200	5,	French expedition. Column from Casa Blanca has been ordered to proceed to Dar-Dzrari, where it will be in touch with Shereefian forces and able to revictual Fez. The column will wait there for further orders..	193
243	Memorandum communicated by Spanish Ambassador	..	6,	Ceuta police. In view of failure of Makhzen to make necessary arrangements for organization of frontier police, as agreed in convention of November 1910, Spanish Government have authorised Governor of Ceuta to employ part of the garrison to the suppression of disorder in frontier regions	194
244	Mr. Lister	54 Tel.	6,	Situation at Fez. Letters from Consul MacLeod and Dr. Verdon confirm French reports of gravity of situation. Only chance for Sultan is French military intervention. German Minister says reports from German consul showed that situation is unchanged. French chargé d'affaires is convinced German consul is acting under instructions	194
245	„ „	55 Tel.	6,	Spain and France. Refers to No. 231. French chargé d'affaires states there is only one French officer at Alcazar who is superintending dispatch of convoys. He has been instructed to go on as soon as possible to Sok-el-Arba	195
246	Sir F. Bertie ..	54 Tel.	6,	Spain and France. Refers to No. 232. M. Cruppi is most anxious to come to terms with Spain, but finds Spanish Ambassador in Paris very difficult to deal with. He had hoped negotiations might be conducted in London, but is willing they should take place at Madrid. He offered to Spanish Ambassador to agree to Spanish road from Ceuta to Tetuan, and to give Spain free hand in Presidios, but Spain seems determined to obtain policing of Tangier district and other demands impossible to grant	195
246*	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	21 Tel.	6,	Spain and France. Refers to No. 231. French Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved suggestion that Spanish Government should send memorandum of their demands to French Ambassador. Latter anxious that His Majesty's Ambassador should be officially authorised to join in the discussion which will ensue.. ..	195*

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247	Sir F. Bertie ..	55 Tel. Secret	7,	Spain and France. Refers to No. 218. M. Cruppi says that persistent intrigues have been going on between German and Spanish Ambassadors in Paris, and he suspects a secret German-Spanish understanding, by which former would obtain a coaling station on Atlantic coast. He thinks that, if His Majesty's Government could intimate at Berlin that England is in agreement with France and Russia it would restrain German activity, and make Spain realise folly of listening to German advice	195
248	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	56 Confidential	2.	France and Spain. Refers to Nos. 206 and 216. French Ambassador has sent reply to letters from Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that, though French Government deprecated independent action which Spain desired to take, they were quite ready to consider in a friendly spirit any reasonable Spanish demands. French Ambassador much annoyed by expressions used by Spanish Ambassador in Paris (see No. 206). Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Ambassador had exceeded his instructions, and that he had telegraphed to him to be more careful in future	196
249	„ „ ..	57 Confidential	3,	France and Spain. Refers to No. 248. Conversation with Spanish Prime Minister, who was very excited with regard to French action in Morocco, and declared she was the implacable enemy of Spain. Ambassador contested this, and pointed out how unwise it would be to precipitate events. Prime Minister hinted that he was thinking of sending a force to perform police duties beyond Ceuta frontier, and also to strengthen Spanish police force at Laraiche	198
250	Mr. Lister	56 Tel.	8,	Spain and Morocco (see No. 243). Guebbas much perturbed by notes from Spanish Minister respecting Melilla and Ceuta police, and insisting on immediate effect being given to convention of November 1910. Guebbas has telegraphed to Mokri to endeavour to arrange matters with Spanish Ambassador in Paris	199
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252	To Sir F. Bertie ..	103 Tel.	8.	France and Spain. Refers to No. 246. Agrees that Madrid is best place for negotiations	200
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254*	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	23 Tel. Confidential	9,	Occupation of Ceuta Heights (see No. 246†). French Ambassador has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that France has no objection, but he has now been instructed to say that any Spanish advance beyond conventional line might lead to danger, and could not receive assent of French Government. Latter are understood to have requested that British Ambassador should make similar representations. Hopes he may be allowed latitude in so doing, and proposes merely to say that His Majesty's Government think it would be wise for Spain to restrict her operations to conventional line	201*
255	Mr. Lister	59 Tel.	9,	Mulai Zin. Mulai Zin has written announcing his proclamation as Sultan and his choice of Mikwar as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Lister does not propose to answer letter. All reports unite in showing intense unpopularity of Hafid	202
256	To Sir M. de Bunsen	54 Tel.	9,	Spain and France. Refers to No. 247. He should notify Spanish Government that His Majesty's Government will fully maintain Anglo-French agreement in 1904, and that their attitude will accord with that which they adopted at Algeciras in 1906 ..	202
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258	Mr. Lister	61 Tel.	10,	Situation at Fez. Insurgents attacked and repulsed on the 4th; town quiet on 5th ..	203
259	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	24 Tel.	10,	German attitude. Conversation with German Ambassador, who says that, if France establishes her influence at Fez in a way to destroy principles of Algeciras Act, Morocco question will revert to *status quo ante*, and he thought Spain would be justified in seizing Tetuan if French occupied Fez. French Ambassador does not think his German colleague is encouraging Spain to adopt a recalcitrant attitude. German-Spanish mining dispute. Dispute has arisen between Spanish company and a German called Natter, who has been ejected by former from a mining site he purchased in the Riff ..	203
260	Sir F. Cartwright ..	42 Tel.	10,	Austrian and German attitude. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has repeated declaration that Austrian Government took little interest in the question, and he hears that it is viewed with calm at Berlin. His information confirms German view that there is no imminent danger for Europeans at Fez	203
260*	To Sir M. de Bunsen	56 Tel.	10,	Occupation of Ceuta Heights. Agrees to language proposed in No. 254*	204*

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261*	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	25 Tel.	11,	Spain and France (see No. 279). Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent memorandum of Spanish demands to French Ambassador. Spanish proposals go far beyond anything that could at present be conceded, but some of them may form a reasonable basis for discussion	204*
262	To Mr. Lister ..	36	11,	Tangier municipality. Agrees generally with views expressed in No. 131	204
263	To Sir M. de Bunsen	38	11,	Spain and France (see No. 246*). Spanish Ambassador states that French Ambassador at Madrid has been instructed to discuss with Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in concert with British Ambassador, points on which Spain desires satisfaction	204
264	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	60	8,	Spanish occupation of Ceuta heights (see Nos. 243 and 246†). Conversation with Spanish Prime Minister on the subject. French Government have intimated that they have no objection. Occupation is likely to be followed by further energetic action, which the press is strongly urging	205
265	„ „ ..	61	9,	Debate in the Cortes. Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in Senate that Government were unable as yet to make a full statement of policy in view of negotiations with France. In Lower Chamber a Socialist deputy criticised occupation of Ceuta heights and protested against this "act of war." Prime Minister replied in rigorous language	206
266	To Sir F. Cartwright	17 Tel.	12,	Austrian attitude. Refers to No. 260. He should inform Austrian Government that British reports from Fez entirely confirm French view of gravity of situation ..	207
267	Mr. Lister.. ..	104 Confidential	7,	Moorish revolt. Reports in detail substance of previous telegrams with regard to optimistic reports from Fez, which now prove to be untrue. Transmits despatches from Consul MacLeod showing the situation to be very serious. Private letter in a similar strain has been received from Dr. Verdon. Visit from ex-Sultan, who seems to have modified his views about reascending the throne since last summer	207
268	„ „ ..	106 Confidential	7,	Dispute between Spanish Government and l'Union des Mines (see No. 138). Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs in March 1909 informed representative of l'Union that Spanish Government were entirely satisfied with arrangements made to safeguard Spanish interests. The Spanish Government cannot, therefore, maintain that they did not acquiesce in scheme. Mr. Harris declares that he never dispatched any agents to Spanish districts without previously notifying Spanish Minister ..	209

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270	Sir F. Cartwright ..	43 Tel. Most Conf.	13,	Anti-French inspired article. Refers to No. 228. Article was inspired by German Ambassador, who told writer that if French force entered Fez. German Government would peremptorily demand its withdrawal, and that French action is calculated to produce a situation similar to Fashoda. German Ambassador has complained to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that certain Ambassadors (*i.e.*, British and French Ambassadors) have been intriguing to influence Viennese press against Germany	210
271	„ „ ..	77 Confidential	11,	Anti-French inspired article (see Nos. 228 and 270). Transmits translation of article which was reproduced in Berlin and affected the Bourse. Reports further articles in the press, especially a number of anti-French articles in the "Neue Freie Presse"	211
272	Sir G. Buchanan ..	128	11,	Russian attitude. Conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who said French assurances were entirely satisfactory. Russian Ambassador at Berlin had gathered that German Minister for Foreign Affairs was favourably impressed by French assurances. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs made no allusion to assurances of support said to have been given by Russian Government to France (see No. 228)	213
273	Mr. Lister	68 Tel.	15,	Spanish activity. Reported fighting at Tetuan between Spaniards and tribesmen and panic in town	213
274	„ „	69 Tel.	15,	Spanish activity. Refers to No. 273. Reports of fighting at Tetuan are contradicted ..	214
275	Sir F. Cartwright ..	44 Tel.	15,	Austrian attitude. French Ambassador will communicate to-day decision of French Government to send relief force to Fez and assurance that force will be withdrawn at earliest possible opportunity ..	214
276	„ „ ..	46 Tel.	15,	Austrian attitude. French Ambassador has made communication reported in No. 275. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs received it very amicably. French Ambassador gathered that Austrian Government are anxious there should be no breach of Algeciras Act, as in that event a fresh conference might have to meet . ..	214
277	To Sir M. de Bunsen	59 Tel.	15,	Spanish activity. Refers to Nos. 269, 273, and 274. He should impress on Spanish Government necessity of Spanish military authorities in Morocco behaving with great forbearance and prudence. His Majesty's Government hope Spanish Government will refuse to sanction any measures likely to complicate the present delicate situation	214
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280	Count de Salis ..	139	14,	Russian attitude. Transmits communiqué which has appeared in "North German Gazette," contradicting statement that Russian Government had taken steps at Berlin with a view to bringing about a *détente* between France and Germany ..	222
281	Sir F. Bertie ..	215 Confidential	14,	General situation. Conversation with French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who said Germany was egging Spain on to make unreasonable claims in order to get something for herself. He is quite ready to make reasonable concessions, and he thinks that, if Germany could be convinced of the determination of Great Britain to uphold Algeciras Act, she would cease encouraging Spain. He does not altogether agree with Sir E. Grey's view as to supporting Mulai Hafid (see No. 257), as he thinks Sultans are all much alike, and France would be charged with altering *status quo* if she did not support authority of recognised Sultan	223
282	„ „ ..	213	15,	French expedition to Fez. Transmits report from military attaché on military situation in Morocco and progress of French expedition	224
283	M. Cambon to Sir A. Nicolson	..	16,	French expedition to Fez. French Government have instructed General Moinier to press on to the relief of Fez, and even to occupy it if necessary. The object of the French action is to assure the sovereignty of the Sultan, the integrity of his country, and freedom of commerce	226
284	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	26 Tel.	16,	Spanish activity. Has spoken to Minister for Foreign Affairs in sense of No. 277. Minister for Foreign Affairs said pressure to occupy Tetuan was very strong from all parties and all quarters. French occupation of Fez would place Spanish Government in a very difficult position, and French entry into Taza would entail Spanish entry into Tetuan. Minister for Foreign Affairs denied that Spanish troops had occupied places within 10 miles of Tetuan	226
285	To Sir M. de Bunsen	41	16,	France and Spain. Spanish Ambassador has conveyed thanks of Spanish Government for assistance of His Majesty's Government in facilitating a Franco-Spanish arrangement. His Excellency had not been able to ascertain whether proposal of German Ambassador in Paris (see No. 218) emanated from German Government, but he did not consider latter desired to make difficulties with France, though they would demand a price ..	227
286	Sir F. Cartwright ..	78	15,	Anti-French inspired article. Refers to No. 270. Gives substance of article which appeared in "Sonn- und Montags-Blatt"	227

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288	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	27 Tel.	18,	Spain and France. Refers to No. 287. Has conveyed substance of No. 287 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who said great pressure was being put on him by his colleagues, and he is not confident of always being able to resist it	229
289	To Sir F. Goschen ..	115	18,	German attitude. Conversation with German Ambassador, who said German Government quite believed French assurances that they would not stay in Fez. If they were forced to make Sultan into a mere puppet a new situation would have arisen, and the hands of the other Powers would be freed	230
290	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	64	15,	Spanish activity. Spaniards have advanced into country beyond Melilla. This may be regarded as a counter-demonstration for French occupation of Taurirt and Debdu	230
291	Sir F. Bertie ..	59 Tel. Most Conf.	18,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. French Minister for Foreign Affairs has made two offers to Spanish Ambassador, viz., that French consul at Tetuan should be promoted to another post, and that French and Spanish consuls at Alcazar should arrange how to spare Spanish susceptibilities, and at the same time not impede forwarding of supplies to French troops in the field	230
292	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	29 Tel.	19,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 291. Minister for Foreign Affairs speaks with satisfaction of French offers. He is uneasy as to position at Alcazar, and, if protection of Alcazar is necessary, he thinks it should be entrusted to Laraiche police, and not to a French force. He will do his best to prevent rash move on Tetuan (see No. 287)	231
293	Mr. Lister.. ..	113 Confidential	13,	Spain and Morocco. Refers to No. 250. Guebbas received on 6th and 7th no less than three notes from Spanish Minister insisting on immediate application of convention of 1910, and threatening that, unless Spanish demands were complied with, the measures Spain was taking would assume a permanent character. Guebbas telegraphed to Mokri in Paris to try and arrange matters. Spanish troops have now pushed on far beyond Ceuta, and are within 10 miles of Tetuan, and there is risk of a serious outbreak of disorder	231

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294	Mr. Lister	116 Confidential	May 14, 1911	Situation at Fez. News of dispatch of French relief force has been well received at Fez. Country which force has to traverse is very difficult, but force will no doubt succeed in reaching Fez. If French decide to keep Mulai Hafid and Glawi in power they may find themselves obliged to reconquer the whole country. Transmits two letters from the pretender Mulai Zin and from Mikwar. French suspicion of Raisuli and Menebhi much to be deplored. Transmits letter which Mulai Hafid has sent to French Minister, asking for relief force to be sent	232
295	Sir R. Rodd ..	80 Secret	16,	German attitude. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs has no news, but King of Italy has expressed considerable anxiety as to probable attitude of Germany ..	236
296	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	30 Tel.	20,	Spanish activity (see No. 292). Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed press that there is no truth in story of impending occupation of Tetuan. King of Spain has said the same	236
297	Sir F. Bertie ..	61 Tel.	20,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. French Minister for Foreign Affairs not ready to concede Spanish demands that conventional period of fifteen years should be reduced; that Spain should forthwith have a free hand in her sphere; and that Tangier police arrangements should be altered. He hopes His Majesty's Government will persuade Spanish Government to relinquish these demands	237
298	To Sir M. de Bunsen	45 Confidential	20,	Spanish activity at Ceuta. Spanish Ambassador has stated confidentially that, to ensure peace, Spanish Governor-General may be compelled to occupy Sierra Bullones	237
299	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	31 Tel.	21,	Franco-Spanish negotiations (see No. 297). French Ambassador has been authorised to make counter-proposals, but thinks they must be amplified if they are to be acceptable to Spain. Nothing is likely to satisfy the Spanish Government except recognition that first conventional period has expired. French Government seem to think this would imply right of Spain to occupy Tetuan and Laraiche, but this does not appear to be the case	237
300	Sir G. Buchanan ..	135	17,	Russian attitude. Inspired article has appeared in "Rossia" to the effect that French assurances have formed the subject of a friendly discussion with Germany, which has shown complete unanimity of views between the two Governments with regard to French intentions. "Novoe Vremya" states that Russian action has had a most beneficial effect on the international situation	238

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302	Note communicated by M. Cambon	..	22,	Suppression of arms traffic. Requests renewal of mandate to French and Spanish Governments on same conditions as previously	239
303	To Sir F. Bertie ..	177	22,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Has pointed out to French Ambassador that Spain must get something out of present situation if she is to be kept with England and France, and has suggested that Spain should be promised liberty in her sphere from 1st January, 1912. If France agreed, Sir E. Grey would urge upon Spain not to demand alteration of secret agreement during the crisis, and not to ask for change in position as regards Tangier	239
304	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	32 Tel.	23,	Spanish activity at Ceuta. Governor of Ceuta has established a post on road to Tetuan, well beyond conventional boundary, under pretext of an assault on a Spanish fishing-boat. Spanish Under-Secretary of State himself described this as "a little sop to public opinion" ..	240
305	„ „ ..	33 Tel.	23,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 299. French Ambassador proposes to send in written statement of French counter-proposals, and to suggest another meeting between Minister for Foreign Affairs, British Ambassador, and himself. Enquires if His Majesty's Government agree	240
306	To Sir M. de Bunsen	64 Tel.	23,	Spanish activity. Spanish Ambassador has asked opinion of His Majesty's Government on Spanish proposal to send police from Laraiche to Alcazar, and to land temporary force at Laraiche. Sir E. Grey urged strongly that Spain should do nothing further, but should keep quiet and concentrate her attention on negotiating with France. It was possible that some of Spanish grievances would be removed, and this would be clear gain to Spain ..	240
307	Spanish Ambassador	Confidential	22,	Spanish activity at Ceuta (see No. 304). Transmits telegram from Spanish Government announcing establishment of police post near Tetuan in consequence of attack on Spanish fishermen	241
308	Mr. Lister ..	76 Tel.	23,	Spanish activity at Ceuta. Refers to No. 304. Spanish Minister assured French representative that occupation of post was provisional. Latter says alleged attack on Spanish fishermen is frivolous pretext	241
309	To Sir M. de Bunsen..	65 Tel.	24,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 305. Agrees to course proposed by French Ambassador	242

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310	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	68	May 21, 1911	German-Spanish mining dispute in the Riff (see No. 259). Reports facts of dispute, which were brought to his notice by Mr. Macpherson, who appealed for British support on behalf of the Spanish Riff mining companies. The German case has been taken up by German Ambassador, who used violent language. Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has suggested a compromise. A further question has since arisen owing to the Spanish company's having now exported ore to Bilbao. As mining regulations are not yet in force, Spanish Government fear that German Government may question legality of this export, and they propose to suggest to German Ambassador that he should raise no objection, and they on their side will undertake that a register of the ore exported shall be kept at Melilla, and that any duties to which company may eventually be liable will be paid subsequently	242
311	To Sir M. de Bunsen „ Sir F. Bertie ..	46 Secret 183 Secret	25,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Spanish Ambassador complains that French counter-proposals make concessions only on trivial points and are silent as regards anticipating date of putting Spain on an equality in her sphere. Sir E. Grey replied that he had impressed on French Ambassador the importance which Spain attached to this point	243
312	To Sir F. Bertie ..	187	25,	Spain and France. French Ambassador informed of substance of conversations with Spanish Ambassador reported in Nos. 306 and 311. Ambassador said he had not heard from French Government respecting Sir E Grey's suggestion of giving Spain a free hand from 1st January (see No. 303)	244
313	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	70	23,	Spanish activity at Ceuta (see No. 304). Reports details of Spanish occupation of Monte Negron. General expectation is that advance to Tetuan will shortly be made	244
314	Mr. Lister	80 Tel.	26,	Outrages by Moorish troops on Lemta villages, near Fez. In spite of assurances given by French consul at Fez (see No. 328), twelve villages have been burnt and raided from Fez. Great indignation among foreigners. Has drawn attention of French chargé d'affaires to the matter. Instructions to French consul at Fez have just arrived from Paris. Consul is given sole charge of the negotiations, and he is to insist on reforms and proper account-keeping of State revenues	245
315	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	36 Tel.	27,	Franco-Spanish negotiations (see No. 309). Reports informal conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador. Former so agitated that serious discussion was impossible, but he finally calmed down and promised to send his observations on French counter-proposals in writing. Prospect of an agreement is very slight	246

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316	Sir F. Bertie ..	69 Tel. Confidential	May 27, 1911	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 303. Minister for Foreign Affairs appreciates force of arguments in favour of giving Spain a free hand from 1st January, but matter must first be discussed by Cabinet. He fears that a formal recognition by France of anticipation of date specified in secret convention may cause Germany to complain that *status quo* of Algeciras Act has been changed, and that a serious European question might arise	246
317	Mr. Lister	119 Confidential	19,	Spanish grievances (see No. 199). Comments on Spanish proposals respecting police, finance, and railways. General impression given by proposals is that Spain considers that her sphere has become Spanish territory, and that Morocco has broken up	247
318	„ „	120 Confidential	20,	Spanish activity at Ceuta (see No. 313). Great anxiety exists as to Spanish intentions in regard to Tetuan, and numerous rumours are abroad. Spanish Minister says he has urged his Government to give strict orders to Spanish troops to avoid a collision	248
319	„ „	122 Confidential	20,	Dispute between Spanish Government and l'Union des Mines. Refers to No. 268. Transmits note from Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to representative of Spanish group in l'Union to the effect that there is no trace in Spanish archives of any previous agreement, and that Spanish participation of 20 per cent. is not sufficient for mines near Spanish presidios. Mr. Harris states that l'Union are in negotiation with the Mannesmanns and will probably arrive at an agreement, and that an enormously rich tract of land has been found near Algerian frontier ..	248
320	„ „	123	21,	Advance of French column. Column has been incessantly attacked but not seriously, and casualties are slight. Advance is very slow, as General Moinier will not advance till he is certain his line of communications is assured. French chargé d'affaires says troops will not enter Fez	249
321	Sir C. Spring-Rice ..	85	23,	Swedish attitude. Swedish Government merely echo voice of Berlin. No news of advance of relief force appears in the press, which is chiefly occupied with reports of impending trouble in the Far East. Turkish Minister thinks any aggressive movement against Morocco will make a deep impression in Turkey, as Young Turks are working for Mussulman solidarity	250
322	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	73	26,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Transmits memorandum, which French Ambassador has handed to Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, containing concessions which French Government are prepared to make to Spanish demands (see No. 279). French Government will firmly resist Spanish demand for advancement of conventional date, when she is to have greater liberty in Spanish sphere	251

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322A	Mr. Lister	81 Tel.	May 29, 1911	Proposed advance on Mequinez. Sultan desires advance, and that no pity should be shown to Mulai Zin and his Government. Has pointed out to French chargé d'affaires that this is impossible in view of assurances given to Consul MacLeod by M. Gaillard (see Enclosure 7, No. 328) ..	252*
322B	To Sir F. Bertie ..	131 Tel.	29,	Proposed advance on Mequinez. Refers to No. 322 A. His Majesty's Government assume there is no danger of their being placed in false position owing to French assurances (see No. 328) not being kept, but they would be glad to have this confirmed	252*
323	To Sir M. de Bunsen	47 Confidential	29,	Spanish activity at Alcazar (see No. 306). Spanish Ambassador states that Spanish and French representatives in Morocco are to discuss arrangements to be made at Alcazar to avoid friction, and suggested that His Majesty's Government might hint to the French Government that, if trouble arose at Alcazar, Spain was the Power who had the right of dealing with it. Sir A. Nicolson replied that such a hint would be most inopportune	252
324	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	78	27,	Spanish attitude as regards Morocco. Memorandum by the Ambassador, explaining the grounds of Spanish attitude towards France and the difference between French and Spanish conceptions of the policy to be followed	252
325	To Sir M. de Bunsen	70 Tel.	30,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. French Ambassador states that Spanish Government ask that anticipation of conventional date should be communicated through a protocol to Powers signatory of Algeciras Act. Sir E. Grey agrees with the French Ambassador that this is impossible, as secret convention does not form part of the Act, and, if it is to be modified, it must be done by arrangement between the Governments concerned	255
326	To Sir F. Bertie ..	196	30,	Situation at Fez. M. Cambon, in reply to enquiry respecting Sultan's reported desire for a policy of vengeance, stated that Sultan was already committed to an amnesty which included Mulai Zin ..	256
327	„ „ ..	200	30,	Suppression of arms traffic. Refers to No. 302. In informing French Ambassador that His Majesty's Government agreed to a renewal of Franco-Spanish mandate, Sir E. Grey enquired what answer he should give if pressed in Parliament with regard to French refusal to suppression of arms traffic in Persian Gulf. Ambassador replied that question of Muscat was one to be settled by compensation, and that we had no real interest in arms traffic in Morocco. Sir E. Grey dissented from this view ..	256

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328	Mr. Lister	127	May 25, 1911	Situation at Fez. Transmits three despatches from Consul MacLeod, with enclosures, reporting latest news and complaints of acting vizier against British-protected persons. He has instructed Consul MacLeod to express surprise of His Majesty's Government that such complaints should have been made, in view of services recently rendered by such persons, and to state that Mikwar rendered a great service by joining Provisional Government at Mequinez and preventing rioting there. Enclosure 7 states definite assurances given to Consul MacLeod by French consul with regard to amnesty, &c.	256
329	Sir F. Bertie ..	245	30,	Reported request of Sultan for establishment of French protectorate. Transmits extract from "Figaro" reporting denial by El Mokri that such a request had ever been made. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs have published a communiqué to the effect that they are not concerned in the matter..	266
330	„ „ ..	247	30,	Lemta outrages. Has acted on instructions contained in No. 322 B. M. Cruppi said reports were newspaper tales, but has ordered telegrams to be sent to General Moinier and M. Gaillard in sense desired. Transmits copy of memorandum handed to M. Cruppi	267
331	Mr. Lister	84 Tel.	31,	Lemta outrages (see No. 314). Raid even more brutal than appeared at first. Real culprits had all fled. Old men were killed, and women and children brought to Fez and publicly sold into slavery. Has protested strongly to French chargé d'affaires, who seemed much upset ..	268
332	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	38 Tel.	31,	Franco-Spanish negotiations (see No. 333). Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent in counter-proposals, which do little more than repeat original proposals (see No. 279). Any agreement is as far off as ever, and it seems doubtful whether Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs really desires one	269
333	„ „ ..	80	27,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to Nos. 315 and 322. Detailed account of conversation with Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador. Former entirely dissatisfied with French counter-proposals, and insisted on advancement of conventional date. He was very excited. No progress has been made towards a practical issue	269
334	„ „ ..	39 Tel.	June 1,	Franco-Spanish negotiations (see No. 322). French Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed Spanish Ambassador in Paris that France cannot agree to advance conventional date, but will carry out convention so as to allow Spain at once full economic influence in her sphere. France will also be ready to discuss question of political influence, but this must wait till Fez is relieved. Spanish Ambassador was apparently satisfied. French Government agree to rearrangement of Casa Blanca police proposed by Spain	271

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335	To Sir F. Bertie ..	133 Tel.	June 1, 1911	Moorish mission to Coronation (see No. 112). He should inform Mokri that, in view of Lemta outrages (see No. 331), His Majesty's Government cannot receive a special mission	271
336	„ „ ..	202	1,	Lemta outrages (see No. 330). Has informed M. Cambon that outrages were sure to make a stir in England, and expressed hope that French Government would make facts known as soon as possible. Presumably sole responsibility rested upon the Sultan and his troops	272
337	Mr. Lister	87 Tel.	2,	Appointment of Rouhan as chief of Anjera police (see Part 40, No. 112). Rouhan is the bandit who captured Clarke Kennedy and whose arrest in 1909 was prevented by Spanish consul at Tetuan. Spaniards have insisted on appointment against wishes of Moorish Government. Thinks His Majesty's Government ought to protest	272
338	„ „	128	May 26,	Revolt of tribes. Transmits two letters from Mikwar and a despatch from Consul MacLeod reporting that Mikwar has requested him to warn Sultan that tribes are prepared to die sooner than submit to Mulai Hafid. Mr. MacLeod has replied verbally that any such action on his part would have the opposite effect to that desired	272
339	„ „	130	28,	French relief column. Reports details of arrival of column at Fez and their excellent reception. News from districts round Fez is distinctly reassuring	274
340	„ „	132	29,	Spanish activity at Ceuta (see No. 318). Conversation with Guebbas, who has sent a long note to Spanish Minister reviewing the whole question, and protesting against Spanish action. He gives a different version of "fishermen" incident which led to occupation of Monte Negro	276
341	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	84	31,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 333. Transmits Spanish counter-proposals, *i.e.*, French counter-proposals as modified by Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Spain has reverted on almost every point to original Spanish proposals and has taken no notice of reservations made by the two Ambassadors. French Ambassador has requested precise instructions from his Government, and proposes to tell Spanish Government that unless these are accepted as a basis it will be useless to continue the negotiations	276
342	Sir F. Bertie ..	75 Tel. Confidential	June 3,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Has again suggested to Minister for Foreign Affairs that unless concessions are made to Spain, latter will make use of Germany to gain her ends. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that German Government would have no cause to raise objections as long as France maintained her treaty engagements, which she intended to do. General Moinier had been instructed to take no action which would contravene Algeciras Act or affect independence of Sultan ..	279

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344	Sir F. Bertie ..	73 Tel.	3,	Moorish mission to Coronation. Refers to No. 335. Has requested Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform Mokri that His Majesty's Government cannot receive mission. Minister for Foreign Affairs begs His Majesty's Government will suspend final decision in the matter until full reports respecting Lemta outrages are received from French authorities, as refusal to receive mission will be a serious blow to Sultan's position ..	279
345	Mr. Lister	91 Tel.	4,	Situation at Alcazar. Spanish Minister is complaining strongly of situation. New Pretender is threatening to overrun the district. Lieutenant Moreaux with 500 men has been sent to oppose Pretender, and Mr. Carleton and Raisuli suspect disorders are being engineered by Spanish Government	280
346	„ „	138	May 31,	Lemta outrages. Refers to No. 331. Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod, giving full details of the raid. Has informed French chargé d'affaires that he considered situation most serious. Latter very much annoyed at outrages, but stated that, now that instructions from Paris (see No. 314) had reached French consul at Fez, any recurrence of such incidents was impossible	280
347	„	139	31,	Lemta outrages (see No. 346). Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod, reporting conversation with General Moinier, to whom he pointed out unfortunate effect produced by raid. General promised to keep in view what consul had said ..	282
348	„ „	140	31,	French relief columns. Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod, reporting arrival at Fez of Colonel Gouraud's column after five days' continuous fighting. A new Pretender has appeared and has been defeated by Amrani	283
349	Sir E. Goschen ..	152 Secret	June 1,	German attitude. Conversation with Chancellor, who said Germany had raised no objections to French expedition to Fez, provided French troops only remained there a "reasonable time." Chancellor refused to say what he considered a "reasonable time." He concluded by saying situation in Morocco did not cause him the slightest anxiety	284
350	„ „ ..	159	2,	German attitude (see No. 349). Conversation with Herr Zimmermann, who said he personally thought a month or six weeks would be a "reasonable time" for French to evacuate Fez. German Government were very anxious to avoid any political discussions and to find themselves in opposition to His Majesty's Government. Press is for the most part reticent, but pan-German organs are very violent. The "Post" suggests that Germany has made a bargain with France, and Germany is to receive either what she wants as regards Bagdad Railway or else the French Congo. The "Post" adds that Germany wants neither, but does want Morocco as a German colony and outlet for German commerce ..	285

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351	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	86	June 2, 1911	Redistribution of Casa Blanca police. Refers to Nos. 322 and 334. Transmits French proposal on subject. Spanish contingents to go to Laraiche and Tetuan, French contingent to Mazagan and Rabat .	286
352	Sir F. Bertie ..	260	4,	Lemta outrages. Refers to No. 330. Transmits French reply to his memorandum. French Minister for Foreign Affairs justifies action of Moorish forces, and states that French Government will not carry out a policy of vengeance at instigation of Sultan. He further deplores hostile action to Moorish Government and France of certain British-protected persons, especially Menebhi	287
353	Mr. Lister	95 Tel.	6,	Situation at Alcazar (see No. 345). Guebbas confirms news of total defeat and flight of Pretender	288
354	„ „	96 Tel.	6,	Coronation mission (see Nos. 335 and 344). Guebbas begs that His Majesty's Government will reconsider their decision, and says Moorish Government are ready to give any guarantees desired by His Majesty's Government	289
355	„ „	97 Tel.	6,	Amrani's mehalla reached Fez on 1st June ..	289
356	To Sir F. Bertie ..	141 Tel.	6,	Coronation mission. Refers to No. 344. He should explain to Minister for Foreign Affairs that, as Lemta outrages are publicly known, reception of a mission would cause a strong protest in England. He should assure Minister for Foreign Affairs at same time that His Majesty's Government desire to cause no difficulties to French Government, and are determined to abide by 1904 agreement	289
357	To Sir M. de Bunsen..	72 Tel.	6,	Appointment of Ruham as head of Anjera police. Refers to No. 337. He should make a strong protest, and say that His Majesty's Government would regard appointment as showing most unfriendly disregard of British interests	289
358	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	42 Tel.	6,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Reports more satisfactory meeting. French Ambassador promised to refer to Paris several points strongly pressed by Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding employment of Spanish engineers and other agents and redistribution of police. French Ambassador stated that, though France could not agree to anticipation of conventional period during present crisis, she was ready to discuss at a more favourable time political status of Spain in her sphere	290
359	„ „ ..	43 Tel.	7,	Appointment of Ruham. Refers to No. 357. Minister for Foreign Affairs knows nothing of appointment, but is making enquiries of general in command at Ceuta	290
360	Sir F. Bertie ..	76 Tel.	7,	Coronation mission. Refers to No. 356. Minister for Foreign Affairs appreciates reasons for refusing mission, but regrets decision	290

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361	Sir F. Bertie ..	265	June 7, 1911	France and Spain. Transmits extract from "Temps," pointing out that occupation of Alcazar, which is strongly advocated in Spanish press, would be a flagrant violation of Act of Algeciras and Convention of 1904	290
362	Mr. Lister	99 Tel.	8,	Appointment of Ruham (see No. 357). Has protested to Spanish Minister, who said he had no knowledge of the appointment, but would make enquiries	292
363	To Sir M. de Bunsen	52	8,	Spain and France. Spanish chargé d'affaires has enquired whether His Majesty's Government had heard that Sultan had asked French to reorganise his forces on a more extended scale with additional French instructors, and whether French had specified a date for their withdrawal from Fez. Sir A. Nicolson replied in the negative	292
364	Telegram communicated by Spanish Chargé d'Affaires	..	9,	Landing of Spanish troops at Laraiche. Telegram from Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Spanish Embassy in London, stating that when Spanish forces disembark at Laraiche authority of basha will be maintained, and Moorish flag only will be flown	293
365	Mr. Rennie ..	45 Tel.	9,	Spanish activity at Ceuta. French Ambassador has called attention officially to presence of General Zuila at Tetuan with escort from Ceuta garrison, and stated that French Government cannot assent to Spanish military movement outside Ceuta mixed police sphere	293
366	„ „ ..	46 Tel.	9,	Landing of Spanish troops at Laraiche. Spanish representative at Paris has been instructed to inform French Government that Spanish troops will be landed at Laraiche in consequence of murder of Spanish-protected subjects at Alcazar ..	293
367	Mr. Lister	100 Tel.	9,	Landing of Spanish troops at Laraiche (see No. 366). Spanish troops have landed at Laraiche, and 500 men have left for Alcazar. British consular agent at Alcazar reports town quite quiet, but on 7th June some thirty horsemen fired a volley at town and rode off. Impression is that this incident was engineered by Spaniards in order to give a pretext for landing. Guebbas is protesting strongly to Spanish Minister ..	294
368	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	90	7,	Appointment of Ruham. Refers to No. 357. Transmits copy of private letter to Minister for Foreign Affairs protesting against appointment	294
369	„ „ ..	91	6,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to Nos. 351 and 358. Transmits copy of new French proposals with comments, and reports details of meeting with Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador	295
370	Telegram communicated by Spanish Chargé d'Affaires	..	10,	Landing of Spanish troops at Laraiche (see No. 366). Transmits telegram from Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Spanish Embassy in London, reporting that in consequence of murder of Spanish protégé at Alcazar Spanish troops will be landed, but their action will be suspended if Moorish Government take proper steps to punish guilty parties	297

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371	Mr. Lister	101 Tel.	June 9, 1911	Landing of Spanish troops at Laraiche. Refers to No. 367. Spanish Minister has given definite assurance that measure was one of police and protection, and purely provisional. Panic was reigning in Alcazar, and Spanish Government were obliged to do something to protect their nationals	297
372	To Mr. Lister ..	50 Tel.	10,	Landing of Spanish troops. Refers to No. 371. He should ascertain strength and composition of force advancing on Alcazar, and whether there is any foundation for alarming reports from there ..	298
373	Sir E. Goschen ..	31 Tel.	11,	German attitude. Chancellor has received French Ambassador's statement in a very friendly manner. Chancellor did not say what he thought of recent Spanish action. French Ambassador pointed out difference between course pursued by France, who had notified signatory Powers, and that of Spain	298
374	Mr. Lister	104 Tel.	11,	Landing of Spanish troops. Refers to No. 372. Details as to composition of force. Spanish Minister has sent a circular to foreign representatives justifying Spanish action on the ground of the murder of Spanish protégés, night attack on Alcazar (see No. 367), and alleged appearance of new Pretender. Discusses real value of these grounds	298
375	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	92	8,	Appointment of Ruham. Refers to No 368. Transmits private letter from Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that rumour appears to be devoid of foundation, and that general at Ceuta cannot have meant to do anything unfriendly to Great Britain ..	299
376	Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society	..	10,	Slavery in Morocco. Transmits report by Mr. Donald Mackenzie. Hopes that consular reports may be obtained on the subject, and that consular officials will be instructed to help any slave requiring a manumission paper. Calls attention to a particular case on board a British steamer..	300
377	Sir F. Bertie ..	270	11,	Lemta outrages. Refers to No. 352. Transmits note from French Minister for Foreign Affairs further justifying conduct of Moorish forces, and commenting on report of His Majesty's consul at Fez, and complaining of conduct of Mikwar	302
378	Note communicated by French Chargé d'Affaires	..	12,	French military proceedings in Morocco. Communications with Fez now reopened, but further military reforms are necessary to maintain order. All measures will be carried out in accordance with principles of Algeciras Act	303
379	To Sir F. Bertie ..	214 Confidential	12,	Lemta outrages. Refers to No. 352. Quotes further facts in support of view held by His Majesty's Government, and asks for specific proofs of charges brought against Menebhi and other British protégés ..	303
380	Minute by Sir A. Nicolson	..	12,	Spain and France. Conversation with Spanish Ambassador, who alleges that France has let it be known that she would not object to Spain going to Tetuan. What troubles Spain is that France and Germany should come to an agreement and leave her out in the cold	304

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381	Note communicated by French Ambassador	..	June 13, 1911	Lemta outrages. French version. Alleges that British press and agents are misinformed	305
382	To Mr. Rennie ..	60	13,	Situation created by dispatch of Spanish troops to Alcazar. Conversation with Spanish Ambassador respecting possible effects in Morocco and in Europe. Counsels of moderation	305
383	To Sir F. Bertie ..	227	13,	Dispatch of Spanish troops to Laraiche and Alcazar. Conversation with French Ambassador, who commented adversely on conduct of Spain. Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904 has been practically torn up. French Ambassador urged that it depended on His Majesty's Government to save the situation	306
384	Mr. Rennie ..	48 Tel.	14,	Dispatch of Spanish troops to Laraiche. French Ambassador has sent in written protest against occupation of Laraiche and Alcazar, and suggesting suspension of conversations between two Governments until position at Laraiche becomes clearer	306
385	To Sir M. de Bunsen	54	14,	Alleged Anglo-German exchange of views respecting Morocco. Spanish Ambassador, on enquiry as to whether there has been, informed in the negative	307
386	To Mr. Rennie ..	57	14,	Spanish occupation of Alcazar. Has urged danger of Spanish action on Spanish Ambassador. Latter replied that Spain could not possibly withdraw from Alcazar, and that all French concessions were of no importance while she refused to anticipate conventional date. France had violated the secret convention indirectly, and, as what she desired was a protectorate, convention would be of no use to Spain. Sir Edward Grey replied that, while convention continued, we could not be a party to any arrangement which ignored it, and, as it assured a sphere to Spain, it was to Spanish interest not to contravene it and thus precipitate partition. Ambassador gave assurances that Spain would not move an inch beyond Alcazar	307
387	Mr. White.. ..	109 Tel.	15,	Appointment of Rouham (see No. 375). Before reporting matter to Foreign Office, it was ascertained definitely from Governor of Tetuan that man whom Spaniards desired to appoint was same man who was arrested two years before and liberated owing to intervention of Spanish consul	308
388	To Sir F. Bertie ..	228	15,	Spanish occupation of Alcazar. Has informed M. Cambon of substance of No. 386. M. Cambon urged that Spain should make a declaration that she would withdraw from Alcazar when order was restored, and Sir E. Grey undertook to urge this on Spain (see No. 389) ..	308

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389	To Mr. Rennie ..	76 Tel.	June 15, 1911	Spanish occupation of Alcazar. Has urged upon Spanish Ambassador that occupation of Alcazar without even previous notification to France is a breach of secret agreement. Considers that Spain ought to make a declaration to Powers on lines of French communication respecting Fez, and say occupation will not be continued longer than is necessary to restore order	309
390	Mr. Lister.. ..	141	1,	Arrival of French troops at Fez. Disappointment and disillusionment of people who thought it was Amrani's mehalla arriving. French ought to have arranged for Amrani and General Moinier to arrive simultaneously. Feeling against Sultan and French much more bitter owing to non-arrival of Amrani and Lemta outrages	309
391	„ „ .. .	142 Confidential	2,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Interview with Spanish Minister. Latter very nervous and depressed and pessimistic about negotiations. French position was being strengthened every day, and Spanish influence was dwindling. He was most anxious to keep on good terms with French chargé d'affaires, but it was almost impossible. Spanish Minister gave impression that his nerves and Spanish Government's were strained almost to breaking point	310
392	„ „	143 Confidential	3,	Spanish advance at Ceuta and appointment of Rouham. Refers to Nos. 340 and 387. Transmits translation of Guebbas' note to Spanish Minister, protesting against Spanish advance. Guebbas also refers in note to appointment of Rouham, and protests against it	311
393	„ „	145	4,	Glawi family. Glawi was dismissed from post of Grand Vizier on 26th May. His brother, Hadj Thami, has been dismissed from post of Basha of Marrakesh, and will be succeeded by Ould Mennou, who tortured Hadj-ben-Aissa's wife at Mequinez last year. French appear to have decided on a destruction of Glawi family. Aissa-ben-Omar is going south to govern Abda and Dukalla tribes, and M'toogi to govern Shillah tribes	312
394	„ „	148	4,	Coronation mission (see No. 335). Refusal to receive mission has come as a severe shock to Government and Sultan, but will be well received by large and influential class of enlightened Moors. Refusal should increase British prestige with Moors and also with French. It is disappointing that Colonel Mangin should have had a hand in Lemta outrages, and there is a strong feeling that he should be removed from Morocco	313
395	„ „	149 Confidential	5,	Spanish occupation of Alcazar. Considerable amount of agitation exists in Gharb owing to new pretender, Tazzia. Raisuli is collecting a force to deal with him. Mr. Carleton and Raisuli both think Spaniards are fomenting disturbances in order to have a pretext for landing troops. Intrigues were to be expected from Spanish consular agent at Alcazar (see No. 267)	313

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396	Mr. Lister.. ..	151	June 9, 1911	Appointment of Rouham (see No. 362). Has protested to Spanish Minister, who said he knew nothing of appointment and of Rouham's past history. It is practically certain that Spanish authorities will deny fact of proposed appointment, but our representations may make them more careful in future	314
397	„ „	152	10,	Spanish occupation of Alcazar (see No. 367). Transmits despatch from vice-consul at Laraiche, reporting landing of Spanish troops there. Details of incident at Alcazar during night of 7th June. Conversations with French and Spanish Ministers on the subject. Former much incensed. Latter has given assurances that occupation is purely provisional ..	315
398	„ „	154	10,	Situation at Fez. Transmits two despatches from Consul MacLeod, enclosing correspondence with Mikwar and Mr. Enyart, relative to state of affairs at Mequinez. Details as to movements of French troops. Consul MacLeod has impressed on French consul and Makhzen value of services rendered by Provisional Government at Mequinez	317
399	Sir F. Bertie ..	279 Confidential	15,	Lemta outrages. Refers to No. 379. Has made verbal communication, as instructed. Transmits copy of memorandum handed to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who thinks account of outrages was exaggerated ..	320
400	„ „ ..	282	15,	French policy in Morocco. Interpellation in Senate by M. Jénouvrier. M. Cruppi's reply was well received, and no vote was taken on policy of Government in Morocco	321
401	Mr. Rennie ..	49 Tel.	16,	Landing of Spanish troops at Laraiche. Refers to No. 384. Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has replied to French representations, and states that Spanish Ambassador in Paris has been instructed to give French Minister for Foreign Affairs detailed report of events at Alcazar. He adds that it is more than ever necessary that conversations should continue, and that endeavours should be made to reach an agreement. Finally, Spanish note calls attention to presence of French officials within Spanish zone at Alcazar, and requests that French agents may be instructed to moderate their zeal	322
402	Mr. White.. ..	158	13,	Landing of Spanish troops. Refers to No. 374. Transmits notes to doyen from Spanish Minister informing representatives of landing of troops, and from Guebbas protesting against landing, and requesting representatives to bring matter to notice of their Governments with a view to representations being made to Spanish Government	322
403	Mr. Dering ..	99	15,	Italian attitude. In reply to question in Chamber, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that France had communicated her intention to send troops to Fez in a *note verbale*, and that Italian Government had no reason to doubt that France would observe Algeciras Act ..	326

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
404	Sir F. Bertie ..	288 Confidential	June 18, 1911	Lemta outrages. Refers to No. 399. Transmits memorandum from French Minister for Foreign Affairs, denying that French consul had given assurances to Mr. MacLeod (see No. 328), or that facts reported by latter had been recognised by General Moinier and French consul ..	326
405	Count de Salis ..	38 Tel.	21,	Landing of Spanish troops. Spanish Ambassador has made formal declaration to German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Latter interprets declaration as meaning that, when French retire from Fez, Spaniards will evacuate places they have occupied	327
406	Mr. White ..	115 Tel.	21,	Spanish vice-consul at Alcazar. Has been taken to Laraiche on his way to Tangier, owing to his health being affected ..	328
407	To Mr. Carnegie ..	236	21,	Mikwar. Refers to No. 377. Protests against statement in M. Cruppi's memorandum that Mikwar has conducted an anti-French propaganda. He should point out to M. Cruppi value of services rendered by Mikwar (see No 328), and express hope that French Government will not credit Moorish reports against British-protected persons	328
408	To Mr. Rennie ..	77 Tel.	21,	Landing of Spanish troops (see Nos. 388 and 389). Spanish Ambassador has communicated verbal declaration from Spanish Government. He should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government would be glad if Spanish Government would state that, if order is maintained at Alcazar, Spanish troops will be withdrawn, leaving other questions to be settled by diplomatic means. Such a statement would greatly facilitate resumption of discussions at Madrid	328
409	Mr. Rennie ..	101	17,	Spanish expenditure in Morocco. Bill published granting credits of 100,000 pesetas to Foreign Office for political expenses in Morocco and 250,000 pesetas to Ministry of Justice for transfer of convicts at Ceuta to Spain	329
410	„ „ ..	103	17,	Landing of Spanish troops (see Nos. 389 and 408). Has enquired whether Spanish Government propose to issue any declaration analogous to that made by France previous to expedition to Fez. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that such a declaration would shortly be issued, and promised to try and expedite matter. He was much concerned at presence of French agents near Alcazar, who were intriguing with neighbouring tribes, and he had instructed Spanish Ambassador in Paris to make representations to M. Cruppi (see No. 401)	329
411	„ „ ..	105	18,	Spanish policy in Morocco. President of the Council has made statement to representatives of the press to the effect that reports of Spanish advance on Tetuan or Tangier were ridiculous. Spanish action in Morocco had three objects, viz., expansion and security at Ceuta and at Melilla and proper performance of duties by Spanish police at Laraiche and Alcazar. Only troops sent to Laraiche belonged to marine infantry, and did not amount to 1,400 men	330

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
412	Mr. Rennie ..	106	June 19, 1911	Spanish advance at Melilla. Papers announce occupation of Tauriet-Zag. This is mainly of strategic importance ..	330
413	„ „ ..	52 Tel.	23,	Landing of Spanish troops. Has spoken to Minister for Foreign Affairs in sense of No. 408. Latter will consult Prime Minister with a view to making a further and more precise statement. Minister for Foreign Affairs attaches great importance to resumption of Madrid conversations ..	331
414	Mr. White ..	159	14,	Ex-Turkish military instructors (see Part 41, No. 163). French chargé d'affaires states that M. Tahir, former chief of Turkish mission, has returned to Tangier in disguise, and is intriguing against Sultan and the French. Moorish authorities proposed to expel him, and Mr. Lister informed French chargé d'affaires that, if there were proof of charges, British Legation would not intervene. Tahir was subsequently arrested and deported to Oran	331
415	„ „ ..	161	15,	Mulai Zin. Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod, reporting conversation with M. Gaillard respecting treatment to be accorded to Mulai Zin and members of Provisional Government at Mequinez. M. Gaillard's attitude not altogether satisfactory, but there is little danger of French allowing Sultan openly to disregard assurances given	332
416	„ „ ..	163	17,	Appointment of Mennou as Governor of Marrakesh. Refers to No. 393. Appointment has created very bad impression, as Mennou was responsible for tortures inflicted on wife of Ben Aissa. French chargé d'affaires considers appointment deplorable, and has written strongly to Fez on the subject, but says French are in a delicate position, as they do not wish to interfere too much. Hadj Thami Glawi has requested British protection, and has been informed this is impossible. Trouble in the south is probable	335
417	„ „ ..	164	18,	Coronation mission (see No. 394). People of Fez are delighted at refusal to receive mission on account of Lemta outrages ..	337
418	„ „ ..	165	17,	Landing of Spanish troops. Refers to No. 402. Transmits further letter to doyen from Guebbas, protesting against action of Spanish troops at Alcazar, who have camped in a cemetery and shocked Mussulman religious feeling. Sherkawi's mehalla, with Captain Moreaux, is encamped near Alcazar, but outside Spanish sphere. Presence of Spanish troops at Alcazar and Laraiche has given rise to little excitement, and country remains quite quiet	337
419	„ „ ..	167	19,	State of affairs at Marrakesh. Refers to No. 416. Transmits despatch from Consul Madden, enclosing letters from vice-consul at Marrakesh. Hadj Thami's plan seems to be to resign quietly, if he is not molested and allowed to retain his property; otherwise he and the other Glawis will fight ..	339

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
420	Mr. White.. ..	168	June 18, 1911	Surrender of Mulai Zin to General Moinier (see No. 415). Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod, enclosing two letters from Mikwar describing arrival of mehalla and surrender. Consul MacLeod has advised Mikwar to comply with request of Basha of Mequinez and accompany deputation to Fez	340
421	„ „	169	19,	Appointment of Rouham. Refers to No. 396. Spanish Minister states that he is informed by Governor of Ceuta that there never was any intention of appointing Rouham head of the police. Transmits copy of despatch from Vice-Consul Bewicke on the subject. There is no doubt Spaniards have been making great use of Rouham ..	342
422	„ „	170	19,	Acquisition of real property by foreigners. Transmits letter to doyen from Guebbas, stating that Sultan intends to create a special board to give effect to provisions of Algeciras Act on the subject, and that no previous purchases of land will be recognised unless Sultan's special permission has been obtained. Has concurred in German Minister's annotation on circular that further explanations be requested ..	345
423	„ „	171	19,	Lemta outrages. Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod, enclosing notes of evidence on the outrages	345
424	„ „	172	20,	Landing of Spanish troops. Transmits letter to doyen from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Fez, protesting against landing. Letter is couched in much the same terms as that of Guebbas (see No. 418) ..	347
425	„ „	173	20,	Deputation of Mequinez notables to Fez (see No. 420). Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod, reporting reception of notables by Sultan, who singled out Mikwar for furious abuse till he was stopped by M. Gaillard. Mulai Zin was previously received privately by Sultan and given a house at the Palace	348
426	Mr. T. Russell ..	96	20,	Austrian attitude. Transmits inspired statement in "Politische Correspondenz" which is clearly intended to show that, up to the present, Austrian Government do not desire to find fault with French policy in Morocco	349
427	Mr. Rennie ..	108	24,	Debate in Cortes. Speech by President of the Council, who declared Government intended to continue their policy of co-operation with France, and that they had no thoughts of conquest in Morocco ..	350
428	„ „ ..	109 Confidential	24,	Landing of Spanish troops. Refers to No. 408. Expands No. 413. French Ambassador has had a friendly conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, but thinks that Spanish Government will be unwilling to make withdrawal from Alcazar in any way dependent on withdrawal of French from Fez	351
429	„ „ ..	53 Tel.	27,	Spanish policy in Morocco. Refers to No. 413. Text of vaguely-worded communication from Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to a fresh declaration of Spanish policy	352

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
430	To Mr. Rennie ..	63	June 27, 1911	Spanish policy in Morocco. Substance of No. 408 has been conveyed to Spanish Ambassador, who did not think his Government would make any difficulty on the point. Ambassador thought tribes at Alcazar would give no trouble, but that presence of mehalla under Captain Moreaux and activity of French vice-consul there were dangerous, and he hinted that it would be well if His Majesty's Government could give a hint at Paris (see No. 418).	352
431	„ „ ..	64	27,	Landing of Spanish troops. Transmits memorandum from Spanish Ambassador, stating that measures taken by them at Laraiche and Alcazar were dictated solely by necessity of obtaining reparation for murder of Spanish protégé and to ensure order. When these objects had been attained, provisional measures would come to an end. Ambassador doubted whether Spanish troops would be withdrawn when French withdrew from Fez	353
432	Mr. White.. ..	117 Tel.	28,	Spanish activity at Alcazar. Excitement caused by Spanish cavalry marching through town with swords drawn and reconnoitring in direction of hill tribes. Spanish Minister said effects of reconnaissance had been good, but he would communicate with Colonel Silvestre on the subject	353
433	„ „	118 Tel.	29.	Spanish activity at Alcazar (see No. 432). Captain Moreaux states that Colonel Silvestre's reconnoitring party passed quite near his camp, and he fears there will be disturbances. Moors are much exasperated at Spaniards marching through standing crops	354
434	Mr. Rennie ..	111	27,	Spanish policy in Morocco. Expands No. 429, and gives text of vaguely worded personal communication from Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding intentions of Spanish Government and occupation of Alcazar ..	354

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Morocco.

PART 42.

[47063] No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 3.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 5, 1911.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 251 of the 24th ultimo, reporting that you have communicated to your French and German colleagues the reasons which render it impossible for His Majesty's Government to support the Société marocaine de Travaux publics.

I approve your action in the matter, and I see no objection to your making a communication on the subject to the doyen of the diplomatic body, as suggested in the postscript to your despatch.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[891] No. 2.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 3.)

Sir, *Madrid, January* 6, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 164 of the 24th November last, I have the honour to report that the King of Spain left Madrid last night for Malaga on his way to Melilla. His Majesty is accompanied by Señor Canalejas, President of the Council of Ministers; by General Aznar, Minister of War; and several officers of his military household. A group of deputies and newspaper correspondents also follow in His Majesty's train. The Royal yacht "Giralda" awaits the King at Malaga.

His Majesty is expected back in Madrid about the 16th January.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[1523] No. 3.

Lord Acton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 10.)

Sir, *The Hague, January* 13, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note addressed by the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs to the French Minister at The Hague, containing observations on the draft mining law for Morocco, which was first communicated to the Netherlands Government by the French Legation, and which formed the subject of your despatch No. 104 of the 1st October of last year. The text of this note has been handed to me by M. de Swinderen, with a written expression of the hope that His Majesty's Government will be willing to instruct their representative

at Tangier to support the proposals of the Netherlands Government for a modification of the draft law in regard to certain specified points.

In this note the Netherlands Government observe that, owing to the importance of the Dutch interests involved, it is not possible for the Government to comply with the French suggestion that they should accept without reserve the text of the draft, which was drawn up, moreover, without their collaboration. The Netherlands Government offer objections to articles 49, 51, 59, 60, and 63. As regards article 49, they propose that it should be explicitly stated therein that, as was recorded in the protocol of the Paris conference, no charges or dues of any kind whatever shall be levied on the output of the mines other than those specified in the said article. They consider, further, that the special bureaux provided by article 51 ought to be placed under the control of the Service of Mines rather than under that of the direction of Public Works. Thirdly, it is important, in the opinion of the Netherlands Government, that the Court of Arbitration should itself have the power to designate experts and to dispatch them to the spot for the purpose of examining documents and questions of a technical character; and they ask for the insertion of a provision to this effect in the text of article 59. In regard to article 60, which treats of applications for prospecting licences, which are to be referred by the Court of Arbitration, under section 2, to the Service of Mines for examination, the proposal is made for the addition of a clause vesting the Service of Mines with the power to summon the assistance of experts, either for temporary work or for duty throughout the duration of the labours of the court.

The Netherlands Foreign Minister then proceeds to inform the French Government that the gravest of the objections formulated by his Government is that entertained in regard to article 63, which establishes a privileged position in respect of companies possessed of large capital funds without taking sufficient account of the individual interests of subjects of those States which are not represented on the said companies. The Netherlands Government have abstained from proposing the total omission of this article, as they fully realise the advantage which will accrue to Morocco from the formation of companies possessed of unlimited capital, which will be able to contribute in a powerful measure to the material development of the country. They insist, however, in the interest of their own nationals, that the firman contemplated in the said article 63 shall not be issuable except with the assent of two-thirds of the diplomatic body at Tangier.

In conclusion, the Foreign Minister expresses the hope that, as to their great regret the Netherlands Government were not invited to take part in the conference charged with the elaboration of the draft law, the Government of the republic will be ready to examine the foregoing proposals with the attention which they deserve, and to instruct the French Minister at Tangier to lend them his support when the draft mining law comes up for examination by the diplomatic body in that capital.

I have, &c.

ACTON.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Dr. van Swinderen to M. Pellet.

M. le Ministre, *La Haye, le 12 janvier*, 1911.

LE 21 septembre dernier M. Delvincourt a bien voulu me remettre le texte d'un projet de règlement minier pour le Maroc, élaboré par les délégués français, allemands, espagnols, et anglais. Il a en même temps exprimé l'espoir que ce projet puisse être accepté sans réserves par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Le Gouvernement Royal partage la conviction du Gouvernement de la république que l'union de toutes les Puissances intéressées sera le meilleur moyen de convaincre le Maghzen de la nécessité d'adopter le règlement.

Aussi dans l'examen du projet s'est-il laissé guider par le désir d'arriver aussitôt que possible à cette entente. Si, toutefois, je me vois obligé de proposer quelques modifications, votre Excellence voudra bien être persuadée que c'est que les grands intérêts néerlandais en jeu ne me permettent pas d'accepter le texte du projet tel qu'il a été élaboré, sans notre collaboration d'ailleurs.

Les objections du Gouvernement de la Reine portent sur les articles suivants :—

Dans le protocole de la Conférence de Paris les délégués ont déclaré entendre que l'industrie des mines au Maroc ne sera pas assujettie à un autre genre de

redevances proportionnelles ni à des droits d'exportation. Or, il me paraît nécessaire de stipuler expressément dans l'article 49 du règlement minier que d'autres redevances ou impôts, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, ne seront pas prélevés.

Dans l'article 51, alinéa 3, les mots "de la Direction des Travaux publics" devraient être remplacés par les mots "du Service des Mines à Tanger."

Il me semble nécessaire que les bureaux spéciaux ne soient pas soustraits au contrôle du Service central des Mines.

J'attacherais du prix à ce que la Cour d'Arbitrage possède la faculté de désigner elle-même des experts et de les envoyer sur place pour l'examen soit de documents, soit de questions techniques, et qu'une disposition à cet effet soit insérée dans l'article 59.

Quant à l'article 60, je propose de lire à la fin de l'alinéa 1er, *sub* 2e, ce qui suit :—

"Pour l'examen des affaires qui lui seront ainsi adressées, le Service des Mines pourra s'adjoindre à Tanger et envoyer sur place, s'il y a lieu, des techniciens chargés à cet effet d'une mission temporaire soient en vue de l'instruction d'une ou de plusieurs affaires, soient pendant toute la durée des travaux de la cour."

Mes objections les plus sérieuses cependant concernent l'article 63 du projet. L'exception qu'il constitue aux règles si soigneusement établies constitue un privilège en faveur de sociétés disposant de grands capitaux, sans tenir suffisamment compte des intérêts individuels des ressortissants de nationalités non représentées dans lesdites sociétés.

Si je m'abstiens de proposer la suppression de l'article 63, c'est que je me rends compte des grands avantages que pourra présenter pour le Maroc la constitution de sociétés à grands capitaux, capables de contribuer puissamment au développement du pays. Mais le Gouvernement de la Reine est obligé, pour la sauvegarde des intérêts néerlandais, d'insister à ce que le firman visé à l'article 63 ne puisse pas être délivré sans l'assentiment des deux tiers du corps diplomatique à Tanger. Le Gouvernement Royal n'ayant, à son grand regret, pas été invité à prendre part à la conférence chargée d'élaborer le projet de règlement, je me flatte, M. le Ministre, que le Gouvernement de la république voudra bien examiner les propositions susindiquées avec l'attention qu'elles méritent, eu égard aux intérêts considérables de nos nationaux dans l'industrie minière du Maroc. J'ose espérer que le Gouvernement de votre Excellence chargera son représentant à Tanger d'appuyer nos propositions quand le projet sera examiné par le corps diplomatique dans cette ville.

Veuillez, &c.

R. DE MAREES VAN SWINDEREN.

[1760] No. 4.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 16.)

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Tangier, January* 9, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of the events of the past week.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Summary of Events for Week ending January 9, 1911.

THE situation in the north remains calm, and there are for the moment no disquieting symptoms. The subject of the Sultan's proposed journey to Rabat is again being discussed, and it is announced from an authoritative source that His Majesty contemplates leaving Fez for Mequinez early in March. After a short stay there he will proceed to Rabat, and thence to Marrakesh. It is possible that the reason for this announcement is the very bad effect which the abandonment of the journey had upon

the attitude of the tribes, who regarded the Sultan's decision to indefinitely postpone his departure as a sign of weakness.

There is nothing in the attitude of the Hiyaina and neighbouring tribes to prevent the departure of His Majesty. They have now relapsed into their usual condition of surly independence from which the aggressive policy of the Sultan had aroused them, and no active hostility is to be feared from them provided they are let alone.

The situation in the south is less satisfactory. The movement in the Sous directed against the Glawa still continues. There is very little definite news from that district, but it would appear that on the whole the Sous are getting the best of matters. Reinforcements of newly-recruited soldiers were dispatched from Marrakesh on the 29th ultimo. Mr. Lennox reports that they were a very wild-looking body, and it is significant that they were made to give security for the rifles and uniforms issued to them.

There have also been troubles in the Doukala tribe in the vicinity of Mazagan. Several farms have been raided, and Mazagan is reported to be full of refugees from the country. The police have been sent out to quell the disturbances, and order will no doubt soon be restored. The trouble appears to have originated in a tribal quarrel as to the appointment of a certain kaïd.

F. R.

[2109] No. 5.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 6.)

Madrid, January 14, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 161 of the 22nd November last, I have the honour to report that the "Madrid Gazette" of to-day's date publishes the text of the Spanish convention with Morocco of the 16th November, 1910, together with a declaration, drawn up in Spanish and Arabic, and signed in duplicate at Paris on the 12th instant, in which their Excellencies Mohamed-el-Mokri, Moorish Ambassador, and Don Juan Perez Caballero, Spanish Ambassador at Paris, duly authorised to that effect by their respective Sovereigns, declare the above convention to be accepted and ratified by the high contracting parties, who bind themselves to fulfil the provisions which it contains.

The same "Gazette" also published a Royal decree, dated the 5th January, conferring upon Don Manuel Garcia Prieto, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the title of Marquis of Alhucemas, in recognition of the exceptional services rendered by his Excellency in the negotiations happily terminated by the above convention.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[2084] No. 6.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 30.)

Paris, January 18, 1911.

Sir,

IT is reported in the press to-day that a French force under Captain Nancy was ambushed on the 14th instant in the neighbourhood of the camp of Boucheron, in the Casa Blanca region, by a party of Moors. Captain Nancy was proceeding to settle a dispute respecting certain pasturage lands of the Beni-Kiran tribe, when he and his escort were attacked by a party of Moors on horseback. Lieutenant Marchand, a non-commissioned officer, and three men were killed, and six men were wounded.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

29

[1523] No. 7.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 19.)

Foreign Office, January 19, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 479 of the 16th November last, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at The Hague, reporting the views of the Netherlands Government on the proposed mining law for Morocco.* I should be glad if you would take an early opportunity of enquiring what the views of the French Government are with respect to the proposals of the Netherlands Government.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[2384] No. 8.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 3.)

Tangier, January 13, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a note which, in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 3 of the 5th instant, I have addressed to the acting doyen of the corps diplomatique, informing him of the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to the lighthouses proposals made by the Société marocaine de Travaux publics, and stating to him the reasons for which His Majesty's Government are unable to give the society their official support.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Mr. Lister to Acting Doyen of the Diplomatic Body.

Tanger, le 13 janvier, 1911.

M. le Doyen et cher Collègue,

DANS la circulaire du 25 octobre vous avez proposé de remettre une décision définitive sur la proposition faite par la Société marocaine de Travaux publics pour la construction de tous les phares prévus au programme de la Caisse spéciale jusqu'à ce que mon Gouvernement et celui de l'Italie eussent exprimé leurs vues à ce sujet.

Mon Gouvernement vient de me faire savoir qu'il ne voie pas d'objection à ce que le contrat pour les appareils optiques des phares soit adjugé à la société sous les conditions indiquées dans le Règlement sur les Adjudications; il se réserve, cependant, d'exprimer une opinion définitive sur la question du contrat pour le travail structural, qui demande un examen plus approfondi; quant à la proposition faite antérieurement (*vide* la circulaire du 19 juillet), que l'exploitation du service des phares soit confiée à une société privée, elle ne se recommande pas à mon Gouvernement.

Je saisis cette occasion pour vous faire savoir qu'au mois d'août dernier la société avait soumis à mon Gouvernement une série de propositions très étendues relatives à la construction de travaux publics au Maroc, et a en même temps sollicité son appui officiel. Après une étude approfondie de ces propositions, mon Gouvernement estime qu'en le priant de les accepter la société lui demande de reconnaître en sa faveur un droit de préférence à tous les contrats et à toutes les concessions pour les travaux publics les plus importants. A part la question de savoir si on peut surmonter d'autres objections, telles que l'infraction de l'Acte d'Algésiras, que constitue le caractère de monopole que revêtissent les propositions de la société l'insuffisance de la participation offerte au capital britannique (6 pour cent, tandis que celle de la France s'élève à 50 pour cent et celle de l'Allemagne à 30 pour cent) à elle seule rendrait inacceptables les propositions dans leur forme actuelle. Le volume et l'importance du commerce et des intérêts maritimes britanniques au Maroc sont

* No. 3.

tels qu'ils justifient pour ses ressortissants une participation si non égale à celle de la France, au moins pas inférieure à celle de tout autre pays.

Veuillez, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[2386] No. 9.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 5.)

Sir, *Tangier, January 16, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events for the past week.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 9.

Summary of Events for Week Ending January 16.

NO important development has taken place in the situation during the past week.

Fighting still continues in the south, but up to the present no decisive success has been obtained by either side. It is evident, however, that Hadj Thami Glawi is beginning to feel alarm at his inability to reduce the recalcitrant tribesmen, and it is reported that he has now appealed to the powerful Mtougua tribe to co-operate with him in restoring order in the Sous.

An event of some significance has occurred at Fez. The Sultan for some time past is rumoured to have had misgivings as to whether the capital would remain loyal to him during his absence in the south. In order to make loyalty easier for the populace, His Majesty succeeded under cover of some military manoeuvres in throwing a large force into two forts which dominate the town. Had this been carried out openly a serious riot would certainly have been provoked, as the inhabitants of Fez do not like to feel themselves at the mercy of the Sultan. A strong garrison will remain in these forts during the absence of His Majesty.

[2588] No. 10.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 6.)

Sir, *Tangier, January 16, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the King of Spain arrived at Melilla on the 7th instant, accompanied by the Prime Minister, M. Canalejas, the Ministers of War and Marine, and a large staff of important officials. A violent gale had raged in the Mediterranean for some days, and it was feared that the departure of the King from Malaga would have to be delayed, but at the last moment the storm abated and His Majesty was able to leave at the appointed time.

He was accorded a most enthusiastic reception on his arrival at Melilla, where the inhabitants had been summoned by the governor, General Arizon, to acclaim the King, and thus show their loyalty to the Throne and their appreciation of the sacrifices made by their country in bringing the Riff campaign to a successful conclusion.

After numerous civil and military deputations had been received by the King, a solemn *Te Deum* was chanted, and His Majesty then rode to the Royal encampment, the roads being lined by several regiments of infantry. In the afternoon a visit was made to the cemetery, where His Majesty laid the first stone of the monument commemorating the officers and men who had lost their lives in the Riff campaign.

General Toutée, who had been dispatched by the French Government to convey their congratulations to King Alfonso on his arrival in Morocco, was received by His Majesty next morning. A banquet was given in the evening, at which complimentary speeches were delivered by the King and General Toutée, laying stress on the friendship between France and Spain, and the desire of the two countries to work loyally together in Morocco.

His Majesty for the rest of his stay at Melilla was occupied in inspecting various

military posts, attending commemoratory services, &c., and left for Almeria on the 15th instant.

Very little impression has been produced in Moorish circles by the King's visit, but it is reported that it has had an excellent effect on the Riff tribesmen, who had not yet made up their minds as to their future attitude towards the Spaniards. The French local press has discussed the matter in a friendly spirit, but has expressed some scepticism as to whether the pomp and ceremony attending the King's visit will have had much effect upon the Riffians. I have the honour to transmit herewith an article in this sense, which has appeared in the "Dépêche marocaine."* I may add that complimentary messages were exchanged between the French and Spanish officers at Casa Blanca on the occasion of King Alfonso's arrival at Melilla.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[2571] No. 11.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 46.)

Sir, *Paris, January 22, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 40 of the 21st instant, to inform you that the "Temps" states that the Commission of the Budget has concurred with the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs as to the necessity of granting a special credit for the construction without delay of a narrow-gauge railway from Marnia to Oudjda which has been called for by the authorities on the Algerian-Morocco frontier for the last four years. There is also a question of extending it to the market of Taourirt in Morocco, but an agreement with the Makhzen must first be arrived at in virtue of the treaty arrangements of 1901, 1902, and 1910, and the question will only assume a practical form when the Marnia–Oudjda line is completed. A similar line in the Shawia region is to be constructed by the military authorities.

The "Temps" adds that this kind of railway need not properly form the subject of negotiation with other nations, for it is simply the consequence of the provisional occupation of the country. However that may be, the "Temps" believes that the French Government is certain of the consent of all the Powers.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

[2957] No. 12.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, January 24, 1911.*

I AM informed by Spanish chargé d'affaires that, in consequence of insufficiency of police force at Laraiche, consular body there desire that soldiers should be sent them to perform night police duties. Matter is said to be before diplomatic body.

Spanish Government would prefer that the police itself should be augmented, if necessary, by a draft from Casa Blanca police force, and chargé d'affaires asked for our support to Spanish view. He was told, in reply, that before promising our support we must enquire of you as to merits of the question.

[2932] No. 13.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received January 25.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, January 24, 1911.*

WITH reference to your letters of the 15th December and the 3rd January, on the subject of the proposals of the Société marocaine de Travaux publics, in regard to the new lighthouses to be erected in Morocco, I am directed by the Board of Trade to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State, the accompanying copy of a letter received from the Corporation of Trinity House relative to the invitation of contracts

* Not printed.

for the proposed works, and I am to state that the Board concur in the views expressed by the Elder Brethren.

I am at the same time to state that the question of the administration of the lighthouse service when established is one which, in the opinion of the Board, requires consideration, and the Board propose to address a further communication to you in regard thereto.

I am, &c.
T. H. W. PELHAM.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Trinity House to Board of Trade.

Trinity House, London, December 24, 1910.

Sir,

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 22nd instant, requesting an expression of the views of this corporation in regard to a question which has arisen in connection with the establishment of new lighthouses on the coast of Morocco.

In reply, I am to acquaint you, for the information of the Board of Trade, that the Elder Brethren concur in the opinion of His Majesty's Government that the building portion of lighthouse contracts should be separate from that for optical apparatus, this being the practice in force in the Trinity House service, and they further consider that it would be to the advantage of the Morocco lighthouse authority that the contracts for the suggested works should be let in two sections for each station, viz., one, including lantern, dioptric apparatus, and illuminant, together with fog-signal machinery if required, and the other section for the construction of the lighthouse tower, dwellings, and all buildings in connection therewith.

I am to add that the Elder Brethren will be happy to furnish any further information or to render any assistance in their power in this matter.

I am, &c.
A. OWEN.

[3288] No. 14.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 7.)

Tangier, January 22, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 246 of the 13th ultimo, I have the honour to report that Cid Guebbas told Mr. Irwin to-day that news had reached him from Fez to the effect that Shereefian orders had already been issued to Kaïds Anfloos, Gillouli, M'tougi, and Khoban, for the abolition of the N'zail, in accordance with the arrangement made by me with Kaïd Anfloos, and approved by my colleagues. If this information is not premature, the Sultan must have acted on the first letter written to him by Mokri on my private letter, as the official answer from El Mokri to the note of the acting doyen of the corps diplomatique only reached Tangier yesterday, and is now in circulation. It has not yet reached me, but I understand it is couched in the same terms as Mokri's private letter to me.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[3289] No. 15.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 8.)

Tangier, January 23, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of events in Morocco for the past week.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[2991] No. 13*.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, January* 25, 1911.

IN my opinion police at Laraiche should be quite sufficient to ensure security if they performed proper police duties. The proposal of the consular body that, until that is done, night guards should be enrolled would, I consider, be the most satisfactory solution. Under present arrangement police consider they are a military force, and do not perform any of the ordinary duties of police as they are understood in England. Unfortunately it is the same at all the ports, and well-grounded complaints similar to those at Laraiche have been made at Casa Blanca and Tangier.

During a conversation I had with the French chargé d'affaires yesterday he mentioned this matter, and said Spanish proposal appeared to him to be a manœuvre to increase the police force at Laraiche, and to extend Spanish influence in the country by means of advance posts and by excursions from the ports. This has already been done by them at Tetuan. A post has been established at El Fondak, about 11 miles from the town, where there was no absolute need of one. M. de Billy foresees the intention to isolate Tangier with a purely Spanish hinterland, and he has reported to his Government that he is of opinion that no alteration of the distribution of the police should be made before the end of this year, when the five years' term expires. The two Governments could then discuss the whole question.

If police were required to fulfil proper police duties it would, in my opinion, solve question.

Enclosure in No. 15.

Summary of Events in Morocco.

THE most important event to be recorded during the past week is an attack which was made on a small French column on the confines of the Shawia. It appears that tribal differences had arisen regarding certain pasture lands between limitrophe tribes of the Shawia and the Emdakra, and a small French force under the command of a captain was sent to enquire into the rights of the matter. This force was ambushed on the 16th instant, and forced to retire with a loss of six killed, including a French lieutenant and corporal, and six wounded. The officer in command was himself wounded, and seems to have been somewhat fortunate in extricating the remainder of his force. Very few details are at present known, but this regrettable affair serves to illustrate the imprudence of despatching a small armed force into an unsubdued part of Moorish territory. Had a more imposing force been employed it is practically certain that the Moors would not have dared to attack. No doubt a strong column will now be sent to punish the tribe implicated in the ambush, and a further considerable tract of Moorish territory will doubtless come under French influence as the result of this affair.

Preparations still continue for the Sultan's journey to Marrakesh, and it is now practically certain that he will leave Fez in March.

The situation in the south is unchanged. There are three disaffected centres—the Sous, the Haha, and the Dukala. The troubles are of a merely local nature and have nothing in common, but serve to show that the authority of the Government is not very firmly established in those districts.

Considerable excitement has been caused in the Haha by the execution of a sheikh and his son, under the orders of Kaïd Anflous. It is reported that there is a great probability of the tribe dividing into two factions over this affair, and fears are expressed that fighting will ensue.

F. R.

[3488] No. 16.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Madrid, January 26, 1911.*

FOLLOWING the usual custom, the presidents of the two Chambers of the Spanish Cortes proceeded to the palace on the 23rd instant to present addresses to King Alfonso on the occasion of his Name Day.

The speech of Señor Montero Rios, President of the Senate and ex-Prime Minister, has attracted much attention. After expressing the hope that His Majesty's reign would be associated with a prosperous and glorious epoch in the history of Spain, and offering a tribute to the Queen as the model of all domestic virtues, he embarked on a historical retrospect of the connection which at all times has existed between Spain and the African regions lying beyond the Straits. As in the time when the Romans, the Goths, and the Moors successively held sway in Spain, so in the present day the latter still regards her true frontier as being formed not by the intervening sea, but by the Atlas Mountains. She must continue to fulfil her destiny in Morocco, acting as a friend and not as a conqueror, and associated in her civilising mission with the parallel advance of the French in that country. Since the time of the Emperor Charles V, King Alfonso has been the first Spanish Sovereign to set foot on African soil. He may well live in history as "Alfonso Africanus."

The grandiloquent language employed by Señor Montero Rios is the more remarkable in that it must have been previously passed by his son-in-law, Señor Garcia Prieto (now Marquis of Alhucemas in recognition of his services in connection with the recent Morocco convention), as Minister of State, and by the Prime Minister, Señor Canalejas. It affords therefore a further proof of the continuity of Spanish policy with regard to Morocco. Whatever may have been said in opposition, every party now feels constrained, on accession to power, to reassert in unmistakable terms the old Spanish claim to exercise a controlling influence over the northern portion of Morocco.

I enclose a summary of the speech of the president and of His Majesty's reply.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
ERNEST RENNIE.

Enclosure in No. 16

Summary of Speech of the President of the Cortes and of the Reply of the King of Spain.

SEÑOR MONTERO RIOS, president of the Senate, speaking in the name of that body, offered His Majesty their assurances of loyalty and personal devotion, and prayed that he might live long to benefit his country and enjoy the blessings of domestic happiness. Continuing, Señor Montero Rios noted that His Majesty had just returned from Africa, the first Spanish monarch since Charles V who had set foot on that continent. There was this difference between them, however, the first had gone as a conqueror, the second in conditions of peace. To Charles V Africa had been a hostile country, his present Majesty must think of it rather in connection with those glorious times when it was Spanish soil; first as part of the Empire of the Cæsars, later of Gothic Spain, and then in the days of the Moorish domination. It was clear to the people of Spain that the Straits of Gibraltar had never been a frontier to them. The people of either side were historically and racially allied, and the sea could not sever their bonds. He prayed that those bonds might grow closer daily, and that their fraternal nature might become more marked. The aspirations of Spaniards would be satisfied the day that the tribes on the other side of the Straits regarded them as elder brothers, free from any thought of conquest.

Europe had interested herself in all that concerned Morocco. Their friends and neighbours in the north had taken an active part in the affairs of the country. Spain would accommodate herself to what had been accomplished, but she must have a position in Morocco equal to that of the most favoured nation. There was room for all to work in the great field of civilisation. But the Spanish nation, apart from any aspiration to political domination, could go on extending her influence from the Muluya to the Atlantic coast, and from the Mediterranean to the Atlas, which was in former ages the natural frontier allotted to their country. A good part of their present and of their future lay there. Let them continue the work, and if the enterprise prospered there would in time be good ground to describe His Majesty's reign, after the manner of the Romans, as the "reign of Don Alfonso the African."

The King, in returning thanks, assured the Senate of his devotion to the public good, and his desire to find his aspirations in the ideals of the nation with which his destiny and the Queen's was involved. As regarded Spanish enterprise in Africa, he was in full agreement with the sentiments expressed. The peoples on either side of the Straits were united by the bonds of nature and of history; to-day there was a desire on the part of the one which the other could satisfy, namely, the wish to be submitted to the influences of civilisation. He begged the Senate to continue lending him their co-operation.

[3980] No. 17.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 2.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, February* 2, 1911.

I UNDERSTAND that the Spanish Ambassador has spoken to you on the subject of the incident which has recently arisen between the French and Spanish legations over the Tangier police, and I telegraph to state that a satisfactory arrangement has been come to.

I urged M. de Billy most strongly to adopt a conciliatory attitude and consider Spanish wishes, and, acting on my advice, he called on the Spanish Minister, with whom he came to an amicable solution of the incident.

I have sent a repetition of this telegram to Sir M de Bunsen, and will forward a full report to you by this week's bag.

[4129] No. 18.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 4.)

(No. 9.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 24, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the scheme for a municipality for the town of Tangier.* This scheme professes to be that of the Makhzen, but, as a matter of fact, was drawn up by Ali Zaky Bey in consultation with the French chargé d'affaires and M. Porché, the State engineer.

I do not consider that it is acceptable in its present form. The municipal council becomes nothing more than a department of the Makhzen (chapter v). It is composed of twenty-four members, half Moors, half foreigners, the Moorish president having the casting vote. As to the "commission administrative" (chapter iv), which is made to appear to have the real power, all the members are practically Makhzen officials or named by the Makhzen, and in any case the Moors are in a majority; but even were the composition of the commission satisfactory, their real power is illusory, as all their decisions are subject to the approval of the Shereefian Minister of Finance, who further has the power of dissolving the whole "conseil municipal" and naming a temporary one of his own choosing (article 116). On the other hand, the diplomatic body is excluded from all right of intervention on behalf of their subjects, whom they are asked to deliver over bound hand and foot to the tender mercies of the Makhzen, who are by no manner of means educated up to a position of such trust. Moreover, the acceptance of the scheme as it now stands would amount to a partial abrogation of the capitulations and treaty privileges, as we are asked to acknowledge the right of the Makhzen, in the guise of the "conseil municipal," to make and enforce regulations to impose rates and taxes, &c.

I enclose a list of very brief notes which I have made on the various articles which appeared to me to call for special comment.*

The Spanish Minister was here the other day and told me that his Government held the view that the power given to the Makhzen by the proposed scheme was very excessive. I said that this was my own private opinion, but that of course I could say nothing until I had referred the matter to you.

The French chargé d'affaires also mentioned the matter to me in the course of conversation on other matters. He asked me what I thought of the scheme, and I told him frankly that I considered that the Makhzen was not yet sufficiently educated to be entrusted with such large powers. He seemed considerably upset, and tried to justify the provisions of the scheme, but I think he realised that there was justice in what I said.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[4133] No. 19.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 4.)

(No. 13.)
Sir, *Tangier, January* 30, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 248 of the 23rd ultimo relative to the opening of the port of Agadir, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of despatches which I have received on the subject from His Majesty's consular officers at Casa Blanca and Mogador, and also an extract from a private letter from Mr. Wellesley, who, by my instructions, made enquiries into the matter at the time of his recent journey down the coast.

The reports may on the whole be considered favourable to the opening of the port of Agadir. At the same time, I cannot help thinking that, in view of the hypernervousness recently shown by the Germans in the matter, it would be wiser to allow it to drop for the moment.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

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* Not printed.

Enclosure 1 in No. 19.

Consul Madden to Mr. Lister.

(No. 5.)

Casa Blanca, January 4, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's despatch No. 129 of the 23rd ultimo with reference to the question raised regarding the opening of the port of Agadir to trade.

In reply, I beg to report to you that, should Agadir be opened, it will mean the practical extinction of the commerce of Mogador, because all the valuable exportable products (almonds, eggs, gums, goatskins, olive oil, wax, &c.) that now come to Mogador from Sûs and its interior would be taken direct to Agadir for shipment. Again, as regards imports, all Sûs purchasers of Manchester cottons and other British merchandise would, of course, obtain their supplies direct from Agadir instead of coming to Mogador for them. These remarks are, I believe, equally applicable to the trade of all foreign nations.

On the other hand, Mogador would still retain the trade of Haha in almonds, &c., and were the province of Shiedma to be cultivated and planted with olive trees, a trade in oil might be built up through Mogador. At present, however, Haha and Shiedma do not send much produce to Mogador.

I am not sure that the volume of trade would necessarily be increased by the opening of Agadir, but two days' journey would be saved on the journey to and from Mogador, and it would allow of certain Sûs products being shipped which do not at present bear the cost of transport to Mogador, *e.g.*, maize and wool.

As regards the view that British merchants established at Mogador would take of the opening of Agadir, I imagine that it would be an unfavourable one, as at present they occupy at Mogador houses and stores at very low rents from the Makhzen, and they would be obliged to go and reside at Agadir, where, I understand, there are no facilities whatever in the way of residences or stores. It is certain that there would be a large exodus of Mogador Jews to Agadir, and Makhzen and private property at Mogador would likewise be depreciated. Possibly the Makhzen would not make much objection on the head of loss of rents at Mogador, as (as I have just remarked) rents at Mogador are so low, and the Government might decide to build at Agadir and charge good rents for its properties.

Probably, British trade from England would in time benefit by the opening of Agadir, as it would bring the merchandise into closer touch with the native purchaser. But, on the other hand, it might not benefit the export trade, as competition would almost certainly force up the prices of produce, and merchants would pay the Arab more for his goods.

As regards your Excellency's inquiry as to purchases of property at Agadir by merchants, a London man of business, Mr. Cornwall by name, bought land at Agadir when I was at Mogador, and I am privately informed that the following have bought property at Fonté:—

Messrs. W. Marx and Co. (Germans).
M. R. Boulle (French).
Mr. A. Coriat (Spanish protégé).

I recommended several of the large British firms in Morocco, at the time I was British vice-consul at Mogador, to take any opportunity they had to buy land at Agadir, but I am not aware whether they did so or not. There are probably others who have obtained land at Agadir that I am not aware of. It would be difficult, however, to say what the legal value of the documents of purchase of property at Agadir will turn out to be.

For British merchants established at ports in Morocco other than Mogador, the opening of Agadir might be beneficial to their interests, as they might place there branches of their businesses, and, in times of dearth in Sûs, they would find a new outlet for their surplus grain stocks.

While on the subject of Sûs, I may perhaps mention to your Excellency that I learn from a private source at Mogador that two Germans connected with the Mannesmanns were recently in Tarudant, and from letters received in Mogador from that place, these men were well received by the Kaïd of Tarudant.

I have, &c.

A. M. MADDEN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 19.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Mr. Lister.

Sir,

Mogador, January 21, 1911.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 20 of the 23rd ultimo, in which I am instructed to furnish you with information relative to the possible opening of the port of Agadir, its effect on British trade as compared with the trade of other nations, and the purchase of land at the locality, I have the honour to report that I have carefully enquired into the matter, and have come to the conclusion that the general opinion here is that the opening of the port would be distinctly beneficial to British trade. From the formation of the country I am informed it would be difficult to establish the N'Zails, which are crippling the trade at this port, and the trade of the Sûs country could be tapped directly, which seems to imply that the trade of Great Britain, which is the most important trade of Mogador, and the greater portion of which finds its way to the south, would be freed from the greatest obstacle which now opposes it.

I am told that land in Agadir has been rapidly changing hands in anticipation of the opening of the port. Of course, purchases have been effected through Moors and under Moorish names, but I know of five British-protected persons who are interested in land at the locality in question, and there are probably many more. For the reasons I have given above, it appears to me that British trade would profit more than the trade of any other nation, but there may possibly occur some failures at this port among the small merchants at the outset owing to the expense of changing head-quarters.

The harbour is said to be considerably safer and more convenient for shipping than the harbour at Mogador. Agadir itself is only at present a village overlooking the harbour, and all water has to be carried up to it from the cisterns at Funti on the beach, where, if the port is opened, the trading town will most probably be established. I have been told that the Germans have been buying land in considerable quantities round Funti, but have also been informed that the Mannesmanns have the idea of obtaining interests which may enable them to open a port considerably further south towards Cape Juby, while I have been told confidentially that the Spaniards intend in about two months' time to claim a port near Cape Aglou as Santa Cruz de Malpacegna. Thus, if two other ports further south than Agadir are opened to commerce of course the value of Agadir would be considerably diminished.

All merchants recognise that the opening of Agadir would mean the death of Mogador as a trading centre; but as Mogador has suffered so heavily owing to the N'Zails, it would hardly appear to me that the extinction of this town as a trading centre could greatly affect British trade with Southern Morocco.

I have, &c.

H. JOHNSTONE.

Enclosure 3 in No. 19.

Mr. Wellesley to Mr. White.

(Extract.)

Hotel de Inglaterra, Seville, January 15, 1911.

I MADE enquiries all along the line as to the possible effect on trade by the opening of Agadir. The prevailing opinion was that it would undoubtedly be a great advantage, as Agadir is the natural and most accessible outlet for the trade of the Sûs country which now passes through Mogador, and is much hampered by distance and the N'Zails. The latter have even driven it to Saffi. As regards the effects on Mogador, opinion seems divided; some say it would deal Mogador a heavy blow, others that the port would suffer, but not to the extent one would suppose. Personally, I am inclined to think that the opening of Agadir would bring about a great dislocation of local interests in Mogador, perhaps temporary, perhaps permanent, especially among owners of property, &c. I do not know whether in pressing this question there are political considerations which bind us to take into account the general prosperity of Mogador, or whether British commercial interests are solely to be considered. If the former, then I think the matter should be closely investigated as to what the effect would be; if the latter, then all I can say is that among the local British merchants, whom I interviewed, I found the majority in favour of the

change, while the slight opposition on the part of a few was of a purely personal character, and should not be allowed to weigh against the superior advantage which would accrue to British trade generally by the opening of Agadir. Of course, all the merchants agreed that they would have to shift their residences to Agadir, but in most cases this would not be a very serious consideration. I hear the Germans are already purchasing land round Agadir.

[4608] No. 20.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 11.)

Foreign Office, February 7, 1911.

Sir,

THE Spanish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 2nd instant and told Sir Arthur Nicolson that the French had asserted that the police force organised by the Spaniards within the walls of Tangier was not sufficient, and that the French had consequently supplemented the force by Moorish soldiers under French officers. This was in contravention to the Algeciras Act, and was the coping-stone to the edifice of complaints which Spain had to make against French action in Morocco so far as regarded Spanish influence and interests.

The Spanish Government had instructed M. de Villa Urrutia to mention the matter here, as if His Majesty's Government did not feel in a position to say a word to the French Government in a favour of a stricter observance of the Algeciras Act and of a more conciliatory disposition towards Spanish interests, Spain would be inclined to withdraw altogether from the organisation of police forces at Tetuan, Laraiche, Tangier, and Casa Blanca, and leave it to the Powers to decide who should undertake the police duties in those ports.

Sir Arthur Nicolson informed the Ambassador that he had heard nothing as to what had occurred at Tangier, but that he would enquire. He also pointed out that if Spain renounced the obligations as regards the police which had been conferred on her at Algeciras, she would reopen a question which had proved to be the most difficult and delicate to deal with at the conference.

The Ambassador also mentioned that Spain intended to take advantage of a promise given by Mulai Hafid in 1908, that he would accept a Spanish military mission, as the Spanish Government had learnt that France proposed to send a military mission of some thirty officers to take charge of the Moorish army.

I understand from Mr. Lister's telegram of the 2nd instant that the question of the Tangier police force has now been settled satisfactorily by negotiations between the French and Spanish representatives.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4646] No. 21.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 66. Confidential.)

Paris, February 7, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a communication from M. Pichon in reply to an enquiry which I addressed to his Excellency on receipt of your despatch No. 19 of the 19th ultimo in regard to the views held by the French Government with respect to the proposals of the Netherlands Government relative to the draft Mining Law for Morocco.

M. Pichon encloses a copy of a confidential report by the French delegate at the conference charged with the preparation of the Mining Law, in which he gives reasons for the rejection of the amendments put forward by the Netherlands Government. His Excellency proposes to instruct the French representative at Tangier in this sense, and he hopes that His Majesty's Government will concur in the opinions expressed in the report.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 21.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Pichon.

PAR sa note en date du 21 janvier dernier son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a bien voulu faire connaître au département que le Gouvernement britannique désirerait avoir l'avis du Gouvernement français sur les modifications que le Cabinet de La Haye proposerait d'introduire dans le projet de Règlement minier marocain.

En réponse, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de communiquer ci-joint à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie une note où le délégué français dans la conférence technique chargée de la préparation du règlement expose les raisons qui ne permettraient pas d'admettre les amendements suggérés par le Gouvernement néerlandais. Le Gouvernement français se propose de donner des instructions en ce sens à son représentant à Tanger, et il serait heureux que le Gouvernement britannique donnât son assentiment aux considérations ci-jointes.

M. Pichon appelle, d'ailleurs, l'attention de Sir Francis Bertie sur le caractère confidentiel de la note ci-annexée, spécialement dans son paragraphe 2.

Paris, le 3 février, 1911.

Enclosure 2 in No. 21.

Note communicated to M. Pichon by M. Aguillon, Inspector-General of Mines.

CONFORMÉMENT à votre lettre du 25 courant, j'ai l'honneur de vous soumettre les observations que me suggèrent les modifications proposées au Règlement minier du Maroc par le Gouvernement hollandais. Je les suivrai dans l'ordre indiqué par la lettre de M. Pellet du 14 janvier.

1. On conçoit très bien que les délégués à la conférence aient cru devoir indiquer dans le protocole comme dans une sorte d'exposé des motifs, la façon dont ils comprenaient la taxation des mines au Maroc. Mais il paraîtrait tout à fait inutile et contraire à tous les précédents de stipuler dans le corps même du règlement les taxes diverses auxquelles les mines se seraient pas assujetties. On doit l'éviter avec d'autant plus de soin qu'en matière d'impôts des circonstances ultérieures peuvent se produire qui justifieraient que les mines, directement ou indirectement, eussent à supporter, très légitimement et très naturellement, d'autres taxes que les redevances fixes et la redevance proportionnelle inscrite dans le règlement. Celui-ci, comme tous les autres règlements miniers, doit se borner à fixer et régler les taxes exclusivement minières sans référence à toutes autres taxes. A défaut, on n'aurait plus au Maroc une législation qui s'inspire des législations étrangères, comme le veut l'article 112 de l'Acte d'Algésiras, et cela ne conviendrait pas en fait.

2. Pour que les bureaux spéciaux ne soient pas soustraits à la direction et à l'autorité de l'administration centrale, comme le veut avec raison le Gouvernement hollandais, il est essentiel de maintenir dans le règlement le principe que le Service des Mines du Maroc, où qu'il fonctionnera, où que soient les bureaux, quelles que soient ses dispositions et son organisation, n'est qu'une dépendance de la Direction des Travaux publics, qui constitue l'administration centrale établie à Tanger.

La modification proposée par le Gouvernement hollandais à l'article 51, dernier paragraphe, n'irait donc à rien de moins qu'à permettre une interprétation du règlement impossible dans son texte actuel, qui pourrait faire soutenir l'indépendance ou l'autonomie des bureaux locaux établis à Tanger ou ailleurs, c'est-à-dire juste le contraire de ce que veut le Gouvernement hollandais et de ce qu'a décidé le règlement.

3. Le Gouvernement hollandais demande que l'article 55 permette explicitement à la Cour d'Arbitrage de déléguer des experts nommés par elle pour enquêter sur certains points. Cela est parfaitement inutile, puisque l'article décide que "la cour établit elle-même sa procédure"; ce sera donc à elle exclusivement à spécifier par ce règlement de procédure, si elle le juge opportun, comment elle recourrait éventuellement à cette voie de procédure. Le règlement, en confiant à la Cour d'Arbitrage un mandat aussi large que celui qu'on lui a remis, a justement voulu lui laisser autant de latitude dans les questions de forme qu'il lui a donné de pouvoirs au

fond. Vouloir préciser certains détails de procédure dans le règlement pourrait avoir le grave inconvénient de soulever, par comparaison, des discussions qui pourraient atteindre la portée et le caractère du règlement de procédure prévu à l'article 53.

4. Il est également inutile au fond, et il pourrait être fâcheux en la forme, de spécifier à l'article 60 que le Service des Mines pourra recourir à des techniciens pour l'aider dans les instructions qu'il aura à effectuer sur les dossiers qui lui seront communiqués par la Cour d'Arbitrage.

C'est inutile, parce que le Service des Mines pourra recourir aux moyens qu'il jugera les meilleurs à l'accomplissement de sa tâche.

Cela paraît fâcheux, parce qu'il s'agit là de l'organisation et du fonctionnement du Service des Mines qu'il appartient exclusivement à l'autorité marocaine de régler comme elle le jugera le plus opportun, ainsi que le décide l'article 52 du règlement.

5. Le Gouvernement hollandais reconnaît l'utilité du principe des compagnies à privilège qu'organise l'article 63. Mais il veut que, pour la sauvegarde des intérêts néerlandais, le firman qui accorde de pareils privilèges au lieu de nécessiter l'assentiment de la majorité simple du corps diplomatique, comme le porte le règlement, soit approuvé par une majorité des deux tiers.

J'avoue ne pas saisir en quoi une majorité des deux tiers au lieu d'une majorité simple sauvegarderait mieux les intérêts néerlandais.

En tout cas, ni en droit, ni en fait, on ne saurait admettre cette modification.

En droit, on peut trouver excessif le principe même de l'intervention du corps diplomatique. A coup sûr, dans cette question d'ordre purement intérieur pour le Maroc, celui-ci aurait pu même se dispenser de consulter le corps diplomatique, sans s'écarter de l'exemple des législations étrangères dont l'article 112 de l'Acte d'Algésiras l'obligeait simplement à s'inspirer.

En fait, étant admis le principe de l'intervention du corps diplomatique, on ne peut invoquer aucune raison, aucun précédent, pour substituer à la majorité simple une majorité des deux tiers ou des trois quarts ; et cette indétermination même à elle seule condamnerait l'idée ; et il semble bien que l'article 70 de l'Acte d'Algésiras soit topique pour faire décider que, dès que l'unanimité du corps diplomatique n'est plus nécessaire à raison de la nature d'une affaire, c'est la simple majorité qui doit suffire.

En traitant une à une chacune des modifications proposées par le Gouvernement hollandais, je crois avoir montré qu'elles doivent être toutes écartées comme inutiles, sinon fâcheuses et même parfois contraires à l'idée même que veut défendre ce Gouvernement. Je me permettrai d'ajouter une observation générale. Certes, je ne disconviens pas que la préparation laborieuse du règlement qui a été adopté à Paris, au milieu de circonstances parfois difficiles, avec les ménagements divers qu'il a fallu garder, n'ait laissé dans le texte certaines défectuosités de forme, voir même de fond ; et dès la clôture de la conférence je vous les signalais dans un rapport spécial. Mais le règlement se tient dans son ensemble ; il est adopté par les quatre Puissances les plus intéressées. Admettre qu'on puisse en discuter une seule classe, est ouvrir la porte à tous les amendements et reprendre une discussion dont on ne pourrait plus sortir. Si l'on veut aboutir, il faut accepter le règlement en bloc, sans le discuter à nouveau.

Paris, le 27 *janvier*, 1911.

[4875] No. 22.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 71.)

Sir, *Paris, February* 9, 1911.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 44, of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a communication from M. Pichon, in reply to an enquiry, which I addressed to his Excellency, as to the views of the French Government in regard to a proposal that the police force at Laraiche should be increased.

M. Pichon states that the French representative at Tangier has expressed the opinion that, owing to the constitution of the police force in the Moorish ports, it would not be possible to expect them to perform the ordinary duties of civil police,

and that he agrees with Mr. Lister in thinking that a civil guard should be instituted, distinct from the police force. He recommends that the matter should be discussed and settled at the same time as the question of the organisation of the municipalities. Instructions in this sense have, M. Pichon says, been sent to the French Legation.

As regards the particular question of Laraiche, the French Government have already replied to the Spanish Government that they have no objection to the reinforcement of the police force by a few men drawn from the Casablanca force, but that the Spanish Government should, first of all, arrive at an understanding on the subject with the Makhzen, who would refer the matter to the corps diplomatique.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 22.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Pichon.

PAR sa note en date du 1er de ce mois, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a bien voulu communiquer au département les vues du représentant britannique à Tanger sur l'organisation éventuelle d'un service de garde de nuit dans les ports marocains, en ajoutant que le Gouvernement Royal demandait l'opinion du Gouvernement français sur cette question.

En réponse, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de faire connaître à Sir Francis Bertie que le Ministre de la république à Tanger, consulté sur ce point, ne croit pas possible de modifier le caractère assigné, dès l'origine, à la police des ports, qui est essentiellement une force militaire chargée d'assurer la protection de villes contre tout danger extérieur ou intérieur. M. Regnault craindrait que cette police—composée de jeunes soldats marocains, et qui n'a reçu qu'une formation purement militaire—ne fût pas en état de rendre les services qu'on doit attendre d'une police civile, surtout dans ses rapports avec la population européenne. Il estime donc, pleinement d'accord en cela avec Mr. R. Lister, qu'il faut recourir à l'institution d'une garde civile, distincte de la police des ports, et que cette question, intéressant à la fois le Makhzen et les futures municipalités, devra être discutée et réglée en même temps que l'organisation des municipalités.

Le département envoie des instructions en ce sens à la légation de la république. Sur le point particulier de savoir ce qu'il conviendrait dès maintenant de faire pour Larache, il a déjà été répondu au Gouvernement espagnol que l'on n'aurait pas d'objection contre la proposition de renforcer le tabor de police de cette ville par quelques hommes empruntés au tabor extra-urbain de Casablanca, mais que la procédure la plus régulière semblait être que le Cabinet de Madrid s'entendît tout d'abord à ce sujet avec le Makhzen, auquel il appartiendrait de saisir le corps diplomatique.

Paris, le 8 *février*, 1911.

[4991] No. 23.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 14.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 2, 1911.

AS you are aware, all Makhzen lands and house property at the ports were assigned as security for last year's loan and are now managed by the "Contrôle de la Dette." A considerable quantity of Government lands have of recent years been sold to private persons owing to the venality of the Moorish officials, who were generally ready to enrich themselves by permitting such sales.

In 1905, when the Government properties at the ports was given as security for the Mendelssohn loan, a register of such properties was hurriedly drawn up by the Moorish authorities, and it was a matter of common knowledge at the time that property, which did not belong to the Government, was included in the register. The "Contrôle de la Dette" are now in possession of this register, and have for some time past been occupied in verifying it and in drawing up a proper list of Government lands with all necessary details. They contest the validity of the titles of persons claiming land which figure in the Makhzen register, and are taking steps to endeavour to recover possession of such lands for the Makhzen.

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I received a short time ago from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca reporting that the British merchants, Messrs. Fernau and Co., had sold a portion of their land to a Frenchman, but that the deed of sale could not be drawn up, as the agent of the "Contrôle de la Dette" had raised objection on the ground that the land in question was included in the register of Makhzen property.

Messrs. Fernau and Co. have been in occupation of this property for some time. The matter was gone into when Mulai-el-Amin was viceroy at Casa Blanca. Messrs. Fernau and Co. then proved their right to the property, and the cadi drew up the necessary papers, all being declared in order.

Upon receipt of Mr. Madden's despatch, Mr. White, at my request, saw M. Luret, acting head of the control during M. Guiot's absence, and discussed the matter with him. M. Luret said that they were taking up a number of cases in which persons of different nationalities were involved; in some of these cases large tracts of undoubtedly Government land had been obtained by bribing the Makhzen officials. He was anxious that the cases should be referred to the cadi's tribunal, as provided in article 11 of the Madrid convention, and was instructing his agent to institute proceedings. Mr. White pointed out that very little confidence could be placed in the impartiality of the cadis, as it is notorious that they never dare to give a judgment against the Makhzen. M. Luret said he would give instructions that the cadi should be informed beforehand that he must decide the case on its merits and give judgment for Messrs. Fernau and Co. if their title to the property was found to be good.

At first sight it appeared to me difficult to refuse to allow the case to go before the cadi as provided in article 11 of the Madrid convention, but I subsequently discussed the question with the German Minister, who came to see me in regard to similar cases in which German subjects were interested. Baron Seckendorff pointed out that though quite ready to allow a reference to shraa when the claim was brought by a private person, he was by no means ready to admit this procedure when the Makhzen was claimant. The Makhzen had, through their accredited agent, the administrator of Government properties, expressly declared at the time of the sale that the land to be sold was not the property of the Government. He considered that the Makhzen was bound by the act of its officials, and was therefore debarred from subsequently bringing an action to claim lands thus sold. If the administrator of Makhzen properties had made a mistake, he was accountable to his own Government, but that was no concern of ours.

Article 60 of the Act of Algeciras provides that at the ports the special consent of the Moorish authorities is no longer required for the purchase of real property, all that is necessary being that the cadi should satisfy himself that there is a good title. In the present case the cadi has informed His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca that Messrs. Fernau and Co.'s title-deeds are in order, and I am of opinion that we must decline to admit the right of the Control of the Debt, who are merely acting for the Makhzen, to question the decision given by the responsible agent of the Makhzen. I propose, therefore, with your approval, to insist upon authority being given for the sale to be effected.

Mr. White has informed M. Luret that this is my view, and, from what the latter said, I have reason to believe that the Control will withdraw their claim in the case of Messrs. Fernau and Co.'s land. I have, however, deemed it my duty to report the matter, as I hear privately from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca that the agent of the Control is endeavouring to collect evidence in regard to other very valuable properties held by British subjects at that place, and important interests are at stake. Baron Seckendorff has referred the matter to his Government, and in the meantime has refused to allow cases in which his nationals are concerned to be tried in the cadi's court.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 23.

Consul Madden to Mr. Lister.

(No. 16.)
Sir, *Casa Blanca, January* 19, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a letter addressed to me by Messrs. Fernau and Co.* protesting against the refusal of the native authorities in their

* Not sent.

action whereby they are refusing to allow the sale of plots of the firm's land, acting, as it is alleged, under orders of the "Contrôle," which is here in the hands of a military officer who administers the municipality.

Some time since Messrs. Fernau sold a piece of their land, called the "gourna" land, to a Frenchman, who erected thereon a large mill, but the native authorities, in this case also, have refused to allow the documents of sale to be drawn up.

I did all I could in the latter case with the Shereef and the Amin-el-Mustafad, the latter even coming to see me about the matter. He explained that the "Contrôle" had stopped the documents being drawn up on the ground that the property in question appeared in the books as Makhzen land.

There is, so far as I know, no register of Makhzen properties open to public inspection, and it is well known that when the registers of Makhzen property were drawn up some seven years ago that many pieces of land were therein inserted as being Government property which were private property. And, possibly, the books have been altered from time to time, so I have heard it alleged.

All the native authorities whom I have either seen or communicated with on this case of Messrs. G. H. Fernau's have been unanimous in admitting that the firm's documents are in perfect order. It seems, therefore, very detrimental to their interests that their documents of sale should be stopped without, at any rate, formal reason being given them or proof that the land is Makhzen property being afforded them.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

[4992] No. 24.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Tangier, February* 2, 1911.

I SENT you a telegram to-day to say that the incident which had arisen between the French and Spanish Legations with regard to the Tangier police had been satisfactorily arranged. I decided to do this as I gathered from the Spanish Minister that the Spanish Ambassador in London had been instructed to approach you in the matter (although M. Merry del Val said he was not quite certain of this), and I thought you would be glad to know that the incident was closed.

Last week a petition was circulated among the foreign representatives, signed by a number of shop-owners of different nationalities on the principal street of Tangier. They complained of the constant robberies that were being committed, and of the general state of insecurity prevailing, and asked that night watchmen might be appointed. I wrote an annotation to the effect that I considered that this unsatisfactory state of affairs could be remedied if the efficient police force were made to do ordinary police duties, as understood in Europe. The French chargé d'affaires wrote to the effect that the basha, Si Guebbas, was to some extent to blame in the matter; that the merchants paid 500 pesetas a-month to him, in return for which he was supposed to provide night watchmen, that he had been very remiss in this latterly, and had pocketed the money. M. de Billy added that he had spoken on the subject to Si Guebbas, and pointed out that if there were no night watchmen available some of the Tabor Makhzen, a small body of troops at the disposal of the basha, and under the instructions of the French officer, might be made to take their place. Si Guebbas seems to have acted at once on M. de Billy's remarks, and six soldiers (according to the French, more according to the Spaniards) in uniform and carrying bayonets were marched down into the town, and stationed in the principle street as night policemen, no previous notice having been given to the captain of the Spanish police or the Spanish Legation. The rage of M. Merry del Val knew no bounds, and I must say that, knowing the susceptibilities of the Spaniards on all matters, and particularly at this moment on this one of police on account of the question which has been raised at Laraiche, I think M. de Billy showed a considerable want of tact in not speaking to M. Merry del Val himself, or at all events telling Si Guebbas to do so before taking such a step.

M. Merry del Val asked to see me yesterday morning and seemed in a very excited state. He read me a telegram from his Government, in which he was instructed to beg me not to write anything on the circular until I had communicated with you (this was too late as the circular had come to me before it went to M. de Billy); he added that his Government were of opinion that a very serious situation

had been created between the two countries; that this was only one of a number of incidents of the hostility and contempt for their rights and wishes shown by France, and that they did not see how the matter was to end unless the Makhzen troops were at once withdrawn. He told me in strict confidence that he could not help thinking that it was a got-up thing, that the alleged robberies and insecurity when examined into amounted to very little, and that the French were simply making the most of it to further their own ends. The actual situation, moreover, in the street was fraught with great danger, as an incident might at any moment be provoked between the Spanish police and the soldiers; as it was, a scuffle had taken place the night before. If such an incident were to occur, the results would be most serious. I did my best to calm him. I said that I felt sure that M. de Billy, in approaching Si Guebbas, had only desired to act in the interests of the citizens of Tangier, and had not realised the awkward situation which would be created for the Spanish police. I did not for one moment imagine that he had any *arrière-pensée* and felt sure that no offence was meant. M. Merry del Val said he hoped that that might be so, but that the soldiers must in any case be withdrawn. I said I would see M. de Billy as soon as I could and do all in my power to induce him to accede to the wishes of the Spanish Government; I felt sure that I should have no difficulty in this. I was unable to find M. de Billy during the whole afternoon, and only ran him to ground about 6 o'clock playing bridge in blissful unconsciousness of the storm he had aroused. He professed to be astounded and disgusted at M. Merry del Val's excitability and want of sense of proportion, but I hope that he realised that he himself had been slightly wanting in tact in the matter. He sent round at once to ask if he might see M. Merry del Val, and told him that his one idea had been to assist the various merchants who had petitioned, that he had thought it very hard that they should pay money for protection and get nothing in return, and that as the proper watchmen were not available he had proposed the utilisation of the Makhzen troops.

He evidently succeeded in pacifying M. Merry del Val, and let me know late last night that all was arranged. I saw M. Merry del Val this morning, and he thanked me for what I had done. He also read me the annotation which he proposed to write on the circular. He fully agreed with my view that the police should perform ordinary police duties, but assured me that they did this already, and read me a long list of instructions, going minutely into details of their duties, and providing for a regular system of police work properly so-called to be carried out during the night by special men told off for the job two by two, and armed with bayonets, dark lanterns, and whistles. These instructions are read out twice a-week, and I must say that, if properly executed, they ought, in my opinion, to be sufficient to ensure the security of the town at night. M. Merry del Val intends to communicate them to the corps diplomatique. He holds the opinion that the shop-people's petition, when sifted, will turn out to have reference to mere petty thefts often committed during the day, and in great measure owing to their own carelessness. M. Merry del Val has seen Si Omar, Guebbas's secretary and son-in-law, Guebbas himself being ill, and has insisted on the withdrawal of the men of the Tabor Makhzen, at the same time pointing out to him the want of consideration that had been shown in the matter for the Spanish police and the Spanish Legation.

I cannot help thinking that the incident may in one way be productive of good results, as it must strengthen the view which I have maintained all along that the policing of the towns should be the duty of the police, and that if their instructions do not provide for this, they should be modified. In the case of the Spanish police at Tangier, they evidently do, but no doubt, like all things Spanish, are badly carried out or altogether neglected.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[4993] No. 25.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 4, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting the execution under the

new army regulations of two Moorish soldiers who had deserted with their arms, and were caught in the Shawia and sent back to Fez.

I spoke to the French chargé d'affaires on the subject to-day, and he read me a despatch which he had just received from his consul at Fez. M. Gaillard deplores what has occurred, and considers that although justified by the strict application of the military regulation the executions, which have produced a painful impression at Fez, are much to be regretted. M. de Billy observed that M. Gaillard's view might to some extent be coloured by the fact that he had not been consulted in the matter. Commandant Mangin, he said, jealously guarded what he considered to be his absolute authority in military matters. He was a man with the courage of a lion, and on several occasions his action had been admirable from its fearlessness, but rather to be deprecated from the point of view of prudence, as, had it not succeeded, it might have placed the French Government in a very difficult position.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—Since writing this despatch I have received letters from Mr. MacLeod and Dr. Verdon, stating that the idea at Fez is that the order for the executions was really given by the French and not by the Sultan, and that His Shereefian Majesty will do all he can to propagate this view, and thus alienate public opinion from the French.

M. Gaillard is evidently very much annoyed that the incident should have occurred.

R. L.

Enclosure in No. 25.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 7.)

Sir, *Fez, January* 28, 1911.

WITH reference to Enclosure No. 1 in my despatch No. 82 of the 7th November last, I have the honour to report that two soldiers, who had enlisted under the new regulations, had taken the oath of fidelity to the Sultan, but afterwards deserted with their arms, were caught in Shawia, and sent back to Fez, and were executed here this morning.

All the troops here were formed up in three sides of a square near Ain Kadus, about three-quarters of a mile west of the city. The men's crime and the sentence were proclaimed, after which, amid a roll of drums, they were blindfolded, shot by a firing party of sixteen of the negro regiment, and were buried on the same spot.

These are the first executions under the new military regulations, military crimes here never before having been punished with death.

All the foreign instructors were present at the parade, but, by direction of Commandant Mangin, they retired during the actual firing.

Sergeant Balding tells me that the troops showed no sign of resenting these executions.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

[4994] No. 26.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 17.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 4, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a list brought up to date for the year 1910 of the heads of foreign missions at Tangier.

Changes have taken place at the German, Italian, and American Legations, while the Spanish Minister is shortly leaving for Brussels. The accounts of the new Ministers have been appended at the end of the previous list.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 26.

Heads of Missions at Tangier, February 1910, *reprinted and brought up to date from List dated March* 1909.

Portugal.—Count Martens Ferrao has been at Tangier for nine years and up till the revolution in Portugal was doyen of the diplomatic body. Having no axe to grind and practically no interests to safeguard, he rarely finds himself in disagreement with his colleagues. Married to an Italian lady with private means, he used to entertain to a considerable extent. He has never been to Fez, and has practically nothing to do with the Moorish authorities. Having represented his Government at Algeciras as second delegate, he considered himself entitled to a higher post and did all in his power to obtain it. He was in Lisbon at the time of the revolution, but returned to Tangier immediately after, and notified to the Maghzen the fall of the Monarchy and the constitution of the Republic. He gave a long interview to the editor of the "Dépêche marocaine," explaining his reasons for not resigning, as the majority of the Portuguese Ministers abroad appear to have done. His action has been very severely criticised by some of his colleagues, notably the Russian and Dutch Ministers. He has never been confirmed in his appointment by the new Government and is considered no longer to be doyen. He never attends any of our meetings, and has withdrawn almost entirely from society, never dines out, and never allows his wife to accept any invitations. He seems to me to be acting foolishly, as by thus hiding his head he looks as if he were ashamed of what he did, and plays into the hands of those who criticised him in none too friendly a spirit. My relations with him have remained the same as they were before, and he generally asks me to represent him at the meetings of the Corps diplomatique and the Conseil sanitaire.

France.—M. Regnault, the French Minister, entered the service in 1883, and has been mostly employed in Tunis; but in 1904 he represented the French bondholders in this country, and accompanied M. Saint-René Taillandier on the mission to Fez.

He has some reputation as a financier, and was employed as an expert at Algeciras, eventually signing the Act as one of the delegates.

Of untiring energy and activity, he brings to bear on the great variety of subjects now dealt with here a technical knowledge seldom at the command of a diplomat *de carrière;* and during the very numerous meetings held here for the construction of the "règlements," the outcome of the Act of Algeciras, he displayed a considerable power of clearly exposing his views with fairness and moderation. Of admirable temper and free from all excitability, he generally produced a better impression on the meetings than his more nervous, though more learned, German colleague.

Of *bourgeois* origin, he represents the best type of Frenchman of the professional classes, and possesses all the dignity engendered by simplicity and rectitude, by remarkable lucidity of thought and expression, and by great elevation of ideas. He has acquired considerable popularity and a reputation for straightforwardness among all his colleagues. He has always acted towards me with the utmost frankness, not unfrequently discussing with me beforehand the measures he proposes to recommend to his Government. Our relations, both official and private, are of the very best.

M. Regnault is about 50 years of age, and, in view of the very successful manner in which he has conducted French policy in Morocco during the last year, it appears probable that he will be called to higher functions in the service of his country. He is married to a simple pleasant lady, and has a large family of daughters.

Holland.—The Netherlands Minister is the Chevalier de Rappard. Holland had for many years been represented here by Germany, and it has never very clearly appeared why that country was not satisfied to allow that condition of affairs to continue. The interests of Holland in Morocco are practically nil. The only persons with any claim to Dutch nationality are a family of some thirty persons of Jewish persuasion, who have only been brought into daylight by the attentions shown to them by the new Minister.

M. de Rappard is a man of some 42 years, of considerable energy, a good linguist, and with a desire to be extremely impartial; but his sympathy for Germany, where he has spent some years of his previous career, is apt at times to predominate. He followed with great care and attention the discussions of the diplomatic corps for

the construction of the "règlements" arising out of the Act of Algeciras last winter, and was often most useful in finding a formula to satisfy all parties.

In order to justify to some extent his appointment, he is anxious to push Dutch trade, and is a frequent visitor at the local grocers' establishments, endeavouring to introduce curaçao and other Dutch delicacies into the local markets.

He has rendered a considerable service to residents at Tangier by arranging for the boats of two of the principal Dutch steam-ship lines to call at Tangier on alternate weeks on their outward and homeward journeys to and from the east.

He is married to a somewhat unpolished lady, remarkable for her "gaffes" and for the excellence of her household and domestic arrangements. They entertain a good deal.

Russia.—M. Botkine was appointed in 1907, and has since been promoted to the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. He is younger than most Russian Ministers. He has previously been employed in Washington, Lisbon, Sophia, and Brussels, and was in London before coming to Tangier. He is married to a pretty, agreeable American lady, and they have a pleasant house, and give a good many small dinners.

M. Botkine's mission is to support the French in Morocco, and he openly says that, beyond that, his Government is more or less indifferent as regards the affairs of this country.

I am on excellent terms with him and his wife.

Belgium.—The new Belgium Minister is M. Garnier. He occupies one room at the rather squalid hotel, and has never been known to offer even a glass of water to anybody. He is practically non-existent.

Austria-Hungary.—M. de Callenburg is a heavy and methodical man, with no sense of humour. He takes his duties, political and municipal, very seriously, and attacks one, both in and out of season, with questions and lengthy expressions of opinion as to some trifling point of detail in the latest circular. He was very much guided by his cleverer and stronger German colleague, Dr. Rosen, but I cannot yet judge how far he will follow the lead of Baron Seckendorff.

His wife has pretensions to beauty aided by art, a great deal of manner, and a very tiring laugh.

They entertain a certain amount, but she has decided views as to the duty of the hostess to entertain each one and all of her guests, whom she likes to keep herded together. She is an avowed enemy of bridge or anything that "can break up a party." Their dinners are consequently rather wearisome, though their one idea is to be very amiable.

Italy.—Dr. Nerazzini was appointed to Siam in the month of July, but he declined to proceed, and has been placed *en disponibilité.* He has been succeeded by Signor Carignani, who was for some years in London, and at one time "chef de Cabinet" to M. Tittoni at Rome. He had not arrived by the end of the year.

Spain.—M. Merry del Val was appointed Minister at Brussels at the end of the year. He is to be succeeded by the Marquis of Villa Sinda, who has latterly been employed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Madrid. Everybody is relieved at their departure, on her account more than his, as she has developed a most poisonous tongue during the last year. I learn from a very reliable Spanish source that she has always been known and feared for it in her own country, but she appears to have kept in check at the beginning of their stay in Tangier. Latterly she has allowed it to run riot.

Germany.—Dr. Rosen was appointed Minister to Roumania in the month of June, and has been succeeded by Baron Seckendorff, previously employed at Sophia. He has the reputation of being conciliatory, and boasts a good deal about it. I have found him a *faiseur d'embarras,* and very wearisome and lengthy in any business I have to do with him. He is inclined to think he has detected some deep-laid plot in the simplest suggestion. The French saying, "Il cherche Midi à quatorze heures," describes him exactly. He prides himself on his acquaintance with a vast number of diplomatists, and is always talking of his colleagues in the numerous obscure posts which he has held in South America and elsewhere. He is married to a very uninteresting woman considerably younger than himself. They are an ostentatiously loving couple. I have seldom met a man more thoroughly satisfied with himself.

America.—Mr. Dodge was appointed to an important post in the State Department at Washington in the month of July, and has been succeeded by Mr. Carpenter, a very quiet man, who does not speak a word of French. I am told that he possesses great qualities when one gets to know him, but the operation is not an easy one. So far he plays no part at all at Tangier.

[4995] No. 27.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 18. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 5, 1911.

THE French chargé d'affaires showed me a telegram yesterday which he had received from his Government, saying that the German Ambassador had spoken to M. Pichon on the subject of the desire of the British merchants of Casa Blanca that permission might be obtained (as had been done in the past) for the importation of their surplus stock of grain to the Sous, where a severe famine existed, and asking for a report on the matter. M. de Billy said that he had already written at some length on the subject, and read me extracts from his despatch, in one of which he said that the whole incident reminded one irresistibly of certain scenes out of "Much Ado about Nothing."

M. de Billy told me very confidentially that he personally was convinced that the Germans had come to some arrangement with the Spaniards in connection with the cession of Ifni, and that they consequently were particularly anxious that no steps should be taken to bring about the opening of the Port of Agadir, which might upset their game, whatever it was, and neutralise any special advantages which they may have secured.

I think that this question of Ifni should be very carefully watched; as you will recollect (see Mr. White's No. 223, Confidential, of the 28th October, 1910), the treaty of the 26th April, 1860, ceded Santa Cruz de Pequena to Spain for the formation thereon of a fishing establishment similar to that which Spain possessed there in ancient times. The locality was never discovered, and in 1883 Ifni was offered and accepted in its place by the Spanish Government, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declaring that it would be used solely as a fishing station. Any attempt on the part of the Spaniards, backed by the Germans, to enlarge the scope of the cession made to them should, in my opinion, be resolutely opposed, as any sort of port at Ifni would tap the whole of the Sous district and seriously prejudice the trade of Mogador.

Were the port of Agadir to be opened, the importance of a trading station at Ifni would be diminished, and it is possible that M. de Billy is right in his view that it is for this reason that the mere mention of Agadir acts upon the Germans like a red rag to a bull.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[4996] No. 28.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 19.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 6, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting that Shereefian orders have been issued for the confirmation of the arrangement which I came to with Kaïd Anflous for the abolition of the "nzalas."

As you will observe, the letter to Kaïd Anflous has been practically sent to him direct, and the engagement which I gave to him has thus been fulfilled.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 28.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Fez, January* 28, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt to-day of your Excellency's despatch No. 7 of the 23rd instant.

After discussion with the French consul I mentioned the matter of your Excellency's negotiations with Kaïd Anflous to Sid Taib Mokri, and the latter replied that they, together with the recommendation of them which had come from Sid Mohammed Mokri, were having the Sultan's earnest consideration, and Sid Taib would let me know as soon as His Majesty came to a decision in regard to them. Sid Taib did not mention the matter again, however, so I called on him this evening and communicated the sense of your Excellency's above-mentioned despatch.

After many apologies to the effect that he had, quite inadvertently, forgotten to tell me at the time what had happened, Sid Taib replied that the Sultan had felt sure your Excellency would see in all that related to your travels in the south how earnest was his desire to be on the most friendly of terms with His Britannic Majesty's Government and with your Excellency, and so he had at once decided to confirm all that your Excellency had arranged with Kaïd Anflous.

Shereefian orders in that sense were therefore issued at once. The Kaïds Mtougi (still here) and Gilooli (here for the recent feast) being in Fez, the orders for them were handed to them in person. The orders to the Kaïds Khoban and Anflous—sealed and addressed to them directly—were transmitted to the amin-mestafad at Mogador to be forwarded by special courier. This amin, Sid Taib explained, habitually distributes the Makhzen's letters for the Moorish authorities in that region in his capacity of Moorish postmaster was doing so in this instance, and was in no other sense an intermediary in the transmission of the orders to those kaïds.

Sid Taib, therefore, felt sure that your Excellency would see how entirely the Makhzen had given effect to your wishes in the matter, and particularly to your promises that the orders be enforced simultaneously on all the kaïds concerned, and that the order to Kaïd Anflous be communicated to him direct.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[4997] No. 29.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 11.)

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 6, 1911.

HIS Majesty's vice-consul at Marrakesh reports that the fighting in the Sous has been serious of late, and that the losses on the side of the Glawi have been considerable. The Basha is very much worried, although his troops seem to have had the upper hand. He told Mr. Lennox the other day that negotiations were in progress, and he hoped that the Sous people would accept his terms, which were that they should pay the cost of the war and permit a permanent Government army to be encamped in their country.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[4133] No. 30.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 13, 1911.

WITH reference to the Foreign Office letter of the 3rd ultimo and previous correspondence, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Tangier, with enclosures,* relative to the opening of the port of Agadir.

It appears to Sir E. Grey that the weight of competent opinion is to the effect

* No. 19.

that the opening of Agadir would be beneficial to British trade, and he would be disposed to discuss with the French Government the question whether such a course would be politically practicable or desirable. In the first instance, however, Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn the opinion of the Board of Trade on the subject, and whether they consider that it would be desirable in the interests of British trade that Agadir should be opened.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[4875] No. 31.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 9.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 16, 1911.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 25th ultimo, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris relative to the police at Moorish ports.*

I leave it to your discretion to take such steps as you may think advisable in regard to the settlement of the question of civil guards at the ports.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5809] No. 32.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 20. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, February* 12, 1911.

IN my preceding despatch No. 18, Confidential, of yesterday, I had the honour to report, on the authority of M. Geoffray, French Ambassador at Madrid, that certain assurances in respect of Morocco had recently been given by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris. M. Geoffray has since had the goodness to show me a long telegram in which M. Pichon informs him of the purport of these assurances. Señor Pérez Caballero's interview with M. Pichon took place on the 8th February. He was informed that there could be no question of revising the Secret Convention of October 1904. This would require a negotiation with England and the reopening of delicate questions much better left alone. Moreover, M. Pichon could see no advantage in modifying the Secret Convention. All that was wanted to secure its harmonious working was good-will on the part of the two signatory Powers. For her part, France was determined to interpret it in the most friendly spirit towards Spain, whose legitimate desire to expand her influence in northern Morocco she had no desire to thwart. She would reckon on an equally friendly disposition on the Spanish side.

Señor Pérez Caballero having shown much nervousness concerning the apparent increase in the numbers and authority of the French military mission at Fez, M. Pichon proceeded to discuss this point with him. The French military mission dated back, he said, to the days of the present Sultan's father. No one therefore was likely to object to its continuance, or to its adapting itself to the present requirements of the Sultan and Makhzen. If, however, a new Spanish military mission were to be set up beside it, Europe would not be slow to suspect some new design, on the part of France and Spain, to undertake jointly the military subjugation of the country. M. Pichon therefore discouraged strongly the suggestion of the Spanish Ambassador as to a participation of Spain in the task of tendering military advice and assistance to the Sultan. He recognised, however, that Spain would have a right to be consulted in the event of the reorganised Moorish mehallas being required to conduct operations under French officers or instructors. Señor Pérez Caballero was accordingly assured that France would make it her business to see that in every such contingency a previous agreement should be negotiated between the Makhzen and the representative of Spain at Tangier before any advance was made into the Spanish sphere.

M. Pichon finally discussed with the Spanish Ambassador the question of fresh

* No. 22.

loans to Morocco, such as the one now under negotiation for 30,000,000 fr. He disclaimed any desire to proceed in this or in any other financial question affecting Morocco, behind the back of Spain.

I only had time to read M. Pichon's telegram very hastily, but I think that the above is a fair statement of its principal contents.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[4129] No. 33.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 17, 1911.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 9 of the 24th ultimo, enclosing and commenting on a scheme for a municipality of the town of Tangier.

I entirely agree with your view that the scheme is inacceptable in its present form for the reasons given in your despatch, and I authorise you to inform your French colleague privately to that effect.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5994] No. 34.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Madrid, February* 11, 1911.

NOTWITHSTANDING the friendly assurances as regards the relations between France and Spain in Morocco, which are always given in the public declarations of the two Governments, a good deal of friction is said to be still observable in the daily intercourse of Frenchmen and Spaniards in that country. From a recent conversation with Señor Canalejas, I gather that the Spanish Government continue to receive reports of petty incidents which are represented to them as indicating a determination on the part of the French representative at Tangier to seize every opportunity of supplanting the legitimate influence of Spain. In his Excellency's view there is no sign yet of the beneficial effects which were expected to result from the conclusion of the recent convention between Spain and Morocco.

This unsatisfactory state of things has been repeatedly brought, of late, to the notice of M. Geoffray, the new French Ambassador. The Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, now home on leave, have successively called upon him to urge the necessity of adopting some new arrangement which should leave each of the two countries free to develop its interests in Morocco without interference from the other. M. Geoffray has been good enough to inform me, in confidence, that these proposals amounted to a suggestion that the two Governments should agree to give full effect immediately to those provisions of the secret Franco-Spanish Convention of October 1904 which were not intended to come into force till the year 1919, *i.e.*, fifteen years after the date of signature. In other words, it was proposed that, within the Spanish sphere of influence as defined in the convention, it should now be no longer necessary for Spain to secure the assent of France to every important step she desired to make. The position of France and Spain, within their respective spheres, would be precisely the same. Each could act as she chose on giving simple notice of her intentions to the other. France would exercise a virtual protectorate in the south and Spain in the north.

At a recent private ball the King of Spain took M. Geoffray aside and spoke to him for some time to the above effect. M. Geoffray, as I have already reported, is anxious to do what he can to remove, or at least diminish, the local friction which has so long impeded the harmonious working of the understanding between the two Governments respecting Morocco. In his opinion, if I have rightly understood it, the course of events in that country, since the elimination of German opposition as a consequence of the Franco-German Agreement of February 1909, has led to the establishment at Fez of a French control amounting to a virtual protectorate. He has not concealed from me his belief that the French Legation at Tangier has not always exercised the influence and authority with which it has thus become invested

in a manner calculated to disarm the suspicion created in the Spanish mind by the increasing preponderance of France. He thinks that the counsels of the French colonial party have not ceased to prevail at Tangier, notwithstanding the tranquillising assurances of M. Pichon at Paris. He has noted the determination shown by one Spanish Government after another to enlarge the area of Spanish influence along the north coast of Morocco.

Meanwhile, the garrisons of Ceuta and Melilla—some 30,000 of the best Spanish troops—are known to be pressing for a further opportunity to display their prowess. The report that a new Morocco loan of 30,000,000 fr. is being negotiated at Paris with a view not only to paying off the outstanding debts of the Makhzen, but to the formation of an organised Moorish army under the control of the French military mission at Fez, has greatly disturbed the minds of the Spanish Government. Quite recently a body of Moorish troops, accompanied by a French instructor, is reported to have entered Tangier, provoking the protests of the Spanish Minister. The termination of the incident was reported by Mr. Lister in his telegram No. 2 of the 2nd instant, which he had the goodness to repeat to me. But apprehension remains here that when the Makhzen has at its disposal an organised force directed by French officers it will become increasingly difficult for Spain to reserve to herself the position which she has laboriously secured by the Melilla campaign and the new Moroccan Convention. M. Geoffray fears that, unless the respective positions of France and Spain in Morocco are further defined, a sharp conflict of interests is almost certain to arise. He is therefore willing to listen to any reasonable proposals calculated to bring about a better understanding on the basis of the 1904 convention. He informs me that he has replied to the Spanish Government that, though quite ready to sound the French Government on the questions raised, he doubts if it would serve the interests of Spain, any more than those of France, to negotiate an amendment of the secret convention. It would hardly be possible to keep secret a new signed agreement giving Spain a free hand in Northern Morocco, and both the old and new agreements would have to be published. Thus the whole Morocco question would be reopened and the claims of other Powers possibly revived. M. Geoffray added that, in his opinion, the right of France to claim to be consulted by Spain in regard to the action of the latter in the Spanish sphere had not hitherto resulted in any unfair restriction of the activity of Spain in those regions. It had prevented neither the Melilla campaign nor the conclusion of the convention of the 16th November, 1910, by which the Spanish hold on the Makhzen had been so greatly strengthened. If impediments had been placed in the way of the construction by Spain of the road which she desired to make from Ceuta to Tetuan, this had been done not by France but by the body of foreign representatives at Tangier, who would have equally claimed to have a voice in the matter if France had surrendered her rights in Northern Morocco to Spain. After all, the irritating incidents of which Spain complained had hitherto been amicably settled on the spot. Was it not unwise to alter arrangements which worked so well?

While holding, however, this language at Madrid, the French Ambassador informs me that he has placed before M. Pichon very frankly his view that something should be done to soothe Spanish susceptibilities. Though a revision of the secret convention would no doubt be inexpedient, other means, he suggests, might perhaps be found to reassure the Spanish Government, and so to forestall a sudden attack on Tetuan or any similar inconvenient display of force on the part of the Ceuta garrison. Such an outburst, he explains, would be difficult to prevent if France continued to strengthen her position at Fez without a frank interchange of views with Spain on the altered condition of affairs. Above all, the Ambassador urges that the representative of the French Government at Tangier should be encouraged to adopt an attitude calculated to win the confidence of his Spanish colleague by avoiding as far as possible the appearance of resisting the efforts of Spain to develop her interests in her recognised sphere, consistently, of course, with the maintenance of the equal commercial rights of other nations.

M. Geoffray claims not only M. Pichon, but the President of the French Republic and the French Ambassadors in London and Berlin, as sympathisers with him in regarding the Morocco question in the above light, and he has told me that they agree with him in thinking that the Spanish Government would be much less likely than they now are to adopt an aggressive attitude in that country if they were allowed to feel that France had no desire to place unnecessary obstacles in their way.

In my frequent conversations with M. Geoffray I have confined myself to expressing the belief that good must ensue from his efforts to dispel the rooted conviction, however unreasonable it may be, of Spanish statesmen of all parties that France is the implacable enemy of Spain in Morocco.

His Excellency states that, as the result of his representations, Señor Perez Caballero, Spanish Ambassador in Paris, was verbally assured by M. Pichon a few days ago that no Moorish mehallas, under French officers or instructors, would henceforth cross into the Spanish sphere without the previous concurrence of Spain. The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs confirms this information, but he informs me that he is instructing Señor Perez Caballero to endeavour to obtain a renewal of M. Pichon's assurances in a more definite form, and if possible in writing.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[4646] No. 35.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 70.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 18, 1911.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 66 of the 7th instant, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copies of despatches which I have addressed to His Majesty's Ministers at The Hague and Tangier on the subject of the amendments which the Netherlands Government desire to make in the draft Moroccan mining law.*

I should be glad if your Excellency would inform M. Pichon of the explanations which I have authorised Sir A. Johnstone to give to M. van Swinderen, and of the instructions issued to Mr. Lister in the matter of the Dutch amendments.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4646] No. 36.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Johnstone.

(No. 9.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 18, 1911.

WITH reference to Lord Acton's despatch No. 10 of the 13th ultimo, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, with enclosures, relative to the amendments which the Netherlands Government desire to make in the draft Moroccan mining law.†

The second enclosure to Sir F. Bertie's despatch consists of a memorandum by M. Aguillon, who represented France at the conference which drew up the mining law, explaining the reasons for which the proposed amendments are inacceptable. I am in agreement with this memorandum, the terms of which will presumably be communicated to the Netherlands Government by the French Minister at The Hague, and I am instructing His Majesty's Minister at Tangier to oppose the amendments when the mining law is discussed by the diplomatic body at that capital.

You will remember that the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed in writing the hope that His Majesty's Government would support the proposed amendments, and I have been considering what reply should be made to him. It is inadvisable, I think, to enter into details, and the best course will be for you to explain to M. van Swinderen that His Majesty's Government were bound by their previous action to support the draft law elaborated by their delegate in collaboration with his German, Spanish, and French colleagues. His Majesty's Government have been in communication with the French Government on the subject of the Dutch proposals, and a careful examination of the criticisms offered has convinced them both that neither the wishes of the Netherlands Government on the one hand nor the interests of the Makhzen on the other would in reality be met by altering the draft law in the manner suggested.

I should be glad if you would communicate with your French colleague before taking action in the sense indicated in the preceding paragraph.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Nos. 36 and 37.

† No. 21.

[4646] No. 37.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 18, 1911.

WITH reference to Lord Acton's despatch No. 10 of the 13th ultimo and Sir F. Bertie's despatch No. 66 of the 7th instant, copies of which will have reached you in the print sections, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister at The Hague on the subject of the amendments which the Netherlands Government desire to make in the draft Moroccan mining law.*

I consider that M. Aguillon's memorandum meets the Dutch criticisms very fairly, and I am anxious that the law should be accepted as it stands. I should therefore be glad if you would support your French colleague in opposing the amendments when the mining law comes up for discussion before the diplomatic body at Tangier.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4991] No. 38.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 13.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 21, 1911.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 14 of the 2nd instant relative to the action of the Contrôle de la Dette in regard to the sale of lands which are alleged to form part of the Makhzen property assigned as security for the loan of 1910.

It appears to me that Messrs. Fernau and Co.'s claim to certain land is indisputable, and I approve your proposal to insist upon authority being given for the sale of this land to be effected. In other cases, however, the titles may not be so clear, and a difficult situation might arise if His Majesty's Government were obliged to make common cause with the German Government against the French loan authorities. I should prefer, therefore, at this stage not to announce definitely that His Majesty's Government will refuse to allow any case of this kind to be taken before the cadi's court, and I will leave it to your discretion, in communication with the Foreign Office if necessary, to decide what course should be adopted with regard to other cases as they arise in accordance with their merits.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[7323] No. 39.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received February 27.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, February* 25, 1911.

WITH reference to the letter from this department of the 24th January on the subject of the proposals of the Société marocaine des Travaux publics in regard to the erection of new lighthouses on the coast of Morocco, I am directed by the Board of Trade to request that you will be good enough to lay before the Secretary of State the following observations which the Board desire to offer on the subject:—

2. The Board concur in the view of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, as expressed in their letter to the Foreign Office of the 30th December last, that it is undesirable that the control of the lights should be vested in the Société, and they are in general agreement with the Lords Commissioners that an arrangement similar to that under which the light at Cape Spartel is controlled would, if it were practicable, be the best for British shipping interests.

3. Such an arrangement would, however, involve certain financial difficulties, for, as Sir E. Grey is aware, the cost of the Cape Spartel light is borne under convention by thirteen Powers in equal shares, and the share of this country, which was a charge on the Exchequer prior to the passing of "The Merchant Shipping (Mercantile

* No. 36.

Marine Fund) Act, 1898," is now paid out of the general lighthouse fund. The Board have been advised that this fund is not available for new lighthouses outside the United Kingdom, and they have reason to believe that any attempt to amend the 1898 Act in order to put further charges upon the fund would be strenuously opposed by the shipping industry, who have for many years past been agitating for the abolition of light dues in this country and the transfer of the charges for British lighthouses to the Exchequer.

4. The Treasury, on the other hand, would probably resist fresh demands upon the Exchequer in respect of lights on or near the coast of a foreign country, as they hold that under the rearrangement of shipping charges, to which effect was given by "The Merchant Shipping Act, 1898," the Exchequer was freed from any further liability in regard to lighthouses either here or abroad.

5. If, as the Board fear, it is found to be impracticable to extend the Cape Spartel arrangement to other lighthouses in Morocco, they would suggest, for Sir Edward Grey's consideration, as an alternative, that questions as to the lighthouses to be erected, the lighthouse administration, and the imposition of light dues for their support should be in the hands of the Moorish Government, who should be guided by the advice of the corps diplomatique at Tangier. It would, of course, be open to the Moorish Government to make the necessary financial arrangements with some suitable company, and it would be the duty of the corps diplomatique to see that light dues were kept within reasonable limit, and that the proceeds were only utilised for lighthouse purposes.

6. If a service on these lines can be established and is found to work satisfactorily, Cape Spartel lighthouse might possibly be included therein, and the international contributions in aid of that lighthouse abolished. This possibility is contemplated in the correspondence which has passed between the Foreign Office and His Majesty's Minister (see p. 2 of Mr. Lister's despatch of the 21st September, 1910).

7. I am to add that if light dues are levied the Board would be glad if Sir E. Grey would favour them with an opportunity of considering the scheme in detail and of offering their criticisms on it, especially as regards the scale of dues to be levied and the classes of shipping which would be called upon to pay.

8. The collection of moderate dues from shipping actually putting in at Moorish ports would, the Board assume, be agreed to by the shipping interests in consideration of the facilities provided, but the question of obtaining contributions from the passing trade would be difficult, if not impracticable.

I am, &c.
WALTER J. HOWELL.

[4995] No. 40.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 2, 1911.

I HAVE had under my consideration your despatch No. 18 of the 5th ultimo, in which you express the opinion that any attempt on the part of the Spanish Government to enlarge the scope of the cession of Ifni, made to them by the Moorish Government in 1883, should be resolutely opposed.

I agree that the creation of a Spanish territory like Ceuta or Melilla, in the south of Morocco, would be most undesirable, especially if the Germans were to secure a privileged position there. But the French Government would appear to be debarred from raising any objection by the terms of the secret agreement of the 3rd October, 1904; and the formal acceptance by His Majesty's Government of the provisions of that agreement would make opposition on their part equally difficult.

It is true that Ifni was ceded "for the formation thereon of a fishery establishment," but this must have been overlooked when the secret agreement was concluded. In article 4 of that instrument it is stipulated that the territory of the Spanish establishment at Ifni should not extend northwards beyond a certain limit, and in article 6 the French Government agree to "Spain establishing herself at any moment in the region defined by article 4, provided she has come to a previous understanding with the Sultan." There is no indication as to the extent of the concession southwards or inland from Ifni, but northwards to the limit fixed by article 4 is some 65 miles,

and it will be practically impossible for the French to contend that in agreeing to the cession of so large a tract of country, they merely contemplated the formation of a fishery establishment.

Again, it might be argued that such a cession was incompatible with the preservation of the territorial *status quo* in Morocco and the integrity of the Sultan's dominions, which figures so prominently in the preamble to the Act of Algeciras. If, however, His Majesty's Government were to suggest that anything in the Algeciras Act was contrary to, and therefore superseded *pro tanto* previous stipulations contained in either the Anglo-French declaration of 1904 or the Franco-Spanish agreement of the same year, very delicate problems might arise. I think that it would be more prudent to avoid putting forward such a view, and it appears to me that the best cause for His Majesty's Government will be to secure the opening of the port of Ajadir.

I request that you will furnish me with your observations on the subject, and that you will report any further information which may come to your knowledge in regard to the alleged arrangement between Spain and Germany in regard to Ifni.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[7911] No. 41.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 4.)

(No. 28.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 27, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 23 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, dealing with the situation created by the military executions at Fez, and the extension of the new military penalties to civilians.

I agree with much that Mr. MacLeod says, at the same time it appears to me difficult to meddle in the matter. The French Legation are fully aware of the situation, and I gather that M. Gaillard, their very able consul at Fez, deplores what has happened no less than Mr. MacLeod.

The despatch in question only arrived just in time to catch the bag, but I propose to talk the whole matter over with the French chargé d'affaires, and I shall have the honour of reporting our conversation to you in a subsequent despatch.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 41.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 14. Confidential.)

Sir, *Fez, February* 21, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatches No. 11, Confidential, of the 6th instant and No. 12 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to state that, in the course of general talk on current events last evening but one, I chanced to ask my French colleague what impression had been produced by the military executions here on the 28th ultimo.

M. Gaillard replied that he understood they had made an unfavourable impression at Tangier and that his disapproval of them was concurred in at the French Legation. Commenting on these cases in detail, M. Gaillard observed that the current report to the effect that one of the executed men was a Ghiata tribesman and not a soldier at all was quite true. This had been quite understood by all the authorities concerned but the position was that such offences were punishable as prescribed by the new regulations for the army whether the offenders were soldiers or civilians.

M. Gaillard added that he had only glanced through the new regulations hastily one day at the French Legation so he could not speak with certainty as to their terms.

As I thought this view somewhat strange, we together examined the text of the new regulations (see Enclosure No. 1 in my despatch No. 12 of the 6th instant), whereupon M. Gaillard admitted quite spontaneously that they did not contain a single word imposing their terms on anybody but members of the army. We concurred

entirely, moreover, in thinking that the extension of such novel penalties to tribespeople and townspeople, and the trial and punishment of such civilians by the military authorities might, quite possibly, create much resentment.

Moreover, these punishments are everywhere ascribed to foreign influence, and so in any acts of reprisal excited by them foreigners would be the most likely sufferers, and so it was to be hoped there would be no more of such punishments of civilians.

To-day I hear that six tribesmen of Ulad-el-Hadj, a tribe in the jurisdiction of the basha of Old Fez, have been tried by the Minister for War, who consults, of course, with the commandant of the French military mission, under the army regulations, and each was sentenced to six months' imprisonment and a thrashing for buying and receiving from deserters two uniforms, one horse, and two saddles and bridles. The minimum sentence, under the regulations, for this offence is two years' imprisonment, and the sentence is a less punishment than would, probably, have been inflicted by the basha.

Still, I would submit for consideration whether such proceedings cannot but weaken the proper authority of the basha.

Some tribes, too (though Ulad-el-Hadj is not one of these), are particularly sensitive to being punished, or even governed, by any but kaïds chosen from such tribes themselves.

In view, too, of the association of the French military mission with such punishments, I beg to call attention to the danger of tribesmen forming an impression that the Makhzen is imposing government by "Christians" upon them, and, indeed, that the Makhzen themselves are being governed by "Christians."

It is true that, on the whole, the Sultan has continued hitherto to consolidate and strengthen his hold on the interior; but may it not be asked whether, however successful the French military mission's present efforts may be, he can, before two or three years yet (at the least) be in a position to, without imprudence, disregard the creating of such impressions as have been herein described?

During the last twelve months the number of French instructors has been increased from ten to twenty (of all military services), and now ten more, I understand, are expected shortly, and, adding the two British instructors, the total will soon be thirty-two.

For purposes of proper instruction even that number may seem too small, but I cannot help wondering whether the effect, in other directions, of such increases is adequately realised?

To Fez, and especially to the cattle-market spaces and the palace precincts, where all these instructors are to be seen at their duties drilling the troops, resort tribesmen from far and near, many of whom have rarely seen a Christian in their lives.

To them such numbers seem very great, and they carry home heady reports that they see Christians "everywhere"; "Christians command all the soldiers"; the Makhzen are doing just whatever the Christians tell them," and so forth.

The new system has now been in work four months. Warm, comfortable clothes and regular pay have lost their pleasant novelty. Both for officers and men the process of weaning from their old habits is at its most painful stage. Many of them in the past have experienced a few weeks of work and then a rest. But now months pass and the work gets harder and harder, and sufficient time has not elapsed for them to have become hardened to it. The men now ask each other: "Who does so much work as we for 3 rvn (say, 5*d.*) a-day?"; and the officers say: "We are as much restricted as the men, and where are our profits? We could make more at our homes ploughing!"

Finding the work too constant, some of the men, of course, desert, and these betake themselves, with further stories of "Christians'" undue influence with the Makhzen and "Christians' governance of Moslems," and the like, chiefly to such tribes as I have described, where they are most secure against pursuit.

Of course all these are consequences inseparable, to some extent, from the reforming of the army. The reforming of the army is obviously vitally necessary, and all intelligent persons here (Moors as well as Europeans) are unanimous in their admiration of the ability, courage, and tireless energy Commandant Mangin and his staff display towards achieving it. I cannot help wondering, however, whether the French military mission fully realise the importance of the manner adopted to accomplish such a change, the manner, indeed, in such a case, often presenting more risk or dangers than the change itself. Whether, for instance, it is wise (for the military mission's own ends) to concentrate practically all their efforts and display

all their increase of numbers at such a point as Fez, where they have such far-reaching and undesirable effects, and, still more, to irritate fanatical feeling in such ways as by the military mission's, in their own foreign persons, imposing (*i.e.*, as seen by the native public, for the instructors are always visible and the Minister of War is a mere lad) the new army regulations on tribesmen as well as soldiers.

These ill-effects may not, of course, be seen very plainly just at once. As between the military mission and the soldiers, the risky time will be rather when the bulk of the troops and of the instructors leave Fez with the Sultan. On their part, too, the tribesmen will be most likely to defer any practical manifestation of their feelings until the court is well away from Fez.

The situation after the Sultan's departure has also to be considered. A certain number of instructors and troops will be left here, but the Minister of War will be absent. Are the cases of civilians accused of offences against the military regulations to be dealt with by the senior instructor or by the civilians' own governor? Or are they to wait till the Minister of War and head of the French military mission can be communicated with? Both of these courses may, perhaps, cause irritation, and in some cases, perhaps, undeserved hardship.

Taking both present and future needs into account, I would beg to submit for your Excellency's consideration whether the difficulty could not be equally well met and the reforms in the army best promoted by the cases of such civilians being dealt with by their respective governors at the joint complaint of the senior instructor and senior native military officer, and the governor's being directed beforehand by the Sultan to inflict penalties, within the ordinary law and practice, and if the complainants were not satisfied with the decision or sentence, that the accused person be kept in prison until the Sultan's decision be obtained.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[7912] No. 42.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 29.)
Sir, *Tangier, February 27, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 9 of the 6th instant, transmitting copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, relative to the police at Moorish ports.

I regret that the French Minister should hold the opinion that it would not be possible to expect the urban police to perform the ordinary duties of police, as it has always appeared to me that this would solve the question, pending a reconsideration of the whole matter at the end of this year, when the term for which the police was instituted in its present form, expires. As soon as it was known that the French Government had no objection to the reinforcement of the police force at Laraiche by men drawn from the Casa Blanca force, the acting doyen of the corps diplomatique referred the question to the Inspector-General of the Police, and asked him for his opinion. Colonel Muller replied that he considered the force of 175 men now at Laraiche to be quite inadequate, and that he was strongly in favour of the transfer of a portion of the extra urban police at Casa Blanca to Laraiche, all the more so as it would enable him to utilise men who up to now had practically been without employment. A letter to Cid Guebbas suggesting that such a transfer should be made has been drafted by M. de Rappard, and is now being circulated amongst the representatives of the Powers.

I understand that the robberies have ceased at Laraiche; they were almost all traced to one man, who has been caught.

The incident in connection with the urban police at Tangier, which formed the subject of my despatch No. 15 of the 2nd instant, is, I hope, closed, the guards sent down by the Basha having been withdrawn. M. de Rappard proposed writing a note to Cid Guebbas on the subject, but I strongly opposed his proposal. Nothing had been done to alter the *statu quo*, and it appeared to me that a note to the Makhzen might only arouse suspicions on their part, that the representatives of the Powers wished in some way to modify the police arrangements made under the Act of Algeciras.

My opinion is that it would be advisable, if possible, to allow the whole matter of the police to rest until it automatically comes up for discussion at the end of the first

five years. The idea of the French, of course, is that the security of the towns will be entrusted to a municipal police force, but I must say that until that idea is realised, it seems to me a pity that we should not take advantage of the efficient body of men whom we have at our disposal, all the more so, as if they are not to perform ordinary police duties they can have hardly anything to do inside the towns.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[7323] No. 43.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 6, 1911.*

IN the note which you addressed to the doyen of the diplomatic corps at Tangier on the 13th January last with regard to the proposals of the Société marocaine de Travaux publics, you stated that His Majesty's Government reserved their opinion relative to the contract for the structural work of the lighthouses, and that they did not approve of the control of the lighthouses being entrusted to a private company. I am now in a position to furnish you with the views of His Majesty's Government on these two points.

As regards the contracts, I agree with the Trinity House and the Board of Trade that the contracts for the lighthouses should be in two sections, viz., for the optical apparatus, and for the structural work. You will have received in the print sections a copy of the letter from the Board of Trade of the 24th January last dealing with this point.

As regards the control and management of the lighthouses, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a further letter from the Board of Trade.* As an arrangement on the lines of the Cape Spartel Convention appears to be impossible, I consider that the alternative suggested in the 5th paragraph of the letter from the Board would be the most desirable solution. In this connection I should be glad to know what arrangements were proposed for the control of the lighthouses which the Public Works Committee had decided to build before the Société marocaine came forward with their scheme. It would simplify matters if a service on the lines now suggested by the Board had been in contemplation.

In calling your special attention to paragraph 7 of the enclosed letter, I may observe that as the question is a complicated one, and as British shipping will be largely affected, I rely on you to keep me fully informed as to the details of any schemes which may be put forward in regard to the lighthouses; and meanwhile I should be glad to learn how the question now stands, and whether it has been formally discussed by the diplomatic body.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8457] No. 44.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, March 7, 1911.*

THE agitation amongst the tribes in the Fez district is assuming a serious aspect. A mehalla, under the command of the French instructors, has been sent out, and the future must depend on whether it is successful or not. The agitation is due partly to the extortionate levies of the Moorish Government, and partly to the bad impression which has been created by the recent military executions.

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* No. 39.

[8755] No. 45.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 9.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, March* 9, 1911.

MY telegram No. 3.

The Consular Agent at Alcazar reports that the Sherarda and Hejawa tribes have been defeated by the Government mehalla, which is now advancing towards the district of the Beni Hassen. The latter are preparing to resist the Government forces, and it is said that several other tribes have joined with them.

[8801] No. 46.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 10.)

(No. 27. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, March* 6, 1911.

THE French Ambassador was good enough to inform me last night, in the course of conversation, that, on the eve of the fall of M. Briand's Government, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris had sent into M. Pichon a formal note inviting the concurrence of the French Government in the dispatch of a Spanish Military Mission to Fez. M. Geoffray considers this demand very inopportune, and he took advantage yesterday of a chance conversation with the Spanish Prime Minister to express clearly his views on the subject. He pointed out to Señor Canalejas that, as already remarked by M. Pichon in conversation with Señor Perez Caballero on the 8th February, which formed the subject of my despatch No. 20, Confidential, of the 12th ultimo, the establishment of a fresh military mission, side by side with the French one, to which the people of Morocco had now become accustomed, would inevitably excite the suspicions of other Powers. It would bear the appearance of a design on the part of France and Spain jointly to undertake the military subjugation of the country. The proposal, moreover, was not a practical one. Was it intended that half the Moorish army should be under French, and the other half under Spanish instructors, or was there to be a joint Franco-Spanish superintendence of the whole? The experience of Casa Blanca was not favourable to the prospect of a harmonious understanding being established at Fez between two independent bodies of officers, one French and the other Spanish; and M. Geoffray added that, in his opinion, the legitimate interests of Spain would be fully guaranteed by the arrangement suggested by M. Pichon to the effect that, in the event of military operations under French instructors being contemplated within the recognised Spanish sphere of influence, a previous understanding should be first arrived at between the Makhzen and the Spanish Legation at Tangier. He deprecated therefore any further insistence by Spain on the proposal put forward by Señor Perez Caballero.

M. Geoffray thinks he made some impression on the mind of Señor Canalejas, who, he suspects, is influenced in this question by pressure from the Spanish army, and from the King. He has informed the Spanish Government that, in the Morocco question, as in other fields of foreign affairs, M. Cruppi, the new French Minister of that department, intends to follow strictly in the course marked out by his predecessor.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[8949] No. 47.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 3, 1911.

I ASKED the French chargé d'affaires to-day what news he had received from Fez. He told me that he felt convinced that the Sultan's journey would have to be put off. It appears that the Sherarda tribes, about 30 miles from Fez, have entered into negotiations with the Zemmour, the Zaian, and the Beni Hassan, and have banded together to oppose the passage of the Sultan through their territory. It has

consequently been decided to send the new Mehalla out against the Sherarda. The Commandant Mangin will himself take the command, and much depends upon the result of the operations. If successful, the Sultan's journey will be undertaken at once, and will partake of the nature of a triumphal progress; if unsuccessful, it is unlikely that he will leave Fez at all. The expedition started on the 28th February.

I told M. de Billy that I heard that the Makhzen was much preoccupied at the idea that a punitive expedition against the Zaer might be undertaken by the French at the moment that the Sultan was at Rabat, which would make a most unfortunate impression in the country. He said he fully shared this view, as also did M. Gaillard; he had written on the subject to Paris. In his opinion it would be far better for all reasons that the punishment of the Zaer should be entrusted to the Moorish forces, who could easily effect it, if successful in their present operations. A great deal of expense and risk would be spared to the French; there would be no need for an increase of the expeditionary force, which had now been considerably reduced; the effect both in Morocco and Europe would be far better, and the Zaer country, which was very rich, if subdued by the Makhzen forces would yield a considerable amount to the Imperial treasury.

This was, however, only his personal opinion, and he had no idea what the views of his Government were.

The military party must always be taken into consideration, and there was no doubt that they would be glad to see a punitive expedition undertaken, entailing an increase of the "Corps de Débarquement."

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—In this connection I have the honour to transmit a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca, reporting that he hears from a private source that operations against the Zaers are probable during the first half of this month.

R. L.

Enclosure in No. 47.

Consul Madden to Mr. Lister.

(No. 38. Confidential.)
Sir, *Casa Blanca, February* 25, 1911.

I AM privately informed, from a source likely to be well acquainted with French plans, that operations against the Zaers in consequence of the recent Merchouch ambush, are probable during the first half of March. The military road, which will permit of the transport of artillery into Zaer, is being continually pushed forward by soldiers from Camp Boucheron. The decision of the French Government as to sending reinforcements, is not certain yet but it is rumoured that 3,000 troops will be sent; and it is stated in the French press that the authors of the ambush have returned to their fields, after having fled into the interior of the country.

As regards the affair of the ambush I hear privately that it was the captain in charge of the detachment whom the Zaer Arabs wished to kill, and not the unfortunate Lieutenant Marchand, who met his death. It is said that for some reason the captain was unpopular, and his life had been attempted before. The lieutenant was wounded in the leg, and fell, and fired his revolver, receiving his death wound afterwards. The captain was not even wounded.

It is rumoured in French circles that a new general is to be sent here, and this seems not unlikely, as General Moinier, who has been general for two years, was colonel here before his promotion, so that his time must be nearly up. The French Government have been strictly applying the rule that no officer may serve here for more than three years, no matter what his position may be.

I hear privately that General Allix may be sent here as commander-in-chief. It seems that there is considerable competition for the post of general at Casa Blanca, as, I learn, that when General Moinier went to Paris last autumn to give explanations regarding the unfortunate Tadla expedition, no less than eight or nine French generals at once put down their names for employment as French commander at Casa Blanca.

The French Government appear to set their face resolutely against any of their officers going into the interior, even on a visit. A colonel tells me that a captain in the army here desired to visit Marrakesh, but was forbidden to do so as long as he was in official employment. Having since absolutely severed his connection with the "Corps de Débarquement," he has now gone up there as an ordinary tourist.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

[8950] No. 48.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 32. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 4, 1911.

DURING the week I have had two conversations with the French chargé d'affaires on the subject of the military executions (see my despatch No. 28), and M. de Billy has assured me that the excitement with regard to them has quieted down. This may be correct as regards Fez itself, but I think there is no doubt that much of the effervescence and agitation amongst the tribes reported in my preceding despatch is to be attributed to them. Mr. MacLeod writes to me privately that the exactions of the Grand Vizier el Glawi are also to some extent responsible. Both he and M. Gaillard regret that the new troops are being sent out, for, of course, if any mishap befalls them it will be attributed to the new system, and it appears doubtful whether in the very short time (four months) they can have learned enough to be able to fight in the—to them—new way. The fact, too, that they are under the command of the French instructors will make it all the more apparent to the tribes that the Imperial forces obey the orders of Christians, and increase the excitement and irritation which already exists. At the same time the moment is no doubt critical, and the Sultan probably realises that he must avail himself of all the resources at his disposal to ensure success.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[8951] No. 49.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 33.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 5, 1911.

SINCE writing my immediately preceding despatch of yesterday's date news of a disquieting nature has arrived from Fez. The Sherarda have pillaged the village of Mekkes within 20 miles of the capital, and the rising has become general. The French chargé d'affaires is evidently very anxious; he is convinced that the situation has been created to a great extent by El Glawi, who for some time past has been intriguing against the French instructors, and is seeking for some means to destroy or, at least, discredit them. Troubled waters were necessary for his fishing, and in order to procure these he embarked on a course of exactions which he felt convinced must in time drive the tribes to desperation. His object has now been attained; the tribes have revolted; but he is careful to give out that the rising is solely and entirely due to the executions ordered by the Christians. He has prevailed upon the Sultan to send out the new and only partially trained mehalla with its French instructors to quell the disturbances. Their presence will, he hopes, add fuel to the flame, and, in the meantime, his agents are inciting the troops to desert or to turn upon their Christian officers.

This theory may or may not be correct; it looks rather like an attempt on the part of the French instructors to attribute to other causes what was really the result of a grave mistake on their part. In any case, the situation is fraught with considerable danger, and there were reports in the town yesterday that Commandant Mangin had been assassinated.

Glawi has asked for a force of 1,500 men to be sent up from the south, and permission has been requested from the French military authorities for them to pass through the Shawia.

There are many people in this country whose opinion is not to be despised who are convinced that El Glawi intends, sooner or later, to attempt to place himself on the Throne. If the Shereefian mehalla were defeated and the 1,500 troops from the south were to arrive at Fez his position would be a temptingly strong one. Menebhi, however, whom I saw this morning, tells me that Hadj Thami will never send the troops, and if he did he doubts whether they would ever be allowed to reach Fez, as the Grand Vizier is now detested throughout the country. Menebhi considers the situation excessively critical; he receives daily letters from his brother-in-law, Bou Mohammed-el-Shergui, a man of very great position at Fez, and the news grows worse every day. Menebhi says that all may still be saved if Glawi will consent to withdraw the mehalla; if it moves on a step further into the country it will certainly be destroyed, and Fez may then very likely be invested by the tribes, who for once appear to be united in concentrated rage against El Glawi.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[8952] No. 50.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 34. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 5, 1911.

I HAVE received and read with great interest Sir M. de Bunsen's despatches Nos. 18 and 20, Confidential, reporting conversations with the French Ambassador at Madrid as to the possibility of an improvement in Franco-Spanish relations with regard to Morocco. It will be interesting to note whether the change of Government in France will produce any change in French policy in this country. I gather from M. de Billy that the orientation of the policy is likely to remain the same, although it may very possibly be prosecuted with greater vigour. M. de Marcilly, the head of the Bureau du Maroc at the Quai D'Orsay, who is hand in glove with M. Regnault, is an intimate friend of M. Cruppi, and their counsels will in all probability prevail even more than before. The advent of a new Spanish Minister at Tangier will no doubt ease the situation, and I must say that in a recent conversation which I had with the Marquis de Villa Sinda I was very favourably impressed by what he told me with regard to the line which he intended to adopt here. He said that he thought it most regrettable that bad blood should be made between colleagues over trivial matters connected with the Conseil sanitaire, the Commission d'Hygiène, the Spartel Lighthouse, &c., which had no political importance. He had every intention of banishing the political and nationality elements from all such questions, and of doing all in his power to get them settled as quickly and as amicably as possible. He would reserve all his force to fight for things which were of real importance. I replied that I was too delighted to hear him say this; that I held precisely the same view, and that he would always find me ready to assist by all the means in my power in promoting harmony and frank co-operation.

I believe I am right in thinking that M. de Villa Sinda was employed in the Moorish Department of the Spanish Foreign Office before coming to Tangier, and it may possibly have been the experience of his predecessor's methods which led him to speak as he did.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[8953] No. 51.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 35. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 5, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 13 of the 21st ultimo, in which you approve my proposal to insist upon authority being given for the sale of Messrs. Fernau's "gourna" land to be effected.

I have since received the enclosed despatch from His Majesty's consul at Casa

Blanca, and in view of the urgency of the matter, as reported by Messrs. Fernau, I asked M. Luret to come and see me. I explained to him the new development in the situation, and asked him if he could have the matter arranged at once, as I understood that he shared our view that Messrs. Fernau's claim to the land in question was incontestable. He replied that the matter was no longer in his hands. That after his interview with Mr. White he had written to Cid Mokri in Paris to say that he was satisfied of the validity of Messrs. Fernau's claim, and to ask that orders might be sent for the property to be removed from the register of State domains. He had as yet received no reply, and he suggested that I should telegraph direct to Cid Mokri on the subject. This I have done (see enclosed telegram). M. Luret added that it was just possible that Mokri might make difficulties, in which case I must, of course, raise the question officially. I hope very much that this may not be necessary, all the more so as Ali Zaky Bey, who has just returned from Paris, told me this morning that the Makhzen were rather annoyed at the activity shown lately by the Contrôle de la Dette, and regretted the line they were taking in the matter of title-deeds. The customs receipts, he said, had been very high lately, the loan was perfectly well secured, and there was no necessity to stir up all this trouble and bad blood with regard to alleged properties of the Makhzen. The German, Dutch, Spanish, and Italian Legations had already taken up a very strong line in the matter, and the Makhzen would soon find themselves in opposition to all the Powers. The register on which the Contrôle based their contention could hardly be taken seriously. For instance, the whole of the Fahs figured in it as Makhzen property, and consequently the title-deeds of the British and German Legations were just as much open to question as those of private holders of land which were now being attacked.

I must say I think that the Contrôle are ill-advised, and if they continue in their present course it appears certain that the question will be raised officially by one or other legation, and they will find the large majority of the Powers against them. It would, I imagine, be difficult for us to allow our compatriots to be subjected to treatment which all, or almost all, the other Governments decline absolutely to admit in the case of their subjects.

I was struck with the bitterness with which Ali Zaky spoke of M. Guiot and the Contrôle de la Dette. They were trying, he said, to make the administration of Morocco French instead of Moorish. This, he felt sure, was quite contrary to the views of the French Government and of the Chamber, and very much to be regretted. He hinted that a considerable amount of friction already existed between M. Regnault and M. Guiot on this subject.

A tiresome incident in connection with a question of a cognate nature has been reported to me by His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador in a despatch, copy of which is enclosed. I consider that until in accordance with article 63 of the Act of Algeciras the question of the rents of Makhzen properties and habous has been settled by representatives of the diplomatic body in agreement with the special commissioner to be appointed by the Sultan the old procedure must be followed, and the Contrôle de la Dette are quite unjustified in demanding that the tenants should enter into contracts of lease with their representatives. I stated this opinion to Mr. Johnstone in the despatch to which he refers.

I spoke confidentially on the subject to the French chargé d'affaires, and told him that I thought the sooner the commission provided for in article 63 of the Act of Algeciras was appointed the better, as until the question was finally settled incidents similar to the one reported by Mr. Johnstone must constantly recur, and must inevitably create bad feeling. M. de Billy appeared to share my view.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 51.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Mr. Lister.

(No. 11.)

Mogador, February 20, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith the copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. A. Abrahams, a British subject in this town, in which he exposes a somewhat disagreeable occurrence on the 18th instant in which he suffered some violence, but as stated in the letter he does not press for reparation, M. Ranouil having already offered his apologies. The proceedings appear to me to

have been high-handed, as it has always so far been customary here to deal in an action affecting European subjects and protégés through their consular officers. M. Ranouil and M. Debets came to call on me yesterday, and expressed their regret for what had occurred, at the same time saying it would be very advantageous for Europeans to make new contracts of lease at present, as they would obtain better terms, than if they waited until the special commission provided for under article 63 of the Algeciras Act had been formed. I, bearing in mind your Excellency's despatch No. 22 of the 29th December last, told the gentlemen that it would be impossible for me to advise any of the British community in the sense they suggested, having already received instructions on the subject.

I had already received a complaint from Mr. Haim Levy, Jewish interpreter to this vice-consulate, that last week a French gentleman, accompanied by the Amin Mustaphad's soldier, came to his house and demanded to be shown over it for purposes of valuation. Mr. Levy allowed him to see over the house, but subsequently ascertained that he had entered no other European domicile in the town in the same manner. It now appears that the gentleman who visited Mr. Levy was M. Ranouil, referred to in Mr. Abrahams' letter.

Mr. Abrahams' position is somewhat difficult, as he is living with his nephew, who is a French citizen, but he is very deeply hurt that the governor's soldiers should have been employed against him without any reference being made to his vice-consul. As soon as I heard of the affair I first sent down my interpreter, Mr. Cecil Broome, to the garden in dispute, and subsequently my soldier. However, as apologies have been offered I do not wish personally to move any further in the matter. However, these proceedings are quite novel and unusual here, and I should be grateful for instructions as to my behaviour on possible similar occasions.

I have, &c.

H. B. JOHNSTONE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 51.

Mr. Abrahams to Vice-Consul Johnstone.

Mogador, February 19, 1911.

Sir,

THE following are the facts in connection with the recent acquisition by me of a key in this town and with the proceedings taken against me yesterday.

Last June, being a month or so after I came here, I was negotiating for the purchase of a key, and called upon you, as there were rumours of impending changes, to enquire whether there were any new regulations to be observed in such matters. You told me that the only conditions were those which you read to me. These were that any purchase must be made in accordance with local custom and with notification to the local authorities (the final appeal being to the Minister for Foreign Affairs), and that no other stipulations were in force. Accordingly, I entered into negotiations for the purchase of a garden house in Derb Allal-ben-Mohamed, in the Madina quarter. These proceedings finally came to a head on the 14th July, the date on which I paid the first instalment of the purchase money to the then tenant, Elmahdi Esherffy. On the same evening my representative in this matter, M. Leon Corcos, acting for me, as I do not understand the language, called upon the governor of this town and the Amin Mustaphad and notified to them the purchase, thereby giving notice to the local authorities, in accordance with local usage. On the third day from this, the French colony were notified that the transference of keys was thenceforth subject to new regulations. As my representative and cousin, M. Leon Corcos, is a French subject, and as besides it was my then intention to make this key purchase for his sister who is now my ward and is at present residing in London—but who is also a French subject—we thought we should be acting with strict correctness were we to inform M. Debets (the acting contrôleur of the State properties here) what had occurred just before the issue of this notice. Accordingly, we went to see him immediately in business hours, but we did not find him there. We had to call twice before we could see him by appointment. M. Corcos and I had an interview with him, in which I informed him that I, a British subject, having previously asked my consul what formalities had to be gone through in purchasing keys and having gone through these formalities had bought this key, and had paid an instalment of the purchase money. Although the new regulations concerned only future transactions—if they concerned

me at all—as French interests might also be involved, we gave him immediate notice of the purchase, now that we knew he was interested in such transactions. This would be about the 17th July last.

Elmahdi Esherffy had then left Mogador on business which was to keep him absent for some months, and he left his family in our charge, with instructions to keep them supplied with a weekly allowance while he was away, and also to discharge an outstanding debt to a tradesman here. My outlays were all to be on account of the purchase money, and his family were to be removed on his return, when I was to be given vacant possession of the garden by the transfer to me of the key. His business kept him away much longer than he expected, and it was only towards the end of last year that he came back. During all this time the weekly allowances were continued by me to his family, and he, soon after his return, took steps to complete his engagement.

From time to time in the course of all these months both M. Corcos and myself had met M. Debets, and knowing that I was interested in the subject he had spoken to me in general terms of contracts, and had frequently asked M. Corcos whether we were yet in occupation of the garden. As soon, then, as Elmahdi Esherffy was ready, about three or four weeks ago, we again notified the Amin Mustaphad, and I went to see him at his house with M. Corcos and a third gentleman to inform him that we were about to take possession, and to make an appointment for him to go with M. Corcos, as my representative, and Elmahdi Esherffy, as the vendor of the key, to call upon M. Debets to tell him that the transaction was completed. As arranged, M. Corcos and Elmahdi went there, and meeting the Amin Mustaphad at M. Debets' office, informed M. Juving, M. Debets' lieutenant, of these facts, and were told by M. Juving that he had taken note and would inform his chief, who was absent at the moment. The balance of the purchase money was then paid, and the key, giving possession, was formally handed over to me. All fees were then paid except the Amin's, who had demanded 50 dollars to be paid on completion of the transaction (which demand had been agreed to), but who now asked for double before he would issue his rent note, the only formality now remaining. I said I preferred to be without his note to being blackmailed. Entering the premises, we found the place was not habitable, and put one of our men to sleep there while some substantial but necessary repairs were effected. Some wooden hoarding concealed a crack in the wall, and when exposed this crack proved to be so dangerous that the wall required underpinning. To do this it was requisite to obtain the permission of the Amin Mustaphad, and we shut up the place on the 10th instant until this permission was secured. This gentleman came to see us on the 13th instant, examined the wall, and said we were to bring the mason. He himself suggested that large block-stones should be used, and these we proceeded to buy next day with the intention of doing the work this week.

Yesterday morning, the 18th instant, M. Debets called to see M. Corcos, who happened to be out. On his return home, M. Corcos went to seek M. Debets, met him, and went with him at his request to the Waterport to see the new inspector, M. Michard. This gentleman asked M. Corcos for the key of the garden. He, thinking that repairs, about which there had been so much talking lately, were in question, said he would be pleased to show him over at any time, but M. Michard replied that he wanted, not to be shown over, but to occupy it, and intended to take forcible possession if necessary. M. Corcos told him that he must refer that to the proprietor, and returned at once to tell me. I had a couple of chairs taken there to await their arrival, so that no violence need be used by them in forcing an entry, and I sent to you, Sir, for advice, as I was quite at a loss to understand the situation. Afterwards, while you kindly left Mr. Broome in charge during my absence, I came round to see you myself, and you took note of the particulars. I arranged with you that I should return, and, when the party came, should receive them and tell their leader that there was no occasion for violence, that they had only to place a finger upon me to represent *force majeure*, to which I would yield, taking my remedies through my consul. Soon after I returned a large party came along; they were surprised to find the door open, and entered to find me there. M. Debets asked by what right I was there, and I replied by right of holding the key handed to me on completion of a bargain which had been notified to him. I was asked if I had any document, and replied that, being a key and not property, there could be no deeds, if that was what he meant. M. Debets then said "no;" what he meant was a contract with them (the French administration), that being the only document they could recognise. I answered that, of course, he knew I had no such document. "Then,"

he said, "this gentleman" (turning to one of those who accompanied him, and who, I now understand, is the master of the French school) "has such a contract, and the garden belongs to him." I protested, and asked M. Debets what it all meant. He replied that it was all because I had refused to take his warning and make a contract with him. I answered that I had acquired the key under the old conditions, and therefore had nothing do with making contracts; also that I had notified to him the purchase in July last, and nothing had since been said to suggest that my occupation of the place would be irregular. He said that I had not told him that I had bought it, but only that I was in negotiation to do so, and that he had warned me to try and get back the money that I had paid. I asked him what money he referred to, and he said the money that I had said I had paid on account. "Then," I replied, "I must have told you that I bought, else how could I have said that I had paid anything on account?"

Some further members of the large party had kept entering the garden during my conversation with M. Debets. These consisted of the Amin Mustaphad, two carpenters and masons, and two governor's soldiers. They removed the furniture from the room and carried it out into the streets. The carpenters then boarded up the door and the Amin sealed it in three places. Observing what was being done, and wishing to enter a formal protest, I went along the passage and was closely followed by the French gentleman (who proved afterwards to be the new contrôleur, M. Michard, until then unknown to me). As soon as I reached the door and was half-way through he pushed it to shut me out, and, on my turning quickly to resist the pressure, my face was hit by the door and blood was drawn. I at once pushed the door back, and, seizing my assailant, severely punished him. Re-entering the garden I asked M. Debets why any violence had been used, seeing what I told him when he first came in. He said that I had spoken to the wrong person, that he was no longer contrôleur, but that the gentleman who had assaulted me now was. I asked him why he had not told me this before, and he shrugged his shoulders. The new contrôleur then asked me would I now yield to *force majeure*, and I replied that as real force had been used, and that I was awaiting a message from you, the circumstances had changed.

Yet another French gentleman now came in, and he proved to be the real chief of the administration. He asked me for an explanation, which I gave him. He walked down the place with me, and, seeing some of the repairs, asked me how long they had taken. I told him about three weeks. He said that he had been informed I had only taken possession that morning on hearing that the others were coming. I told him that, while it was true that I had a couple of chairs and a rug brought in then for my convenience in waiting for them, he could see this was not the case.

The Amin Mustaphad was then, in presence of all, accused by us of having known and sanctioned everything, and he had not a word to say to the contrary. M. Ranouil seemed to be vexed with his subordinates. He took me aside and asked me to let what had happened be considered as dead, and to regularise what he must call my irregular position by making a contract. I would find him, he added, very reasonable: so reasonable, indeed, that I must be a very unreasonable person myself for us not to come to terms. I said that for his sake I would not bring any technical charge of personal assault against M. Michard, although in all other matters I had placed myself in the hands of my consul, whose advice I would follow, and whom I would consult about his proposal. He pressed for a reply, which I promised to give him the same night. Then he restored the *status quo*, and at my request instructed the Amin to himself break open the seals and have the door reopened.

I consulted you again in the evening, and you informed me that I must decline the proposal, as your instructions were not to sanction any British subject making a contract. On my giving this reply to M. Ranouil later on, saying (with your permission) that it was official, and telling him that you had asked me for a statement of all the facts with a view to forward my letter to Tangier, he appeared to be greatly disappointed. He assured me again and again that there had been no intention to assault me personally, and he said to me that I had myself admitted that there had been a slight misunderstanding. Of course I had, and do. There must indeed have been a very big misunderstanding to have brought about the action of these people, but I freely admit that M. Ranouil's behaviour to me personally from the moment he appeared on the scene was all that I could desire, and I gratefully appreciate his timely intervention, which probably saved further regrettable incidents from being provoked by his subordinates.

It would seem that the sum and substance of my offence is not that I was not in

possession of documents which could not exist; not that I was there in peaceful possession with the knowledge and acquiescence of all the authorities, Moorish as well as French; but that I had not made a contract with the French administration—a contract which you, Sir, now inform me that I, as a British subject, may not make. For this offence a contract had already been given over my head by the French administration to a gentleman of their own nationality, and, to enforce the carrying out of the contract so given, recourse was had to the native authorities for the use of their soldiers against me, thereby depriving me of all the protection which is my due and violating the conventions under which European subjects are now living in this country.

I feel that I am entitled to all the redress that such outrageous conduct calls for.

I await to hear from you, Sir, what further action I am to take to regularise my position, and remain, &c.

A. ABRAHAMS.

Enclosure 3 in No. 51.

Mr. Lister to Cid-el-Mokri.

(Télégraphique.) *Tanger, le 4 mars*, 1911.

PRIE votre Excellence de bien vouloir donner suite à l'avis favorable exprimé par le Contrôle de la Dette et envoyer le plus tôt possible des ordres pour qu'on raye du registre des domaines du Makhzen la propriété de Messrs. Fernau dite Gourna située à Casablanca.

L'affaire est urgente.

[8954] No. 52.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 36.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 5, 1911.

ALI ZAKY BEY, who has just returned from Paris, called to see me yesterday.

He told me that the two loans were practically arranged, and all would have been settled by now had the fall of the Ministry not intervened. He imagined, however, that the delay would only be a very short one, as M. Caillaux had been kept *au courant* of all the negotiations; in fact, in many instances, his suggestions had been followed. The two loans are for 30,000,000 fr. and 40,000,000 fr. respectively. The first will be employed for paying off the Makhzen debts over from the last loan; the second will be devoted to the building of ports at Tangier and Casa Blanca and to the construction of a railway from Tangier to Alcazar.

It was represented that of this second loan only a small portion would be required at once, and it appeared hard that the Makhzen should be obliged to pay 5 per cent. on the whole sum; at the same time, Mokri pointed out that some arrangement must be found which would ensure the various sums being at his disposal as he required them, as he could not lay himself open to being obliged to return each time to Paris and practically negotiate a fresh loan. The French authorities realized the justice of this, and M. Caillaux suggested that the full sum of 43,000,000 fr. should be handed over to the Moorish Government, and that they should pay 5 per cent. interest on it, but that the surplus which they did not require should be deposited at some French bank, who would pay them 4 per cent. on it. This Cid Mokri apparently agreed to, and as M. Caillaux is now Minister of Finance the matter will no doubt be arranged in this way. M. Regnault was to have left Paris on the 3rd of this month, but delayed his departure on account of the fall of the Government. Cid Mokri is not expected here for at least another month.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[8955] No. 53.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 37. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 5, 1911.

I HAVE received a cypher telegram from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca, stating that his German colleague has informed him that a German war-vessel will visit Casa Blanca shortly, and remain a few days. I asked the French chargé d'affaires whether he had been similarly informed. He replied that he had heard nothing from his consul, but that Guebbas had been round to see him about the matter, and appeared in somewhat of a twitter. The German Minister had, his Excellency said, made a very official notification of the arrival of the vessel to him, and he wondered whether there was more in it than met the eye! It must be remembered that Guebbas is of a very nervous temperament, and M. de Billy thinks that the notification was made specially official by Baron Seckendorff, who is a "formaliste" in the extreme.

I don't see any reason why a German war-vessel should not go to Casa Blanca, and probably it is thought that its presence may give some form of moral assistance to German commercial and agricultural enterprise in the Shawia, which is particularly active just now under the lead of the Mannesmanns.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[8956] No. 54.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 38.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 6, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of the events that have occurred here during the past week.

I have &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 54.

Weekly Summary of Events.

THE hostility of the tribes towards the Makhzen has developed considerably during the past week. The movement appears to have begun with a meeting of the tribes near Mequinez, which was attended by representatives of the Beni Mtir, Beni Mguild, Zemmour, and Guerouan. After an animated discussion of their grievances, the various representatives agreed that the moment had arrived for putting aside all intertribal differences, and decided to unite in opposition to the common enemy, the Makhzen. Two days later a similar union was formed between the Hiaina and the Taza tribes, as also between the Sherarda and Beni Hassen. Should this union of the tribes against the Makhzen prove really effective the situation will become most critical for the Sultan, as the capital will be completely cut off from communication with the coast.

The defection of the Sherarda tribe is of particular significance, as they have the quality of "Guich," which confers exemption from certain contributions and taxes in exchange for military services.

At the same time, it is reported that a somewhat serious reverse has been inflicted upon the small mehalla which was operating against the Beni Zeroual, under the command of Kaïd Ben Gilali, while the Sefrou road has been cut by the rebellious Ait Youssi tribe.

Meanwhile, intertribal troubles continue in the Dukala tribe, where there has been severe fighting between the different factions.

F. R.

[8957] No. 55.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 39.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 6, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca, transmitting regulations which have been drawn up by the consular body with a view to preventing encroachments on the public roads in that town.

I venture to suggest that I may be authorised to instruct Mr. Madden that he may enforce these regulations against persons under British jurisdiction.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 55.

Consul Madden to Mr. Lister.

(No. 42.)

Sir, *Casa Blanca, March* 1, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith translation of a letter addressed to me, as doyen of the consular corps, by the Shereef El Amrani, Viceroy of the Shawia, complaining of encroachments on the public roads by persons building on properties abutting on highways, to the great detriment of the public interest by narrowing streets and places. This letter was sent to me last September, and was considered at a consular meeting held at this consulate on the 6th September, 1910. I left on leave to England the day after the meeting, and I find that the *procès-verbal* was not sent to the legation. I therefore beg to enclose copy of the decisions taken by the consular body to prevent future encroachments, which decisions have, however, been in abeyance waiting for the consular agents, who had not sufficient powers, to obtain authority to subscribe to them and enforce them.

As the consular agents have now all notified me, as doyen, that they are empowered to agree to the rules made, a further consular meeting was held at this consulate on the 28th ultimo, in order to agree on a common procedure for the enforcement of the rules made on the 6th September last.

I beg to transmit the final rules drawn up by the consular body as embodied in the *procès-verbal* of the meeting of the 28th ultimo. I should be grateful if your Excellency would kindly inform me if I may enforce them as against persons under British jurisdiction as soon as you conveniently can.

I have, &c.

A. M. MADDEN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 55.

Shereef El Amrani to Consul Madden.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) *Shaaban* 26, 1328 (*September* 2, 1910).

TO the doyen of the consular body, the British consul at Casa Blanca. Salutations!

It is desired that you will be willing to further the good work by calling a meeting of the local consular corps to discuss the following matter, namely: That whereas the governor, having used all the means in his power towards preserving the proper width of the streets and keeping them wide enough for traffic, nevertheless certain proprietors persist in encroaching on the public lands and places by building new constructions thereon or by extending their old buildings by addition thereto, under plea of repairing their buildings, thereby going beyond their proper boundaries.

It is therefore desired that you should approve of a measure whereby "every foreign person desirous of commencing building operations should be required to apply to the Governor of Casa Blanca for approval of the boundary line, and should there be a difference of opinion between them it could be settled by the consul of the applicant's nationality."

At the present time buildings are being constructed without any regard to the boundaries, thereby restricting the road for passers-by and spoiling the appearance of the streets.

The roads outside the town leading out to the Shawia were traced originally to facilitate the movements of commerce and for the public benefit; but now certain people do not hesitate to destroy this useful work by taking possession of the sites of the roads, either by cutting them or narrowing them by trenches.

It is therefore requested that the consular body should use their authority towards putting a stop to this encroachment.

Peace.

MOHAMED-EL-AMRANI.

Enclosure 3 in No. 55.

Procès-verbal of Meeting of Consular Body, September 6, 1910.

A L'INVITATION de M. le consul d'Angleterre, doyen du corps consulaire, la réunion s'est faite au consulat d'Angleterre, le 6 septembre, 1910, à 11 heures du matin.

Présents:

Mr. Madden, MM. Navarro, Maenss, Maigret, Brandt, Butler, G. H. Fernau, et Garassino.

Après lecture et examen de la lettre reçue du Chérif Si Mohamed-el-Amrani, en date du 26 chaaban, 1328, adressée à M. le doyen du corps consulaire de Casablanca, il est décidé d'accepter en principe la proposition faite, dans la forme suivante:—

"Toute personne de nationalité étrangère qui désirerait entamer des opérations de construction en bordure de rues, routes, places ou chemins, est tenue de s'adresser au Gouverneur de Casablanca, pour que les limites soient fixées dans un délai de quinze jours au maximum. Dans le cas où il y aurait divergence d'opinion entre eux, le gouverneur aura recours à l'intervention amiable du consul de la nationalité du postulant."

Le corps consulaire s'engage à empêcher à l'avenir tout empiétement sur la voie publique.

Les agents consulaire qui n'ont pas de pouvoirs suffisants s'engagent à en référer à leurs légations respectives, pour être mis à même de faire respecter ces dispositions.

Le doyen du corps consulaire sera tenu informé par les agents intéressés au fur et à mesure qu'arriveront les réponses de Tanger.

A. M. MADDEN.
R. GOMEZ NAVARRO.
MAENSS.
G. H. FERNAU.
R. MAIGRET.
N. GARASSINO.
BRANDT.
H. F. BUTLER.
LAPEEN.
E. RUIZ.

Enclosure 4 in No. 55.

Procès-verbal of Meeting of Consular Body, February 28, 1911.

A L'INVITATION de M. le consul de Sa Majesté britannique, doyen du corps consulaire, la réunion s'est faite au consulat d'Angleterre, le 28 février, 1911, à 11 heures du matin.

Présents :

Mr. A. M. Madden, C.M.G., consul de Sa Majesté britannique, doyen du corps consulaire et gérant du vice-consulat de Portugal.
M. W. Maenss, consul d'Allemagne.
M. P. Alicot, consul suppléant de France.
M. L. Ariño, consul d'Espagne.
M. F. Brandt, consul honoraire d'Autriche-Hongrie.
M. G. H. Fernau, vice-consul de Suède.
M. H. F. Butler, vice-consul de Danemark et des Pays-Bas.
Mr. H. Toel, agent consulaire d'Amérique.
M. F. M. Fournier, gérant du vice-consulat de Belgique.

L'objet de la réunion est de se mettre d'accord sur une procédure commune à suivre en vue de rendre exécutoires les dispositions arrêtées par le corps consulaire à l'occasion de sa réunion du 6 septembre, 1910, qui avait pour but d'empêcher les empiétements sur la voie publique par des personnes construisant sur les bordures de rues, routes, places ou chemins.

Après discussion, on a décide d'un commun accord :—

1. Le rayon d'action compris dans l'arrêté consulaire du 6 septembre, 1910, est celui qui constitue actuellement la juridiction du Caïd de Casablanca.

2. Toute personne qui veut bâtir en bordure d'une rue, route, place ou chemin, doit s'adresser au Caïd de Casablanca, par l'intermédiaire de l'autorité consulaire dont elle relève, pour que les limites de sa propriété soient fixées dans un délai de quinze jours au maximum.

2. Toute contravention à ce règlement sera punie d'une amende de 50 fr., et la construction sera immédiatement arrêtée.

Le consul de Sa Majesté britannique se déclare conforme, sous réserve de l'approbation de ce règlement par la Légation d'Angleterre à Tanger.

[8973] No. 56.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 113.)

Sir, *Paris, March* 10, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 110 of yesterday, I have the honour to acquaint you that the "Matin" of to-day's date reports that General Moinier, the officer in command of the French troops at Casa Blanca, came to Paris some weeks ago on purpose to ask for reinforcements of from 3,000 to 4,000 men, in order to enable him to chastise the tribes responsible for the murder of Lieutenant Marchand. The "Matin" adds that at a meeting at the Élysée, at which were present M. Briand, M. Pichon, General Brun, and Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère, it was decided not to comply with General Moinier's request.

The "Temps" of this evening, however, publishes the following official communiqué which has been issued to the press by the Presidency of the Council :—

"Le Gouvernement n'a fait aucune communication concernant le Maroc et rien n'autorise à lui prêter l'intention de laisser impuni le guet-apens qui a coûté la vie au Lieutenant Marchand, au maréchal des logis Hyvert et à trois de nos soldats.

"Le Gouvernement obtiendra les réparations légitimes."

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[9200] No. 57.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.—(*Received at Foreign Office, March* 13.)

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Fez, March* 2, 1911.

THE following is what may be termed the Makhzen version of the situation in Sherarda. It has been afforded to me by the Grand Vizier through his first scribe, Sid Hamed Zemmouri, and is in harmony, as far as it goes, with what one hears elsewhere :—

2. Some few months ago the Sultan sent a mehalla to Zarhon and Sherarda, which tribes have been placed under the Grand Vizier, whose child-son became the nominal governor. This mehalla was under the Sultan's brother, Mulai Yusef.

3. In Zarhon nothing of importance occurred. From Sherarda a levy of 25,000 dollars and sixty days' maintenance ("mona") for the mehalla were demanded. Of these, 18,000 dollars and thirty-seven days' "mona" were paid. The Sherarda asked and were granted time to pay the balance, and this mehalla passed on to Feshtala, where it now is, and Mulai Yusef returned to Fez. There are no foreign instructors with it, and it is composed of troops not as yet reorganised. It is under the Kaïds Mohammad and Saïd Bagdadi, the latter of whom is Governor of Feshtala and Ulad Jama.

4. Completions of these sums being demanded the Sherarda refused to pay them, and drove away Omar Bugrin, commonly called "Bu Kador," the Grand Vizier's khalifa.

5. The Sultan found it intolerable that the Sherarda, a Makhzen tribe whose lands lie across all the usual trade routes to the coast, be allowed for a moment to remain in that attitude, and so had sent the present mehalla to bring these tribesmen to their senses at once; otherwise, they would presently be pillaging caravans and couriers, and so forth, and such an impression would be created in Morocco and abroad that the Makhzen was isolated and impotent as would lead to further and more widespread disorders.

6. Then, yesterday morning, a large party of Sherarda and (some say) Beni Hassan horsemen had entered Hejowa and successfully raided the camp of the Grand Vizier's khalifa there, Hamadi Bu Grin, brother of "Bu Kador," already referred to.

7. I should explain that, Sid Hamed Zemmouri chancing to call on me, we had, quite informally, discussed the situation, and I had deprecated in detail the Makhzen's action in not going easily with these loyal tribes, and in interrupting the training of the troops, and so forth. Somewhat to my surprise, Sid Zemmouri returned presently and said he had told the vizier of this, and the latter had sent him to narrate the Makhzen's version of the situation for your Excellency's information. It was clear to me that the vizier must be feeling very uncomfortable and eager for support.

8. So far the Makhzen version. The tribesmen, on their part, admit these facts, but add that they had paid as much as they could, and that the Grand Vizier thereafter had begun to quarter his khalifas and their retainers upon them. These proceeded from village to village exacting "mona" of 50 dollars a-night, and the like, and it was impossible to pay such sums and the Sultan's levies as well. They had no intention of pillaging caravans or couriers and would keep the roads safe, but they would resist any further exactions and would not tolerate the vizier's, in effect, paying his retainers by quartering them on these tribes.

9. This forenoon the French consul called on me, and confidentially informed me that on hearing of the raid into Hejowa he had, yesterday afternoon, gone near enough to the mehalla to have an interview with Commandant Mangin, and had urged on the latter the advisability of availing of every opportunity towards bringing the present state of things to a peaceable conclusion.

10. The attitude of the tribes was, M. Gaillard pointed out, merely "anti-Glawiste," and it would in every way be regrettable if the new (but still imperfectly trained) troops and the French Military Mission services were exploited and perhaps discredited for such an end, and with no accompanying advantage.

11. Commandant Mangin had entirely agreed with this, and had promised to do his best, *e.g.*, by a friendly conciliatory attitude to tribesmen who might want to come to the mehalla, and by guaranteeing their immunity from imprisonment or ill-usage of any sort, to promote that object.

12. M. Gaillard added that both he and Commandant Mangin had urged the

Sultan strongly not to send that mehalla, but the Sultan was inexorable, and in the end no choice was left but either to comply with His Majesty's wishes or to refuse the services of the French Military Mission, which would, M. Gaillard considered, have meant a sort of local rupture between the French and the Sultan, and would have placed the French in the position of being responsible should any of the disorders which the Sultan anticipated would follow the non-sending of the mehalla come to pass.

13. Between these two issues M. Gaillard said he was still in a most difficult position. I inferred from his embarrassment that he might be wanting some help, but was hesitating to ask for it. So I remarked that both he and the Makhzen knew of course that we (British) did not seek in any way to intervene in such matters. Still, the fact of about half the trade over those routes being British gave us a reasonable cause to speak if we saw traffic being needlessly interrupted, and so, if he wanted the Makhzen to be further impressed with his views towards that end, I would be happy to speak, in a "mutual-friendly" way, in such a sense. Our situation was such that I could speak thus quite frankly, and yet feel sure of incurring no responsibility as regards His Majesty's Government, nor of giving any offence to the Sultan.

14. M. Gaillard answered with some eagerness that this was just what had been in his mind, and that he would be very glad to avail of what I had suggested whenever the occasion arose.

15. 3 P.M. The British and German courier of the 28th February from Fez and the British and German courier of the 25th February from Tangier have come in, having been robbed by a party of Sherarda tribesmen. In the case of our mail of the 25th from Tangier, the most of the contents of the mail were saved.

These couriers report the Sherarda district to be in a very excited state, large parties of horsemen moving about, and apparently expecting to resist the mehalla as soon as it arrives.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[9199] No. 58.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 40.)

Sir, *Tangier, March 7, 1911.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 33 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report that the British and German couriers have been robbed on their way down from Fez. The French courier managed to get through, and M. de Billy has kindly communicated to me the enclosed extract from the latest despatch which has reached him from his consul at Fez. The feeling against the Grand Vizier is evidently very strong, and it would appear as though the north were rising up against the domination of the south; the present Sultan being of course identified with the latter.

M. de Billy also showed me an interesting despatch which he had received from M. Leriche, the French vice-consul at Rabat, who has spent many years in this country, and though unpractical and a dreamer, has a considerable knowledge of Moorish affairs. Speaking of the present rising of the tribes against the Makhzen, M. Leriche writes:—

"Il serait contraire à la réalité d'établir la moindre connection entre ce mouvement et l'expédition que nous projetons chez les Zaers: il n'y en a aucune. La cause des Zaers n'intéresse même qu'une partie de cette tribu, et les Zaers voisins de Rabat aussi bien que les autres Marocains, y sont fort indifférents.

"Loin que ce mouvement soit dirigé contre nous, il m'est revenu de plusieurs côtés que les tribus épuisées par les exactions incessantes du Makhzen, et fatiguées de l'insécurité permanente où elles vivent, désirent nous voir apporter la paix française telle qu'elles la remarquent dans le Shaouïa. C'est ailleurs qu'il faut chercher les causes de cette révolte et les motifs de la haine qui animent tout le peuple marocain contre leur Souverain.

"Loin de débarrasser son Empire des infidèles qui en occupent une partie, comme il s'y était engagé en montant sur le trône, Moulai Hafid a laissé les Espagnols s'étendre autour de Melilla et il a affermi la situation des Français en concluant avec eux de nouveaux emprunts. Ce sont là des raisons qu'on peut appeler

extérieures. Il y en a d'autres plus profondes qui touchent à la constitution intime et à l'esprit même du peuple marocain. Moulai Hafid n'a pas craint de toucher aux privilèges de la noblesse, les chorfa, d'une façon brutale, et, fait encore plus grave, il a osé s'attaquer aux coutumes religieuses de son peuple et le blesser ainsi dans ses sentiments les plus chers. Aux chorfa qu'il a traités fort durement il a supprimé sans aucun ménagement toutes les pensions que ses ancêtres se faisaient une loi de leur donner, trouvant que les pratiques religieuses de son peuple s'éloignent de la simplicité primitive de l'Islam, il s'était levé contre le culte des saints et les exercices de quelques confréries religieuses, principalement de la plus puissante peut-être, les Tidjania, qui comptent parmi ses membres la partie la plus influente de la bourgeoisie marocaine et à laquelle appartient le Grand Vizir."

The situation revealed is curious: the unscrupulous and, I imagine, totally irreligious El Glawi posing as the defender of religion against the Sultan, the Commander of the Faithful and the representative of the Prophet on earth, who is busy trying to destroy religious orders throughout the Empire.

Letters have just reached me from Mr. Carleton at Alcazar which paint the situation in very black colours. He reports that two French instructors, who left on the 4th for Fez, were obliged to return owing to the disturbed state of the country. The road to Fez is practically cut, and anarchy is spreading throughout the tribes of the hills and the Gharb.

Rumour has it that Boushta Bagdadi, who was in command of the Shereefian troops near Alcazar, has gone over to the rebels.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 58.

Extract from Despatch communicated to Mr. Lister by M. de Billy.

LA révolte des Cherarda est plus grave que l'on s'y était tout d'abord attendu à Fez. Les cavaliers de cette tribu ont pris l'offensive et ont attaqué le khalifa de Glaouï, qui se trouvait sur le territoire des Hadjoua. Plusieurs "Chleuh"—c'est-à-dire compatriotes de Mtougui et Glaouï—ont été tués. Les rakkas anglais et allemand ont été dévalisés et les communications avec Tanger deviennent fort difficiles.

Presque toutes les tribus environnantes sont très hostiles au Makhzen. Les Beni Ahssen sont alliés aux Cherarda; ils ont décidé d'empêcher complètement les "Chleuh" ainsi que les caïds du sud et leurs contingents de se rendre de Rabat à Fez.

Le mouvement est surtout dirigé contre Glaouï; cependant, la tendance du Makhzen de se rapprocher des Européens est également exploitée contre le Makhzen par les fanatiques, surtout dans la région berbère.

La mehalla a séjourné hier à Benito à 18 kilom. au nord de Fez; elle doit se porter aujourd'hui à Hammoud (voir la carte Weisgerber), puis, si possible, à Sidi Malek-ben-Keda. Ce mouvement, très bien compris quant à sa direction, est nécessaire pour empêcher Fez d'être complètement séparé de Tanger en empêchant les Cherarga et Ouled Aïssa de faire défection. Nos officiers ont maintenu un ordre parfait dans la mehalla, qui marche comme une troupe européenne.

Fez, le 3 mars, 1911.

[9200] No. 59.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 41.)

Sir, *Tangier, March 7, 1911.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's consul at Fez, which

have just come in, on the subject of the agitation amongst the tribes round the capital, and the departure of the "mehalla" under the French instructors to quell the disturbances.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 59.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Fez, February* 28, 1911.

DURING the last few days a number of disquieting reports have been in circulation in regard to unrest amongst various tribes to the south-west and north-west of Fez.

To the south-west the Beni Mtir and Gerwan were stated to be angry in regard to the military executions here of the 28th January, and (as regards the Beni Mtir) by the Sultan's insisting upon levies of soldiers from them to serve under the new regulations.

According to fairly reliable information I had yesterday from that district itself, the Beni Mtir and their neighbours had a number of conferences towards resisting the Makhzen, and one report, from Mequinez, is to the effect that they have come to an understanding with their neighbours and with Beni Hassan and Sherarda to attack the Makhzen at Fez on the ensuing "Mulud" feast day, *i.e.*, 14th March. This is, of course, probably an empty threat, but even as such it has some significance, as being symptomatic of the prevailing feeling.

I had reliable news yesterday that the Beni Mtir had begun to move their families and flocks to the higher lands behind them, Beni Mguild, and this is a very usual first step towards hostilities with the Makhzen.

On the evening of the 25th instant news reached the Makhzen that the Kaïd of the Tekna Sept of Sherarda having died, the inhabitants, on hearing that the deceased's son had been appointed to succeed his father instead of a nominee of their own plundered the deceased kaïd's farm, carrying off some 400 sheep.

All along the Sboo and Warga valleys, the tribes have of late become more and more resentful of the ever increasing exactions of the Makhzen, especially of the Grand Vizier, and say they mean to resist paying any more, but to refrain from disorders such as pillaging caravans, couriers, and the like, *i.e.*, to make only a passive resistance.

The situation seems to have excited the Makhzen a good deal.

Should this strain continue, none, presumably, of these tribes would send in deputations to the ensuing feast, which would produce a very bad impression throughout the country. These tribes lie across all the routes but one between Fez and the coast, and little reliance could be placed on their, themselves, keeping order on the roads, and interruption to traffic would produce much unfavourable criticism in Tangier and Europe, besides great inconvenience to the public here. The remaining route, *i.e.*, the most easterly one, which has for some weeks been in the occupation of a "mehalla" of soldiers of the non-organised regiments who are still endeavouring to collect arrears of contributions, is not practicable for Europeans, and too rough and hilly for caravan traffic.

On the other hand, the only troops at Fez are those now in process of reorganisation and training, and who number (including sick) only 4,000 or so. To send away a large number of these would both interrupt their training and leave practically no troops at Fez. The French Military Mission urged that it would be better to leave the tribes alone for a time, and go on with the training of the troops, and not expose them, and the new system, while only half developed, to risks of discredit.

Prolonged discussion between the Sultan, Commandant Mangin, and the French consul ensued, the Sultan insisting on his view that a strong "mehalla" must be sent at once, and desiring that as many foreign instructors as possible accompany it.

In the event this was agreed to, the Sultan promising, in view of the services of the foreign instructors being given, that the operations would be conducted in civilised fashion, and that neither cruelties of any kind nor pillage would be allowed—in other words, that the operations would be in accord with the new regulations for the army.

The "mehalla" was then got ready with remarkable speed, and marched off this

forenoon. The departure was a strange sight indeed for anyone accustomed to the old general disorder on such occasions. Each regiment, complete with its convoy of baggage, was ready in good time, and moved off punctually at the times appointed, between 8 and 10 A.M., for each, without the least confusion, cavalry (three regiments), infantry (six regiments, including a regiment of sergeant instructors), and artillery (two regiments), numbering about 2,500 of all arms and all ranks.

Their general appearance and clothes seemed good. The only item in their personal wear which seemed bad was their boots. These are clumsy and hard, and a good many of the men complain of sore feet.

The cavalry have been exercised as such some twenty times, and are, so far, really infantrymen mounted on horses and in process of conversion into cavalry. They are not intended to be "mounted infantry."

Sergeant Balding and Mr. Redman have gone with the "mehalla." The other foreign instructors are Commandant Brémond (head) and Dr. Buffé, and the whole of the French Military Mission except Commandant Mangin, Lieutenant Sedira, Adjoint Ronchon, and Engineer-Instructor Pellequeux, and Dr. Cristiani, who remain at Fez.

Commandant Mangin is, however, going with the "mehalla" till it reaches Tekna, when he will return to Fez. Dr. Verdon remains at Fez.

As these operations affect the tribes on all the routes from the coast to Fez, I would suggest British subjects be warned to avoid journeying to Fez at present.

I have informed Mr. Consular Agent Carleton in this sense, in case any British travellers should be passing Alcazar. These affairs may, of course, cause delays soon in the postal service to the coast.

The general impression here is that the Sultan feels sure this mere display of this force will be sufficient to bring Sherarda into its usual state of obedience, and that it is really a "bluff" movement, and that its root cause is his need of money. The Grand Vizier's own exactions on these tribes, of course, makes them less tractable now on that score.

Quite possibly it may be successful, but there is a general opinion amongst foreigners here, in which the French consul and I entirely concur, that the whole proceeding is full of risks, and that on the whole the safer, and perhaps wiser, course would have been to treat quietly with the Sherarda, by tradition a most orderly and "Makhzen" tribe, and to have gone on persevering with the training of the troops.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 59.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Fez, March* 2, 1911.

THE following is what may be termed the Makhzen version of the situation in Sherarda. It has been afforded to me by the Grand Vizier through his first scribe, Sid Hamed Zemmouri, and is in harmony, as far as it goes, with what one hears elsewhere:—

2. Some few months ago the Sultan sent a "mehalla" to Zarhon and Sherarda, which tribes have been placed under the Grand Vizier, whose child-son became the nominal governor. This "mehalla" was under the Sultan's brother, Mulai Yusef.

3. In Zarhon nothing of importance occurred. From Sherarda a levy of 25,000 dollars and sixty days' maintenance ("mona") for the "mehalla" were demanded. Of these, 18,000 dollars and thirty-seven days' "mona" were paid. The Sherarda asked, and were granted, time to pay the balance, and this "mehalla" passed on to Feshtala, where it now is, and Mulai Yusef returned to Fez. There are no foreign instructors with it, and it is composed of troops not as yet reorganised. It is under the Kaïds Mohammad and Saïd Bagdadi, the latter of whom is Governor of Feshtala and Ulad Jama.

4. Completions of these sums being demanded the Sherarda refused to pay them, and drove away Omar Bugrin, commonly called "Bu Kador," the Grand Vizier's khalifa.

5. The Sultan found it intolerable that the Sherarda, a Makhzen tribe whose

lands lie across all the usual trade routes to the coast, be allowed for a moment to remain in that attitude, and so had sent the present "mehalla" to bring these tribesmen to their senses at once; otherwise they would presently be pillaging caravans and couriers and so forth, and such an impression would be created in Morocco and abroad that the Makhzen was isolated and impotent as would lead to further and more widespread disorders.

6. Then, yesterday morning, a large party of Sherarda and (some say) Beni Hassan horsemen had entered Hejowa and successfully raided the camp of the Grand Vizier's khalifa there, Hamadi Bu Grin, brother of "Bu Kador" already referred to.

7. I should explain that, Sid Hamed Zemmouri chancing to call on me, we had, quite informally, discussed the situation, and I had deprecated in detail the Makhzen's action in not going easily with these loyal tribes and in interrupting the training of the troops and so forth. Somewhat to my surprise, Sid Zemmouri returned presently and said he had told the Vizier of this, and the latter had sent him to narrate the Makhzen's version of the situation for your Excellency's information. It was clear to me that the Vizier must be feeling very uncomfortable and eager for support.

8. So far the Makhzen version. The tribesmen, on their part, admit these facts, but add that they had paid as much as they could, and that the Grand Vizier thereafter had begun to quarter his khalifas and their retainers upon them. These proceeded from village to village exacting "mona" of 50 dollars a-night and the like, and it was impossible to pay such sums and the Sultan's levies as well. They had no intention of pillaging caravans or couriers and would keep the roads safe, but they would resist any further exactions, and would not tolerate the Vizier's, in effect, paying his retainers by quartering them on these tribes.

9. This forenoon the French consul called on me and, confidentially, informed me that, on hearing of the raid into Hejowa, he had, yesterday afternoon, gone near enough to the "mehalla" to have an interview with Commandant Mangin, and had urged on the latter the advisability of availing of every opportunity towards bringing the present state of things to a peaceable conclusion.

10. The attitude of the tribes was, M. Gaillard pointed out, merely "anti-Glawiste," and it would in every way be regrettable if the new (but still imperfectly trained) troops and the French Military Mission services were exploited and perhaps discredited for such an end, and with no accompanying advantage.

11. Commandant Mangin had entirely agreed with this, and had promised to do his best, *e.g.*, by a friendly conciliatory attitude to tribesmen, who might want to come to the "mehalla," and by guaranteeing their immunity from imprisonment or ill-usage of any sort, to promote that object.

12. M. Gaillard added that both he and Commandant Mangin had urged the Sultan strongly not to send that "mehalla," but the Sultan was inexorable, and in the end no choice was left but either to comply with His Majesty's wishes or to refuse the services of the French Military Mission, which would, M. Gaillard considered, have meant a sort of local rupture between the French and the Sultan, and would have placed the French in the position of being responsible should any of the disorders which the Sultan anticipated would follow the non-sending of the "mehalla" come to pass.

13. Between these two issues M. Gaillard said he was still in a most difficult position. I inferred from his embarrassment that he might be wanting some help but was hesitating to ask for it. So I remarked that both he and the Makhzen knew, of course, that we (British) did not seek in any way to intervene in such matters. Still, the fact of about half the trade over those routes being British gave us a reasonable cause to speak if we saw traffic being needlessly interrupted, and so, if he wanted the Makhzen to be further impressed with his views towards that end, I would be happy to speak, in a "mutual-friendly" way, in such a sense. Our situation was such that I could speak thus quite frankly, and yet feel sure of incurring no responsibility as regards His Majesty's Government, nor of giving any offence to the Sultan.

14. M. Gaillard answered with some eagerness that this was just what had been in his mind, and that he would be very glad to avail of what I had suggested whenever the occasion arose.

15. (3 P.M.) The British and German courier of the 28th February from Fez and the British and German courier of the 25th February from Tangier have come in, having been robbed by a party of Sherarda tribesmen. In the case of our mail of the 25th from Tangier the most of the contents of the mail were saved.

These couriers report the Sherarda district to be in a very excited state, large parties of horsemen moving about, and apparently expecting to resist the "mehalla" as soon as it arrives.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[9201] No. 60.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 13.)

(No. 42.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 7, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 35 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of a further despatch which I have received from the vice-consul at Mogador, reporting that the inspectors of the State domains have commenced an inspection of all the Government houses in the town. The inspection seems so far to have passed off quietly, but I cannot help fearing that some unpleasant incident might occur, and I spoke confidentially on the subject to M. de Billy. I said that this fresh sign of activity on the part of the Contrôle de la Dette seemed to make it all the more desirable that the Commission provided for under article 63 of the Algeciras Act should get to work without loss of time. I also told him that I proposed to send Mr. Irwin round to M. Luret to represent to him how necessary it was to do nothing which would provoke any sort of incident, pending the settlement of the question.

M. Luret assured Mr. Irwin that the inspection was being merely undertaken to verify the various Makhzen properties designated on a list which had been handed to the Contrôle de la Dette as forming part of the security for the last loan.

I have telegraphed in this sense to Mr. Johnstone, and told him to do all in his power to explain the situation to British subjects, and avoid any possible unpleasantness. I have added that in all probability the Commission for the settlement of the lease and habous questions will very shortly be appointed and commence its labours.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 60.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Mr. Lister.

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Mogador, March* 1, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday M. Ranouil, Inspecteur des Domaines, and M. Michard, local Contrôleur des Domaines, commenced an inspection of the Government houses in this town, many of which are let to British subjects or British protected. Prior to the commencement of the work I received a small deputation representing the British community, who inquired whether they should admit the above-mentioned gentlemen to their houses or not. I informed the representatives that I had received no instructions from Tangier on the matter, but that I hoped that, at least, the gentlemen in question would receive a polite welcome from members of the British community, but that, as I had received no notification of the arrival of the party officially, I had no right to order my colony to do anything more. The deputation stated that they would behave politely. A little later on, M. Debets, the Contrôleur des Fonds concédés, called upon me and told me that M. Ranouil had decided to do nothing more than to ask each householder the number of rooms in his house. I told M. Debets that I could see no harm in that, but that I could not force anyone to give the information in the absence of instructions from the legation. I immediately told him the number of rooms in this vice-consulate, and he and his companions went off to pursue their duties. Later on, in the afternoon, M. Michard came back, and stated that they had recognised a certain British subject standing at the door of several British houses, who said that he had my authority to refuse any information. I ascertained who the individual was, and as I had given no instructions of any sort I expostulated with the young man, whom I found to be a certain M. J. Bendahan, who has just arrived here after several years' absence, and whom I have only met once. He informed me that the complaint arose from a

misunderstanding, he not having stated that he had received orders from me, but that he could not furnish the information without direct orders from me, and, furthermore, that he had only met the Commission at the door of his own house, and nowhere else. I have not yet heard that there has been any further difficulty, but I should be very grateful if your Excellency would instruct me as to how I should act. M. Debets says that at present these visits are being made for the purpose of making a plan of the town, but that no doubt later on the Contrôle would wish to visit every room in each house. I have also heard from a French source that the Commissioners represent the Sultan, and that he, as landlord, has naturally a right to enter his own houses, which, to me, does not seem a conclusive argument. Instructions on this point would great simplify matters for me.

I have, &c.
H. B. JOHNSTONE.

[9160] No. 61.

Sir A. Johnstone to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 34.)

Sir, *The Hague, March* 9, 1911.

I RECEIVED on the 25th ultimo by bag your despatch No. 9 of the 18th ultimo relative to the amendments which the Netherlands Government desire to make in the draft Moroccan Mining Law.

I saw M. Pellet, the French Minister, on the 27th ultimo, and after reading him a French version of your despatch, enquired if he had received instructions from Paris to act with me in communicating to the Government of the Netherlands the decision of our Governments, that they were unable to accede to the alterations proposed by M. van Swinderen in the draft law.

M. Pellet had not then received instructions to that effect from his Government, but said he would at once communicate with the Quai d'Orsay on the subject.

Owing doubtless to the change of Government in France, it was not till yesterday that the Minister received from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs instructions in the same sense as those I have received from you.

I saw M. Pellet at the French Legation this morning, and we arranged that, as I am leaving to-night for a short visit to London, we would attend the weekly reception of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 15th instant, and verbally state to M. van Swinderen that, after a careful examination of his proposals, our Governments are convinced that neither the wishes of the Netherlands Government on the one hand nor the interests of the Makhzen on the other would in reality be met by altering the draft law in the manner suggested by the Netherlands Government.

I have, &c.
ALAN JOHNSTONE.

[9403] No. 62.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received March 14.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, March* 13, 1911.

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to advert to your letter of the 13th February, with its enclosure, relative to the opening of the port of Agadir in Morocco, and in reply, I am to inform you that, in the opinion of the Board, it is in the interests of British trade and shipping that this port should be opened.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

[9551] No. 63.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, March 14, 1911.

(Privée et Confidentielle.)

POUR assurer le ravitaillement de nos postes au Maroc, l'autorité militaire française a l'intention de construire dans la Chaouïa un chemin de fer reliant Casablanca à Settat, et dans la région de l'est sur la frontière algérienne un autre chemin de fer reliant Marnia à Oudjda et Oudjda à Taourirt.

Le Gouvernement allemand, ayant eu connaissance de ces projets, fit remarquer au Gouvernement français par M. de Schoen, vers la fin de décembre dernier, que les lignes en question devraient être construites dans les conditions de l'Acte d'Algésiras. Il déclarait ne faire aucune objection à la construction directe par la France, mais sous la condition que tous les étrangers pourraient user des nouvelles lignes dans les mêmes conditions que les Français.

M. Pichon donna à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne des assurances à cet effet.

Un peu plus tard, au commencement de février dernier, M. de Schoen entretint de nouveau notre Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de cette question. Il fit observer que son Gouvernement ne faisait pas d'objection à la construction de lignes militaires dans notre zone d'occupation, mais que la ligne projetée d'Oudjda à Taourirt paraissait sortir de cette zone et constituer l'amorce d'une voie de pénétration.

Il rappela que, deux ans auparavant, les deux Gouvernements avaient favorisé la création d'une Société marocaine de Travaux publics avec la participation financière de groupes français, allemands, anglais, &c., que, la participation française étant la plus importante, la présidence de la Société marocaine appartenait à un représentant du groupe français, et il suggéra que l'autorité militaire française fût invitée à s'adresser à cette société pour la construction de ses lignes. Ainsi les travaux seraient confiés à une société internationale, la question de savoir si les chemins de fer militaires deviendraient l'amorce de voies de pénétration ne serait pas soulevée, et la continuation de ces lignes pourrait être confiée, le moment venu, à la Société marocaine.

M. Pichon n'avait pas encore répondu à cette suggestion lorsque, le 22 février dernier, M. de Schoen aborda de nouveau la question en demandant que les projets des futurs chemins de fer fussent établis de façon à ne pas écarter les soumissions allemandes pour les fournitures de matériel. Le Ministre français des Affaires Etrangères n'eut pas le temps de poursuivre cette conversation à cause de la crise ministérielle qui survint à ce moment. Il mit M. Jules Cambon au courant des démarches de M. de Schoen et le chargea de suivre ces pourparlers si M. de Kiderlen les continuait. Il se montra disposé à déclarer que le concours de la Société marocaine serait demandé pour l'exécution des lignes militaires, mais il prescrivait à notre Ambassadeur à Berlin de réclamer du Gouvernement allemand la promesse de s'abstenir de toute concurrence si notre ligne d'Oudjda à Taourirt se continuait dans la direction de Fez ou de l'Atlantique ou si la ligne de la Chaouïa prenait du développement, à la condition, bien entendu, d'un traitement égal sur ces voies ferrées pour toutes les Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

M. de Kiderlen reprit en effet la conversation avec M. Jules Cambon et mit en avant diverses suggestions, notamment pour la mise en adjudication d'une ligne de Tanger à Fez. Il ne soulève aucune objection à l'exécution de lignes militaires dans nos zones d'occupation si nos officiers sont invités à se mettre officieusement en rapport avec la Société marocaine pour l'exécution des travaux.

Quant aux adjudications publiques qui pourraient éventuellement avoir lieu plus tard, il se déclare disposé à user de son influence pour écarter ceux de ses nationaux qui se proposeraient de faire concurrence à la Société marocaine. Il désire seulement qu'il soit expressément stipulé que toutes les voies ferrées à construire au Maroc soient ouvertes aux ressortissants de toutes les Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras aux mêmes conditions et spécialement en matière de tarifs.

Les entretiens du Ministre allemand des Affaires Étrangères et de notre Ambassadeur à Berlin sont récents et M. Cruppi en a reçu la relation il y a moins de huit jours. Il n'a pas encore répondu, mais il m'a chargé d'informer officieusement et confidentiellement Sir E. Grey de ces suggestions.

J'ignore encore l'opinion de M. Cruppi et il est probable qu'il m'entretiendra de cette question lors de la visite que je dois lui faire dans quelques jours ; mais je ne vois, quant à moi, aucun inconvénient à répondre favorablement aux ouvertures qui

nous sont faites. Elles n'ont rien de contraire aux dispositions de l'Acte d'Algésiras, elles règlent les rapports de Paris et de Berlin en ce qui touche les chemins de fer au Maroc et elles ne portent atteinte aux droits et aux intérêts d'aucune Puissance. C'est dans ce sens que je m'exprimerai si mon avis est demandé.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 14 mars, 1911.

[9551] No. 64.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 99.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 14, 1911.

M. CAMBON gave me to-day a detailed account, for my confidential and private information, of what had passed between the French and German Governments respecting certain railways which the French contemplated making in Morocco, in the first place for military reasons.

M. Cambon himself saw nothing in the conclusions arrived at between France and Germany that need be unacceptable to us, but M. Cruppi wished us to be informed.

I said that I should have to refer to the Act of Algeciras, to see exactly what was the bearing of all he had told me, and how we stood.

He gave me, privately and confidentially, the accompanying memorandum.*

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[9448] No. 65.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 117.)
Sir, *Paris, March* 14, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 113 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, extracted from this evening's "Temps," an official communiqué made to the press as to the decision come to in regard to Morocco at the Council of Ministers held at the Élysée to-day. It has been decided to send out to Casa Blanca two battalions of infantry and two sections of mountain artillery to enforce order in the Shawia district. Note is taken of the engagement entered into by the Sultan to punish those responsible for Lieutenant Marchand's murder, and the French Government declare their intention of enforcing the execution of that engagement with the least possible delay. The Council of Ministers, moreover, approves the Franco-Moroccan financial scheme, whereby the Maghzen will be enabled to procure the money necessary for the organisation of a Moorish force to maintain the authority of the Sultan over the tribes, to police the ports during 1912, to execute urgent public works, &c., and to fulfil the engagements entered into before the 30th June, 1909.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 65.

Extract from the "Temps" of the 15th March, 1911.

LES AFFAIRES DU MAROC.

LE Conseil des Ministres s'est réuni ce matin à l'Élysée sous la présidence de M. Fallières.

La majeure partie de la séance a été consacrée à l'examen de la situation au Maroc et des mesures qu'il y avait lieu de prendre. Le conseil a arrêté sa ligne de conduite, et le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères la fera connaître à la Chambre au cours des

* No. 63.

interpellations de MM. Denys Cochin et Jaurès. Le Gouvernement acceptera la discussion de ces interpellations pour le vendredi, 24 mars prochain. Mais dès aujourd'hui la note suivante qui nous est communiquée donne les indications ci-après sur les questions gouvernementales :—

"Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a fourni au conseil des informations sur l'attitude de la tribu Zaer, dont une fraction s'est rendue coupable de l'attentat du 14 janvier contre nos officiers et le goum indigène.

"Le Gouvernement a décidé l'envoi à Casablanca de deux battalions et de deux sections d'artillerie de montagne pour assurer l'exécution des mesures d'ordre et de police nécessaires à la protection de nos ports, à la sauvegarde des tribus, et à la sécurité des relations commerciales dans les limites de la Chaouïa.

"Des instructions précises seront données en ce sens par le Ministre de la Guerre au Général Moinier, commandant le corps d'occupation.

"Le conseil a, d'autre part, pris acte des engagements de Moulaï Hafid de procéder lui-même au moyen d'une action répressive au châtiment des auteurs de l'attentat du 14 janvier.

"Le Gouvernement de la république est résolu à veiller à la stricte exécution dans le plus bref délai de ces engagements, de façon à ne pas laisser impuni cet attentat et à prévenir le retour d'agressions contre nos troupes.

"Le conseil a approuvé enfin le projet d'accord financier préparé entre le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement chérifien. Ce projet a pour but de permettre au Makhzen de se procurer les ressources nécessaires à l'organisation d'une force militaire marocaine destinée à maintenir l'autorité du Sultan dans les tribus, à l'entretien de la police des ports pendant l'année 1912, à l'exécution des travaux publics urgents pour le développement économique du pays et la prospérité des indigènes, et de dégager complètement le Makhzen des engagements qu'il avait pris antérieurement au 30 juin, 1909."

[9553] No. 66.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, March* 15, 1911.

SPANISH representative tells me that his Government are anxious [? that] the mining regulations should be discussed by the corps diplomatique without any further delay. They propose [? that] representatives of the four Powers whose delegates drew them up in Paris should approach doyen and ask him to fix date for discussion. Am I authorised to do this?

[4553] No. 67.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr Lister.

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March* 16, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 7 : Morocco Mining Law.

We are ascertaining views of French Government on Spanish proposal. You should take no action pending receipt of further instructions.

[8953] No. 68.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 16, 1911.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 35 of the 5th instant reporting the action of the Contrôle de la Dette in the matter of Messrs. Fernau's land at Casa Blanca and Makhzen property at Mogador.

I entirely approve your proceedings, and I concur in your opinion that the commission provided for in article 63 of the Act of Algeciras should be appointed and commence its labours as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government cannot countenance the high-handed and

entirely unwarranted proceedings of the French officials of the Contrôle, and unless an equitable solution is promptly arranged they will find themselves, however reluctantly, compelled to take sides with all the other treaty Powers against the pretensions of the Franco-Moorish officials.

I leave it to your discretion to inform your French colleague of as much of the preceding paragraph as you may consider desirable or necessary; but in any case, there is no objection to your pointing out to him that His Majesty's Government cannot in any circumstances allow British subjects to be treated in a manner which other Governments decline to admit in the case of their nationals.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8386] No. 69.

Sir E. Crowe to Mr. Norton.

My dear Norton, *Foreign Office, March* 16, 1911.

YOU will be interested to hear that instructions have now been issued to Lister with regard to the lighthouses in Morocco.

We have told him—

1. That we think the contracts for the lighthouses should be in two sections, viz., for the optical apparatus and for the structural work.

2. That as an arrangement on the lines of the Cape Spartel Convention appears to be impossible, we think that questions as to the lighthouses to be erected, their administration, and the imposition of light dues for their support should be in the hands of the Moorish Government, who should, however, be guided by the advice of the diplomatic body at Tangier.

It would of course be open to the Moorish Government to make the necessary financial arrangements with some suitable company, and it would be the duty of the diplomatic body to see that light dues were kept within reasonable limits and that their proceeds were properly and exclusively utilised for lighthouse purposes.

Yours, &c.
E. CROWE.

[9710] No. 70.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 43.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 11, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 35, Confidential, of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report that, having received no reply from Cid Mokri to the telegram which I addressed to him with regard to Messrs. Fernau's Gourna land, I asked Mr. Irwin to see M. Luret and ascertain from him how the matter stood. M. Luret said that, in reply to his request that instructions might be issued for the land in question to be struck off the register of Maghzen properties, as the Control of the Debt were convinced that Messrs. Fernau's right was incontestable in view of the decision given by the Sultan and communicated to Messrs. Fernau by the Shereef El Amrani, Cid Mokri had telegraphed that nothing could be done until the letter of the Sultan on which the Control of the Debt based their view had been produced. M. Luret said that he regretted very much that Cid Mokri should have caused this fresh delay, and that he personally considered the letter from the Shereef quite sufficient. It was the Control of the Debt who had raised the question in the first instance, and if they, after a careful examination of the case, were satisfied of the validity of Messrs. Fernau's claim, he did not see why the Maghzen should raise further difficulties; he could not, however, do otherwise than obey instructions, and had telegraphed to Casa Blanca to ask for the letter. Ali Zaky Bey came to see me this afternoon, and I told him what had occurred. He said that he felt convinced that Cid Mokri must have misunderstood the case, and must be under the impression that the Sultan's letter was a *fait nouveau*. He begged me to telegraph again to Cid Mokri, and promised to write and explain the matter himself. I have sent the enclosed telegram.

Nothing could have been more amiable than the attitude both of M. Luret and Ali Zaky throughout, and I feel sure that the matter will be settled all right; but the delay is regrettable owing to the developments reported in Mr. Madden's despatch No. 43 (which was enclosed in my despatch No. 35 of the 5th instant). It was at Ali Zaky's suggestion that I told Cid Mokri that the delay might entail pecuniary loss to Messrs. Fernau, and that I should be obliged to hold the Maghzen responsible.

I cannot help fearing that trouble is still to be anticipated over this question of title-deeds, and we are certainly fortunate in having as good a case as that of Fernau to defend at the outset, the justice of which is now recognised by the Control of the Debt. The Germans have apparently been far less lucky. Baron Seckendorff asked to see me yesterday, and enquired whether M. Fernau's case had been settled. I told him that the Control of the Debt were satisfied of the incontestability of M. Fernau's claim, and had reported in that sense to Cid Mokri; but that a slight delay had occurred owing to the request of the latter that a certain paper might be produced. Baron Seckendorff said that I had evidently been more fortunate than he had in the case of M. Carl Ficke, of Casa Blanca. From a long conversation which he had had with M. Fernau when the latter passed through Tangier some ten days ago, he had derived the impression that the two cases were quite analogous, and yet, in the case of M. Ficke, the Control of the Debt were raising all sorts of difficulties. As he had told me before, he held the opinion very strongly that any attempt on the part of the Control of the Debt to dispute M. Ficke's right or to have the case submitted to Shraa should be resisted, and he had reported in that sense to his Government. To his great surprise and regret, however, they had not fallen in with his view, but had instructed him to see M. Ficke and induce him to submit his case to arbitration. This he was trying to do, though he was by no means sanguine of success. I observed that, as the Control of the Debt had themselves recognised the validity of M. Fernau's claim and withdrawn their objection, there had been no necessity for my Government to take up any attitude in the matter.

My impression is that the Control of the Debt must have some very good reason for believing that there is some serious flaw in M. Ficke's case, and that this accounts for the uncompromising attitude which they have adopted in the matter. The reputation borne by the gentleman in question is by no means of the best, and I am informed that on the coast people are very shy of entering into any sort of business dealings with him.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 70.

Mr. Lister to Cid El Mokri.

(Télégraphique.) [*Non datée.*]

JE ne comprends pas le retard apporté dans la solution de la question Fernau, comme la Dette, qui en premier lieu a soulevé la question, a reconnu, après examen approfondi, que le droit de M. Fernau était incontestable. Le retard pourrait causer des pertes dont je serais obligé de rendre le Makhzen responsable. Je vous prie instamment de télégraphier à la Dette d'urgence pour faire rayer la propriété du registre.

[9711] No. 71.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 44. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 11, 1911.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 15 of the 2nd instant on the subject of the cession of Ifni to Spain, and I have carefully noted what you say.

In the course of conversation with the French chargé d'affaires, whom I see practically every day, I reverted to what he had said as to his personal conviction that the Germans had come to some arrangement with the Spaniards in the matter, and told him that in examining the question I had been surprised to find, according to the map at my disposal, how large a tract of country was to be conceded by article 4 of the secret treaty. I asked him if he could let me see map No. 2 (alluded to in the

article in question), which was not annexed to the copy of the secret treaty in the possession of this legation. We subsequently examined the map together, and he was obliged to admit that it would be practically impossible for the French Government to contend that in agreeing to the cession of so large a tract of country, they had contemplated nothing more than the formation of a fishery establishment.

He said that he was surprised that the French Government should have agreed to the clause, but it must be remembered that at the time of the negotiations in Paris the claims put forward by the Spanish Ambassador had been preposterous, and M. Delcassé had probably been glad to find something which was not of very vital importance to which he could agree.

He said that the question of the cession of Ifni had been discussed in the recent Hispano-Moorish negotiations at Madrid, which constituted the latest *entente* with the Sultan on the subject, and he believed that it had been once more clearly laid down that the cession was merely for the establishment of a fishing station.

I rather gathered that M. de Billy was of opinion that the case would be covered by the preamble of the Act of Algeciras insisting on the integrity of the Sultan's dominions, but I was careful not to discuss this point.

Ali Zaky Bey was here yesterday afternoon to talk over various small matters of local interest, and I took advantage of his visit to get him on to the subject of the Madrid negotiations, about which he likes very much to talk. In the course of conversation we touched upon the cession of Ifni. He told me that the Spanish Minister had been very anxious that a clause on the subject should be inserted in the convention, but that Cid Mokri had absolutely declined to agree to this. He had, however, finally written a letter to the Spanish Minister, by which he undertook to give effect to two previous letters, one written by Bargash, the other by Moulai-el-Hassan, respectively, in which the cession of Ifni instead of Santa Cruz de mar Pequeña (which could not be located) was agreed to. Both letters clearly laid down that the cession was merely for the formation of a fishing station. Mokri added in his letter that if agreeable to Spain, a Moorish delegation would be prepared to start for Ifni on the 1st May to conclude the necessary arrangements.

Commandant Sénès, who commands the French squadron in Moorish waters, and who made a trip all down the south-western coast of Morocco, dined here last night. He told me that the only natural harbour along the coast was Agadir; the rest were mere open roadsteads. It was true that Agadir was only protected in the north by a long promontory, but the formation of the ground was such (a sort of double cape) that even in a westerly gale there was always a smooth sheet of water within, unaffected by the swell which rendered all the other roadsteads on the coast so dangerous. There was a great depth of water, and one part of the bay was admirably suited for the construction of a port. Ifni, he said, was a mere roadstead, and would require a very large sum of money to be expended upon it before it could be converted into any kind of a port. The country at the back, he told me, was rich and well cultivated, with many villages and a general air of prosperity. Considerable numbers of natives had come off from the shore to sell fish, &c., and he had talked to them. They had all said that it would be dangerous for any European to land. He gathered, however, that they were all more afraid of the arrival of Makhzen officials than of Europeans. He was particularly struck by their fierce independence and their determination to resist any encroachment upon their liberty. He could not help smiling, he told me, at the thought that the Makhzen had made an agreement with Spain to cede to her this tract of land over which it had absolutely no control, and he would give a good deal to be present at the arrival of the Moorish and Spanish delegates, and to witness the reception that would be given to them.

I was much interested by what the commandant told me, and I have no doubt that it is true. At the same time, the idea of making money presents very special attraction to all Moors, and their love of independence might eventually yield to the temptation of gain. There appears little doubt that agents of the Mannesmanns have penetrated into the Süs, and M. de Billy thinks it quite likely that with the possibility of the cession of Ifni to Spain in view that firm may have reopened the relations with the Spanish mining groups, which were broken off in the spring of 1909.

I fully share the opinion expressed in your despatch, that in order to guard against the possibility of Spain creating a commercial centre at Ifni, in which Germany might hold a privileged position, the best course for His Majesty's Government would be to secure the opening of the port of Agadir, and as the reports furnished by His Majesty's consular officers at Casa Blanca and Mogador on the subject

tend to show that British commerce would, if anything, benefit by the measure, I see no reason for any hesitation on our part.

As you will recollect, Baron Seckendorff, in a conversation which I reported to you in my despatch No. 11 of the 27th January last, gave me to understand that he did not imagine that his Government would have any objections to the opening of Agadir to international commerce, but that the question would have to be raised in an absolutely formal way, so that the interests of all nationalities might be placed on the same footing.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[9712] No. 72.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 45.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 12, 1911.

THERE has been a great dearth of news from Fez during the last week, owing to the fact that hardly any of the couriers have been able to get through. Tangier has been full of contradictory rumours, and considerable anxiety has been felt as to the state of affairs in the neighbourhood of the capital. It appears, however, more or less certain that the Shereefian mehalla has had one or more successful engagements with the Sherarda, and that their resistance is now practically broken. A courier reached the German Legation late on Friday night with despatches from the German consul, reporting that the Sherarda, after sacrificing bulls in token of submission to the mehalla, treacherously attacked the camp; they had, however, been completely routed, and a large number of prisoners and of cattle had been taken. There had been some discussion as to the treatment to be meted out to them, but counsels of moderation had prevailed, thanks to the intervention of the French instructors, and it had been decided to offer them lenient terms of submission.

Dr. Vassel said that the Sultan was anxious that the mehalla should proceed against the Beni M'Tir, but that Commandant Mangin had opposed this course, on the ground that the force at his disposal was not sufficiently strong.

In a private letter which M. de Billy received some days ago, M. Gaillard said that he intended to do all in his power to induce the Sultan to be satisfied with a small success, and to arrange matters by negotiation; this is no doubt what will be done. In the meantime, complete anarchy appears to reign in the country between Fez and Alcazar, to judge by despatches which I have received from Mr. Carleton, and I have instructed him to warn British subjects and semsars to take all possible steps to ensure the security of their property.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[9713] No. 73.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 46.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 11, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 37 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to transmit copies of despatches which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca relative to the visit to that port of the German gun-boat "Eber."

I found the French chargé d'affaires in a state of some agitation on the morning of the 6th, as Guebbas had told him that the German consul at Casa Blanca had gone to the Basha (Guebbas' son) and insisted upon "special honours" being paid to the captain of the "Eber" on landing. Orders had been sent to the Basha from here to conform to the usual practice, but the young Guebbas had interpreted this as meaning that he should go to meet the captain accompanied by the police tabor! This, M. de Billy told me, was never done even for Commandant de Senès, who has the local rank of admiral, and commands the French squadron in Moorish waters. He had told Guebbas that he must send further instructions to the Basha, telling him that the

police tabor was not to be turned out, and that he was only to be accompanied by his soldiers. Thanks to the delay occasioned by bad weather these instructions were received in time, and all passed off satisfactorily.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 73.

Consul Madden to Mr. Lister.

(No. 44.)
Sir, *Casa Blanca, March* 3, 1911.

HAVING learnt last evening from some members of the German colony that the German gun-vessel "Eber" is to arrive next Tuesday, the 7th instant, at Casa Blanca, I asked Herr Maenss, the German consul, if such is the case, and he confirmed the information, adding that it was only yesterday that he had received the news of the visit by telegraph.

The consul said that no German war-ship has visited Casa Blanca since the year 1902, when the training-ship "Gneisenau" came here from Mogador. The "Gneisenau," it will be remembered, was soon afterwards wrecked at Malaga.

Herr Maenss said he does not know where the "Eber" is at present, but he believes the vessel has been in the Cameroon.

From what a German told me, it was expected that a German war-ship would probably visit Casa Blanca next July, but I am unaware if the present visit is instead, or in addition to, the expected call later on.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

P.S. *Later.*—I understand that great social preparations are in progress to celebrate the event, and make the visit as showy a one as possible.

A. M. M.

Enclosure 2 in No. 73.

Consul Madden to Mr. Lister.

(No. 46.)
Sir, *Casa Blanca, March* 7, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 44 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to report the arrival this morning of the German gun-vessel "Eber," coming from Cadiz, and *en route* to the Cameroons.

Owing to the rough sea prevailing at this port the "Eber" is unable to communicate, and has gone outside to await calmer weather.

The French cruiser "Forbin" also arrived here this morning, coming from the north, and has gone to the offing for a similar reason.

The German doctor, whom I saw at the waterport, tells me that the object of the visit of the "Eber" is to show the German flag; he added that the German colony had been petitioning the Government to allow a war-vessel to visit this port.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

[9714] No. 74.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 47.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 12, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a summary of events for the past week.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 74.

Summary of Events for Week ending March 12, 1911

AS previously reported, the situation of the Makhzen in the north has been considerably improved by the recent victories obtained by the Shereefian mehalla over the Sherarda rebels, and it is hoped that the other disaffected tribes in the north may now abandon active hostility to the Makhzen.

The situation in the Dukala has likewise improved, and His Majesty's vice-consul at Mazagan reports that the roads are again safe. It appears that Kaïd-bu-Ali with his mehalla, assisted by other governors, attacked the Oolad Furdj, who are at the bottom of the troubles, and inflicted a severe lesson upon them.

Fighting still continues in the Süs. It seems that the Basha Hadj Thami-el-Glawi demanded that the Makhzen and Glawi army should be allowed to pass through to Tarudant. Permission was refused by the tribesmen. Since then the mehalla of the brother of Kaïd Mtougui, who was appointed Governor of Tarudant, has been defeated in the Süs by the Howara tribe.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Rabat informs me that rumours of tribal unrest have lately been current in his district. It is stated that a tribal gathering was held at a place called Hajeb, at which the representatives of the Zian, Beni M'tir, Oolad Inser, Girowan, M'jat, Sherarda, and Deni Hassan tribes were present. Apparently the independence of these tribes was proclaimed, and it was further announced that no Makhzen couriers would be allowed to pass through their territory, though no interference would be made with the European mails.

[9715] No. 75.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 17.)

(No. 48.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 13, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have just received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting that he has delivered to Sid Taib-el-Mokri the copy of the letter which I had addressed to his father, in accordance with your instructions, informing him that it would give the King pleasure if the Sultan of Morocco were represented at the forthcoming Coronation.

I also enclose extracts from two private letters from Mr. MacLeod on the subject.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 75.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Fez, March* 3, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's despatch No. 9 of the 24th ultimo, the copy-letter of which I delivered to Sid Taib-el-Mokri to-day.

Sid Taib expressed high gratification at the contents of your Excellency's letter, which, he added, he would communicate at once to the Sultan after prayers to-day.

As directed, I intimated privately to Sid Taib that, in view of the limitations of space in the Abbey, it would be convenient if the special mission did not exceed four persons, and he said he would be careful to explain this to the Sultan.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 75.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(Extract.) *Fez, March* 3, 1911.

SID TAIB MOKRI was kept till late at the Palace yesterday, so I could not see him till this morning. Naturally he was very delighted by the contents of your letter to his father about the Coronation, and sent all manner of greetings to you. Happily,

Friday after prayers is, in the Moors' eyes, an auspicious moment to get such news and decide such points as your letter refers to. I am myself very happy to hear of that special mission, for I feel sure it will do a great deal of good to our position in this country and will facilitate the accomplishment of many objects, especially philanthropic and commercial ones, in which we are interested.

Enclosure 3 in No. 75.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(Extract.) *Fez, March* 4, 1911.

SID TAIB MOKRI tells me that the Sultan is more than ordinarily pleased by the invitation in regard to the Coronation, and desired his warm appreciation of this mark of friendship to be conveyed to His Majesty's Government. The invitation would be accepted with the greatest pleasure. The Sultan wished also to send his very particular thanks to your Excellency, who, he was sure, had contributed so much to bring about this happy event, and he desired also that his best wishes and congratulations on the Coronation in prospect to His Majesty the King, the British Government, and all His Majesty's subjects.

Sid Taib then, in a private way, said the Sultan was considering who to send, &c. Meantime, could I tell him (Sid Taib) whether, in view of the written communication received here being a copy of a letter to his father, a written reply to it was expected from Fez, as presumably his father would be answering it formally. They were anxious to do what we should think the most friendly and proper thing in the matter.

I answered that under the circumstances I felt sure that a letter in the sense of the verbal communication above made would be in no way amiss, but the contrary, and so Sid Taib said this would be written and handed to me for transmission to you. I therefore await this letter before sending the above message officially, so as to make one despatch of the matter.

[9890] No. 76.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, March* 17, 1911.

MOROCCO.

New loan convention between France and Morocco has created profound agitation in the Spanish Cabinet. Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw to-day, told me that the King had postponed his return to Seville in order to discuss the situation fully with his Ministers, and that the Prime Minister was also greatly incensed against the French Government. The Marquess de Alhucemas was about to repeat to the Spanish Ambassador in London, for communication to you, his telegram to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, containing instructions to make serious representations to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The increase of French influence throughout Morocco, which the Spanish Government apprehend will result from the arrangements contemplated by the new agreement, and especially from the guarantees on which the loan is secured, causes some alarm. Further causes of annoyance and irritation are the initiation of an important railway scheme within the Spanish sphere of influence without previous consultation with the Spanish Government, and the proposed reorganisation of the Sultan's army under French instructors without Spanish assistance. An early interpellation in the Cortes, which will be very embarrassing to the Spanish Government, is feared by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Though the French Ambassador, in the course of conversation to-day with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, defended the action of the French Government on every point, his Excellency nevertheless advised his Government, in a long telegram which he read out to me, to endeavour to find some satisfaction which might be given to Spain in the Spanish sphere of influence. M. Geoffray fears that, if this be not done, the Spanish Government, whose political position is somewhat shaken, may,

under the influence of the King, take some hasty step in Morocco to distract attention from home affairs.

In speaking to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have endeavoured, by employing the same arguments as those brought forward by the French Ambassador, to soothe the apprehensions of the Spanish Government.

I have repeated the above to His Majesty's Minister at Tangier.

[9403] No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 93.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 17, 1911.

YOUR Excellency will be aware from the Tangier despatch No. 13 of the 30th January last and from the Foreign Office letter to the Board of Trade of the 13th ultimo, copies of which are enclosed for convenience of reference,* that His Majesty's Government have had under consideration the question of the opening of Agadir to foreign commerce.

The Board of Trade have expressed the opinion that the opening of the port would be to the interest of British trade and shipping. In these circumstances, I should be glad if your Excellency would approach the French Government on the subject, and enquire whether they see any objection to the opening of Agadir from the political point of view, and whether they would be ready to instruct their representative at Tangier to support His Majesty's Minister in bringing the matter before the diplomatic body there with a view to collective action.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[9553] No. 78.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 94.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 17, 1911.

WITH reference to Mr. Lister's telegram No. 7 of the 15th instant, which will have reached you in the telegram sections, I should be glad if your Excellency would ascertain whether the French Government have any objection to the immediate discussion of the draft Morocco mining regulations by the diplomatic body at Tangier.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[9890] No. 79.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 19, 1911.

MOORISH loan. Madrid telegram No. 2.

We can form no opinion as to whether Spanish apprehensions are well founded, as we have no knowledge of terms of loan convention.

You should endeavour to obtain from French Government information respecting sources from which loan is to be drawn, security offered, and objects to which money is to be applied. The lack of trustworthy information in regard to a matter of such importance renders our position difficult.

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* Nos. 19 and 30.

[10629] No. 80.

Papers communicated by Señor de Villa Urrutia, March 20, 1911.

(1.)

Señor de Villa Urrutia to Sir Edward Grey.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency, *Spanish Embassy, March* 20, 1911.

ARTICLE 3 of the Anglo-French Declaration of the 8th April, 1904, provides for an agreement between France and Spain respecting Morocco. This agreement was concluded on the 3rd October of the same year, and its secret clauses are known to His Britannic Majesty's Government. It is a fact that not only has Spain scrupulously observed the compact, but that in her desire for good-will and harmony she has refrained from raising difficulties and has co-operated in all the affairs which her dignity allowed. Our pacific and conciliatory attitude has encouraged an incessant and hardly concealed penetration which has reached the established zone which constitutes our sphere of influence. But the agreement of 1904 will be turned as regards Spain into a dead letter, impossible of fulfilment, if the criterion prevails which has been adopted by France relative to the grant of loans and their guarantees, the exclusive instruction of the Shereefian army, the organisation and maintenance of the police and the execution of works without the cognisance of the Caisse spéciale and the diplomatic body at Tangier—measures which by agreement between France and the Makhzen without our knowledge, affect our zone of influence, and constitute a breach of the agreement of the 3rd October, 1904, and also an infringement of the stipulations of the Act of Algeciras.

The Spanish Government, on the occasion of the latest Franco-Moorish financial arrangement, have been obliged to formulate to the Paris Cabinet the objections set forth in the instructions addressed to the Spanish Ambassador in that capital, a copy of which is enclosed. I have been directed to call the special attention of the Cabinet of St. James thereto, and since the Franco-Spanish agreement is due to the initiative His Britannic Majesty's Government—who must therefore be interested in the development, in accordance with that agreement, of the work of civilisation in the Moorish Empire which is incumbent on Spain as on France, the Spanish Government do not doubt that His Britannic Majesty's Government will be disposed to use their good offices, now more than ever necessary, to promote an amicable agreement which will satisfy our just but disregarded claims, and avoid a breach with its lamentable consequences in Morocco between the two nations equally friendly to Great Britain.

I have, &c.

DE VILLA URRUTIA.

(2.)

Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Spanish Ambassador in Paris.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

His Majesty's Government have considered the draft Moorish arrangement which the political director of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs handed to your Excellency on the 13th instant. They presume that the matter remains in the state of a project, and that the approval of the French Council of Ministers denotes nothing more than their concurrence therein, without its being invested with the character of a definitive act, a character which it cannot have, seeing that it affects the Spanish sphere of influence in Morocco, and the Madrid Cabinet have not yet expressed an opinion thereon. There can be no doubt, firstly, of the necessity of the expressed acquiescence of Spain in conformity with paragraph 4, article 2, of the agreement of the 3rd October, 1904, before France can concert with the Makhzen the provisions of the project to be put into force after the 3rd April, 1919, in the said Spanish sphere of influence; and, secondly, the right which at the same time pertains to Spain that, with regard to the clauses destined to enter into force in the Spanish sphere before the above-mentioned date, time should be given to Spain to make her

observations, without which the object underlying the "previous agreement" referred to in the third paragraph of the second article of the agreement of 1904, that "les droits et les intérêts reconnus à l'Espagne . . . . soient toujours respectés" would not be attained.

In these circumstances you should point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, firstly, that in proposing to the Powers the recognition of Mulai Hafid as Sultan of Morocco, and in informing the latter of such recognition, Spain and France made a joint reservation with regard to the action to be taken to obtain direct from the Makhzen the reimbursement of the expenses which both Powers had incurred through military expeditions to ensure the tranquillity of certain regions of Morocco. In obtaining this reimbursement the Paris Cabinet took over, less than a year ago, the sole guarantee in Morocco which could easily be obtained, viz., the surplus of the revenues affected to the loans of 1904 and 1910, and this not only at the ports in the French sphere of influence but in the Spanish as well, and not merely for a short period or up to the 3rd October, 1919, but for seventy-five years. Further, if after payment to France of the annuity corresponding to the indemnity a surplus remains, it is to be devoted to the payment of the forces in the Shawia; and, lastly, the French Government have the right to prevent the imposition of new taxes in the ports, both in the Spanish as well as in the French sphere of influence, without the consent of their delegate. Against such stipulations, which thus rendered difficult the reimbursement of the Spanish war indemnity, and which limited the rights appertaining to the Spanish Government under the agreement of the 3rd October, 1904, the Madrid Cabinet, while maintaining their conciliatory attitude and their desire to preserve harmony with the Paris Cabinet, could not do less than formulate objections and ask that the French Government, taking the Spanish views into account, should formulate proposals calculated to conciliate the two points of view and to guarantee the rights and interests of Spain, who was ready, if it was considered preferable, to endeavour to find and to propose the formula desired. These remonstrances remained unanswered, and the Spanish Government, when negotiating with Mokri, had to be content with 55 per cent. of the Makhzen's share in the mining royalties as an incomplete and very insecure guarantee of their indemnity. They informed the Paris Cabinet before accepting this guarantee throughout the Empire, after accepting it, and again quite recently, that they proposed and desired to change it, in a suitable form and limited as far as the French sphere was concerned, for the guarantee mentioned above which France had obtained in the Spanish sphere.

The objections to this change which the French Government raised in their note of the 15th ultimo do not appear convincing; in any case, however, the least that could be hoped for is that the situation in this respect resulting from the Franco-Moorish agreement of 1909, against which the Madrid Cabinet maintain their observations and reservations, should not be aggravated by the cession to third parties of the French guarantee in the Spanish sphere of influence and by the prolongation of the term—already very long and out of harmony, in the opinion of the Spanish Government, with the Spanish-French stipulations of 1904—during which it is to last. This, however, is precisely what occurs in the draft financial arrangement now under consideration. The French Government cede temporarily their guarantee, without distinction of ports and consequently of spheres of influence, to the State Bank, as regards one half, and to the holders of the future loan for public works as regards the other half. And it follows that that the term for the liquidation of the debt owing by the Makhzen to France is also prolonged, and the action of Spain in her sphere of influence becomes more and more difficult, as the present and future charges are greater than the actual resources, and will therefore absorb new revenues such as the opening of ports to commerce, the increase of the customs duties, &c. The Spanish Government cannot permanently remain indifferent nor refrain from asking, as a preliminary, and on the basis of the Franco-Spanish Agreement of 1904, that France should desist.

After this statement of a general character, your Excellency should express the following opinion with regard to the financial arrangement which provides for a loan of 2,350,000 fr. for the maintenance of the police in 1912, and another of 15,000,000 fr. for the organisation of a Shereefian military force within five years :—

Firstly: The Spanish Government cannot see the reason why, while measures are being discussed with regard to the Moorish military forces for a term of at least three years, the same is not being done concerning the police, but only for the year 1912, since, if France and Spain have received any trust whatever, the chief object of it is that they should secure the protection of strangers living in the ports. On the other

hand, considering that the mission of the instructors to the police ends on the 31st December, 1911, and that the advances which the State Bank must make under that head are regulated by articles 6 and 35 of the Algeciras Act, the natural course would be that France and Spain should concert measures with each other, and with the other signatory Powers, respecting the renewal of the commission to the instructors and the application of the aforesaid articles in the present circumstances.

Secondly: Without further explanation of the organisation which it is proposed to give to the Shereefian military forces; or of the possibility that, in conformity with the undertakings of the Sultan and the promises of M. Pichon in 1908, Spanish officers will take part therein, and finally of the districts in which the Government of the Republic consider that they may advise the Makhzen to employ those forces, the Spanish Government are not in a position to express an opinion, but maintain, nevertheless, unchanged their point of view and their rights.

Thirdly: The projected financial arrangement provides as guarantee for the loan under consideration (because half the guarantee of the French war indemnity in the ports) one part of the "tertib" which His Shereefian Majesty, it appears, proposes to levy, or if the "tertib" cannot be imposed, a part of the old tribal taxes. It lays down the use to which in the event of a surplus the Makhzen is to put the part of the "tertib" not affected to the guarantee, fixing a certain quota for public works. The taxes of the Shawia alone are exempt from these provisions. But in the first place, as far as concerns the Riff, a stipulation of this nature is contrary to articles 3 and 6 of the Spanish-Moorish Agreement of the 16th November, 1910. In the second place, it cannot be admitted that the future yield of a tax should be allocated without the consent of the Madrid Cabinet, seeing that this tax, as the other revenues in the Spanish sphere are already destined for other purposes, constitutes the only one on the basis of which Spain can sooner or later approach the Makhzen and propose adequate measures for the institution of reforms or simply for the maintenance of order, to the benefit of the sovereignty of the Sultan and the integrity of the Empire. And it is all the less admissible considering that in the whole of the Spanish sphere and in a great part of the northern region (Gomara, Tehala, &c.), it will be very difficult not to say impossible in present circumstances to raise the "tertib" and the old tribal taxes, so that by including these regions in the guarantee the State Bank will not obtain an effective guarantee, nor is it to be anticipated that the Shereefian military forces, whose organisation is under discussion, will be able to carry out operations there. The question is practically reduced to that of the "tertib" of the Fachs, the Gharbs, and a few Kabyle tribes; and in these circumstances the Madrid Cabinet has more than ever reason to ask that a tax should not be allocated without its consent to purposes to which it has not agreed, especially when it is the only one it can control in the near future.

To sum up: the Madrid Cabinet holds the projected combination to be contrary, on the one hand, to the engagements entered into by the Makhzen, and, on the other, to the engagements of France, and also to the Act of Algeciras in so far as it concerns the advances for the police and Shereefian military forces. The Madrid Cabinet is ready to concert measures with the French Government respecting the renewal of the mission of the instructors provided under article 4 of the said Act, and the necessary measures for their maintenance under suitable conditions and in agreement with the other signatory Powers, respecting the organisation of a Shereefian military force, which, with the co-operation of Spanish instructors, may extend its action to the Spanish sphere, and to whose upkeep or to the guarantee of whose upkeep the "tertib" of certain tribes will contribute, and finally respecting the examination of any other measure, which circumstances may render necessary, including the temporary renunciation by France of a part of her war indemnity, and the change mentioned above in the other analogous system.

Passing now to the subject of a loan for 43 millions to be issued in sections for public works "de première urgence," the Spanish Government ask themselves whether it would not be more useful to wait until the question of the port works at Tangier has been settled by the diplomatic body in that town, which has already discussed the subject, and whether M. Porché has been able to adhere to the instructions of the Paris Cabinet not to consult his Spanish colleague or the Spanish Legation with regard to the utility of a railway from Tangier to Alcazar—a measure which up to now had never been submitted to the consideration of the Spanish Embassy in Paris or the Ministry of State in Madrid. In any case, as it appears indubitable that the construction of such a railway could not be finished much earlier

than the 3rd October, 1919, the right of the Madrid Cabinet to oppose the financial intervention of the "affermage," or of the exploitation of the monopoly organised by the Moorish Government in agreement with the French Government is beyond doubt. As the system of intervention is not to be changed at the approach of that date, it is by agreement with the Spanish Government that the organisation should be fixed. In the same order of ideas the Spanish Government have serious objections to formulate against the system of "affermage" and especially against the proposal that "le fermier versera au représentant des porteurs de l'emprunt le produit de l'affermage par l'intermédiaire de l'Administration de la Dette marocaine," otherwise the French delegate.

Finally, it is clear that the moment the French Government consider it legitimate to make arrangements direct with the Makhzen on the subject of a public work which has never been discussed by the committee of the Caisse spéciale nor the diplomatic body at Tangier, the Spanish Government retain full liberty of action, on which doubts are cast indirectly when they endeavour to carry out enterprises of a modest nature such as the Ceuta–Tetuan road.

The projected financial scheme includes amongst the guarantees of the loan for public works the port and lighthouse dues, and provides that these shall be collected in the same manner as the customs dues—that is to say, always through the medium of the Administration of the Moorish Debt. The Cabinet of Paris will, however, recognise that—

(*a.*) According to article 65 of the Algeciras Act, jetty and lighthouse dues can only be devoted in future towards the improvement of the ports, and consequently they cannot be employed towards guaranteeing the Tangier–Alcazar Railway.

(*b.*) With reference to the same article, the imposition of these dues must be effected with the support or the diplomatic body at Tangier, and it amounts to prejudicing the decision of this body to decide that payment shall be made in such and such a form.

(*c.*) The anchorage dues fixed in the treaty with Spain cannot, amongst other things, be revised until after the improvement of the ports, and the unanimous vote of the diplomatic body at Tangier is a necessary condition.

(*d.*) Finally, from the practical point of view, it does not seem natural that the lighthouse and port dues of the whole Empire should serve as guarantee for a loan which is destined for the exclusive improvement of the ports of Tangier and Casa Blanca.

The Spanish Government hope that the Government of the republic, taking the above considerations into account, and bearing in mind the general idea that even the first series of the loan in question is dependent "upon the scale of the port and lighthouse dues being fixed," will endeavour to separate the questions of works at Tangier, Casa Blanca, and Tangier–Alcazar respectively, and to examine afresh, with the Cabinet of Madrid, those works which affect the Spanish sphere of influence.

The third part of the financial scheme, namely, the loan for liquidating the present debts of the Makhzen, principally interests France, since it is based upon the guarantee of the taxes levied in the Shawia. However, the assignment of 5 per cent. of the customs duties (at present belonging to the Makhzen) to the guarantee in question raises—so far as concerns the ports of Tetuan, Tangier, and Laraiche—considerations similar to others which have been put forward, though the Spanish Government desire to point out that, in order to facilitate the proposed liquidation, they are for their part prepared to make the necessary sacrifices—provided, naturally, that their effect is not to diminish Spanish influence.

The Cabinet of Madrid is without sufficient data to determine whether, with the "tertib" of the French sphere of influence, where it is possible to collect it, and with the excess revenue of the ports of Casa Blanca, Mogador, Mazagan, Saffi, and Rabat (the import and export trade of which amounted in 1909 to more than 84 millions out of a total of 115 millions for all the ports), it would be possible to realise the plans of the Cabinet of Paris in the latter's own sphere of influence. If it were so—and the figures quoted are a strong indication to that effect—the Cabinet of Madrid, acting in accordance with the agreements which bind the two countries, would raise no objection, but, on the contrary, they would be glad to give their loyal support to the French proposals with the Makhzen, with the diplomatic body at Tangier, and with the Powers signatory to the Act of Algeciras.

The French Minister for Foreign Affairs will not fail to recognise that, in other conditions—that is to say, if it is a question of measures in the Spanish sphere of influence which are not subject to the consent of Spain, and which compromise for the present and the future the rights derived from those same agreements—the Spanish Government consider themselves under the imperious necessity of insisting upon their rights, some of which are, moreover, protected by the Act of Algeciras.

[10296] No. 81.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 21.)

(No. 123.)

Sir, *Paris, March* 20, 1911.

ON the receipt in the evening of your telegram No. 48 of yesterday I communicated with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and I obtained an appointment to see him this morning. I found that his Excellency had received from the French Ambassador at Madrid very much the same information as that furnished to you by His Majesty's Ambassador in his telegram No. 2 of [date not stated], as to the state of mind of the King of Spain and his Government in regard to the draft convention negotiated between the French and Moorish Governments for a new loan to Morocco. The Spanish Ambassador had made representations on the subject of the convention, and M. Cruppi had, he informed me, given to his Excellency explanations which he hoped and thought had reassured him as to the attitude of the French Government.

M. Cruppi gave me a copy of the draft convention, which I have the honour to transmit to you herewith. On my stating that you were quite in the dark on the subject of the convention and loan, their objects and the securities to be given, and that the complete absence of information on so important a matter placed you in a position of difficulty and prevented you from being able to judge whether you could properly give your support to the French Government at Madrid, his Excellency, after enquiry of the Political Director, informed me that the text of the convention was forwarded to the French Ambassador in London on the 16th instant. I observed that it had evidently not been communicated to you, for your instructions to me were of yesterday's date. M. Bapst suggested that M. Cambon was probably waiting for your day, but I observed that you had no particular day on which to receive the Ambassadors, and that if M. Cambon was not asking to see you on Friday or Saturday it was to be regretted that his Excellency had not communicated the text of the convention to Sir Arthur Nicolson, as the absence of information caused embarrassment and made it impossible for you to send suitable instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid.

M. Cruppi then gave me the following explanations relative to his own position in regard to the draft convention. When he came into office he found that it had been accepted by the Moorish envoy, El Mokri, and had been approved by the Minister of Finance of the late Ministry. He could not well reverse what had been done. He was anxious to take into account the anxieties and susceptibilities of the Spanish, but he thought that in the present questions in Morocco the Spanish Government were over-suspicious and anxious. The French Government were taking measures to enable the Sultan to hold his own against the revolted tribes and to establish his authority, which was a Spanish as well as a European and French interest. They hoped that he would be able to give satisfaction for the murder of Lieutenant Marchand, the quarter-master, and three soldiers, instead of French troops having to procure it. The latest orders issued by the French Government were that, though the troops were to be reinforced, they were not to go beyond their present posts, but to hold them and leave it to the Moorish troops to punish the guilty tribe. The furnishing of resources to the Moorish Government for the policing of the ports, the execution of public works and the payment of the old debts of the Makhzen provided for in the convention would be of benefit to Spain as well as to France and other countries, as also the construction of ports at Tangier, Casa Blanca, and of the Tangier-El Kars Railway.

I observed to M. Cruppi that it would be important to meet the wishes of the Spanish so far as they might be found reasonable, and it might be possible so as to prevent a state of friction between Spain and France being used by Germany, who had had at one time ambitions on the Atlantic coast of Morocco and might still have them, to obtain some advantage for herself from the Spanish Government in the neighbourhood of Ifni. His Excellency said that he quite appreciated the necessity

to avoid anything likely to have such a result. The French military mission had been established in Morocco for a very long time. The Spanish Government had withdrawn their military mission, and they could hardly complain of the assistance which the French military mission had been giving to the Sultan in his endeavours to subdue the revolted tribes. M. Cruppi finally requested me to assure you that he would do his best, whilst not reversing the policy of the late French Ministry, to conciliate Spanish interests and meet your wishes in that respect.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 81.

Accord préalable : Projet de Combinaison financière.

LE présent projet de combinaison financière a pour but de procurer au Gouvernement chérifien les ressources nécessaires—

(*a.*) D'une part, à l'organisation d'une force militaire chérifienne, et, d'autre part, à l'entretien de la police des ports pendant l'année 1912.

(*b.*) A l'exécution de travaux publics de première urgence (ports et chemins de fer).

(*c.*) Au paiement du reliquat des dettes du Makhzen antérieures au 30 juin, 1909.

La combinaison comporte, pour le premier de ces objets, des avances temporaires à demander à la Banque d'État du Maroc ; pour les deux autres, deux emprunts distincts, amortissables en soixante-quinze ans et convertibles à partir du 1er octobre, 1926.

En vue de faciliter (*a*) les avances de la Banque d'État au titre des dépenses de la force chérifienne et de la police des ports et (*b*) l'emprunt des travaux publics, le Gouvernement français consent à différer, aussi longtemps et dans la mesure qu'il sera nécessaire, le recouvrement de l'annuité de 2,740,000 fr. à laquelle il a droit en vertu de l'article 4 de l'accord franco-chérifien du 21 mars, 1910, sans toutefois rien abandonner de sa créance. Il sera cependant prélevé sur les excédents concédés au Trésor français, après service fait des emprunts 1904 et 1910, une somme de 100,000 fr. en vue de la constitution du fonds de réserve prévu à l'article 4 précité.

Il est, du reste, expressément entendu que le Gouvernement français ne cède son rang de créancier, tel qu'il a été déterminé dans l'accord du 21 mars, 1910, qu'au seul profit des deux opérations (*a*) et (*b*) relatives à l'organisation de la force militaire et à l'exécution de travaux publics. Par suite, les stipulations dudit article 4 reprendront tout leur effet aussitôt que les excédents des revenus affectés à l'annuité française (article 3 de l'accord du 21 mars, 1910), jointe aux autres revenus affectés aux deux opérations dont il s'agit, dans les conditions qui seront déterminées plus loin, dépasseront la somme nécessaire, soit au complet remboursement en capital et intérêts des avances de la Banque d'État, soit au service de l'emprunt des travaux publics.

(a.) *Police des Ports et Force chérifienne.*

On demandera à la Banque d'État d'avancer au Makhzen, à un taux d'intérêt inférieur au taux habituel—

1. Pour les besoins de la police des ports en 1912, 2,350,000 fr.

2. Pour les besoins de la force chérifienne, 15,000,000 de francs au maximum, correspondant aux besoins de trois années, à compter du 1er janvier, 1911. La Banque d'État ne pourra avancer au maximum que 5,000,000 de francs par an. Si, au bout de trois années, le crédit de 15,000,000 de francs n'était pas épuisé, le reliquat pourrait être utilisé par le Makhzen pendant les deux années suivantes.

Sur les 5,000,000 de francs de la première année, le Makhzen pourra prélever, dès la signature du contrat, une somme de 1,500,000 fr. pour les besoins généraux du Gouvernement chérifien.

La Banque d'État sera remboursée de ses avances en capital et intérêts :—

1. Par l'application de 50 pour cent des excédents des revenus concédés en 1910 (article 3 de l'accord) après service des emprunts 1904 et 1910, déduction des 5 pour

cent du produit des douanes réservés au Makhzen (article 3 (1) de l'accord) et versement d'une somme de 100,000 fr. au fonds de réserve de l'annuité française.

2. Par des prélèvements effectués sur le produit du tertib que le Makhzen décide d'appliquer cette année, et qui sera versé à la Banque d'État. Si, pour une raison ou pour une autre, le tertib ne pouvait être recouvré dans certaines tribus, le Makhzen s'engage à verser à la Banque d'État, jusqu'à l'application du tertib, les sommes recouvrées dans ces tribus suivant l'ancienne coutume. Le tertib qui sera perçu dans la Chaouïa n'entrera pas en ligne de compte.

Les prélèvements sur le produit dont il s'agit seront déterminés dans les conditions ci-après :—

Pour la première année, la totalité dudit produit sera réservée au Gouvernement chérifien pour ses besoins généraux, sauf versement au compte courant des avances de la Banque d'État de la somme qui excéderait 5,000,000 de pesetas hassani.

Pour la deuxième et la troisième année, ledit produit sera attribué deux tiers au Mahkzen, un tiers au compte courant. Mais si la part du Makhzen dépasse 5,000,000 de pesetas hassani, le surplus est affecté deux tiers au compte courant, un tiers aux travaux publics à entreprendre dans l'intérieur de l'Empire.

A partir de la quatrième année, il est entendu que ledit produit sera tout d'abord affecté à l'entretien de la force chérifienne. Toutefois, pendant la quatrième et la cinquième année le Makhzen pourra faire appel, pour cet objet, au reliquat, s'il en existe un, de l'avance de 15,000,000 de francs. Après paiement des dépenses de la force chérifienne, le Gouvernement chérifien conservera 5,000,000 de pesetas hassani pour ses besoins généraux. Le surplus des recettes sera divisé en trois parts : un tiers pour le compte courant, un tiers pour les travaux publics, un tiers pour le Makhzen. Lorsque les avances de la Banque d'Etat auront été totalement remboursés, le un tiers attribué au compte courant reviendra au Makhzen.

(b.) *Emprunt des Travaux publics.*

Il sera créé un emprunt de 43,000,000 de francs réalisables par tranches et destinés à la construction des ports de Tanger et Casablanca et d'un chemin de fer de Tanger à El Ksar.

D'après les devis de M. Porché, ingénieur en chef des ponts et chaussées, conseiller technique du Makhzen, il sera affecté—

	Fr.
Au port de Tanger	15 000,000
Au port de Casablanca	18,000,000
Au chemin de fer	10,000,000
Total	43,000,000

Cet emprunt sera gagé par les affectations suivantes :—

1. Cinquante pour cent des excédents des revenus concédés en 1910.
2. Le produit de l'affermage ou de la régie coïntéressée du chemin de fer.
3. Le produit des droits de phares et des taxes à percevoir dans les ports.

La construction des ports et du chemin de fer sera confiée à des entrepreneurs par voie d'adjudication publique. Les plans et devis seront dressés par le Service chérifien des Travaux publics.

Les droits de port et de phares existant ou à créer seront perçus dans les mêmes formes que les droits de douane.

L'entretien des ports et des phares se fera par les soins du Service chérifien des Travaux publics avec subvention de la Caisse spéciale de 350,000 fr. par an, sans que ladite Caisse spéciale intervienne dans l'exploitation.

L'exploitation du chemin de fer se fera soit sous forme d'affermage, soit sous forme de régie coïntéressée ; le contrôle technique sera exercé par le Service chérifien des Travaux publics ; un contrôle financier technique sera organisé par le Gouvernement chérifien, d'accord avec le Gouvernement français, et payé par le Makhzen. Le fermier ou le régisseur du chemin de fer versera au représentant des porteurs de l'emprunt par l'intermédiaire de l'administration de la dette marocaine, le produit de l'affermage ou de la régie.

La première tranche ne devra pas excéder 15,500,000 fr. effectifs ; sur le produit, il sera prélevé une somme de 500,000 fr. pour la constitution d'un fonds de réserve spécial à cet emprunt (première tranche) ; le surplus sera réparti par le Service

chérifien des Travaux publics entre les trois entreprises, autant que possible proportionnellement à la dépense totale prévue pour chacune d'elles.

La réalisation de cette première tranche restera subordonnée à l'établissement du tarif des droits de port et de phares.

En attendant cette réalisation et pour permettre les études définitives des travaux ci-dessus prévus, il sera demandé à la Banque d'État une avance de 500,000 fr. remboursables sur les fonds de l'emprunt.

Les gages affectés à la première tranche comprendront les revenus nécessaires à couvrir cette opération.

(c.) *Emprunt de Liquidation des Dettes.*

Le décompte des dettes antérieures au 30 juin, 1909, restant à rembourser s'élève, d'après les déclarations du Ministre chérifien des Affaires Étrangères, à 14,000,000 de francs.

D'autre part, le Makhzen est débiteur vis-à-vis de la Banque d'État de 1,000,000 de francs.

Pour rembourser ces 15,000,000 de francs, il sera émis un emprunt effectif de 15,000,000 de francs, au gage duquel seront affectés, en première ligne, le produit des impôts perçus en Chaouïa, mais seulement à concurrence de 700,000 fr.

En cas d'insuffisance de l'affectation ci-dessus, le Makhzen complétera la somme nécessaire au moyen des 5 pour cent du produit des douanes qui lui sont réservés (article 3 (1) de l'accord du 21 mars, 1910).

Les impôts de la Chaouïa qui sont actuellement perçus sous la surveillance de l'autorité militaire continueront d'être recouvrés dans les conditions actuelles pendant le temps de l'occupation militaire. Dans la suite, ils seront perçus sous la surveillance de la force marocaine prévue à l'article 1er de l'accord du 14 janvier, 1910. Leur produit, à dater du 1er janvier, 1911, sera versé à la Banque d'État, au compte de l'emprunt. Avis des versements sera donné, par la partie versante, au représentant des porteurs de l'emprunt.

La disponibilité, au 31 décembre, 1910, du compte des impôts Chaouïa, tenu à la Banque d'État, qui s'élève à 1,063,831 pesetas, sera affectée à la constitution d'un fonds de réserve spécial au nouvel emprunt des dettes.

Il est, d'autre part, entendu que les dépenses du goum de la Chaouïa prévu à l'article 7 (1) de l'accord du 14 janvier, 1910, à l'effectif de 1,200 hommes, seront acquittées, au lieu et place du Makhzen, par le Gouvernement français. Ces dépenses ne devront pas dépasser le chiffre de l'année 1910.

Il sera tenu un compte spécial sans intérêt des avances faites à ce titre par le Gouvernement français. Le Makhzen pourra en rembourser le montant à toute époque.

Le 28 février, 1911.

[10575] No. 82.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, March 22*, 1911.

MOROCCO Loan Convention.

Although public opinion remains uninformed on the subject, since the press has as yet kept silent, the Spanish Government, as reported in my telegram No. 2 of the 17th instant, continue to be greatly disturbed.

A question on the subject was addressed in the Senate yesterday to Señor Garcia Prieto, who confined himself to replying that the French Government had been asked for an explanation.

In the meantime, and as a result of a Cabinet discussion of the question, an official letter has been sent to the French Ambassador, stating that the Spanish Government wish to consult with the French Government as to the best form in which the Franco-Spanish, 1904, Secret Convention could be published.

The letter points out that such publication is provided for in article 16 of the said convention, and has now become necessary if a satisfactory statement of the true state of the question is to be rendered in reply to an impending interpellation. The Spanish Government are, it is added, about to publish a Morocco Red Book.

The French Ambassador came to see me this morning, and conveyed to me confidentially that his private opinion was that no very great objection could be urged against the publication of the convention. I gathered that, if asked by his Government, he would suggest that its publication could be easily explained by the argument that it was drawn up at a time when there seemed to be every probability of an early collapse of the Makhzen, whereas now the latter had become stronger than ever, and that therefore the case for a complete partition of influence as contemplated by article 3 had not arisen. Of course, the convention cannot be published without the consent of both Governments.

M. Geoffray feels that although the Spanish Government have shown somewhat undue irritation, yet the sudden way in which the French Government communicated the convention to the Spanish Government in the form of a *fait accompli* and without previous consultation was lacking in tact. He fears that, unless some concessions, as those detailed below, are made to Spain by the French Government, there is a danger that the former may appeal to Germany, and he indicated his belief that his opinion on this point would have the support of the French Ambassador in London.

Officially, M. Geoffray has confined himself to telegraphing the substance of the Spanish Government's letter to Paris, without expressing an opinion. He hears that a very friendly statement as regards Franco-Spanish relations in Morocco is to be made on Friday by M. Cruppi in the French Chamber, but he has telegraphed to the effect that something more than fair words will be required if the French Government wish to remove the disagreeable impression which has, however, unduly been created in the minds of the Spanish Government by the new convention, and suggests the following concessions as the easiest means of conciliating Spanish susceptibilities :—

1. Statement that railway to Alkazar need not be put in hand immediately, and that there will be sufficient time for the French and Spanish Governments to come to an agreement on this point at some later date.
2. Withdrawal of French objections to an increase of Spanish police force at Laraiche and Tetuan.
3. Engagement that Makhzen troops under Spanish instructors shall not penetrate into Spanish sphere without consent of Spanish Government.
4. Appointment as far as possible of Spanish agents for the collection of taxes guaranteeing loans within the Spanish sphere.

I have repeated the above to His Majesty's representatives at Paris and Tangier.

[10258] No. 83.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 103.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 22, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 99 of the 14th instant, I have to inform your Excellency that the French Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 16th instant, and discussed with Sir Arthur Nicolson the question of the construction of railways in Morocco.

Sir A. Nicolson told his Excellency that, after examination of the Act of Algeciras, it was clear that if any British firms tendered for the construction of railways in Morocco, His Majesty's Government would be bound to support them.

M. Cambon stated that France and Germany had come, or were coming, to an arrangement by which a free hand was given to the Société marocaine, but he quite understood that other countries were at liberty to take any action they desired. He hinted that perhaps the British share in the société might be increased.

Sir A. Nicolson observed that even in that event His Majesty's Government could not recognise the société as having a monopoly of public works in Morocco, and that they would always be obliged to support independent British firms who asked for assistance.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[8957] No. 84.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 22, 1911.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 39 of the 6th instant, enclosing regulations drawn up by the consular body at Casa Blanca with a view to prevent encroachments on the public roads in that town.

I approve these regulations, and I authorise you to instruct His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca that he may enforce them against persons under British jurisdiction.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[10875] No. 85.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 25.)

(No. 50.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 17, 1911.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 17 of the 6th instant, relative to the question of the new lighthouses to be constructed in Morocco.

The note which I addressed to the doyen of the diplomatic body at Tangier on the 13th January, setting forth the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to the construction and control of the lighthouses, was circulated amongst the representatives of the Powers at Tangier on the following day. After a considerable amount of discussion (by writing), it was finally decided that the following two letters should be addressed, the one to the Société marocaine de Travaux publics, the other to the delegates of the corps diplomatique on the Special Committee of Public Works.

1. A la Société marocaine de Travaux publics :—

"En réponse à votre lettre du 17 juin dernier, concernant un accord à conclure avec le Gouvernement marocain au sujet de l'installation de phares au Maroc, le corps diplomatique me charge de vous informer qu'il n'appartient ni au Maghzen ni au corps diplomatique d'accorder une concession pour l'exécution d'un travail public quelconque au Maroc, une telle concession étant contraire aux dispositions du chapitre 11 de l'Acte général d'Algésiras, qui stipule que tous les travaux publics à effectuer au Maroc doivent être mis en adjudication publique. Toutefois, pour satisfaire dans la mesure du possible au désir que vous avez bien voulu exprimer dans votre lettre précitée, le corps diplomatique a soumis au Comité spécial la question de savoir si sous certaines conditions la mise en adjudication en une fois des phares de tous les ports du Maroc serait possible."

2. Aux délégués du corps diplomatique au Comité spécial des Travaux publics :—

"En réponse à votre lettre du 17 septembre dernier, concernant la question de la construction des phares prévus au programme de la Caisse spéciale, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que le corps diplomatique ne voit pas d'objection à modifier le programme officiel de travaux en ce sens que la construction de tous les phares du Maroc pourra être exécutée en une fois au lieu de l'échelonner sur cinq années. Le corps diplomatique estime qu'il y a, toutefois, une distinction à faire entre la livraison des appareils optiques et les travaux d'architecture. La livraison des appareils optiques pourra se faire par concours, tandis que les travaux d'architecture devront être exécutés par moyen d'une adjudication. Le cahier des charges de cette adjudication devra contenir une disposition stipulant que les travaux d'architecture en question devront être entrepris en plein accord avec les fournisseurs des appareils optiques et sur des plans approuvés par ces derniers."

These letters were dispatched on the 28th February.

The question of the control and method of exploitation of the lighthouses when constructed was not discussed.

On receipt of your despatch under reply I asked M. Porché to come and see me, and asked him what arrangements he had intended to propose for the control of the lighthouses which the Public Works Committee had decided to build before the

Société marocaine came forward with their scheme. He told me that in view of the poverty of the Maghzen and their lack of administrative ability his original idea had been to hand over the exploitation of the lighthouses to a company. When, however, the Société marocaine de Travaux publics came forward he realised that if he proposed such a scheme it would look as though the whole thing had been arranged for that company. He had, moreover, the impression that such a proposal would meet with opposition from various Powers, and he knew, from a conversation which he had had with the Sultan, at Fez, on the subject, that it would not find favour with the Maghzen. He had therefore decided in his own mind that it was impracticable, and his present view was that the whole service of the lighthouses, administration, imposition of light dues for their support, &c., should be placed in the hands of the Moorish Government, and form a section of the Public Works. This view, as you will note, coincides with that of the Board of Trade, and the proviso that the Moorish Government should be guided by the advice of the corps diplomatique at Tangier is fulfilled by the fact that the latter are very fully represented on the Comité spécial. A "règlement" for the administration of the lighthouses, the tariff of the dues to be imposed, &c., would be drawn up by the committee, and submitted by them to the corps diplomatique. I went into the whole question both as to the contracts and the management and control very fully with M. Porché, who is particulary competent on the subject, having been for years in charge of the lighthouse service in Tunis. He is quite in agreement with the views of His Majesty's Government, and it would appear to me advisable now that the matter should be discussed at a meeting of the corps diplomatique at which he might be invited to attend. Should you agree to this course I should be glad to be informed whether you would desire me to raise the question of the eventual inclusion of Cape Spartel Lighthouse in the new Government service to be established.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[10876] No. 86.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 51.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 17, 1911.

MR. IRWIN, who had gone round to the Dar-en-Niaba yesterday about various small matters affecting the interests of British subjects, had a long and interesting conversation with the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

Guebbas began by taking the line that "tout était pour le mieux dans le meilleur des Marocs," but soon dropped that when he saw that it did not take, and spoke very frankly and confidentially; he said that when the mehalla left Fez, he considered the situation most critical; the troops were only partially trained, disaffection and intrigue were rife, and efforts were undoubtedly being made to discredit the French instructors with the soldiers under their command. He was, he said, very much pleased with the results obtained so far, but the danger was by no means past, and he prayed that the mehalla might not be induced by its early successes to advance too far into the country of the rebellious tribes. Were it to meet with any serious reverse, or to be surrounded and cut off by some large combination of tribes, which was still quite possible, the capital would be practically undefended, and the fate of the Sultan and the Grand Vizier would be sealed. In any case, he considered that it would be madness for the Sultan to think of leaving Fez for the present; if he did, he might be quite certain that he would never return there. Guebbas said there could be no question that El Glawi's exactions were the real cause of the rebellion, and that the reports that it was due to the military executions were spread by him, and should not be taken seriously; it was a great pity that the Sultan could not be made to realise the harm that was being done him by the methods of his Grand Vizier, and make up his mind and get rid of him. His Excellency considers that the reorganisation of the army has already given excellent results in this connection; he recalled the recommendations which had been made to the Makhzen by Sir Ernest Satow when at Fez to equip and train a force of 5,000 men; if only, he said, they had been attended to and carried out, almost all the disturbances of the last eight years which have brought the Makhzen to the verge of ruin would have been avoided. Guebbas spoke in very flattering terms of the work of Commandant Mangin, whom he considers a most capable officer. He had had

serious tussles with him in the past, but he realised now that he had his work at heart, and that his demands which then appeared exorbitant had been in the real interests of the Makhzen. Guebbas also paid a high tribute to Sergeant Balding.

Mr. Irwin asked him whether he did not think that, in view of the excellent results achieved by the reforms in the army, it might not be possible to attempt the reorganisation of other branches of the administration; but his Excellency, whilst fully admitting the urgent need for reform, replied that the difficulties were as great as they were obvious; the few small reforms already effected had put all sorts of wrong ideas into the heads of the people, and it would be necessary to proceed with the greatest caution.

Guebbas's view that the rebellion is due to the exactions of the Grand Vizier bears out the opinion held by Mr. MacLeod and M. Gaillard. The country, too, has suffered cruelly from the brutality and licence of the Berber warriors whom the Grand Vizier brought up with him from the south, and I understand that the behaviour of a body of these horsemen who accompanied the mehalla was such that Commandant Mangin threatened to throw up the command and retire with his officers unless they were recalled to Fez.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[11162] No. 87.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 27.)

(No. 51A.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 17, 1911.

THE French chargé d'affaires informs me that he dispatched a special courier yesterday to Fez with instructions to M. Gaillard to inform the Sultan that the various agreements had been signed. He was at the same time to state that a further force of 2,000 men was being dispatched to the Shawia, that the French Government gave an engagement that they would not be employed outside the frontiers of that province, but that in return they must request that His Shereefian Majesty should take immediate steps to bring about the punishment of the Zaer.

M. de Billy states that, pending such time as the mehalla would be free to operate against them, the markets of Casa Blanca and Rabat would be closed to them. A telegram from Mokri to the Sultan, to the effect that he had signed agreements on the various matters with which he had been entrusted, and that His Majesty might have confidence, was sent up by the same opportunity.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[10878] No. 88.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 53.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 19, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 44 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report that the "Dépêche marocaine" of this morning publishes a telegram from Teneriffe to the effect that the Spanish gun-boat "Infanta Isabel," with a Spanish military commission and the Spanish consul at Mogador on board, has left for the African coast for the purpose of determining the exact locality of Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña.

As Ifni has already been accepted (quite erroneously, I believe) as the old Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, I cannot help thinking that the gun-boat must have been sent to ascertain what sort of reception a Spanish committee of delimitation may expect.

Commandant Senès told me that he had satisfied himself as to the position of the real Santa Cruz at a spot about 40 miles north of Cape Juby, where there was a small almost landlocked sea; he said that it was inaccessible to ships owing to the surf.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[10879] No. 89.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 54.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 19, 1911.

I REGRET to state that there has been a further hitch in the settlement of the question of Messrs. Fernau's Gourna land, which formed the subject of my despatch No. 43 of the 11th instant.

The German Minister, at the beginning of last week, sent his dragoman to the Contrôle de la Dette to say that he must insist upon Mr. Ficke's case being treated in exactly the same manner as that of Messrs. Fernau.

The demand appeared to me preposterous: the cases were absolutely different; the Debt had recognised that the one (Messrs. Fernau's) was a good one, they were convinced that the other (Mr. Ficke's) was not. M. Luret said that he fully concurred in my view, and that he had used these arguments to Mr. Maroum, but with no effect. The latter had been most unreasonable and rather violent. He had now reported the incident to M. Guiot in Paris, and he begged me to allow him a little time, and not to press the matter. He was convinced that Messrs. Fernau would obtain satisfaction, but the situation was rather delicate, and the Control of the Debt were placed in a difficult position by the action of the German Minister. I acceded to M. Luret's request, but I said that I could not allow Messrs. Fernau's interests to suffer because the German Legation chose, against their instructions as far as I could make out, to support a bad case. The one could in no way be made to depend upon the other.

I understand that Mr. Ficke has declined absolutely to go to arbitration; but, as stated in my above-mentioned despatch, the German Minister himself told me that his instructions in that respect were categorical.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[10880] No. 90.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 55.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 19, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of two private letters which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting on the present situation in the north.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 90.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

Dear Mr. Lister, *Fez, March* 12, 1911.

WHEN the hubbub of the Beni Mtir's feat of yesterday afternoon subsided a bit, it appeared that the raided cattle were a mile or so further away than was at first stated, and that the marauders were stopped by Shijah people, who induced them to restore part of the booty on the ground that it did not belong to Makhzen officials. The Ait Yusi *v.* Sherarda raid, too, is reduced now to 500 sheep and 40 head of cattle. This afternoon's events were, however, still more sensational.

There were rumours that repetitions of these raids were intended. The Sultan, Glawi, and Taib Mokri were seen in conference in the verandah of the kiosk where you were received in state, the Sultan walking rapidly backwards and forwards. News had come in of the robbery by Beni Mtir marauders at Nzala Faraji (only 3½ miles to the west and in sight of the palace) of some Aissawa Shereefs.

Just then shots were heard near Bab Sagma, which suggested Beni Mtir there. Booting and saddling and mounting of palace horsemen, and serving out of cartridges, &c., and pouring helter-skelter out of the Meshwar ensued, when it transpired that the shots were blanks, and had been fired by some Sus acrobats performing for their livelihood just outside the town gate! The authorities, in great wrath, instantly haled these offenders off to prison.

Ben Jellali's Askris were having the new regulations read to them and were saying whether they would or would not accept them when, presently, further firing began to be heard, this time from the west, and smoke was seen to be rising from the village of Nzala Faraji, *i.e.*, the first village to the west as one leaves Fez for Mikkes or Mequinez, and about 3½ miles off.

Out poured the palace "mounted fencibles," retainers of Mtugi's, Glawi's, and Aissa Ben Omar's, again under the Hajib and the Kaid Er Rha Ben Jellali. They found one party of Beni Mtir burning the village of Nzala Faraji, and another beginning to burn a village on the low hill range above Nzala Faraji.

The Nzala Faraji lot were driven off, and those on the hills retired parallel with them, the whole lot being chased nearly to Duyats (*i.e.*, for 4½ miles more), by which time the pursuers' cartridges being exhausted and the raiders getting farther and farther out of range, the fencibles returned home.

Whether any of the raiders were hit is not known, but the Makhzen had two men killed and five wounded in the affray, including Ben Jellali.

The Sultan had watched the affair from the battery (which was ready for action) at the west of the Meshwar, had the dead and wounded brought to him, and gave directions for the funeral of the one and the medical care of the others at the little military hospital near to the palace.

With, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 90.

Consul Macleod to Mr. Lister.

Dear Mr. Lister, *Fez, March* 13, 1911.

I SAW Sid Taib Mokri this morning, but he said that he had had no suitable chance yet to ask the Sultan for the audience I had mentioned, but would do so after the Feast.

This is, of course, nonsense, but I let it pass until I should see Gaillard and discuss the point, as I did not wish to give any appearance of being insistent unless sure of his approval beforehand.

Gaillard, whom I saw later, said he had had the same experience sometimes with Sid Taib, and in this case he thought I should tell Sid Taib that I would get the audience through some other channel if he did not procure it soon.

Gaillard thinks the situation will right itself in due course, but he is of opinion that we should tell our respective people how it stands, so as to give any of them the opportunity of leaving (especially women and children) should they be so minded.

It appears, from all accounts, that the Ulad Aissa–Sheraga route continues fairly safe. Our courier of the 7th from Tangier has just arrived and confirms this.

I have explained the above to Dr. Verdon and Mr. Fava (manager of (America) Vacuum Oil Company), the only male non-Moslem British subjects (save Selous and I) here, and I have asked the other British subjects, all ladies, to tea this afternoon, when I shall explain the situation. These ladies are Miss Mellett, Miss Denison, and Miss Greathead, missionaries; Miss Cooper, senior clerk of the British post office; and Miss Hancock, governess with the Campinis (Italians).

I hardly expect anybody will want to go, as the general idea seems to be that the excitement will calm down after the Feast (to-morrow).

The affair of yesterday, and some attacks on certain villages of Ulad Jama, close to the west of Ben Ito, have, naturally, alarmed the Fez people a good deal. It takes very little to make *them* alarmed, of course, and none of them can point to any bad feeling inside the city, nor, especially, to any sign of anti-European feeling such as there was in 1907, or in December 1902.

The net sum of all we hear to-day is that the situation at the Fez mehalla is improving, the insurgents thereabouts having sacrificed to the mehalla, and supplying it with provisions freely.

On the other hand, there is a "harka" of Beni Mtir camped some 10 miles west-south-west of Fez. Of this report I have no exact evidence, but all the other circumstances point to its being probably true.

Both Gaillard and I had (separately) long talks with Aissa ben Omar last night. His suggestion was that as the tribes had lost confidence both in the Makhzen and in Shereefs whom the Makhzen usually employ as intermediaries, the consuls, or some of them, might be of service towards procuring a settlement with Sherarda. The

modus operandi would be for such consuls to get the Makhzen's promise of "Aman" to some responsible leaders of the Sherarda, whose safety would then be guaranteed during negotiations and at Fez.

Then a settlement might be mediated on the basis of a fixed sum to be paid by the Sherarda annually at stated periods, and kaids of their own to be appointed over them in succession to the present emissaries of the Grand Vizier.

I thought, and Gaillard quite agreed, that all this would be a very delicate and risky business, at the beginning in particular (and we remembered the speaker's bias, too), especially in view of the loss of prestige it might involve to the Makhzen, and the bad precedent, weakening of the Sultan's authority, Glawi's opposition, &c., &c., but that it is a means to be kept in view should the situation become worse, and that, meantime, he and I should try to find means, for resort to in case of need, of getting into touch with influential leaders of Sherarda. The Beni Mtir can give no serious worry, of course, if once they can be separated from the Sherarda.

So Gaillard and I are, without saying why, trying to collect here names of influential Sherarda men known to be amongst the insurgents.

With, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[10881] No. 91.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 25.)

(No. 56.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 20, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a summary of the events that have occurred here during the past week.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 91.

Summary of Events for Week ending March 20, 1911.

THE district of Rabat is still in a very disturbed state, and communication with the interior is almost entirely suspended. On the 11th instant all the European couriers were forced to return to Rabat; they reported that they had heard heavy firing on the 10th. The town is full of Makhzen officials and khalifas of important kaïds, who are on their way to Fez with large sums of money and have had to suspend their journey in view of the tribal rising.

Mr. Lennox reports from Marrakesh that order has been restored in the Sous, and that the Makhzen army is returning to the city. The Basha has given orders that no body of more than ten tribesmen is to be allowed within the walls. Mr. Lennox believes that these precautions are being taken in view of the report that large numbers of fugitives from the Oolad Furdj tribe, who have been undergoing punishment for their rising in the Dukala district, are fleeing to the south.

Mr. Madden learns that the French army of occupation in the Shawia is shortly to be reinforced by 2,000 men. He is informed by the officer commanding the force that these additional troops are destined, not for any punitive expedition, but merely to keep order in the extended Shawia zone. Meanwhile the military road into the Zaer country has been pushed forward some 25 kilom., which will render more easy of accomplishment any punitive measures that may eventually be undertaken against the tribesmen who were responsible for the murder of Lieutenant Meaux and the ambushing of the French column at the end of last year.

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[11198] No. 92.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 26.)

[By Post.]

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, March* 26, 1911.

YOUR despatch No. 94 of 17th March.

The French Government have no objection to the immediate discussion of the draft Morocco mining regulations by the diplomatic body at Tangier. Instructions have been sent to French representative there in the sense of the Spanish proposal

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[11163] No. 93.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 27.)

(No. 58.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 20, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch which has been forwarded to me by His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca, from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador, relative to the relief of famine at that port. I also enclose a note which I have received from the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, conveying to me his gratitude and appreciation of the beneficent action of Mr. Johnstone and of the British merchants at Mogador.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 93.

Cid Guebbas to Mr. Lister.

(After compliments.)

I BEG to convey to your Excellency the expression of my commendation and praise of the beneficent action of the consul of your honoured Government and of the friendly British merchants at Mogador, and of their praiseworthy exertions on behalf of the unfortunate people who arrived there from the Sous, to whom they gave generous alms and assistance.

I should be grateful if your Excellency would convey to them my friendly thanks.

May you, &c.
March 9, 1911. GUEBBAS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 93.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Consul Madden.

(No. 23.)
Sir, *Mogador, February* 26, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my despatch No. 18 of the 4th instant, relative to the famine stricken natives of the country at this port, that after Miss MacNab, of the Scottish mission, and Mr. Forrest, British subject, assisted by a few friends, had been feeding the most destitute of the children for a fortnight, I summoned a meeting of British subjects and protected persons at this house on the 14th instant, to consider the best means we could adopt to alleviate the distress. A committee was formed, consisting of Mr. S. Weinstein, secretary, myself, treasurer, Mr. G. V. Forrest, Mr. Richmond, of the Scottish mission, and Mr. A. Abrahams, and a sum of exactly 100 dollars was collected, to furnish food for some days to the most starving. There was a small delay in collecting the money, and on the 16th instant I enquired of Don Gustavo de Sostoa, the doyen of the consular corps, whether he would summon a consular meeting to consider the question of joint action in the relief work. A consular meeting was called for the following day, the 16th [? 17th] instant, at which it was decided that the charities should take a private form, so as to avoid, as far as possible, attracting more natives to the vicinity of this town, and a telegram was dispatched by the doyen of the consular corps to the doyen of the diplomatic

corps in Tangier, urging the danger to the sanitation and tranquillity of Mogador occasioned by the presence of the starving natives here, and expressing the conviction that it was the duty of the Moorish Government to cause the removal of the people from here, as well as to provide them with temporary subsistence.

On the 19th instant the British relief committee commenced feeding the famished natives, or rather feeding all the "blue" people in the town and at the gate, supplying a cupful of maize meal once a day to every person, without distinction of age or sex. It was found impossible with our small number of workers to make a distinction between the really starving and those who may possess some small amount of means. In the meantime, on the 18th instant, it was discovered that there existed several cases of small-pox in the huts of some of those outside the walls. The small-pox at first appeared in a mild form, but added to the anxiety of the married members of the European community to see the famished quit this neighbourhood. On the 20th instant M. de Sostoa called a meeting of representatives of the different European communities, at the house of Mr. R. L. N. Johnston, to discuss the possibility of forming an international committee, I hastily summoned a meeting of the committee of the British Famine Relief Fund, at which Mr. A. Abrahams was appointed to represent the British relief fund at the proposed meeting. The governor of the town was present at Mr. Johnston's house, and it was proposed to give fifteen days' provisions to the strangers and to send them to their own countries, forming a concentration camp for those who refused to go, at some distance from the town, and to send to the island all those who both refused to return to their own country or to enter the concentration camp. His Excellency the governor was appointed [*sic*], Mr. R. L. N. Johnston, secretary, and myself treasurer of the international fund, but I refused the post of treasurer, foreseeing that many difficulties might arise in the discharge of my duties. On the same day the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company's steam-ship "Arzila" arrived, and a collection was made among the passengers and officers for the famine relief, which resulted in the sum of 48*l.* 4*s.* 6*d.* being placed in my hands. Mr. Forrest further brought me the amount remaining in his hands of 7½ Hassani dollars, 1 Alfonso dollar, and 3*l.* 11*s.* 6*d.* The sum thus collected I deposited in the Morocco State Bank, the total being 51*l.* 19*s.* 8*d.* and 7½ Hassani dollars.

Upon the following afternoon an open-air meeting of the international committee was called at 3 o'clock in the afternoon by the governor. The meeting, at which the British committee requested me to be present, took place outside the Bab Es-Sebah, at the time of our distribution of meal to the sufferers. The mokaddemeen of the tribes were called, and all consented to leave the town and return to their own districts upon receiving their provisions for sixteen days. The governor accordingly stated that the provisions would be distributed on the following morning, and that all must depart immediately afterwards. The governor and the committee had, however, miscalculated their time, for, in the first place, it was found impossible to grind the amount of maize required in less than two days. Again his Excellency had forgotten to reckon the illness which might exist among the tribesmen, and also the fact that many of them were nomads and had no "mokaddem" who could represent them, or, in fact, country to which they could return. The British committee was therefore requested by the international committee to feed the tribesmen for another two days (Thursday the 23rd and Friday the 24th instants). On Saturday, the 25th instant, the maize having been ground, the tribesmen assembled outside the "Powder Magazine" on the beach, and each individual, without respect to age or sex, received sixteen days' rations in meal in a sack. There was much delay, owing to miscalculations of numbers and time, and, though the distribution was timed to commence at half past six in the morning, it finished at three in the afternoon. It was further found that "confluent" small-pox in its most dangerous form existed amongst the tribesmen, and that many were suffering from dysentery, and that some were so enfeebled as to be unable to be removed. Yesterday I interviewed and examined those remaining, in the company of the Spanish consul and Mr. Richmond, and found they numbered 75. 2,500 sacks of meal were distributed on the 25th instant, and still on Sunday, the 26th instant, when the Spanish consul, Mr. Richmond, and I went round the site of the encampment, there remained 75 individuals, sick of dysentery or small-pox, with those who were bound to attend to their wants, so that those who had come to this town must have amounted to 2,275 at least. In addition to this number I am informed on good authority that many Moors have received good looking young women into their houses, with the intent of disposing of them to a profit, so that I believe I cannot put down the figure of the number of indigents on Saturday at less than 3,000. It is rumoured that, upon the

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governor's notification that sixteen days' rations would be supplied, messengers were dispatched to Agadir to inform others there that they should come to Mogador, and there is no doubt that the numbers greatly increased for the last two days of the British distribution of food. There are said to be 2,000 indigents encamped round Agadir at present. A minority, but a considerable minority, came from Shedma. Many came from the desert, who had been fighting under Sheikh Malainin against the French, so were not real victims of famine. A large number were nomads. To-day the contagious sick have been isolated and the weak and feverish have been sent to the "Powder Magazine," so that the minds of the nervous have been to a certain extent tranquillised.

The governor has announced that if any more indigent return to Mogador they will be sent to the island and can expect no more charity, but it remains to be seen whether his Excellency will carry out the intention of his announcement.

I have, &c.
H. B. JOHNSTONE.

[11105] No. 94.

Sir A. Johnstone to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 27.)

(No. 42. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *The Hague, March* 20, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 34 of the 9th instant respecting the amendments which the Government of the Netherlands desire to insert in the draft Moroccan Mining Law, I have the honour to report that I accompanied M. Pellet to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 17th instant, and that the French Minister, acting as spokesman, told M. van Swinderen that his Government were unable to accede to the alterations proposed by the Netherlands Government in the draft law; firstly, because that document had been very carefully drawn up by the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Spain, and that any changes in one article would reopen the discussion of the whole question; and, secondly, because they considered that the amendments proposed would not really meet the wishes of the Government of the Netherlands or be in the interests of the Makhzen.

After M. Pellet had concluded, I told M. van Swinderen that His Majesty's Government, after most carefully considering the question, had instructed me to state that their views were in entire accordance with those of the French Government.

His Excellency replied that he had been prepared for our answer by the German Government having also told him that they could not agree to the proposals of his Government. He attached special value to the alteration proposed in article 63, namely, that a majority of two-thirds of the diplomatic body and not a simple majority only should be necessary for the issue of the firman referred to in that article. One other Government he knew was also desirous that the majority of two-thirds should be adopted, and, in the circumstance, he must for the present reserve any further communication on the subject.

The French Minister tells me he is not aware who this one other Power is.

(Secret.)

I enquired of M. Pellet previous to our interview with M. van Swinderen whether he was authorised to communicate M. Aiguillon's memorandum to the Netherlands Government, and he somewhat carefully explained that he had not that authority. I caught a glimpse accidentally of his instructions, and I thought, though I may be mistaken, that he was instructed to keep No. 2 of the memorandum secret from the Spanish Government.

I have, &c.
ALAN JOHNSTONE.

[10629] No. 95.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, March* 27, 1911.

SPANISH objections to Franco-Moorish Loan Convention.

I approve your language to M. Cruppi as reported in your despatch No. 123. You might also express the hope of His Majesty's Government that the French Government will do their best to avoid wounding Spanish susceptibilities, and that they will not give their consent to any measures which do not strictly adhere to the terms of the Act of Algeciras.

[11198] No. 96.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Foreign Office, March* 27, 1911.

MY telegram No. 3 of 16th March.

We have no objection to immediate discussion of Mining Law.

[10629] No. 97.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 22.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 27, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 4 of to-day's date, I transmit to you herewith a translation of a note from the Spanish Ambassador,* enclosing a copy of a despatch which the Spanish Government have addressed to their representative in Paris, on the subject of the objections of Spain to the recent Franco-Moorish loan convention.

I should be glad if you would telegraph to me shortly any alterations which you may have to offer on the Spanish objections as set forth in the above-mentioned despatch.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[11507] No. 98.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received March 29.)

Sir, *Admiralty, March* 28, 1911.

I HAVE laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 25th ultimo, forwarding an extract from a letter addressed to a director of the Société marocaine des Travaux publics by the president of the syndicate relative to the new lighthouses to be erected in Morocco.

In the absence of any detailed information as to the proposed situation, candle power, &c., of these lighthouses, my Lords are unable to give an opinion whether the advantages to be derived from their construction will be a sufficient compensation for the disadvantages involved in their control by the syndicate.

If the proposed lights or any of them are of such importance to navigation as that established at Cape Spartel, it is considered that an arrangement similar to the convention of 1865 is desirable, but if they are of small importance the question of their control appears to be of no great consequence.

I am, however, to request that further details of the proposed lights may be obtained if possible.

I am, &c.
C. I. THOMAS.

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* No. 80.

[11421] No. 97*.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 28.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, March* 28, 1911.

THE Portuguese Minister has written to acting doyen stating that he has received his credentials from his Government as Minister and asking to take over the *décanat*. Acting doyen is circulating the letter, as it raises a problem of international law as to whether representative of a Government not recognised by the Powers can act as doyen; also whether appointment counts as a new one. I should be glad of instructions as to attitude I should assume.

[11590] No. 99.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 140. Secret.)

Sir, *Paris, March* 28, 1911.

I HAD an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in order to carry out the instructions contained in your telegram No. 49 of yesterday.

I informed his Excellency that what I had said to him on the 20th instant on the subject of Morocco had been approved by you, and I gave to him for perusal my despatch No. 123 of that date, so that he might be reminded of our conversation, and I told his Excellency that you had desired me to add to what I had said to him that His Majesty's Government trusted that the French Government would do their best to avoid wounding the feelings of the Spaniards, and would not give their consent to any measures not in strict conformity with the Act of Algeciras.

M. Cruppi requested me to assure you that his desire is to spare the feelings of the Spaniards as much as possible and to act entirely in conformity with the Act of Algeciras. It would, however, be necessary to take up a very firm attitude towards the Spanish Government at the same time as sparing their feelings. The Spanish Ambassador had had a long interview with him yesterday, in the course of which he had intimated that the Spanish Government intended to send a military mission to Fez. M. Cruppi had, he informed me, told the Ambassador that the French Government could not possibly consent to such a proceeding. The French military mission was by right at Fez, and it had existed from 1877 onwards. The Spanish military mission had been withdrawn. M. Cruppi said that you may rely on no incident arising out of the present controversy between the French and Spanish Governments. The negotiations would be carried on in the most amicable spirit, and no announcement would be made in Parliament likely to cause irritation. M. Cruppi then gave me an instance of the intrigues which he stated were being carried on by or on behalf of the Spanish Government. The French consul at Fez had reported that the Spanish Legation at Tangier had written to the Grand Vizier to the effect that the Spanish Government had prepared a military mission for dispatch to Fez in accordance with the arrangements existing between the Spanish and Moorish Governments. No such arrangements existed. This was only one out of many examples of the spirit in which the Spanish Government were acting in Morocco. He quite realised that the King of Spain found himself in a difficult position in regard to the Cortes and the feeling in the Spanish army on the subject of Morocco, and he was anxious to do what he could without reversing the French policy to which his Excellency had succeeded, with a view to facilitating matters for His Majesty, whose good qualities he knew and appreciated. He would also bear in mind the danger of doing anything which might afford to Germany an opportunity to intervene and make capital with the Spanish Government to the detriment of French and British interests.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

[10875] No. 100.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 23.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 30, 1911.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 50 of the 17th instant relative to the question of the new lighthouses to be constructed in Morocco.

I approve your suggestion that a meeting of the diplomatic body at Tangier should now be summoned to discuss the matter, and that M. Porché should be invited to attend. I see no objection to the question of the inclusion of the Cape Spartel lighthouse in the new service being discussed at this meeting, but I do not consider that His Majesty's Government are called upon to raise the subject; and I do not propose to express any opinion on the scheme until some definite suggestion for giving practical effect to it is put forward.

I observe that in the letter to the delegates of the diplomatic body on the special committee of public works a distinction is drawn between the contracts for the optical apparatus and for the structural work of the lighthouses, the opinion being expressed

that the former should be awarded *par concours* and the latter *par moyen d'une adjudication*. I do not understand in what the difference consists, and I should be glad of explanations as to the exact meaning of the words *par concours* in this context. It was not the intention of His Majesty's Government that there should be any difference in the system of awarding the contracts, and it is not apparent why the terms of the Act of Algeciras and the adjudication regulations should not be strictly adhered to in either case.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[11858] No. 101.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 31.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, March* 31, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 5.

My Spanish and French colleagues and I are requesting a meeting of the corps diplomatique to discuss mining regulations.

Should any amendments be proposed by representatives of other Powers, they are instructed to reply to the effect that all such proposals must be referred to their Governments for discussion between Cabinets.

Should I act similarly?

[11858] No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March* 31, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 14. Yes.

[11908] No. 103.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 1.)

(No. 57.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 20, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca, relative to the visit of the German gun-boat "Eber" to that port.

You will already have received from me the correct version of the incident with regard to the reception of the commander.

The French chargé d'affaires told me yesterday that the German Minister had mentioned the matter to him, and had said that he quite disapproved of the claim to "special honours" made by the German consul at Casa Blanca, and had told him so. What had been done was quite sufficient, and quite right and proper.

M. de Billy seemed much gratified at the line taken in the matter by Baron Seckendorff.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 103.

Consul Madden to Mr. Lister.

(No. 53. Confidential.)
Sir, *Casa Blanca, March* 13, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 46 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to report that the German gun-boat "Eber," which arrived here on the 7th instant, and had to leave port again owing to the rough sea, returned to the Casa Blanca anchorage on the 9th instant, the weather having moderated.

The commander of the "Eber" landed in the afternoon, and was received at the waterport by the basha and the German consul. Later, he called on the Moorish Viceroy and the basha, but no visits were, so far as I know, made to the foreign consulates.

[11865] No. 101*.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 31.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, March* 31, 1911.

SULTAN has dispatched the Fez mehalla to oppose a body of Beni M'Tir. This was done against the recommendation of Commandant Mangin, who has now returned to Fez. The enemy, whose strength had been under-estimated, repulsed the Government troops, and drove them back to the walls of the capital with considerable loss.

[11421] No. 101†.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 31, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 13.

It would be very anomalous if Count Martens Ferrao acted as doyen so long as Portuguese Republic is not recognised by the Powers, but before raising objection on this ground you should ascertain views of your colleagues.

The first day there was a dinner at an hotel, followed by a ball at the German consulate. Next day the German colony entertained at the club. A representative of the French army was present at the ball at the consulate, and the whole of the staff of the French consulate attended both functions.

The general feeling is that the French felt annoyance at the visit of the German cruiser, as shown by the military not participating in any of the fêtes, and by the arrival of the French gun-boat "Forbin" at the same time as the "Eber." The French military are in mourning for the late War Minister, and have made the most of this as an excuse for keeping away—indeed, at the German ball at the club not a single French officer was present.

It is evident that the German colony had expressed a desire that their flag should be shown here, but the French consul, being a man of broad views, laughed at the idea of any importance being attached to the visit.

The "Eber" was to have left on the afternoon of the 11th instant, but by permission obtained by the commander telegraphically from Berlin, the vessel remained till nightfall yesterday, then proceeding to Orstava and Las Palmas.

The French gun-boat "Forbin" also left last night for a destination at present unknown.

I learn privately that the German consul, having notified the Moorish authorities beforehand in writing of the German gun-boat's visit, the basha telegraphed to his father, Sid Guebbas, at Tangier, for instructions, and a reply was received to the effect that the usual offering of fresh provisions should be sent off and that the commander of the gun-boat be received by the basha, with the police drawn up at the Waterport. The basha thereupon wrote to the Spanish and French officers in command of the Moorish police forces, informing them of the orders he had received. The Spanish lieutenant-colonel replied, expressing his readiness to send down the police under his command to the port; but the French captain referred the matter to superior authority, and explanations were asked of the basha, who produced his instructions. Telegraphic communications were then exchanged with Tangier by the French and by the local Moorish authorities, with the result that there were no police present at the port when the German commander landed.

Fresh provisions were sent off to the ship, but the French contrôle of Makhzen funds having refused to pass the amount (130 dollars, Moorish) for their purchase, the Umana themselves paid the sum privately, pending reference to Tangier.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

[11909] No. 104.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 59. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 22, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of two despatches which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador relative to the activity of Spaniards and Germans in the Sbouia district of the Sous, a little to the north of Ifni.

The Spanish frigate referred to by Mr. Johnstone must, I think, be the "Infanta Isabel," whose movements were reported in my despatch No. 53 of the 19th instant. She must have made a previous journey to the African coast before her departure for Ifni.

I propose, subject to your approval, to instruct Mr. Johnstone to give good words to his Moorish friends, and to thank them for their professions of friendship. He should answer them that whenever the country is opened to foreign commerce, British merchants, mindful of the friendly disposition of the inhabitants towards them, will take full advantage of the opportunities offered to them. He should also take steps to ensure that he be kept informed of any activity on the part of other nationalities.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 104

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Mr. Lister.

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Mogador, March* 14, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith the translation of a letter which has been brought to me this day by a certain Amran-bin-Ibrahim Aliat, the "cousin" alluded to in the communication. Amran states that the Europeans alluded to by the kaïd in the letter are Germans, and that they first appeared in Sbouia about two years ago, and are at present visiting it again. In the spring of 1909 Sbouia was visited by a Belgian named Tacquin, accompanied by Mr. J. L. Ratto, of this town. Dr. Tacquin had difficulties about landing, and eventually was obliged to abandon most of his effects. Some ten years ago a British subject, named Curtis, established a small settlement in Sbouia, but it was a failure, and he finally abandoned it.

I would be grateful if I might be informed what reply, if any, I should make to Kaïd El Bashir's letter.

I have, &c.
H. B. JOHNSTONE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 104.

Kaïd El Bashir to Vice-Consul Johnstone.

(Translation.)

TO our friend the English consul at Mogador.

(After compliments.)

You know that the water-port in our country a few years ago was quite neglected until now, when we are annoyed with reposals regarding it. Others are wanting it. Should you have any interest in this part, my cousin, whom I send to you, will explain the matters to you. We give you the preference to the others who are asking for it. If you have any interest in this place, as we are told, you can take up the matter. People tell us that you are nearer to our country than any other nation.

By order of Kaïd El Bashir Ben Aliyat Sbouiye.

EL BASHIR.

Rabih 4, 1329.

Enclosure 3 in No. 104.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Mr. Lister.

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Mogador, March* 15, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 15, of yesterday's date, in which I transmitted to your Excellency the translation of a letter I had received from Kaïd El Bashir Ben Aliyat Sbouiye, I have the honour (to report) that this day a certain Sheikh El M'ki Ben Mulai Hamed, who resides near the above-mentioned kaïd, knows him well, and had received a letter from him requesting Sheikh El M'ki to visit me, came to see me, and repeated very much the same request that the kaïd had made in his letter. It appears that some days ago a Spanish frigate visited Aglou, having on board Don Gustavo de Sostoa, the Spanish consul at this port, who left here for the Canaries on the 2nd instant. The cruiser, my informant stated, spent a few days at Aglou, then returned to the Canaries, after giving the natives to understand that it hoped to visit Ifni very shortly. Arksis—where Mr. Curtis, the British subject referred to in my immediately preceding despatch, had established himself about thirty, not ten, years ago, and from whence neither he nor any of his expedition ever returned—is immediately south of Ifni. The French here are convinced that the Spanish Government wishes to establish that Ifni is Santa Cruz de Marpequeña. Members of the Mannesmann enterprise were in Sbouia one year ago, and, Sheikh M'ki told me, at present intended visiting it again from Taroudant. The sheikh produced a document signed by Mr. J. L. Ratto on the 29th November, 1897, purporting to be a certificate that title-deeds for lands he had bought, in common with Mr. Curtis, were in the hands of Kaïd El Bashir, but I believe that Mr. Ratto has come to some agreement with the Spanish consulate concerning the subject.

I told the sheikh that I could give him no reply until I received instructions from your Excellency, but promised to communicate with the legation at once.

Sheikh El M'ki repeated Kaïd El Bashir's assurance that the natives of Sbouia would much prefer the British to either Spaniards or Germans in their country.

I have, &c.
H. B. JOHNSTONE.

[11901] No. 105.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 1.)

(No. 32.)

Sir, *Madrid, March* 25, 1911.

THE Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me again yesterday concerning the new Morocco Loan Convention, which has created such a stir in Government circles in Madrid. His Excellency said he did not doubt that friendly explanations would be offered by France, but it remained a matter of surprise that questions of the first importance to the development of Spanish interests in Morocco should have formed the subject of a signed convention in Paris without any opportunity being previously afforded to the Spanish Government to offer its observations. Señor Garcia Prieto alluded more especially to the question of the projected railway from Tangier to Alkazar. It was difficult to believe, he said, that the omission to inform the Spanish Government of this important work was a mere oversight. The convention stated that the proportions in which the loan of 43,000,000 fr. for public works should be distributed between the requirements respectively of the railway and ports of Tangier and Casa Blanca had been founded on the plans of M. Porché, the French chief engineer of the department of public works. Why had M. Porché carefully avoided saying a word on the subject to his Spanish second in command? The Spanish Minister at Tangier had not heard a word about it from M. de Billy, the French chargé d'affaires, nor had any whisper of what was intended reached the ears of the Spanish Ambassador in Paris. Yet the proposed railway scheme, if carried out in its entirety, would afford an easy pretext for a French control over the line, the receipts of which formed the second of the three securities assigned to the loan.

A further grievance is the assignment, out of the proposed advance by the State Bank, of a sum of money for the requirements of the police of the Moorish ports in 1912.

Señor Garcia Prieto thought that the question of the renewal of the functions of the port police was a matter interesting the Algeciras signatory Powers as a whole, and that a French Government has no right to deal with it by a single-handed negotiation with Morocco.

He mentioned a rumour he had heard that the French colonial party's intention was to endeavour to induce the Powers to put an end to the port police altogether.

The supposed object was to secure the substitution of the police by Moorish soldiers instructed by French officers, and paid out of the proceeds of the advance (2,350,000 fr.) until further arrangements could be made. His Excellency did not suppose there was any ground for this strange report, but he objected none the less to France having included within the contemplated advance a sum destined to provide next year for a force whose powers were held to expire at the end of the present year, and the conditions of whose further employment depended entirely on the wishes of the signatory Powers.

His Excellency added that the opposition party leaders, who had been consulted, were quite agreed with the Government in taking a serious view of the situation created by the new convention. Señor Maura, he said, laid stress on the danger to which Ceuta might at any moment be exposed at the hands of a Moorish force organised and instructed by French officers.

Notwithstanding these complaints and apprehensions, I found the Foreign Minister yesterday in a much calmer mood than at his last diplomatic reception. He seemed to have grounds for believing that the French Government were prepared to consider the representations which Señor Perez Caballero had been instructed to make to them in a friendly spirit. He mentioned two points on which he hoped to obtain satisfaction, namely: (1) A definite engagement that Moorish forces under French instructors should not penetrate into the Spanish sphere of influence without the concurrence of Spain; (2) withdrawal of French opposition to the

construction of a road from Ceuta to Tetuan by direct arrangement between Spain and the Makhzen.

Meanwhile the friendly declarations made by M. Cruppi yesterday in the French Chamber of Deputies will no doubt help to remove the irritation which still remains in the minds of the Spanish Ministers.

Señor Garcia Prieto did not allude, in his conversation with me, to the demand which he has put forward, as reported in my telegram No. 3 of the 22nd instant, respecting the expediency of publishing the secret Franco-Spanish Convention of the 3rd October, 1904.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[11913] No. 106.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 1.)

(No. 63.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 27, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 60 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that the French chargé d'affaires told me yesterday that a panic had been created in Fez on the 21st. It appears that a few Berber horsemen arrived within several kilometres of the capital and began looting cattle. The cannons of the town were turned upon them, and the population at once imagined that they were once more being attacked by the Beni M'Tir. The horsemen appear to have retired, and *on était quitte pour sa frayeur*.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[12018] No. 107.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 1.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, April* 1, 1911.

FRANCO-MOORISH Loan Convention. (Please see my telegram No. 3 of the 22nd March.)

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, and he stated that the Spanish Government were not dissatisfied with the general attitude of the French Government. Although they had refused their consent to the publication of the 1904 secret treaty, yet on minor points they had shown themselves disposed to meet Spanish wishes.

His Excellency was gratified to hear that Sir F. Bertie had been instructed to invite the French Government, in your name, to consider Spanish susceptibilities as regards Morocco. He told me that the King had been highly gratified by this information, which had been also communicated by his Excellency the Spanish Ambassador in London.

[12011] No. 108.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 2.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, April* 2, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 6.

French Government favour Portuguese Minister's claim, and quote following precedent: After abdication of King Amedeo of Spain and proclamation of republic, Spanish Ambassador who remained in Paris retained his seniority amongst his colleagues. German and Spanish Governments hold that representatives of a Government which they have not recognised cannot act as doyen, and have instructed their representatives here to object. I should imagine that objection on the part even of one Government would preclude acceptance of claim.

[12303] No. 109*.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, April 3, 1911.*

I HAVE not yet received text of financial agreement, which makes it rather hard for me to deal with the matter, especially as I have no information as to the reserves, protests, &c., mentioned in the Spanish note. M. Regnault has been transacting the business in Paris, so M. de Billy is in a somewhat similar position. The holders of the 1910 loan cannot be expected to give up the guarantees on which they took it up; the Spanish suggestion for an exchange of guarantees seems therefore scarcely practicable.

I understand that the Sultan requires the police loan in order that the force can carry on its duty uninterruptedly while the Signatory Powers are deciding as to the renewal of its commission.

The French have, as I understand, informed the Spanish Government that their claim to have a military mission cannot for a moment be entertained.

The Spanish contention that the tribal tax, or tertib, if it is levied in districts named in Hispano-Moorish convention, cannot be taken as guarantee for the military loan, but must be applied as provided for in the convention, is accepted by the French Government.

With regard to the railway project, it was to be constructed by the Maghzen, and paid for out of a loan granted by France; consequently, I do not think it can be rightly considered as "French action" according to article 2 of the secret treaty.

Spain objects to *affermage* and any similar arrangements, but in my opinion the French have every right to make whatever arrangements they think most likely to be profitable.

The objection marked (*d*) does not seem to me to be tenable, as one must begin somewhere, but I deprecate the lighthouse dues being taken as part guarantee for the loan.

The zones are non-existent so far as concerns the Maghzen or the other Powers, and I think the Spaniards are laying far too much stress on that question.

[12127] No. 109.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 143.)
Sir, *Paris, April 1, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you, with reference to your despatch No. 93 of the 17th ultimo, that I left a memorandum with M. Cruppi, copy of which is herein enclosed, respecting the opening of the port of Agadir to foreign commerce.

I transmit to you herewith copy of his Excellency's reply, in which he states that before coming to a decision he desires to consult the French representative in Morocco as to the matter, and especially as to the effect of such a step on Mogador.

M. Cruppi states that, as regards the decision to be arrived at, he will concert with His Majesty's Government on the subject.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 109.

Note communicated by Sir F. Bertie to M. Cruppi.

HIS Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the question of the advisability of opening to foreign commerce the port of Agadir, and they consider that the opening of that port would be to the interest of British trade and shipping. His Majesty's Ambassador has therefore been instructed by Sir Edward Grey to approach the French Government on the subject and to enquire whether they see any objection to the opening of Agadir from the political point of view, and whether they would be ready to instruct their representative at Tangier to support His Majesty's Minister in bringing the matter before the diplomatic body there with a view to collective action.

Paris, March 22, 1911.

Enclosure 2 in No. 109.

Note communicated by M. Cruppi to Sir F. Bertie.

PAR sa note en date du 28 de ce mois, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a bien voulu faire connaître au département qu'il avait été chargé de s'enquérir des intentions du Gouvernement de la république en ce qui concerne l'ouverture éventuelle du port d'Agadir au commerce étranger.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères apprécie comme Sir Edward Grey l'intérêt de cette question. Toutefois, avant de prendre une décision, sur laquelle il ne manquera pas de se concerter avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, il croit devoir demander à la légation de la république au Maroc des renseignements précis au sujet des conditions locales du port d'Agadir et des conséquences diverses que pourrait entraîner, notamment pour la ville de Mogador, la mesure envisagée dans la communication de Sir Francis Bertie.

Paris, le 30 mars, 1911.

[12613] No. 110.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, April 5, 1911.*

MOROCCO. Mr. Lister's telegrams Nos. 17 and 18 of the 2nd April.

Information received by the French Ambassador from Paris foreshadows an advance on Fez at an early date by the French forces to restore the Sultan's shaken authority. M. Geoffray considers that the French troops on the Algerian frontier are of sufficient

strength to carry out this task by way of Taza without serious difficulty. His Excellency is warning the French Government that the apprehensions of Spain would almost certainly be roused by a French advance, and that the Spanish Government might find it impossible to resist making a corresponding demonstration in their sphere of influence. German opposition, M. Geoffray thinks, will be overcome by explanations which are being given at Berlin.

I have repeated the above to Paris and Tangier

[12011] No. 111.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April* 5, 1911.

DOYEN of diplomatic body at Tangier.

Mr. Lister's telegram No. 16.

Please enquire whether French Government remain of the same opinion, notwithstanding the German and Spanish objections. In that event you should inform them that to accept Portuguese Minister as doyen seems irregular, and may prove an inconvenient precedent; but that if the German and Spanish objections can be overcome, we shall agree as a matter of practical convenience.

[12654] No. 112.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No 2. Treaty.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 31, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 48 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting that the Sultan had designated Sid Taib Mokri as special envoy to the Coronation.

I cannot say I think the choice quite satisfactory; Sid Taib Mokri appears to me to be hardly a man of sufficient standing to warrant his being selected to represent the Sultan on such an occasion; it is true that he is nominally Minister of Finance, and that the Sultan has married his sister, but at the same time he is not more than 28 or 30 years old at the outside, and was absolutely obscure until his father came to the fore a few years ago; moreover, the Mokris cannot lay claim to any great position from birth. The grandfather was an official, and possessed some influence at Court, and succeeded in amassing a large fortune.

I certainly consider that Cid Mohammed-el-Mokri himself ought to have been sent, but, of course, if that cannot be arranged, Sid Taib has the advantage of having been in Europe, and of being accustomed to the society of Europeans; he has good manners, and may be expected to behave properly. As M. Gaillard said, "C'est quelque chose qu'il sache manger à la fourchette."

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 112.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 22. Confidential.)
Sir, *Fez, March* 20, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 19 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to state that the Sultan received me in audience to-day to speak about the Môorish mission to the Coronation of His Majesty the King.

Sid Taib Mokri was present.

The Sultan, speaking with considerable emotion, said that he had been more deeply gratified by the invitation to send a representative to the Coronation than he could well express.

The presence of a Moorish representative there would give the greatest satisfaction to all the Moors and all British subjects, and increase their friendship for each other.

It would be a testimony in the eyes of all the world of the entirely good feeling between our respective nations, and "would be an event which would be remembered and be talked about between our children and your children, and which they will always rejoice to look back upon."

I then mentioned that in view of the limitations of space in the Abbey it would be convenient to restrict the party to four persons, and I pointed out the usefulness of intimating as soon as possible who had been selected as envoy, &c., so that arrangements might be made.

The Sultan replied that, under the circumstances, he thought four persons a very generous number, and that, as envoy, he proposed to send Sid Taib Mokri, who is his brother-in-law, is his Minister of Finance, and is at present Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. I could discuss details with Sid Taib Mokri from time to time, and rest assured that the Sultan would accelerate everything we should suggest so as to facilitate the making of all arrangements in the matter.

The Sultan then asked in detail about the Coronation ceremony and proposed festivities, and I gave these particulars so far as I knew them, and after further conversation the Sultan then asked me to renew his good wishes on the occasion and his remembrances to your Excellency.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

[12769] No. 113.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 120.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 6, 1911.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 150 of the 5th instant, I have to inform your Excellency that the French Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 4th instant, and read to Sir A. Nicolson a telegram which he had received from M. Cruppi, to the effect that unless there was an improvement—a contingency not to be excluded—in the present grave situation at Fez, the French Government might feel called upon to take military measures for the protection of the lives of Europeans. These measures would probably consist of the dispatch of a column from the Algerian frontier to Fez. He added that the French Government were in consultation with the Spanish Government on the subject.

Sir A. Nicolson mentioned to M. Cambon, as purely personal observations, that the news of a French column crossing the frontier would probably arouse a fierce agitation throughout the country, and might even precipitate a catastrophe. If the tribes round Fez were really to capture the capital, the column would arrive too late to save Europeans, if the lives of the latter were, as a matter of fact, endangered. If the object of the column was to reinstate Mulai Hafid on the throne, the troops would never be able to leave Morocco, and the country would have to be conquered.

M. Cambon did not deny that the French Government would like to keep Mulai Hafid on the throne, but he said that they could not look on with folded arms if chaos and anarchy were to become general, and they could not leave Europeans exposed to danger.

Sir A. Nicolson admitted this difficulty, but pointed out that the other serious eventualities ought to be taken into account.

The Ambassador stated that a debate would take place in the French Senate in a few days, and M. Cruppi would have to announce what measures the Government contemplated.

Meanwhile His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid has repeated to you his telegram No. 7, dated the 5th instant, *i.e.*, a day later than the conversation between M. Cambon and Sir A. Nicolson. At that time the Spanish Government do not appear to have been fully informed of the views of the French Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12915] No. 114.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, April 7*, 1911.

MOROCCO: Please see my immediately preceding telegram.

The French Ambassador informs me that M. Cruppi on the 4th instant gave friendly assurances with regard to Morocco to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, and that he added that if circumstances should render a French advance necessary, the French Government desired that this should take place in agreement with Spain who would be at liberty to take such measures as might be required for the protection of her fortresses. This explanation was purposely granted to M. Perez Caballero before the other foreign representatives were admitted to see the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It appears from what my French colleague tells me that Germany is not entirely satisfied by the explanations which have been given her, and that the German Minister for Foreign Affairs had told M. Jules Cambon that his Government would regard a French advance on Fez as very inopportune at the present moment. My informant thinks that the German attitude may, however, be construed as a bid for some concession in exchange for German compliance. I imagine M. Geoffray meant by this concession certain facilities which Germany is anxious to secure on the Paris Bourse.

At the first diplomatic reception since the formation of the new Government the Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me of the difficult situation which would arise if the French advance on Fez were actually to take place. Any such movement would, he said, probably be followed by disturbances in other parts of Morocco, and Spain must insist on her right to take measures necessary to maintain order within her own sphere.

I expressed the hope that his Excellency would answer the interpellation in the Cortes announced for to-morrow in such a way as to calm the excitement which was beginning to show itself in the press and public opinion. I pointed out that for the present there was no reason to anticipate trouble in the region of the Spanish fortresses. He promised to endeavour to make his reply to the interpellation as soothing as possible, but added that Spain must clearly assert what she regards as her just claims.

[11507] No. 115.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 7*, 1911.

WITH reference to your letter of the 28th ultimo on the subject of the proposals of the Société marocaine des Travaux publics in regard to new lighthouses in Morocco, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that it has now been agreed that the new lighthouses shall be under the control of the Moorish Government, subject to the supervision of the Comité spécial des Travaux publics, on which the foreign Powers are effectively represented. This solution would appear to meet satisfactorily the question of the control of the lights.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[12940] No. 116.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 64.)
Sir, *Tangier, March 31*, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 19 of the 16th instant, in which you concur in the opinion I had expressed, that the committee provided for in article 63 of the Act of Algeciras should be appointed and commence its labours as soon as possible.

I spoke to the French chargé d'affaires the other day on the subject, and said that I proposed to write in that sense to the acting doyen of the corps diplomatique. M. de Billy, while absolutely sharing my view as to the expediency of getting the whole matter settled, begged me, if possible, to delay writing, for a short time at all events. With the "projet de municipalité" and the mining regulations to discuss

our hands, he said, were full, and he did not see how we could possibly start the discussion on a question as complicated and thorny as that of the habous, the "key" leases, &c. I said that my desire in wishing to bring on the discussion without further delay was to obviate the possibility of any friction arising in the ports, where the officials of the Debt seemed to be very active; it would be most regrettable that any sort of incident should occur between a British subject and a French official. If the discussion were delayed, I hoped at all events that M. de Billy would give a hint to M. Luret to instruct his employés to leave matters alone for the present. M. de Billy promised to do this at once. In this connection, I would state that M. Luret told Mr. Irwin two days ago that more experienced officials were being sent to Saffi and Mogador, and that no sort of unpleasantness need be apprehended in the future.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[12941] No. 117.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 65.)
Sir, *Tangier, April 2*, 1911.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 15 of the 31st March, the small mehalla in Fez sustained rather a severe reverse on the 26th instant. The Sultan appears to have insisted on sending it out, against the advice of Commandant Mangin, who declined all responsibility for what might occur. His view was fully justified. The Ait Yussi have now joined the Beni M'Tir, and the fear is that this success may induce other powerful tribes, such as the Hyaina and the Sheragha, who have hitherto remained loyal in this last revolt, to join the rebels.

Reports reach us from Mequinez that Moulai Sliman, a cousin of the present Sultan, has been proclaimed Sultan, but so far there is no confirmation of this. The reason for the whole movement is undoubtedly hatred of the Grand Vizier, and the determination on the part of the tribes round Fez, who have suffered so cruelly under his exactions, to have him removed. The Sultan is of course very closely associated with him, and appears unwilling to throw him over; in fact, Dr. Verdon tells me that the Grand Vizier actually sent in his resignation to the Sultan, who refused to accept it. There appears, so far, to be no anti-Christian feeling.

The situation is evidently a serious one, and Dr. Verdon writes privately to tell me that the Basha of Fez, who is one of his patients, came to ask him what Europe would do in the event of things going worse and Fez being besieged. This is significant, as showing the views taken by the Moors themselves. At the same time, one must always remember that in Morocco situations change with kaleidoscopic rapidity, and it is quite possible that in a few days we may hear that the tribes have submitted or quarrelled amongst themselves, and that the Sultan's position is once more assured.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[12945] No. 118.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 69. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, April 3*, 1911.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 17 of yesterday's date, the effect produced by the rout of the small body of men sent out by the Sultan on the 26th instant has been very serious.

The French consul at Fez, writing on the 27th, reported that all the tribes round the capital had now joined in the rebellion, and that it appeared more than probable that Fez would be invested. The Sultan had neither money nor men at his disposal. The price of food would go up at once, and M. Gaillard considered it quite likely that the inhabitants, who had no particular love or loyalty for the Sultan, would take the matter into their own hands and capitulate.

The French chargé d'affaires sent M. de Beaumarchais round yesterday morning to communicate this news to me. M. de Billy, he said, was of opinion that it was essential to do all in our power to keep the communications open as far as possible in

the direction of the capital. This could best be done by means of the mehalla under Raisuli's command in the neighbourhood of Alcazar, and of the mehalla which had been operating in the Sherarda, and which had lately been immobilized on account of the heavy rains. The former had received no pay since the month of July, and it was imperative, if they were to render any service, to get some money for them. An arrangement had been made with the State bank for an advance of 400,000 fr., and a portion of this was to be sent up at once by Captain Moreau, one of the French instructors here. A further 400,000 fr. was promised, but would not be paid until the 15th April; however, they were in telegraphic communication with Paris on the subject, and it was hoped that the money would be placed at their disposal at once.

M. de Beaumarchais then said that the situation in the Gharb was also very unsatisfactory, and that there appeared considerable danger that the various tribes, hearing of the successes of the Berbers round Fez, might be induced or driven to join the rebellion. This, M. de Billy thought, must be prevented if possible, and he had sent to ask me whether, as a great favour, I would use my influence with Menebhi and get him to write to any influential friend he might have in the Gharb, and perhaps also to Raisuli, to impress upon them the necessity for maintaining order and keeping open the communications.

M. de Billy was of opinion that if the tribes were made to recognise that the European Powers were determined to take a strong line in the matter, they would think twice before they revolted, and with this object in view he asked whether Menebhi might add something to the effect that if the situation grew worse, and the lives of the Europeans at Fez were in danger, it must be remembered that French reinforcements had arrived recently in the Shawia, that the garrisons on the Algerian frontier were very strong, and that it was possible that the French Government might be obliged to march troops up to Fez to ensure the safety of the Europeans. M. de Beaumarchais added that he did not say for one moment that this would be done, merely that M. de Billy thought that the threat, or perhaps rather the hint, of the possibility of such a measure being taken would do much to keep the Gharb tribes quiet.

I said I would send for Menebhi at once and talk the matter over with him. He arrived in about an hour's time, and said he was quite prepared to write the letters as desired, and mentioned the names of four private persons in the Gharb, all of them intimate friends of his own, with whom he was in constant correspondence, and whose influence in the country was really greater than that of the kaids. The letters, of course, would be absolutely private, and he would make it quite clear that any suggestions or hints that he might make came from him personally. He fully confirmed all that M. de Beaumarchais had said as to the unsatisfactory situation in the Gharb. He had, he said, many friends amongst the tribes, and their position was a very difficult one; they had always been friendly with the Sherarda, and it had required considerable courage on their part not to join in the present movement. He himself had always enjoined upon them the necessity of remaining loyal to the Maghzen, and so far his counsels had prevailed; but they had all suffered cruelly from the exactions of Glawi, and the rapacity, cruelty, and lust of his Khalifa in the Gharb apparently knew no bounds. They had written him desperate letters quite recently, saying that they were between the devil and the deep sea, and that they would be surely eaten up either by the Maghzen or by the Sherarda, who were furious at what they considered their desertion. So much did they anticipate trouble that many of them had sold all their cattle, &c., and he had now a sum of no less than 28,000 dollars (about 4,000*l.*) which they had sent in to him to keep until times got better. It appears that the notorious Remiki, who now enjoys Spanish protection (see my despatch No. 132 of the 5th November, 1910), is once more making trouble. Menebhi tells me that he spoke quite openly on the subject to the new Spanish Minister, and told him that it was disgraceful for a foreign Government to grant protection to so notorious a scoundrel. M. de Villa Sinda had replied that he was new to the post and knew nothing about the matter, but said he would inquire into it. Another Remiki, either a brother or a cousin, enjoys German protection, and is also giving trouble. A blood feud has, moreover, sprung up lately between two of the greatest families in the Gharb, which is not calculated to conduce to the general tranquillity.

I thought it would be a good thing that M. de Billy should see Menebhi, and they met at the legation in the afternoon, and we talked over the whole situation. M. de Billy was most grateful to Menebhi for the prompt response which he had given to his request, and I am not at all sorry that the French should have been once more obliged to come to him for assistance, as indeed they always are when they find themselves in a tight place. It may, I hope, make them a little less inclined to criticise him

in future. Menebhi evidently takes a very serious view of the situation. The rising, he says, is general throughout the country, but so far it is directed entirely against the Grand Vizier. It is, however, on far too large a scale to fizzle out as smaller movements so often have in this country, and he is convinced that it must entail great changes. He shares the view expressed by M. Gaillard, that the inhabitants of Fez will insist upon capitulating if the town is surrounded. They consist mainly of artisans who live by the produce of their daily labour; they have no feelings for Glawi, or indeed for the Sultan; in fact, they would probably very much prefer to see the former, at all events, removed, and they have no intention of undergoing the misery and horror of a siege, which would spell ruin for them. They would, Menebhi said, very soon get hold of the authorities and insist upon their opening negotiations with the tribes and acceding to their demands. Menebhi does not believe that the tribes will enter the town as victors, or that any of the excesses concomitant with such a victorious entry will take place. The awe inspired by Moulai Idris, the patron saint of Fez, is very great, and the whole town, or at any rate the old part of it, is looked upon as his "sanctuary."

At the same time, of course, it is useless to attempt to shut our eyes to the fact that the Europeans are in a critical situation, and further news is awaited with anxiety. Fortunately the British, French, and German consuls are all men of proved wisdom and courage, and all work absolutely together.

M. de Billy told me that he had instructed Captain Moreau to be very careful to keep Raisuli's mehalla, which would now be accompanied by French instructors, outside the limits of the Spanish sphere, that is to say on the far side of the Lukkus River, and thus avoid the possibility of any protest by the Spanish Government.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[12946] No. 119.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 8.)

(No. 70.)

Sir, *Tangier, April* 3, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two private letters which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez in connection with the mutiny in that district.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—These letters arrived just before the bag was leaving. Mr. MacLeod appears to take a less gloomy view of the situation than M. Gaillard.

R. L.

Enclosure 1 in No. 119.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

Dear Mr. Lister, *Fez, March* 26, 1911.

THIS afternoon a mixed force of the Makhzen, which included the usual retainers of the big kaïds, palace horsemen, some infantry soldiers and two guns, accompanied by the French instructors Pisani, Rouchon and Ben Sedira, the hajib and the master of ceremonies, made a sortie, with the idea, apparently, of capturing the Beni M'tir Camp, near Ras-al-ma. The guns were posted at Nzala Mfaraji, from which point they opened fire on the enemy's camp, while the rest of the force advanced. Nearing Duyats they encountered a mounted body of the enemy, and came to a stand. Presently the enemy were joined by some more horsemen from the heights to the north, and the enemy then assumed the offensive. While this was in progress another body of the enemy, said to be Ait Yusi horsemen, came up across the river, and began firing on the left rear of the Makhzen people. The enemy in front then rushed forward, and the Makhzen people then broke and retreated more or less (mostly more) to Fez. The Makhzen are said to have lost some 35 or 40 killed and to have had many wounded, besides losing about 2,000 rounds of rifle ammunition and about 100 rifles. It will be remembered, of course, that the first accounts of such affairs are apt to be very exaggerated. The guns were, however, got away, and the foreign officers with them are all safe. Altogether, a nasty and very discouraging affair for

the Makhzen. We could hear the artillery banging away even here in our own houses, but happily no panic ensued in town. The Makhzen appear to have based their plans on information to the effect that a large proportion of the enemy had gone off towards Mequinez. This is probably true, though not very consolatory, for by general accounts the total of the enemy was under 1,000. There was a high wind and some dust blowing in the Makhzen people's faces all the time, and to-night it is raining hard and the barometer again very low.

In my last letter I mentioned that some Shereef was reported to have gone out from Mequinez in the Makhzen's interests. It is bruited about in town this evening, however, that this Shereef is one Mulai Ismail, a descendant of the Sultan Mulai Sliman (reigned 1795–1822 A.D.), and who is a middle-aged man who has lived in obscurity hitherto in Mequinez, and that he has been summoned by Hamoo-u-Akka, of Zayan, with the view of being proclaimed Sultan by the insurgents. The idea is that the insurgents have decided to have done with the sons of Mulai Hassan. It all sounds at first hearing plausible enough, but I am quite at a loss to understand how, should it be true, that I have had no word of it either from Mr. Enyart (American missionary at Mequinez) or Hadj Mohammed Mikwar. The latter has had particular directions to send me any news of importance by special messenger, and I should have expected would, even in the present state of the roads, have contrived to do so.

(11 P.M.) Since writing the foregoing I have seen Gaillard and discussed the situation with him minutely. He tells me that he was with the Sultan this afternoon, and they saw the fighting through field-glasses from the Palace battery. According to Gaillard, the result was due to insufficient cartridges having been issued to the soldiers by the hajib, and to the fire of foot people of the Beni M'tir, who had concealed themselves under the river banks. He, too, has heard the rumour of this new Pretender, and says that the Sultan has told him that the Makhzen have heard of it also. According to their news, however, the man's name is Mulai Sliman (not Ismail), and he went to Zayan some time ago.

Of course, with such meagre and vague details, it is impossible to come to absolute conclusions as to how all this will work out, but on the face of it it would seem evident that if this movement has found a leader, and puts that leader up for the Sultanate, and he is a Shereef of the Sultan's own family, too, the outlook becomes much more obscure. Gaillard spoke in the very gloomiest way of it all, and urged strongly that all non-official Europeans should, by degrees, quietly but speedily betake themselves to the coast while the Sheraga–Ulad–Aissa road is still open, on the ground that further developments may compromise the security of Europeans; he was confident that anti-European feeling was increasing in the town, &c. (I should explain that Gaillard has been suffering severely with neuralgia, and was in considerable pain all the time he was talking, which, of course, is not very conducive towards cool reasoning out of such a situation, especially just after an affair like the defeat of to-day.)

He then asked whether it would not be well for me to request him, as doyen of the consular body, to call a meeting of the consuls to consider about the security of Europeans, and to advise that all non-official Europeans should leave. (I did not like this at all. The Makhzen, of course, will be very angry should Europeans leave, and if things mended would be apt to remember who had called for it.) Gaillard quite possibly, therefore, was providing himself with somebody on whom to lay the blame if things went right, but securing himself if they went wrong. I answered, therefore, that I thought it was for the doyen, of his motion, to call a meeting of the consuls for such a purpose, and assuredly the present situation was such as at least justified the calling of a meeting to consider such points. Gaillard said he anticipated the consuls would not be at all unanimous in their ideas about it all, and he could not discuss the political situation with them, but only the question of the security of Europeans. I answered that he could rely on me raising no difficulties, and that he could be sure that I would follow him in whatever action he took, and I did not doubt that the British subjects would follow the course taken by the French citizens in the circumstances. So he is calling a meeting of the consuls for to-morrow forenoon, and there the matter stands.

I do not know what the Spanish consul's ideas are, but Vassel has been talking very strongly indeed against going away, though not very coherently, saying, on the one hand, that he is sure there is a lot of anti-European feeling, and with the next breath that Europeans won't be meddled with. He has always been very bitter about our leaving in 1907, as he assured the German merchants here that they would be compensated for the losses this entailed to them, but in the event they were not fully

compensated, and, by the German service rules also, it came to pass that he had, as the post was not being filled, to go back to his salary as a dragoman of his legation, which was a severe loss to him, and it is well known the Vassels are not all well off, as he has relatives at home dependent on him, as well as his wife and children. All which also does not help towards dispassionate reasoning of such a situation!

After the news of to-day's events was known, Miss Mellett and Miss Denison came to me in some uneasiness to ask what they had best do. I answered that I should let them know at once should any decision be come to about all Europeans, but in any case they would do well to put all their affairs [*sic*] and make such arrangements quietly as would enable them to leave, if necessary, with as little inconvenience as possible.

With, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 119.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

Dear Mr. Lister, *Fez, March* 27, 1911.

THE town has been very quiet and depressed all day after the affair of yesterday. So much secrecy is kept as to the Makhzen losses yesterday, that it is impossible to check the various estimates of them. What is clear, however, is that in this case the first accounts were not as exaggerated as usual, and that it has been an extremely nasty knock for the Makhzen, and may possibly be of great encouragement to the insurgents. The rumours of the proclamation of that Mequinez Shereef, now in Zayan, by the Berbers still continue, but there are no authentic details. Sidi Hamza Tahry (my interpreter) tells me that this Shereef is a nephew of a certain Shereef Mulai Mustafa, who used to go with mehallas to the Rif, and who is an acquaintance of Menebhi's, so perhaps the latter may be able to tell something about him. Outside, nothing particular seems to have been going on to-day, but there have been reports of parties of Hiayna horsemen visiting Sheraga, exhorting the latter to join in the movement against the Makhzen, on pain of being raided, and the absence of the usual entries of traffic from Hiayna to-day, which the watchman I have at Bab Ftuh reports, gives some colour to this rumour.

In the event, no meeting of the consuls, officially, took place, owing to Vassel having replied that he could not take part in such a meeting nor be affected by its decisions, as this would be against the regulations of the German consular service. I gather from him that Vassel is of opinion that none of his people should leave. Gaillard and Cortés are telling the non-official French and Spanish people here that in view of the possibility of communications between Fez and the coast becoming liable to spells of interruption later on, and the dearth and disorders which may continue indefinitely, and the anxieties to themselves and their friends which all these would cause, they would do well to go quietly to the coast while the Sheraga–Ulad–Aissa road is still open, and this I am telling to our non-official people, asking them to make all their preparations quietly, so that they may go as soon as the French non-official people have gone, or sooner if they so prefer.

An important consideration in this connection is the contingency of the Sherarda mehalla having perhaps to be brought back to deal with the Beni M'tir. The Sherarda have in the meantime been looted very thoroughly by the Ulad–Aissa.

Were the mehalla withdrawn, the Sherarda would quite possibly make reprisals on the Ulad–Aissa, with the result that the Ulad–Aissa road also would become unsafe. This risk will be increased, of course, if it prove true that the Hiayna are minded to join the insurgents, for, of course, they will then attack Sheraga.

The non-official British subjects here (Christians) are Mr. Fava, Miss Mellett, Miss Denison, Miss Greathead. To these may be added Miss Hancock (governess with the Campinis), and Miss Cooper of our post office. The other non-official British subjects are persons of Moorish parentage, who are British merely by having been born in England. There are also Mrs. Verdon and two children and nurse, the latter a Swiss girl. The weather is still cold and stormy.

We have received safely the mails of Tangier of the 20th, but not of the 19th; this latter courier not having gone viâ Laraiche, is presumed to be stopped by flooded rivers between Tangier and Alcazar.

With, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[12947] No. 120.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 71. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, April 3, 1911.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 62 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the French consul at Mogador reports that the Spanish gunboat, with M. Buigas on board, anchored at Ifni on the 18th ultimo. A boat with six natives on board went out to her on the following day. The Spaniards announced to them that they had come to them with a letter from the Sultan for the purpose of opening a port destined to assure commercial relations between the Süs and Spain. They said that they would not land, but asked that the Shereef of Tazeroualt might be informed of their presence, in order that he might come in person to Ifni to guarantee their security and give an engagement that he and the sheikh of the district would favour the installation of the Spaniards. The sheikhs replied that the Shereef must have a letter to this effect, which they offered to take to him at once. The Spaniards, however, refused to put anything in writing, and the gunboat left the same night.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[13059] No. 121.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8, 1911.)

(No. 30.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, April 8, 1911.*

SIR MAURICE DE BUNSEN'S telegram No. 8 of yesterday.

I am informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that, at any rate for the moment, there is an improvement in the situation according to the latest news of Fez. M. Cruppi had just seen my Spanish colleague, and the interview had been satisfactory. I reminded his Excellency of the danger there might be of Germany taking advantage, for her own purposes, of any entanglement which France might get into by making a military expedition to Fez. M. Cruppi said that it might become necessary for the French Government to make the expedition, and in that case Germany could not reasonably make any objections; he would, however, be watchful, and the Government would do their utmost to avoid making the expedition.

[13718] No. 122.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, April 11, 1911.*

FRANCO-SPANISH Secret Convention of 1904. Please see my telegram No. 4 of the 1st instant.

Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has addressed further note to the French Ambassador urging the expediency of publishing the convention, and arguing that it does not in any way violate the terms of the Algeciras Act, and that European public opinion has accustomed itself to the idea of France and Spain partitioning Morocco into different spheres of influence.

M. Geoffray now feels that Germany would never consent to the arrangements contemplated in the secret treaty, and has therefore changed his view as to the desirability of the publication in question, being now fundamentally opposed to it.

[14485] No 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 24.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 11, 1911.*

THE Spanish Ambassador spoke to me to-day about Morocco in the same sense as he had already spoken to Sir Arthur Nicolson.

He told me that the French Government had consulted the German Government

[13057] No. 120*.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 8, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 53.

French Government are of opinion that the diplomatic body at Tangier should decide who should be doyen, and whether the adoption of Republican Government in Portugal deprives Count Martens Ferrao of the quality of doyen which he possessed in the reign of King Manoel.

[13522] No. 122*.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, April 11, 1911.*

DOYEN.

On second round of circular German, Spanish, and Italian Ministers stated that their Governments were of opinion that, as Portuguese Republic had not been recognised by Powers, Portuguese Minister could not act as doyen. French chargé d'affaires stated that, as unanimity was essential in the matter, it appeared to him that solution of matter must be adjourned. Russian charge d'affaires and I stated that we shared this view.

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as to an expedition to Fez, and the German Government had replied that, in their opinion, there was no cause for anxiety at present, and that should cause for anxiety arise they would be willing to consult with the French Government as to the measures which should be taken. The Ambassador asked me what news we had from Fez.

I said that Mr. Lister had reported that the situation had not changed in fact, but that the expectations were now more optimistic. I endorsed what Sir Arthur Nicolson had previously said, pointing out that precautionary measures were justifiable, but that if Spain took action in Morocco at places where there was no cause for anxiety simply because the French were taking action elsewhere, it would only force the pace. I urged that every one should take as little action as possible of a forcible sort in Morocco.

The Ambassador said that if the French occupied Taza and Fez this would certainly react upon all the ports, and that no Spanish Government could stand unless, in an eventuality of this sort, they took steps at Tetuan and Laraiche.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[13551] No. 124.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 12.)

(No. 72. Confidential.)

Tangier, April 5, 1911.

Sir,

THE French chargé d'affaires has been kind enough to communicate to me the latest information which he has received from his consul at Fez, dated the 31st ultimo.

M. Gaillard states that the insurgents are still encamped at Ras-el-Ma (about 8 miles from the town), but so far have made no further attack. They are in negotiation with all the other tribes, and the disaffection is spreading up to the date of his writing; however, the Oulad Jamaa were still hesitating, and the road through their country was open.

The force at the disposal of the Makhzen consists of 1,000 infantry and 100 cavalry, to whom may be added the personal retainers of El Glawi, M'tougui, and Aissa-ben-Omar. The Sultan also possesses a body of 150 soldiers, who look after the cannons and the bastions. The whole force is just about sufficient to defend the walls.

The Sherarda mehalla, M. Gaillard writes, is not strong enough, however well organised it might be (which it is not), to hold the whole country in submission, and the tribes are perfectly well aware of this fact.

The only hope of salvation for the Makhzen, unless reinforcements arrive from the south, and I gathered from Menebhi that this was most unlikely, lies in the possibility that dissensions will arise amongst the tribes, but M. Gaillard says that so far there is no sign of this. Many of them realise that they are too far compromised to go back now; moreover, they are well aware of the weakness of the Makhzen. They believe that they have them at their mercy now, whereas if they agreed to negotiate the Sultan would have time to go on with the organisation of his army, and by means of foreign pecuniary aid put an army in the field against which they would be unable to cope.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[13729] No. 125.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 12.)

(No. 33. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P.

Paris, April 12, 1911.

WHEN I saw M. Cruppi at 6 o'clock this evening, I found that he had not received from the Spanish Government any fresh request for the publication of the secret convention between France and Spain of 1904, such as is reported by His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid in his telegram No. 10 of to-day. His Excellency said that should such application be made he would refuse most categorically to give his consent. He considers that the publication of the convention would raise an embarrassing question with Germany, and he hopes you will support his refusal and strongly advise the Spanish Government to desist from urging publication.

[13751] No. 126.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 39.)

Sir, *Madrid, April 9, 1911.*

THE situation in Morocco formed yesterday the subject of statements of Government policy in both Chambers of the Cortes.

In replying to questions addressed to the Government on previous days, Señor Garcia Prieto in the Senate recapitulated the events which had led up to the present state of affairs. His Excellency stated that in view of these occurrences the French Government had been in communication with the Spanish Government as well as with the other Powers interested, and had warned them that if the situation at Fez became worse, intervention in Morocco might become inevitable. The Spanish Government had replied that in this eventuality they would willingly act jointly with the French Government in accordance with the terms of the Act of Algeciras. He concluded by declaring that the steps taken by the Government would be adequate to the needs of the situation; that Spain, far from being interested in the situation growing worse, was keenly desirous that order should be re-established; and that the Government would maintain an attitude of strict prudence, and would obtain an exact fulfilment of international obligations.

Señor Maestre (Liberal) in reply expressed satisfaction at the Government declarations, but reminded the Chamber that the revolutionary character of the present movement was spreading to the eastern as well as to the western districts of Morocco, that communications between Taza and Melilla were interrupted, and that this state of anarchy would oblige Spain to take action in agreement with the Powers. It was, however, necessary first of all to know to what limits such action would have to extend. He concluded by declaring that the Government could count on the support of the country, the army, and the press. Similar promises of support were given on behalf of the Conservative, Republican, and Catalan parties.

In reply to a series of questions in the Lower Chamber, Señor Canalejas stated that the Government had announced its readiness to carry out, whenever opportune, its obligations under the Act of Algeciras and in accordance with the Franco-Spanish agreement. In virtue of these agreements, Spain must be prepared to act in certain contingencies within given zones. He would not accept responsibility for action undertaken outside these limits, but the country would censure a Government which failed in its duties towards the oversea possessions. At present no extraordinary expenditure was necessary, but should it become so, he would not fail to ask the sanction of the Chamber. In certain quarters Spain was being represented as feeble and decayed, but he wished to declare that while the country must avoid a policy of adventure, yet it must be shown that she would not hesitate to act in accordance with her interest and duty.

After an incident caused by an independent deputy, who stated that Spain was unable and therefore should not endeavour to embark on a policy of warlike adventure, Señor Maura, on behalf of the Conservatives, declared that his followers were ready to give their complete support to the Government. A similar expression of confidence and approval was given to the Prime Minister by the Regionalists and the Carlists. On the other hand, Señor Azcarate and Señor Lerroux, speaking for the republicans, warned the Government that the necessity for intervention in Morocco had not yet arisen, and that the question, should it become acute, must be solved not by two Powers only, but by all the Powers signatory of the Act of Algeciras; while the Socialist orator, Señor Pablo Iglesias, added a threat that the Socialists "would know what to do" if the Government entered on a policy of expansion and adventure.

In the course of the day a communiqué epitomising the declarations of the Prime Minister was published, in which it was stated that in view of recent events the French Government had expressed to the Spanish Government and other signatories of the Act of Algeciras the necessity of being prepared for an aggravation of the situation at Fez and the question arising of intervention to protect European interests. The Spanish Cabinet had replied that in this eventuality they would be prepared, as always, to act cordially with the French Cabinet on the basis of the Act of Algeciras, and of the agreements come to between France and Spain. As events at Fez are only symptoms of a general state of affairs and make themselves felt in other parts of the Empire, the Spanish Government is bound to pay attention to what is going on in districts where Spanish interests are predominant, or where Spain has received the mandate of Europe to watch over collective interests. The measures

which will be taken by the Spanish Cabinet will be in accordance with the development of the situation, which it was, however, not in the interest of Spain to precipitate. Meanwhile, the Government wished to declare that they would maintain—and of this their previous conduct was proof—an attitude of the strictest prudence and respect for treaties, confident that they enjoyed the support of an immense majority throughout the country in their efforts to maintain Spanish interests and prestige in Morocco.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[13752] No. 127.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 40. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, April 9, 1911.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, recording the purport of the statements made yesterday in the Cortes by the Spanish Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to report that the French Ambassador has had the goodness to keep me informed from day to day of the communications which pass between his Government and that of Spain in respect of events in Morocco.

His Excellency showed me this morning a copy of a French note, dated the 3rd April, in which full and friendly explanations are given to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris in reply to the protests which the latter was instructed to make with regard to the recent Moroccan Loan Convention. Dealing in succession with the points which were the principal cause of offence at Madrid, M. Cruppi points out that the text of the convention was communicated to Señor Perez Caballero as soon as it was completed; that conversations with regard to it had previously taken place on more than one occasion between himself and his Excellency at Paris and between M. Geoffray and Señor Garcia Prieto at Madrid; and that there had been no desire to conceal anything from the Spanish Government, whose concurrence in all matters of importance relating to Morocco the French Government were always anxious to secure. As regarded the provision made in the convention for the payment of the police of the Moorish ports in the year 1912, M. Cruppi gives the assurance that there was no intention to limit the full discretion of the Powers in respect of the extension of the functions of the said police at the end of the present year. If it had become necessary to provide for the organisation of a military force at Fez and to increase for that purpose the numbers of the French military mission, there was nothing in this that contravened either the General Act of Algeciras or the special conventions between France and Spain. The French Foreign Minister expresses the hope, however, that the force in question will not be called upon to operate in the Spanish sphere of influence. Turning to the subject of public works, M. Cruppi proceeds to relieve Spanish apprehensions regarding the projected railway from Tangier to Alcazar. Both technical and financial guarantees had to be provided. For the former it was natural to rely, as laid down in the convention, on the Moorish department of public works, in which Spain was duly represented. For the latter, the establishment of French financial control afforded the only means of raising the necessary funds in Paris. But on these points the French Government were ready to listen to any reasonable Spanish propositions. The note goes on to defend the inclusion of port works at Tangier among the more urgent public works for which provision is made. The Spanish Government having apparently raised difficulties on this point, M. Cruppi replies that the scheme was put forward in the interest of all the foreign communities residing at that port. He concludes by rejecting as impracticable and likely to provoke protests from other nations the Spanish proposition that only Spanish agents should be appointed in the Spanish sphere, and only French agents in the French sphere, as collectors of the taxes assigned to the service of the various loans. Such an arrangement would certainly be regarded as a long step towards the partition of Morocco.

When the French Government reluctantly adopted the resolution to take forcible steps, if necessary, to maintain the authority of the Sultan and to protect the lives of Europeans at Fez, M. Geoffray informs me that M. Cruppi made a point of communicating the intentions of the French Government first of all to the Spanish Ambassador. The latter was assured at the same time that if Spain should feel compelled to take corresponding measures for the protection of her fortresses, there would be no

objection on the part of the French Government. In view of this friendly declaration, M. Geoffray was somewhat surprised to find the Spanish Foreign Minister, at his last diplomatic reception on the 7th April, in a mood which showed that his Excellency was still far from satisfied. Señor Garcia Prieto complained that Señor Perez Caballero had been unable to extract from M. Cruppi the slightest indication of the field within which the French relieving force was likely to conduct its operations. M. Geoffray explained that these military details must necessarily depend on the development of events at Fez. In the end he thinks he succeeded in persuading his Excellency that the present French Government desires to take full account of the legitimate anxiety of Spain as regards military action in the neighbourhood of the fortresses or ports in which she conceives herself to be specially interested.

I gather from M. Geoffray that steps have already been taken to provide both the Imperial Mehalla in the Cherarda country, and that which is under the orders of Raisuli, with funds to pay the troops a portion of their arrears, and that a body of French instructors is now making its way to Fez viâ Alcazar. His Excellency thought a few days ago that the advance on Fez would be made, if necessary, from the Algerian frontier viâ Taza. From more recent information he gathers that the French plan of operations would consist of an occupation of Rabat, which would render easy the chastisement of the Zaer tribes and a movement against those which are threatening Fez.

Operations from the Atlantic coast would no doubt offer the advantage of arousing less suspicion in the Spanish mind than an advance on the Moorish capital from the East. It has, indeed, become almost a commonplace, in the mouth of Spaniards commenting on the growth of French influence in Morocco, to say that the appearance of French troops at Taza would be the signal for an immediate Spanish advance on Tetuan.

At my last interview with Señor Garcia Prieto, I argued against what I understood to be his Excellency's belief that a French advance on Fez would naturally involve a Spanish military movement in the northern region of Morocco. I urged that it would be difficult for Spain to justify such action on her part in the absence of serious tribal disturbances threatening the security of her possessions. His Excellency said the Spanish Government were anxious to avoid any military demonstration if possible.

The question has attracted much attention in Madrid during the last few days, and, as already reported in my telegram No. 9 of to-day, the papers are full of the alleged movements of troops towards Cadiz and Malaga in view of shipment across the Straits if occasion should arise.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[13888] No. 128.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, April 13, 1911.*

BEN GHABREET is returning from Fez immediately, Sultan having ratified financial agreement.

Above is with reference to my despatch No. 75.

[13729] No. 129.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April 13, 1911.*

MOROCCO. Paris telegram No. 33.

Please take a suitable opportunity to inform Spanish Government that I consider it would be a grave mistake to publish secret convention of 1904. Amongst other consequences, it would be certain to have a deplorable effect on the Moors.

[13911] No. 130.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 26. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, April 14, 1911.*

I AM informed that the German Ambassador here (whether acting on his own account, or under instructions from Berlin, is not quite clear) approached the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs two days ago and endeavoured to persuade him to regard the action which the French Government propose to take in Morocco more seriously than he has done up to the present. The answer returned by the Marquis Pallavicini to M. de Tschirschky was, I am told, of an evasive character. I do not believe that Austria-Hungary desires to see a revival of the Morocco question; but it is my opinion that in the event of an appeal to this country by Spain should a dispute arise between the latter country and France, pressure would be exerted from Berlin to ensure Austrian support being given to Spain rather than to France, and that Austria would give this support, though perhaps in a half-hearted manner.

[13935] No. 131.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 73.)
Sir, *Tangier, April 6, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 9 of the 24th January, I have the honour to report that the first meeting of the sub-commission charged by the diplomatic body to examine the draft of the "règlement" drawn up by the Makhzen for a municipality for the city of Tangier, was held on the 21st ultimo.

It was decided that we should examine the scheme article by article; the Spanish Minister, however, said that he was still awaiting definite instructions from Madrid, and must reserve the right to come back upon all or any of the articles that we might have agreed upon, as soon as his instructions arrived.

For convenience of reference I enclose copy of the *procès-verbaux* of the first three meetings, which state briefly the various points raised and the arguments for and against. They give a clear view of the situation and obviate the necessity for lengthy despatches, which without them could only tend to confuse. As you will observe, I stated, in connection with article 19, that in my opinion there was a tendency in the draft "règlement," as it now stood, to infringe the principles of the Capitulations; this, of course, was quite inadmissible, and I should, on this ground, be obliged to raise various objections. Zaky Bey said that nothing was further from the thoughts of the Makhzen, and after a certain amount of discussion it was agreed that a clause should be added to the "règlement" to the effect that the principles of the Capitulations should be strictly maintained. With this object in view I had previously insisted upon the words "par l'autorité compétente" in article 11.

The German Minister and I also drew attention to the fact that the European element was insufficiently represented on the municipality, and on my proposal it was finally accepted that article 15 should be amended as follows, subject, of course, to the reservation made by the Spanish Minister:—

"La Commission administrative se compose du président de la municipalité, de deux vice-présidents qui seront nommés par le Makhzen parmi les conseillers municipaux et dont l'un sera sujet marocain et l'autre sujet étranger, du mohtasseb, du khalifa du pacha, d'un délégué technique de la Direction chérifienne des Travaux publics, d'un médecin désigné par le conseil municipal et d'un conseiller étranger également désigné par ce dernier."

The khalifa of the pasha was substituted for the amin-el-moustafad at the request of Zaky Bey.

At the first meeting we discussed no less than thirty-two articles, but at the next meeting, when the Marquis de Villasinda had received his instructions, the pace was very different, and we were obliged to go over all the ground that we had previously traversed.

With regard to article 5, I am inclined to agree with Zaky Bey and the French chargé d'affaires.

Article 7.—I must say that I consider it would be a mistake to press the point

raised by the Spanish Minister. It was evident that from what Zaky Bey said that the Sultan would consider it an encroachment upon his rights as Sovereign if his choice of a president were limited to three members to be proposed to him by the municipal council. I agree, moreover, with the German Minister that the result would probably be the same, and it seems to me that it would be better to leave the article as it stands. I strongly supported M. de Villasinda's amendment of the second paragraph of the same article.

In the second discussion of article 11 it was agreed that the clause insisting upon the absolute maintenance of the principle of Capitulations should be placed at the beginning of the "règlement," following immediately upon the formula establishing the sovereign rights of the Sultan. This, I think, is a great point gained, and precludes throughout the whole "règlement" the danger of any infringement upon the rights of foreigners.

Article 15 has given rise to a great deal of discussion. I must say I prefer my proposal to that of the Spanish Minister. The proportion of Moors and Europeans is the same in both, and I think we shall have great difficulty in inducing the Makhzen to agree to two European vice-presidents as against one Moorish. The Spanish Minister's proposal is, of course, prompted by the fear that the one European vice-president might be a Frenchman and not a Spaniard. He argues that the fact of their being two European vice-presidents (which, of course, will mean one Frenchman and one Spaniard) will prevent friction and jealousy; but I am inclined to think that the result would be exactly the opposite, and I think that the system of equality is better maintained by there being two vice-presidents, one Moorish and one European. If we start increasing the number of European vice-presidents to prevent jealousy amongst the various European colonies, there seems to be no reason why we should not have eleven—the number of nationalities represented at Tangier. I should be glad to be informed as to your views with regard to the position of the four technical advisers, viz., the mohtasseb, the khalifa of the pasha, the engineer, and the doctor; whether you are of opinion that they should vote or simply be called in as advisers. It appears to me preferable that the engineer employed should be the engineer of the Committee of Public Works, at all events for the first few years, for the reasons given by Zaky Bey; moreover, the question of expense must be considered. The funds at the disposal of the municipality will be very limited, and a great hole will be made in them if a special engineer is appointed. M. de Villasinda pretends that it will be quite easy to find a clever young engineer who will be delighted to accept the post at a very small salary, meaning of course a Spaniard, but this remains to be proved, and experience has unfortunately shown that Spanish engineers are far from efficient; M. Porché is loud in his complaints that M. Llorens, his Spanish adjoint, is worse than useless, being quite undependable, and I fear that his complaints are justified.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 131.

Procès-verbal of First Meeting of Sub-Commission, held March 21, 1911.

SI ALI ZAKY, assisté de Si Bennis et de Si El Ahlou, présente aux membres désignés à cet effet par le corps diplomatique le projet de règlement municipal, élaboré par le Makhzen. Ce projet est examiné article par article.

M. le Ministre d'Espagne déclare faire toutes réserves, d'une manière générale, dans la discussion, jusqu'à ce que les instructions qu'il a demandées à son Gouvernement lui soient parvenues.

Article 9.—MM. les Ministres d'Espagne et de Grande-Bretagne réservent leur avis jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient pris connaissance des développements contenus plus loin dans le projet de règlement.

Article 11.—Sur la demande de M. le Ministre de Grande-Bretagne, et pour la clarté du texte, l'article est modifié ainsi qu'il suit :—

"Il publie et fait exécuter, *par l'autorité compétente*, les règlements de voirie."

Article 15.—Sur la demande de M. Zaky, au nom du Gouvernement chérifien, il est convenu de substituer à l'amin-el-Moustafad, comme membre de la Commission administrative, le khalifa du pacha.

M. le Ministre d'Angleterre fait connaître que son Gouvernement estime insuffisante la part faite à l'élément étranger dans cette Commission administrative, pour laquelle il n'est prévu qu'un seul membre européen, d'ailleurs désigné par le Makhzen. D'autre part, il ne semble pas nécessaire qu'il y ait trois vice-présidents.

Après discussion, le texte de l'article 15 est remplacé par le suivant :—

"La Commission administrative se compose du président de la municipalité, de *deux* vice-présidents qui seront nommés par le Makhzen parmi les conseillers municipaux *et dont l'un sera sujet marocain et l'autre sujet étranger, du mohtasseb, du khalifa du pacha*, d'un délégué technique de la Direction chérifienne des Travaux publics, d'un médecin désigné par le conseil municipal *et d'un conseiller étranger également désigné par ce dernier*."

Cet article est réservé.

Article 19.—Sur la remarque de M. le Ministre d'Angleterre que cet article peu, paraître porter atteinte, sinon dans le fond, du moins dans la forme, aux Capitulationst Si Ali Zaky répond que l'intention du Makhzen est de ne toucher en rien aux Capitulations; il fait observer que les decisions prises par la Commission administrative ne sont pas définitives et peuvent être modifiées par le conseil municipal; qu'en outre, les taxes prévues sont toutes des taxes déjà existantes et acceptées par le corps diplomatique; que le Makhzen s'est borné à unifier, sans distinction de nationalité, dans un esprit d'équité.

Néanmoins, pour éviter toute équivoque sur ce point et donner satisfaction au Gouvernement britannique, les délégués chérifiens acceptent volontiers qu'un article additionnel soit inscrit *in fine* du projet pour déclarer que le règlement laisse intactes les Capitulations, et qu'aucune taxe ni aucun impôt nouveau ne seront établis sans entente préalable avec le corps diplomatique.

L'article 19 est réservé.

Article 22.—M. le Ministre d'Allemagne déclare qu'à son avis la part faite aux Européens est trop restreinte, d'une manière générale, dans le projet. Il a lieu de croire que chaque légation serait désireuse d'être, autant que possible, représentée par un de ses ressortissants au sein du conseil municipal. Il paraît néanmoins difficile d'augmenter le nombre des conseillers municipaux, pour que ce nombre demeure proportionné à l'importance de la population à représenter. Peut-être pourrait-il être remédié à cette situation par une modification de l'article 25.

Article 23.—Les mots "khalifa du pacha" sont subsitués à ceux de "amin-el-Moustafad."

Il demeure bien entendu que les Israélites étrangers pourront être élus conseillers municipaux par leurs colonies en tant que nationaux, seuls sont exclus les protégés.

M. Zaky expose que, comme il n'existe pas d'Israélites non protégés remplissant les conditions requises, le texte proposé sauvegarde à la fois le principe de la porte ouverte pour les Israélites indigènes et le droit de souveraineté du Sultan, et qu'il est, par suite, préférable à celui qui stipulerait que l'un des deux membres de droit, visés par l'article, "devra" appartenir à communauté israélite.

Article 25.—M. le Ministre d'Allemagne propose que le texte de cet article soit modifié ainsi qu'il suit (voir article 2.) :—

"Le conseil municipal ne pourra comprendre plus de *trois* membres élus, appartenant à la même nationalité."

M. le Ministre d'Espagne et M. le chargé d'affaires de France font toutes réserves.

L'article 25 est réservé.

L'examen des articles suivants ne donne lieu à aucune observation. Il est poussé jusqu'à l'article 32.

La prochaine séance est fixée au lundi, le 27 mars, à 11 heures, au Dar-en-Niaba.

Enclosure 2 in No. 131.

Procès-verbal of Second Meeting of Sub-Commission, held March 27, 1911.

M. LE MINISTRE D'ESPAGNE déclare que, ayant reçu les instructions qu'il attendait de son Gouvernement, il désire en faire part à la commission et demande

qu'il soit procédé à un nouvel examen de certains articles, au sujet desquels il a des observations à présenter ou des amendements à proposer.

Article 5.—M. le Ministre d'Espagne demande qu'il soit simplement stipulé, au paragraphe 3 de cet article, que :—

"Le domaine public est inaliénable et imprescriptible."

M. Zaky fait observer que l'adoption de cette proposition reviendrait à interdire au conseil municipal tout déclassement.

M. le Marquis de Villasinda répond que, d'après le point de vue de son Gouvernement, le conseil municipal n'étant que dépositaire, n'a pas le droit d'aliéner.

M. le chargé d'affaires de France remarque que cette clause est de style, dans les règlements municipaux et que sa suppression pourrait avoir pour effet de causer une gêne considérable au développement de la ville.

M. le Ministre d'Espagne déclare qu'il ne peut que réserver cet article, en attendant qu'il en ait référé à Madrid ; si les explications qui ont été fournies à M. le Marquis de Villasinda et qu'il transmettra à son Gouvernement ne modifient pas sa manière de voir, celle-ci sera exposée en séance plénière au corps diplomatique.

M. le Ministre d'Espagne rappelle qu'au cours de la séance précédente ses collègues avaient été d'accord pour reconnaître que le respect des Capitulations devait être exprimé d'une manière précise et que MM. les Ministres d'Allemagne et de Grande-Bretagne avaient, d'autre part, manifesté l'opinion que l'élément européen était représenté d'une façon insuffisante dans la municipalité ; c'est dans ce sens qu'il propose l'adoption d'amendements à un certain nombre d'articles relatifs à la constitution de cette municipalité.

Article 7.—M. le Ministre d'Espagne demande que le premier paragraphe de l'article 7 soit modifié ainsi qu'il suit :—

"Le président de la municipalité est nommé et, s'il y a lieu, révoqué par le Makhzen. Il est choisi parmi les conseillers municipaux sujets de Sa Majesté chérifienne, sur une liste de trois noms, présentée par le conseil municipal."

M. Zaky fait remarquer que le choix du président qui, représente l'autorité souveraine, doit appartenir, sans restriction, à l'autorité locale. Il insiste sur le point qu'il s'agit bien d'une question de souveraineté, en ce sens que le choix ne porte pas parmi tous les membres de la municipalité mixte, mais seulement parmi les indigènes, et que le Sultan est mieux placé que quiconque pour faire ce choix.

M. le Marquis de Villasinda répond que Sa Majesté chérifienne, ayant déjà désigné tous les conseillers indigènes, a ainsi donné la preuve qu'elle a également confiance en tous. Sur l'observation de M. Zaky que, parmi eux, il peut cependant s'en trouver de supérieurs, particulièrement désignés pour remplir les fonctions de président, M. le Ministre d'Espagne exprime l'avis que l'intérêt du conseil sera également de choisir les meilleurs. Il ajoute que le conseil municipal sera, lui aussi, à même de faire un choix en toute connaissance de cause et que ce système n'a rien de contraire aux droits de souveraineté, auxquels il ne saurait être question de porter une atteinte quelconque, puisqu'il existe dans certains États monarchiques d'Europe.

M. le chargé d'affaires de France craint de voir s'élever sur cette question des conflits d'attributions capables d'entraver l'organisation de l'institution projetée et qu'il faut chercher par suite à éviter.

M. le Ministre d'Allemagne émet l'opinion que le Sultan choisira sans doute la même personne, que ce soit parmi dix ou parmi trois et que, dans ces conditions, la nécessité de l'amendement lui échappe.

M. le Ministre de Grande-Bretagne pense de même.

La sous-commission se range à son avis ; seul, le Ministre d'Espagne se réserve de soulever à nouveau la question en séance plénière.

M. Zaky maintient son point de vue.

Pour le deuxième paragraphe du même article, M. le Ministre d'Espagne propose la rédaction suivante :—

"Au cas où le Sultan s'abstiendrait de procéder à la désignation d'un nouveau président dans un délai de quatre semaines, à compter du jour de la cessation dans ces fonctions du président antérieur, le premier nommé de la ligne mentionné serait considéré comme bénéficiaire de cette désignation.

"A partir de la cessation des fonctions du président en exercice et jusqu'à la

désignation et prise de possession de son successeur, le vice-président, sujet marocain, remplira les fonctions de président de la municipalité avec les mêmes attributions, droits et devoirs que celui-ci."

M. le Marquis de Villasinda expose qu'il semble naturel que ce soit le vice-président de la municipalité qui remplisse les fonctions vacantes, plutôt que le gouverneur de la ville ; il y a là une question de bon fonctionnement de l'institution, en même temps qu'une application du principe d'autonomie, tandis qu'aucune raison ne paraît expliquer l'entrée, dans l'assemblée, pour un temps assez long, d'un personnage d'ordre politique, choisi à l'extérieur. L'exemple de ce qui se passe dans les Chambres législatives pourrait être utilement suivi dans le cas qui est étudié.

M. Zaky objecte qu'il faudrait, pour cela, trouver une formule pourvoyant également au remplacement du vice-président devenu président ; il ajoute qu'il faut tenir compte aussi que la question se pose différemment suivant qu'il s'agit de l'entrée en fonctions du premier président ou de la nomination de ses successeurs, puisque dans le premier cas, l'on se trouvera uniquement en présence de délégués, tous égaux.

Après discussion, la sous-commission tombe d'accord pour proposer dans la séance plénière la formule qui suit :—

"A défaut de désignation dans un délai d'un mois à dater de l'élection du conseil municipal, les deux conseillers municipaux les plus âgés rempliront, le premier les fonctions de président, le deuxième celles de vice-président. Il sera procédé de même au cas où le président en exercice cesserait ses fonctions."

Article 11.—Tout en étant d'accord sur le fond, M. le Marquis de Villasinda trouve que le texte n'est pas suffisamment clair au regard du respect des Capitulations et il suggère le suivant :—

"Tous les règlements de voirie et de police municipale doivent recevoir l'adhésion préalable de chacune des légations étrangères, pour ce qui se réfère à leur application aux ressortissants des diverses nations représentées au Maroc. Sans cette condition, ils ne pourront avoir force de loi que pour les ressortissants de la Puissance qui les aura acceptées."

M. Zaky répond que la formule "tous règlements de voirie et de police" ne peut être admise et qu'il n'a été question, lors de la précédente séance, que des impôts ou taxes nouveaux, au sujet desquels le corps diplomatique doit être préalablement consulté. D'ailleurs, il a été convenu que le principe du respect des Capitulations serait expressément stipulé dans un article additionnel.

M. le Ministre d'Angleterre rappelle que la question de la sauvegarde des Capitulations a déjà été étudiée au cours de la séance précédente, sur sa demande l'adjonction à l'article 11 des mots "par l'autorité compétente" avait été acceptée. Il avait estimé dès le début qu'il faudrait insérer un article de principe à ce sujet, il est d'accord avec M. le Marquis de Villasinda pour estimer que puisque cet article est fondamental, il serait préférable de le placer au commencement du projet de règlement. Ils proposent donc que le principe en question soit énoncé au premier article, après la formule établissant le droit de souveraineté du Sultan.

Cette suggestion étant acceptée par tous les membres de la sous-commission, ils décident que la phrase suivante sera ajoutée à l'article 1er :—

"Étant bien entendu que les principes admis par le Makhzen en ce qui concerne les Capitulations ne recevront aucune atteinte."

La commission, à l'exception de M. le Ministre d'Espagne, estime que, le principe ainsi établi, l'amendement présenté devient inutile.

Article 15.—M. le Ministre d'Espagne, revenant sur la question de l'autonomie de la municipalité, présente, à l'article 15, un amendement qui a pour but d'éviter l'introduction de fonctionnaires d'un autre ordre dans la Commission administrative, tout en permettant une répartition qui lui semble équitable, des membres étrangers et des membres indigènes. Il propose à cet effet que le texte du projet soit ainsi modifié :—

"La Commission administrative se compose : du président de la municipalité ; de trois vice-présidents, dont l'un sujet marocain, les autres de nationalités différentes et élus par les conseillers étrangers ; de deux conseillers municipaux, l'un marocain, l'autre étranger, élus par le conseil."

Quant aux délégués techniques, ils ne seraient, d'après ce nouveau projet, admis qu'à titre consultatif.

L'ingénieur devrait être choisi en dehors de la Direction chérifienne des Travaux publics.

M. Zaky observe qu'il ne faut pas oublier la prépondérance de l'élément indigène dans la ville de Tanger; il est indispensable que cet élément soit représenté dans la Commission administrative par le mohtasseb et le khalifa du pacha. La présence du mohtasseb est particulièrement utile; déjà la Commission d'Hygiène a obtenu, après plusieurs demandes, que ce fonctionnaire assistât à ses séances. Il représente, en quelque sorte, actuellement tous les pouvoirs municipaux; quant au khalifa du pacha, il serait tout naturellement le représentant de l'autorité centrale à laquelle la municipalité devra avoir fréquemment recours.

Pour le délégué technique, il est utile qu'il soit un délégué de la Direction chérifienne, ce qui le met en meilleure posture pour renseigner le conseil sur toutes les questions touchant aux travaux publics. La commission avait, d'ailleurs, admis à la séance précédente que deux vice-présidents suffisaient. Quant aux délégués techniques, il importe, par raison d'économie, qu'ils ne soient pas rétribués; l'article 15 répond à cette nécessité sans qu'il y ait, ainsi que semble le craindre le Gouvernement espagnol, empiétement d'une administration sur une autre, mais simplement aide donnée à l'une par l'autre.

M. le Marquis de Villasinda rappelle que la suppression de l'un des vice-présidents primitivement prévus avait eu pour objet de mieux équilibrer la répartition des voix entre indigènes et étrangers; il explique que l'adoption du système qu'il préconise aboutirait au même résultat.

Si Ali Zaky estime, au contraire, que l'équilibre se trouverait ainsi rompu, les vice-présidents disparaissant lorsque le président est présent.

M. le Ministre d'Espagne maintient que la répartition lui semblerait plus équitable si, en l'absence du président, ses pouvoirs étaient délégués à des vice-présidents appartenant à des nationalités différentes. On éviterait ainsi, à son avis, l'excès d'émulation.

M. Zaky observe que pour satisfaire toutes les nationalités il serait nécessaire, dans ces conditions, de désigner autant de vice-présidents qu'il y a de nationalités.

Sur la proposition de M. le Ministre d'Allemagne l'article est réservé, et la prochaine séance fixée au 1er avril, à 10 heures, au Dar-en-Niaba.

Enclosure 3 in No. 131.

Procès-verbal of Third Meeting of Sub-Commission, held April 1, 1911.

M. LE MINISTRE D'ALLEMAGNE dit qu'il tient à bien préciser qu'il ne peut, au cours des séances, que donner son opinion, mais non pas prendre part à un véritable vote qui créerait, au sein de la sous-commission, une majorité et une minorité; pour des questions aussi importantes que celles qui font l'objet des amendements présentés, il doit en référer à son Gouvernement.

M. Zaky fait remarquer que cette manière de procéder risque d'entraîner des retards considérables; selon lui, la procédure à appliquer paraît devoir être celle adoptée dans les diverses commissions dont il a fait partie précédemment et d'après laquelle, lorsqu'il y avait divergence de vues entre les membres de la sous-commission, la question était tranchée dans la séance plénière.

M. le chargé d'affaires de France pense que la discussion des articles durera assez longtemps pour que les instructions demandées puissent être reçues et que, le cas échéant, un accord intervienne avant cette séance plénière.

D'après M. le Ministre d'Espagne, il n'y a pas lieu de procéder à un vote, au sein de la sous-commission, pour chaque amendement présente, qui n'aura pas obtenu l'assentiment unanime, mais ces amendements seront soumis à l'appréciation de la réunion plénière, qui décidera.

M. Zaky signalant l'intérêt qu'il y a à ce que la sous-commission présente au corps diplomatique un travail suffisamment avancé, il est admis que les observations faites par chaque membre seront consignées et que les points sur lesquels il subsistera des divergences d'opinions seront soumis à la séance plénière qui statuera.

Article 15.—M. Zaky reprend l'examen de l'article 15, qui a été réservé à la dernière réunion. Il expose l'importance que présente cet article pour le Gouvernement chérifien et rappelle les arguments qu'il a fournis pour que le texte primitif soit maintenu. C'est d'après lui, un très grande concession faite par le Makhzen, que d'admettre l'égalité absolue entre les conseillers municipaux étrangers et indigènes; le Gouvernement chérifien ne saurait aller plus loin et accepter que cette égalité soit rompue au bénéfice des étrangers. D'autre part, aux yeux des indigènes, le conseiller technique et le médecin doivent être considérés en fait comme des Européens. Dans l'amendement proposé par M. le Ministre d'Angleterre, on trouve quatre indigènes et quatre Européens; or, il faut tenir compte que le président sera parfois empêché de se rendre aux séances, auxquelles les Européens, connaissant mieux leurs devoirs, assisteront certainement d'une manière plus régulière que les Marocains.

Le maximum des concessions que peut faire le Gouvernement chérifien est donc d'accepter l'amendement proposé par M. le Ministre de Grande-Bretagne.

M. le Ministre d'Espagne rappelle, à son tour, les observations qu'il a faites au sujet des principes de la souveraineté du Sultan et du respect des Capitulations. En dehors de ces deux principes, il pense qu'il faut encore tenir compte des suivants:—

Autonomie municipale. Cette autonomie est indispensable, puisque les intérêts de la ville peuvent, en certains cas, se trouver en opposition avec ceux de l'Etat; c'est pourquoi il voudrait que les conseillers municipaux fussent exclusivement les représentants de la municipalité et non de l'État.

Équilibre entre les éléments étrangers et indigènes. Cet équilibre est, dit M. le Marquis de Villasinda, dans l'esprit de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Équilibre entre les diverses nationalités, au sein du conseil. L'amendement proposé par le Gouvernement espagnol présentait l'avantage de permettre la représentation de quatre nationalités.

Enfin, M. le Marquis de Villasinda rappelle qu'un article du règlement exclut du conseil municipal les membres des légations et consulats; il lui semble logique, par réciprocité et pour les mêmes raisons, de ne pas y admettre davantage les fonctionnaires marocains.

M. Zaky estime que la formule proposée par M. le Ministre d'Espagne n'établit nullement l'équilibre entre les éléments européens et indigène, puisqu'il prévoit deux vice-présidents étrangers contre un seul indigène.

M. de Villasinda répond que ce sera toujours le vice-président indigène qui représentera le président absent.

M. Zaky dit qu'il ne s'explique pas, en ce cas, la nécessité de désigner deux autres vice-présidents, sans prérogatives spéciales. L'amendement de M. le Ministre de Grande-Bretagne, qui prévoit un "conseiller" étranger, lui semble plus rationnel.

M. le Marquis de Villasinda objecte qu'il ne faut pas confondre entre la question de la délégation des pouvoirs du président et celle de sa représentation. C'est, du reste, un point sur lequel on devra revenir, à l'occasion d'un article postérieur.

M. Zaky insiste à nouveau sur la nécessité de la présence du mohtasseb et du khalifa du pacha dans le conseil, pour la bonne marche des affaires.

M. le Ministre d'Espagne craint que ces personnages n'apportent, dans le conseil, des principes tendancieux. Il maintient donc son amendement.

M. le Ministre de Grande-Bretagne demande que l'on étudie la question de savoir si les délégués techniques et le médecin auront voix délibérative ou seulement voix consultative.

M. Zaky observe que dans une assemblée où, sur vingt-quatre il n'y a que quatre techniciens, l'influence de ceux-ci sur le vote est peu considérable et qu'il y a pourtant intérêt à ce qu'ils puissent soutenir leur manière de voir par le vote, afin d'éviter, en certains cas, que les mesures qu'ils préconisent ne soient repoussées par des conseillers qui n'ont pas leur compétence.

D'un commun accord l'article 15 est réservé.

Article 16.—M. le Ministre d'Espagne demande que le paragraphe 2 de l'article 16 projeté soit remplacé par le suivant:—

"Pendant le délai prévu au paragraphe antérieur, l'administration municipale est gérée par le président, ou, à son défaut par les vice-présidents sortants."

M. Zaky objecte que l'adoption de cette formule reviendrait à introduire, dans la Commission administrative, un élément étranger, qui n'aurait peut-être été choisi par les colonies.

Mr. Lister est d'avis qu'il serait plus simple de s'en tenir au principe admis à l'article 11 de la nomination du conseiller le plus âgé.

M. le Marquis de Villasinda déclare qu'il en référera à son Gouvernement.

Article 17.—M. le Ministre d'Espagne demande la suppression, à cet article, du mot "secrètes."

M. Zaky explique qu'il est nécessaire, pour la bonne marche des affaires, que les délibérations de la Commission administrative, qui seront, d'ailleurs, soumises publiquement au conseil municipal, ne soient pas publiques.

M. le Ministre de Grande-Bretagne et M. le Marquis de Villasinda sont d'avis que la suppression du mot "secrètes" n'entraînerait pas obligatoirement la publicité, la commission pouvant toujours demander le secret de ses séances.

M. Zaky fait observer que le secret des délibérations de cette nature est prévu dans toutes les municipalités.

La sous-commission tombe finalement d'accord pour remplacer les mots "sont secrètes" par "ne seront pas publiques."

Article 19.—M. le Ministre d'Espagne demande que la modification suivante soit apportée au texte de l'article 19 :—

"La Commission administrative établit les règlements de police municipale, concernant l'hygiène et la santé publiques. Elle établit aussi les règlements applicables en matière d'immeubles et de voirie. . . . . ."

M. le Marquis de Villasinda estime, en effet, que l'ordre et la sécurité générale sont du ressort de l'État et non de la municipalité ; le maintien de la disposition prévue porterait, selon lui, atteinte aux Capitulations, en ce sens que la police municipale, forcément indigène, pourrait avoir à opérer l'arrestation d'étrangers.

M. Zaky répond que le désir du Makhzen a été de renforcer autant que possible la municipalité, au lieu d'apporter des entraves à son fonctionnement ; c'est pour rendre possible les réformes projetées qu'il a de lui-même renoncé à certains de ses droits en faveur de la ville et, par suite des étrangers, puisqu'il pourrait incontestablement, établir de sa propre autorité un règlement de police.

M. le chargé d'affaires de France rappelle que la tendance du Gouvernement espagnol lui-même est d'élargir, dans la mesure du possible, l'autonomie municipale.

M. le Marquis de Villasinda objecte que l'Acte d'Algésiras a déjà institué une police chargée de maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité dans les huit ports et, qu'en tout état de cause, la rédaction de l'article 19 lui semble beaucoup trop vague. Les attributions de la municipalité seraient, d'après lui, suffisamment amples, même avec restriction qu'il propose.

M. Zaky fait remarquer que la police des ports n'a pas le droit d'arrêter les étrangers, mais seulement de veiller à la sécurité des personnes et à la liberté des transactions commerciales. Or, il est indispensable qu'il y ait une police qui puisse arrêter les délinquants et assurer l'exécution des mesures adoptées. Si une atteinte était portée aux Capitulations, l'article du règlement municipal qui s'y réfère permettrait toujours d'éviter toute infraction, la garantie serait donc la même que celle qui existe actuellement avec la police des ports.

L'article 19 est réservé.

La prochaine séance est fixée au 4 avril, à 10 heures.

[13936] No. 132.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 74. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, April* 6, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 71 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of two despatches which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador relative to the presence of Europeans in Sbouia, and giving various versions of the doings of the Spanish consul during his recent visit to Ifni.

As Mr. Johnstone says, it is difficult to arrive at the truth in the matter, but one thing is clear at all events, viz., that the Spaniards and also the Germans are showing considerable activity in the region.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 132.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Mr. Lister.

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Mogador, March* 30, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 17 of the 18th instant, relative to the presence of Europeans in Sbouia, I have the honour to report that I have been informed, both through European and native sources, that Don Gustavo de Sostoa, the Spanish consul at this port, returned to Ifni, and was there on Saturday last, the 25th instant. I was further informed that Señor de Sostoa arrived, accompanied by two sailing vessels, which were laden with grain, from the Canaries, and that he was causing the grain to be sold to the natives at cost price, and, at the same time, arranging agreements with the surrounding chiefs.

I have, &c.
H. B. JOHNSTONE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 132.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Mr. Lister.

(No. 21.)

Sir *Mogador, April* 1, 1911.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, relative to the presence of Europeans at Ifni, I have the honour to report to your Excellency three somewhat conflicting rumours with which I have become acquainted since I sent the communication referred to.

Yesterday, the 31st ultimo, a ceirtain Sheikh Mohammed, from Ait Bu Amran, came to see me, and told me that a German came to their district with a Moor, and that the natives of the district refused to have anything to do with him. Also that my informant has property in the place, and has the authority of the tribe to do what he likes with it, and the tribe, he stated, had always dealt with the English. He further said that the Spaniards and Germans were anxious to do business with them, but that they only knew the English ; that one of the tribesmen, now in Mogador, had spoken to some Englishmen about it, and was told to come to the consul. He furthermore assured me that there were many rumours respecting the Spanish consul, all of which were untrue, that it was ten days since he had left his country, but that if a steam-ship had arrived there, he would have received the news through a courier. He stated that there existed many minerals in the country, of which the inhabitants wished the British to have the use. On his property he will not allow Spanish and Germans to do anything. If the Spaniards are there, he added, it does not matter, since they cannot do anything there, unless they agree with him. The interview ended by my assuring the sheikh that I would communicate with your Excellency on the matter, and by his requesting to furnish him with money, while he was waiting, so that my impression was that the sheikh's professions were possibly interested.

Upon the 30th ultimo I received the letter from Sheikh El M'Ki Ben Mullai Hamed, referred to in my despatch No. 16 of the 15th ultimo, of which letter, which was one of the causes of the above-mentioned despatch, and of which I have the honour to enclose a translation. I did not succeed in having an interview with the sheikh until this morning. The sheikh told me, in the presence of his informant, a courier, who had left Ifni on Monday last, the 27th ultimo, that the Spanish consul had arrived at Ifni on a Spanish gun-boat ("Frogata"), and that he had landed and had an interview with Kaïd El Beshir ; that he had told the kaïd that he had the Sultan's authority for landing, but that the kaïd replied that if that was so, he should have a letter from His Shereefian Majesty, and that the Sultan's umana should have met him at Ifni, coming overland, that otherwise he would not be allowed to spend a night on shore. Don Gustavo offered to the kaïd two sacks of corn, which were refused, and landed a sack of corn, of which he distributed cupfuls to the natives, but ultimately embarked on the "Frogata" and left Ifni.

This evening I have heard a third version, through the French consul, M. Marc. This was ascertained through a merchant of the tribe of Ait Bu Amran, at the skin market. The purport was that the Spanish consul arrived upon a Spanish gun-boat at Ifni upon the 18th ultimo (I calculate that the 27th Rabih I, mentioned in Sheikh M'Ki's letter, should be the 29th ultimo). A boat, full of natives, rowed out to the

ship and enquired what was wanted. The Spanish consul replied that he had the Sultan's authority to land and build a town at Ifni, and that he wished to send a letter to the Shereef of Tazerwalt. The boatmen refused to take the letter unless it was accompanied at the same time by a letter from His Shereefian Majesty. The Spanish consul then landed a sack of grain, which was distributed to the natives, and sailed away.

It may be seen from these three accounts that it is somewhat difficult to arrive at the truth. I am inclined to think that Sheikh M'Ki's account is probably the most correct, as he is an uncle of Kaïd El Beshir. But I am not sure that he is entirely personally disinterested, since, at the conclusion of our interview of this morning, he requested to be supplied with money, and I felt bound to furnish him with a small sum from my own pocket. Later on I ascertained that he had also visited the French consul, so that he does not appear to me to be as violently Anglophil as he pretends.

Mr. G. Broome, who is the sole survivor of those interested in the Curtis expedition, referred to in my despatch No. 17 of the 18th instant, assures me that he is quite ready to make any rights he may possess over Arksis to the British Legation if there is any wish to reassert British claims.

I have, &c.
H. B. JOHNSTONE.

Enclosure 3 in No. 132.

Sheikh El M'Ki to Vice-Consul-Johnstone.

(Translation.)

To our friend the British Consul at Mogador,

I BROUGHT a letter from the tribe and spoke to you regarding a subject, and you promised to give me a reply. I beg to inform you that I received a courier from my country with letters from the governor, who informs me that a Spanish steamer communicated at Ifni on Saturday, the 27th Rabih I. I should like to have an interview with you about this matter.

Your friend,
EL M'KI.

[13937] No. 133.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 75. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, April 8, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 22 of the 27th ultimo, enclosing a copy of a despatch which the Spanish Government have addressed to their representative in Paris, on the subject of the objections of Spain to the recent Franco-Moorish Loan Convention, and asking me to telegraph to you any observations which I might have to offer upon them. As I stated in my telegram No. 20 of the 3rd instant, I was somewhat embarrassed at your request, as I felt that it was difficult for me to offer observations on a matter about which I possessed but little information. I had not as yet received the text of the draft convention, and I was unacquainted with the negotiations referred to in the above-dispatched despatch, which had passed between the French and Spanish Governments, and of the reserves that had been made by the latter. Moreover, although I had on several occasions questioned M. de Billy as to the recent negotiations in Paris, I had never succeeded in eliciting much information from him, and I was consequently unaware of the arrangements on which the French Government based their attitude. I gather now that the French Legation were only kept very partially informed of what was going on, owing, no doubt, to the presence of M. Regnault in Paris, and the prominent part played by him in the negotiations.

M. de Billy was kind enough to lend me his copy of the convention, and we had some conversation on the subject, in the course of which he told me that the French Government would never agree to Spain having a military mission at Fez; he was also good enough to show me a copy of the note which had been addressed to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris to that effect. It is therefore evidently useless for the Spanish Government to expect to obtain any satisfaction on that point.

I also mentioned the question of the tertib to him. I said that I observed that it was given as one of the sources from which the Banque d'État was to be repaid for the sum advanced for the police and the Shereefian troops. It was, however, stipulated in articles 3 and 6 of the Hispano-Moorish Convention of November last that in certain specified districts in the Riff, the proceeds of all taxes to be imposed in the future were to be devoted to the payment of the special police force. I imagined, therefore, that in those districts the tertib, when imposed, would not be available for the Banque d'État. M. de Billy replied that he believed his Government recognised that fact, but he could not say so for certain.

With regard to the question of the guarantees of the loans, the Spaniards may consider that they have a grievance, and it is no doubt tiresome for them to feel that most of the serious guarantees are already pledged: at the same time their proposal that an exchange of guarantees should be effected appears to me perfectly preposterous. It is surely out of the question to imagine that, a year after a loan has been concluded, one of the guarantees, on the strength of which the holders were prepared to lend their money, can be removed and handed over as guarantee for a subsequent loan in exchange for guarantees of a less serious nature.

The question of the police is evidently a delicate one, and personally I cannot help regretting that ordinary police duties should not be entrusted to the military police established in the ports under the Act of Algeciras. The French, however, evidently object to this, and the whole matter will have to be discussed at the end of this year when their term of appointment comes to an end. M. de Billy assures me that the advance of 2,350,000 fr. was made at the special request of the Makhzen, who were most anxious that there should be no interruption of the functions of the police during the discussion of the question of the renewal of their commission by the representatives of the signatory Powers.

The French, of course, have been clever enough in their relations with the Makhzen to induce the latter to themselves initiate the proposals for public works such as the ports of Tangier and Casa Blanca and the railway from Tangier to Alcazar. The action, they say, is purely that of the Makhzen, who merely apply to France, as a country where money is plentiful, for the wherewithal to enable them to put their designs into execution: moreover the various works will be put up to adjudication, and thus will be open to all. It is therefore quite erroneous to describe these enterprises as French action, and any attempt on the part of Spain to make them come under article 2 of the secret convention must be resisted. I must say I think that there is a great deal of force in their argument. As I have said before, the Spaniards appear to me in all these matters to lay by far too much stress upon the question of the spheres of influence, which after all do not exist for the Makhzen or for the other Powers, and their pretention that the Makhzen have no right to make an arrangement such as the *affermage* of the railway for the repayment of the money advanced for its construction appears to me quite inadmissible.

The Spanish Government maintain that according to article 65 of the Algeciras Act, jetty and light-house dues can only be devoted towards the improvement of the ports, and consequently they cannot be employed towards guaranteeing the Tangier–Alcazar Railway, but it must be remembered that the loan is to be devoted to the improvement of the ports of Tangier and Casa Blanca as well, and the railway will be closely connected with the port of Tangier. Still it might, perhaps, have been wiser not to have selected this particular source of revenue as a guarantee. I cannot, however, agree with their view expressed in section (*d*), that it does not seem natural that the light-house and port dues of the whole Empire should serve as a guarantee for a loan destined for the exclusive improvement of the ports of Tangier and Casa Blanca; all the ports cannot be improved at once, and a beginning must be made somewhere.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[13939] No. 134.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Tangier, April 9, 1911.*

THE reports which have reached us from Fez during the past week show that there has been little change in the situation, but this in itself is satisfactory and justifies

the hope that the Makhzen may, after all, overcome its difficulties. It is unheard of in the history of Morocco that a coalition of Berber tribes should hold together for more than a few weeks, and the fact that no decided action has as yet been taken by them is most encouraging. The Ou-lad Jamaa have remained loyal, and the road through their country is still open; the Hyaina, too, who were reported to have joined the rebellion, appear to be still wavering.

The situation inside the town is not very satisfactory, and the breach between Glawi and Aissa-ben-Omar seems to have widened. The Sultan is reported now to have inclined towards the latter.

The anti-European feeling, or rather the feeling against the French, and more particularly against Colonel Mangin, is, I fear, increasing. The movement is no doubt being engineered by the Grand Vizier, who has once more emerged from his retreat.

Captain Moreau and the instructors with him arrived safely at Arzila and Alcazar with the money for Raisuli's mehalla, but their advent seems to have considerably upset Raisuli, who wrote to Guebbas that he and the whole mehalla would be compromised in the eyes of the tribes unless the French captain were withdrawn. Guebbas has replied that the French are working absolutely with the Makhzen in this matter, that the instructors have been sent up merely to pay the troops and help him in every way they can, and that the Makhzen depend upon him to do all in his power, with their assistance, to maintain order and to keep the communications open. Menebhi, I think, rather shares the view that it would be better to withdraw Captain Moreau, as any services that he can render are more than outweighed by the exasperation which his presence might create amongst the tribes; moreover, Glawi, who is certainly working against the French, will not be slow to take advantage of this fresh evidence of their interference and make the most of it. Raisuli is all-important in the present juncture, and it would perhaps be wiser to fall in with his views. However, M. de Billy is very obstinate, and I doubt his giving way. I personally have rather kept aloof during the last few days, as M. de Billy is inclined to suspect Menebhi's loyalty and to attribute any little failure to some intrigue on his part. As I say, the French always come to him for assistance when they are in difficulties; but they never really trust him, and they are always ready to turn upon him when they have got what they want. I showed M. de Billy that I rather felt this, and he assumed a more or less apologetic attitude; he said that he was continually receiving reports of the propaganda which Menebhi was carrying on against the Makhzen and in favour of Abdul Aziz, and that it was difficult not to believe them. I said that I was convinced, from the innumerable conversations which both I myself and Mr. Irwin had had lately with Menebhi, that he was doing all he could to avoid being dragged into the present struggle in any way, and that the advice which he invariably gave to those who appealed to him was that they should do all in their power to support the Makhzen. I was convinced that the reports which reached M. de Billy were the work of some enemy, and I should not be surprised if they were eventually traced to the Grand Vizier. M. de Billy seemed rather struck with this idea and developed it. El Glawi, he said, was no doubt a man who could brook no rivals; he had succeeded in crushing the various officials who had appeared to threaten his supremacy, and it was quite possible now that he feared the personal power and prestige of Menebhi in the country, and was working to discredit him with the French. I must not imagine, he said, that the French had anything against Menebhi; on the contrary, he would tell me in strict confidence that Ben Ghabrit, who had just gone up to Fez, had instructions to represent very strongly to the Sultan that Menebhi was certainly one of the ablest and strongest men in the country, and that it was the greatest pity that he should not be employed officially. I said I was very glad to hear this opinion from him, that there was no doubt as to Menebhi's ability and strength; he was very probably the only man in Morocco who could get them out of their present mess; at the same time I was rather sceptical as to his re-employment.

I have no personal knowledge of Ben Ghabrit, as he has been absent from Tangier during almost all my time here, but I have gathered from Mr. White and Mr. Irwin that he is not a man on whom one can place complete reliance, and I rather wonder whether at heart he is as grateful a friend to Menebhi as he professes to be.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[13940] No. 135.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Tangier, April 8, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith four private letters which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, dated respectively the 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st March, relative to the situation in the district round the capital.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 135.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

Dear Mr. Lister, *Fez, March 28, 1911.*

TO-DAY the weather has been cold and most stormy, and so there have been no incidents outside the town to relate. It has been too wet apparently for even the Beni M'tir to care to move about.

This afternoon about 200 mountaineer prisoners, taken some time ago from Fichtala by the Basha Eshirgui, have been released, in pursuance of the idea, I suppose, that it is best to give freely what may otherwise be extorted. Then this afternoon Mulai Mustafa, the uncle of the Mequinez Shereef who is rumoured to have joined the insurgents, and who, in fear that the Makhzen would arrest him, had last night taken refuge in Mulai Dris, has been taken from that sanctuary under safe conduct to the Sultan, but with what result I have not yet learned. Taib Mokri tells me that the Makhzen have no reason to believe that anybody has been proclaimed in opposition to the Sultan, and that these rumours have arisen through the Beni M'tir having visited Mequinez and extorted some money under pain of raiding that vicinity.

There have been persistent rumours to-day that a meeting of delegates of Hiayna, Beni Sadin, and Beni M'tir is taking place to-day, but whether it can really have come off in such weather is doubtful.

Vassel, Gaillard, and I had a long talk together this evening over the situation. According to Vassel the shereef who has gone out from Mequinez is named Mehdi-ben-el-Kebir-ben-Sliman, but Vassel said he could not be absolutely certain of his information. Vassel suggested that quite possibly the appearance of a Pretender would be of assistance to the Sultan, as it would concentrate the rebels and afford an objective for a hard blow at the whole movement. Just now the trouble is to know, if at all, where to hit, and no blow struck anywhere can be as conclusive as it would be had the movement a head on whom it depended for direction. Locally, too, it was suggested, the result might be to draw off insurgents from this district and make them hive around the new man amid the Zair, Zayan, &c. All this is possible, of course, but what lessens the chances considerably of such a development is the Sherarda-Oudaya-Hejowa element in the present movement. Pretenders who gained only Berber support have almost always come to nothing, but the gaining of two or three regular Makhzen tribes would be a long step towards success.

I have now spoken to the mission ladies on the situation in the sense of my letter of yesterday, and they said they would now begin making preparations so as to be able to leave at any time. Gaillard now says that his compatriots refuse to think of leaving, and that, of course, they are free to do as they please, but he has warned them so that he may not incur any responsibility should any mishap befall through their remaining. (This is quite different from what he said to me the other day, which was to the effect that if he wished the French to leave here they would have to do so, particularly people in the pay of the French Government, like the Murats.) He said, too, to-day that he was very hopeful that nothing would happen to any European in the town. There was no increase of fanatical feeling, &c. Vassel asked him straight whether there was any question of a French expedition to assist the Makhzen, and Gaillard said there was none to the best of his knowledge.

I saw Taib Mokri for some time this evening, but he had nothing whatever to tell or forecast except the usual thing, that time would put all to rights, the Makhzen

would soon divide the tribes again, and so forth. He said the letter I forwarded last night to you from him was about the case of Carrara, of Saffi; reply, I presume, to your letter to Sid Taib of the 4th March.

With kind regards, I remain, &c.

J. M. MacLEOD.

P.S.—We have no mails from Tangier to-day.

J. M. MacL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 135.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

Dear Mr. Lister, *Fez, March* 29, 1911.

THE rumours from Mequinez of some shereef having gone out to be proclaimed Sultan by the Berbers are now denied on all sides. My interpreter has seen the uncle of the shereef who was said to have gone out, and the uncle states that he is sure the story is untrue (natural enough for the uncle to say under the circumstances!). The full name of the alleged pretender is now given as Abdherman-ben-el-Kebir-ben-Abdherman-ben-Sliman.*

He would appear, therefore, to be a great-grandson of the Sultan Mulai Sliman. This family has, I am told, always considered themselves the rightful heirs to the Throne, inasmuch as the Sultan Mulai Abdherman was a nephew and not a son of Mulai Sliman, and gained the Throne on the allegation that Mulai Sliman had willed it to him. The father of the present alleged claimant was imprisoned for many years by Mulai Hassan for an attempt at sovereignty when Mulai Hassan acceded, and the grandfather, similarly, was imprisoned by the Sultan Sidi Mohammed. According to to-day's reports in the town, all that happened at Mequinez was that the Beni M'tir came there and demanded delivery of the arms and ammunition in the town and of this shereef. The latter refused to go out, and the demand for arms, &c., was refused. I give all the foregoing, however, merely for what it is worth, as nobody seems to have authentic news from Mequinez.

Late in the afternoon the Beni M'tir burned a village on the western slope of Jebel Taghat, about 4 miles from Fez, and some unimportant skirmishing occurred between them and mounted patrols of the Makhzen. The Sultan has now begun treating with the Hiayna and Beni Warain for money to send contingents here to help against the Beni M'tir. The Beni Warain might be useful towards attacking Ait Yusi. This was the case, at any rate, when Menebhi beat Muhamara, the Beni Warain co-operating then with the mehalla.

Though he has not yet gone up to the Palace Glawi has to-day been receiving some callers, townspeople. It is remarked by many people that yesterday and to-day there is less anti-Glawi talk in town and a good deal more anti-French talk, especially anti-Commandant Mangin, all which has probably been set about by Glawi. As regards the situation in general it is very difficult to see any exit from the dilemma, I mean any steps to which risks do not attach. If the Sultan arrested Glawi terms might be come to with the Sherarda, and possibly even with the Beni M'tir and Berbers generally.

The difficulties on the spot therein would be the risk of trouble at the mehalla in Sherarda where Glawi has about 200 retainers at least, mounted men, besides 200 or 300 men on foot, and next that, in town, it might now be called a concession to the French. The Glawi party would, of course, try to make it appear like that. The one thing which seems clear is that, as long as Glawi remains untouched, negotiations do not seem practicable with anybody. French consul thinks the making of Aissa-ben-Omar Grand Vizier and of Muhamd Bagdadi Minister of War might perhaps improve matters and make negotiations practicable. Both these have good reputations as managers of tribes and are popular. Verdon and I agree with this, but French consul hesitates to propose this, although he says that France is ready to secure Aissa-ben-Omar against future reprisals of Madain Glawi, and also to secure Tahami Glawi from disturbance in his present post, or, at any rate, from persecution of any sort. Another man who could fill a prominent post is Ben-Muaz. He is said to be a favourite in French and Spanish quarters. French consul asked that the strictest secrecy be observed in regard to what he said about Madain Glawi, Aissa-ben-Omar, Muhamd Bagdadi, and Tahami Glawi.

* He has a house in Beni Mguilt as well as in Mequinez.

So far as we all can make out, the Makhzen must have had at least fifty to sixty killed in the fighting of the 26th. The Beni M'tir are believed to have some four or five killed in that affair.

There is considerable indignation felt amongst the Makhzen people, and even the general public, that no steps were taken to recover and bury the dead. It is said the Beni M'tir would have had no objections to this, but that those who alone had opportunities of speaking about this to the Sultan were afraid to tell him how many had been killed. The Beni M'tir have now moved their camp to Bilgama, a spot between Nzala Faraji and Duyats, *i.e.*, about 5 miles or so west of Fez.

In everyone's opinion the key of the deadlock is in Sherarda. If terms could be arrived at with them the trade roads would be reopened and the growing economic distress in Fez be relieved and the mehalla could return, which done the Beni M'tir difficulty would be of little importance. Herewith I enclose a list of the names of the Sherarda leaders, which I have had from a Moorish merchant here, well acquainted with that district, in case it may be of use should it be desired to make any overtures to them from Tangier or from here by directions from Tangier. What might possibly be of value would be some sort of assurance from the foreign representatives that the agreed terms would really be kept. What has to be realised is that the Makhzen is absolutely distrusted and is now quite powerless for the time being to enforce anything soever, and can only defend its own walls here until (should it prove so) the usual dissensions occur amongst the insurgents, or else get military assistance from the French or the Spaniards, or from both of those Powers, to which course (*i.e.*, foreign military assistance), even if it could be had, there is the obvious probability of its first of all upsetting everything before it eventually made itself effective!

The stormy weather we have had these days seems now passing off, but we have had no further mails from Tangier.

With kind regards, I remain, &c.

J. M. MacLEOD.

Enclosure 3 in No. 135.

Names of Leading Insurgents in Sherarda and Beni Hassan.

Sherarda.

Sheikh Tahir-ben-Sellam, of Shabanat.
Kaïd Mohammed-el-Miniwi, of Shabanat.
Kaïd Hamadi-ben-el-Mamun, of Shabanat.
Dris-el-Ghuiri, of Greena, Zirara.
Kaïd-el-Hashmi, of Greena, Zirara.
Allal-ben-Alrhmani, of Alawarem, Zirara.
El Hashmi-ben-el-Abbas, of Alawarem, Zirara.
Kaïd Mohammed-ben-el-Abadi, of Ulad Delem.
Ahmed-ben-el-Abid, of Ulad Delem.
Si Yahia, of Tekna.

Beni Hassan.

Bushaib-el-Nasrowi, of Dakhala-ben-el-Ksiri.
Mohammed-el-Zahti, of Dakhala-ben-el-Ksiri

Hejowa.

Abn-el-Ginawi.
Benakka. (Now in prison.)

Fez, March 29, 1911.

Enclosure 4 in No. 135.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

Dear Mr. Lister, *Fez, March* 30, 1911.

WE have now received safely all mails up to that of Tangier the 22nd instant inclusive, and I am much obliged for your despatch with the names of protégés in the tribes between here and Alcazar. A list from Laraiche has (as you directed) already reached me.

There has been no fighting to-day, but a body of Berbers were seen in the afternoon riding about beyond Dar Dabibagh.

Some five mules belonging to the ex-Mohtasseb Shemi were carried off by marauders this afternoon at Sboo Bridge, *i.e.*, only 2 miles to the east of the town. I am told also that yesterday eight men were murdered by Sijja people within 2 miles or so of the west side of the town, namely, four men from the mehalla here who were cutting green barley, two men from the town who had gone to gather fuel, and two southern Arabs who were coming from Mulai Yakob. I cite these not so much for their direct importance, but as showing the utter impotence of the Makhzen on all sides of the town except, perhaps, the north, *i.e.*, in the direction of Ulad Jama.

I had a long talk with the Basha Hadj Hamad Mokri this afternoon over the situation. He is neither very experienced nor very clever and is very young, but what he said was of interest as echoing the sort of ideas which are heard everywhere these days. He could see no exit from the present situation except either absolute submission of the Sultan to the tribes' demands, whatever they might prove to be, or else the bringing back of the mehalla from Sherarda and using it to keep order in and around Fez while foreign troops were brought to deal with the tribes between Fez and the coast, and then on to Fez to permanently strengthen the Makhzen. In the worst times of Mulai Abdul-aziz (at any rate while he was still in Fez), Makhzen people did not talk as despairingly as this!

The weather is now dry again.

With kind regards, I remain, &c.

J. M. MacLEOD.

Enclosure 5 in No. 135.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

Dear Mr. Lister, *Fez, March* 31, 1911.

GLAWI, at last, has appeared in public again. This forenoon he went to Friday prayers with the rest of the Makhzen, but returned immediately afterwards, not having the usual conference thereafter with the Sultan.

Another little camp of Ait Yusi has been formed, this time at Sidi Harazem, about 5½ miles east-south-east of the town, and it currently reported that parties of Ait Yusi and Beni M'tir are again in Hiayna exhorting that tribe to join the insurgents. It is now being rumoured all over the town that, having failed to persuade that shereef at Mequinez to join them, the Beni M'tir and other insurgents have sent an invitation to Mulai Abdul-aziz to put himself at their head. In the afternoon there was an alarm raised that Beni M'tir raiders had attacked a village on the north side of Jebel Taghat, as firing was heard in that quarter. Soldiers were sent to the spot, but it proved merely some local affray.

As the proclamation of a new Sultan by the insurgents would probably, if made, be heard of first at Mequinez, I have to-day sent a special courier to Hadj Mohammed Mikwar, asking him to communicate any news of urgent importance to our vice-consul at Rabat to be telegraphed to you or to Carleton at Alcazar for transmission to you. No direct courier has any serious chance of passing, at any rate with his letters, from Mequinez to Fez just now, and such men as can be got to go travel viâ Ulad Jama and Zarhon, and take two or three days instead of eight or nine hours by the direct road. I have advised the vice-consul at Rabat and Carleton of the foregoing by to-day's post, as shown in the copy letters herewith enclosed. Letters for Rabat and the south go just now viâ Laraiche.

We have had no post from Tangier since I last wrote.

Small supplies of sheep, charcoal, &c., continue to come in from the south and south-west by paying "Sattat" to the insurgents, and cattle from the Gharb arrive circuitously viâ Ulad Aissa and Sherarga. Nevertheless, all commodities remain dear,

and on every side one hears of increasing hardships thereby and of growing want of employment and want of trade.

With kind regards, I remain, &c.

J. M. MacLEOD.

P.S.—There are rumours to-night of further raids on the south and west to-morrow. Funnily enough such rumours hitherto have mostly proved well-founded, the tribesmen talking quite publicly of their plans in a boasting way. Mulai Mustafa-ben-Sliman has told my interpreter that the Sultan has now sent him a message of grateful thanks for transmission to his nephew for refusing the insurgents' overtures, and has granted Mulai Mustafa himself an allowance of 2 dollars a-day.

J. M. MacL.

[13941] No. 136.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 15.)

(No. 79.)

Sir, *Tangier, April* 8, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 23 of the 30th ultimo relative to the question of the new lighthouses to be constructed in Morocco.

The difference between a "concours" and an adjudication is the following:—

In the case of an adjudication, a complete scheme of the works to be executed is drawn up by the Committee of Public Works. It is accompanied by a "cahier des charges," stating the conditions under which the work is to be carried out, and a "bordereau," stating all the various prices. Tenders are then invited, and the work is handed over to the individual or firm which offers the largest reduction in the price.

A "concours" (or, as it is wrongly called in the "règlement," "à marché de gré à gré après concours," see article 28 of the "règlement" on adjudications) is resorted to when any work of a very special nature is to be undertaken, for the execution of which only a limited number of firms in Europe and America possess the necessary qualifications, as in the optical apparatus for lighthouses. A programme is drawn up, and the firms in question are invited to submit to the Commission des Travaux publics their projets. These projets are then carefully examined, and the one which appears most satisfactory from all the various points of view is adopted.

The two methods of procedure are fully explained in the "règlement" on adjudications which was drawn up under the Act of Algeciras, and a copy of which was sent home by Sir Gerard Lowther. For convenience of reference, I enclose a further copy of the "règlement" in question.*

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[13942] No. 137.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 15.)

(No. 80.)

Sir, *Tangier, April* 10, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 78 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith private letters from Mr. MacLeod dated the 2nd and 3rd April, which have reached me just as the bag is leaving.

The position of the Makhzen in the town ought certainly to be improved by the successful repulse of the raiders on the 2nd instant, and if the Hyaina settle to support the Makhzen and the Sherarda begin to quarrel amongst themselves, the danger of the situation will be very much diminished.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—The French chargé d'affaires has just been to see me. He too is far more hopeful with regard to the situation. He tells me, however, that in the various

* Not printed.

negotiations which the Makhzen has opened with the tribes, the latter are all absolutely unanimous in insisting upon the removal of Glawi, and are backed up in their demands by the Sheraga and the Oulad Jama, who have remained faithful.

R. L.

Enclosure 1 in No. 137.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

Dear Mr. Lister, *Fez, April* 2, 1911.

THIS forenoon a party of marauders, apparently from the Ait Yusi and Beni Sadin Harka beyond Sidi Harazem, robbed a lot of townsmen and women, who had gone out to their daily work in the gardens along the Sboo Valley, taking their clothes and tools and, it is said, carrying off some of the women. Moving westwards the marauders then began to drive off cattle. The alarm was raised meantime, and a party of soldiers went out to stop them. A fight ensued in which the raiders were driven off, the soldiers being assisted by cannon fire from the South Bastion. What the losses were on both sides I have not heard exactly, but none of the marauders were captured, and one of my servants saw three wounded soldiers being brought in at the Mellah Gate. No panic ensued in town, but the affair naturally caused an inpour of surrounding country people, with their belongings and live stock and gardeners, &c., into the town at Bab Ftuh.

Early in the afternoon parties of Beni M'tir and Zarhon people (the latter on foot) were seen coming along the road from Nzala Faraji and the heights of Jebel Taghats. The usual Makhzen force of Vizier's retainers, Palace horsemen and infantry soldiers, went out against them. The object of the enemy was supposed to be to capture the Sultan's tent, which is still pitched about half-a-mile or less to the west of Bab Segma. The Makhzen force was supported by artillery fire from the mehalla, and from the battery at the west end of the Palace Meshwar. One of the guns at this battery, a long-range Schneider, is said to have done considerable execution amongst the insurgent horsemen.

What the losses on both sides were are not exactly known yet, but those on the Makhzen's part were, by all accounts, small, probably less than twelve killed. On the other hand, a party of mountaineers, part of 200 Fichtala prisoners released the other day, and now armed and sent out to fight for the Makhzen, are said to have been with their rifles captured. But whether this is really so, or whether they merely deserted, remains to be seen. These, apparently, were the fulfilment of the attacks "announced" for yesterday, but not then carried out!

This evening I called on Glawi. He either was or affected to be in the cheeriest of spirits, and seemed quite well save for his occasional coughing. I said that at the present juncture you could not but be interested to learn his views on the situation. I alluded to there being only one road still open to the coast, and mentioned the probable closing of this remaining road should the Hyaina and their neighbours join the insurgent tribes. I had, of course, to think of what would be the position of British subjects here should that road become closed. It was true that there had been no sign so far of anti-foreign feeling in town, but if the present dearth and want of employment continued to increase it might become much less easy to keep order, and, in the latter case, foreigners who could be spared had best be away.

He replied that, as regards Hyaina and that tribe's neighbours, the position was that they were discussing, not invitations of the insurgents, but overtures of the Makhzen to support the latter by sending contingents to Fez, and the Makhzen had had to-day news from their Emissaries that this was in full course of arrangement. Assuredly the Hyaina and their neighbours would have contingents here in a very few days. Then, about Sherarda, the Makhzen had quite satisfactory accounts of the mehalla, and negotiations were in progress for a settlement there. Mohammed Bagdadi was arranging matters there, but besides M. Bagdadi he (Glawi) had a friend at work whose efforts, he was certain, would be entirely successful within the next three or four days.

I enquired who was this? Glawi answered, laughingly, that that was a secret! "Even between friends and confidentially"? I rejoined. "Yes," he said; "even so." I asked was it Raisuli, or Menebhi or the French consul or some Shereef, or who? but Glawi would only say that he would tell me in three or four days! (I remembered that Gaillard had said he was endeavouring to communicate with some of the Sherarda people, and I recalled Vassel's eagerness to oblige the Makhzen by mediating with

Raisuli, which affair was, however, taken up by Kaïd Maclean, with the results we all deplored, but I said nothing.) The conclusion I came to was that it would be safest not to rely at all on anything the Vizier had said, but to be guided by such knowledge as we should ourselves gain of events and our own experience of their significance, especially as the Makhzen have so great an interest in Europeans' showing no such want of confidence in them, in the local public eye, as would be implied by anything in the way of an exodus of foreigners.

With kind regards, I remain, &c.

J. M. MacLEOD.

P.S.—Glawi said, too, that they had news of the night before last from Mequinez that all was well there, and that it was not true that the Beni M'tir had compelled the town of Mequinez to acknowledge Mulai Abdalaziz by having him mentioned as Sultan in the Friday prayers, of which a report is current to-night in the town, but is most probably merely an amplification of the previous reports to the effect that, failing to induce Mulai Abdherman-ben-el-Kebir-ben-Abdherman-ben (Sultan) Mulai Sliman to accept their offer of allegiance the insurgents had made a similar offer to Mulai Abdalaziz.

Supplies of sheep, charcoal, &c., continue to come in from the west and south, only paying "sattat" to the Beni M'tir or the Ait Yusi as the case may be.

Our last mails from Tangier are those received yesterday, namely, those of the 23rd and 24th.

The weather is now warm and sunny at last.

J. M. MacL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 137.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

Dear Mr. Lister, *Fez, April* 3, 1911.

WE have had quite a quiet day on all sides, no robberies, no cannon firing, no nothing, except a false alarm from Taghat direction late in the afternoon, for which repose we have to thank the superintendent of the weather, who gave us a downpour of rain during most of the day.

In the afternoon a party of some seventy horsemen from Beni Sadin, Beni Warain and Hyaina arrived, in response to the Makhzen's overtures through the Shereef Mulai Mustapha Kandusi, to treat with the Sultan for contingents to help him, and their leaders are to see His Shereefian Majesty to-morrow. I hope they may prove of more use than such contingents were to Mulai Abdalaziz. According to Gaillard things remain much as they were in Sherarda, but the general news in town is to the effect that the different septs of the Sherarda themselves are now beginning to disagree with each other. There is no news from Mequinez, but the special courier I sent thither a few days ago ought to be back to-morrow or next day with some definite report of what has been doing there.

With kind regards, I remain, &c.

J. M. MacLEOD.

P.S.—We have to-day received safely the mails of Tangier of the 25th and 26th March.

J. M. MacL.

[13930] No. 138.

Señor de Villa Urrutia to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 15.)

(Translation.)

Your Excellency, *Spanish Embassy, April* 10, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency confidentially, by instructions from my Government, that on the formation of the international group called L'Union des Mines marocaines the Madrid Cabinet, whose desire to avoid the creation of difficulties among the Powers in regard to Morocco is well known, welcomed the effort to unite the most important European interests relative to mining in Morocco. The Cabinet, however, did not act thus without receiving assurances in regard to their political

interests; and among other points was the one that mines situated in the neighbourhood of the Spanish fortresses should be excluded from the operations of the syndicate pending a special arrangement with the Madrid Cabinet. This declaration was made categorically and authoritatively to the diplomatic representative of His Majesty at Fez by Mr. Harris, the delegate of the Union des Mines, on the 12th March, 1909.

In these circumstances, the Duke de las Torres, who together with other Spaniards participated in the union, recently approached the Madrid Cabinet with a view to arranging the conditions under which the international group should found a branch in Spain to exploit the mines of Beni Masala, at a short distance from Ceuta, and within the zone referred to in article 8 of the Spanish-Moorish Convention of the 14th November last. The Cabinet expressed the desire that the majority of capital should be Spanish, and that other clauses should assure to Spanish enterprise in the future branch a situation in harmony with the great importance of the agreement to them. When the Duke de las Torres conveyed this desire to the Union des Mines, the latter replied to the effect that the Spanish Government had previously acquiesced in a different scheme by which Spanish capital participated in the branch only up to 20 per cent., and that it would be sufficient if the branch was constituted according to Spanish law with a Spanish president of the board of directors and a Spanish delegate for the conduct of foreign business. It is not the case that the Spanish Cabinet acquiesced in such a scheme; and it is obvious what a disproportionate and meagre idea of Spanish interests is held by the union in supposing that this scheme would be satisfactory to the Madrid Cabinet.

On the other hand, notwithstanding the proposal of the union to take Spanish interests into account, the Cabinet are not only ignorant of the intentions of the union with regard to mines situated in the neighbourhood of Peñon and Alhucemas, but they learn that agents of the union who have recently been prospecting in those districts have done so in a manner which shows their desire to escape the notice of the military authorities.

In view of the fact that these events have been misrepresented in the newspapers, that the Union des Mines has the support of the London Cabinet, and that probably His Britannic Majesty's Government have means of influencing the syndicate in a sense favourable to a wider recognition of legitimate Spanish interests, the Spanish Government have thought it desirable to inform your Excellency confidentially of the above.

I have, &c.
DE VILLA URRUTIA.

[13955] No. 139.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 168. Secret.)
(Extract.)

Sir, *Paris, April 13, 1911.*

AT an interview which I had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I asked him what reply he intended to make to the renewed representation from the Spanish Government that the Franco-Spanish Secret Convention of 1904 should be published.

M. Cruppi said that no such representation had reached him. I thereupon informed him of what I had heard from His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid (see his telegram No. 10 of yesterday to you.) His Excellency stated that he would give the most categorical refusal to an application for publication, and the secret convention could not be published without the assent of the French Government. He was, he said, losing patience with the Spanish Government. They were acting in an underhand manner. His conviction was that the German Government were advising them in regard to Morocco in the hope of bringing about a misunderstanding between the Spanish and French Governments. This M. Cruppi would do his utmost to avoid, but the Spanish Government were acting in a very provocative and foolish manner, and he trusted that His Majesty's Government would use their great influence with the King and his Government to persuade them to be calmer and more reasonable. The publication of the convention at the present moment would be most unadvisable, and might cause serious complications.

Having heard from a fairly reliable source that at the General Staff of the War

Office there was considerable anxiety in regard to Germany at the present moment, I asked M. Cruppi whether, when he spoke of possible complications, he had any ground for thinking that the German Government intended to make difficulties. His Excellency said that he did not attribute any such intention to the German Emperor or the Imperial Government. He thought that they were sincerely desirous to maintain peace, but he was very anxious in regard to the tone adopted by the German mercantile world, and a portion of the German press, always referring to the omnipotence of Germany and to the necessity that every matter should be settled in accordance with German ambitions, and amongst such matters was the question of Morocco. This created a dangerous atmosphere. This condition, I reminded M. Cruppi, rendered it very necessary that the French Government should act with the greatest caution in Morocco, so as not to give the German Government any opportunity to make objections and difficulties. His Excellency said that the French Government would be most careful in that respect, and ought to be assisted by the Spanish Government in avoiding German representations, instead of which the Madrid Cabinet were creating difficulties, and by their actions and suggestions helping to bring in Germany into a discussion of the question of Morocco.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[13379] No. 140.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 25.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 15, 1911.*

THE Spanish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 8th instant, and informed Sir Arthur Nicolson that if France found it necessary to occupy Taza and Fez, Spain would be compelled to take certain measures in her sphere in Morocco. He said that the Spanish Government had told the French Government that they were ready to act in unison with them, either materially or morally, in any measures which the latter might deem necessary to take for the protection of European interests in Morocco, but that the French Government had replied that they preferred to act independently, leaving to Spain liberty of action in the Spanish sphere. If France advanced to Taza and Fez, and occupied them, it would be impossible for Spain, were such an occupation to become in any way of a permanent character, to abstain from occupying Tetuan and, the Ambassador was understood to say, Laraiche also.

Sir A. Nicolson observed that he did not follow the Spanish Ambassador's reasoning. The French Government had said that in order to protect Europeans they *might* have to send a column to Fez, but they would not take that measure unless the need was urgent and the danger imminent. Why should Spain take any active measures in her sphere where there was at present no need and no danger? Señor de Villa Urrutia replied that if France moved troops there would be effervescence all over Morocco. Sir A. Nicolson observed that possibly this might be so, possibly not, but that, so far as he recollected, the French military action in the Shawia had left the greater part of Morocco indifferent and quiet. In any case, Spain could wait till the effervescence had shown itself.

The Ambassador said that Spain might do this, but that there would be no harm in taking precautionary measures such as the strengthening of the garrison at Ceuta. Sir A. Nicolson replied that there would be no objection to that; what he did see objection to was that, if France advanced to Fez to protect Europeans, Spain should reply by advancing to Tetuan, where Europeans were not endangered. His Excellency remarked that he contemplated an occupation, nominally provisional but developing into permanence, of Fez. Señor Canalejas had consulted the leaders of all parties, and there was unanimity that, in such an event, Spain, in defence of her vital interests, would have to reply by the occupation of certain localities in her sphere.

The Ambassador explained that he was speaking unofficially, and he left with Sir A. Nicolson an official memorandum giving the substance of the Spanish reply to the French communication. A translation of this memorandum is enclosed herewith.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 140.

Memorandum communicated by Señor Villa Urrutia.

(Translation.)

THE Madrid Cabinet having been warned by the Paris Cabinet of the necessity in which France may find herself, if the situation becomes worse, of undertaking military operations to protect European interests at Fez, declared that it will, as always, be on the side of France, on the basis of the Spanish–French Agreement and the Act of Algeciras, and that as events at Fez react, and may react more in future, on other districts, Spain must anticipate the consequences of the same, and is occupied with the measures called for by the circumstances within the limits of perfect prudence in regard to the northern ports and the vicinity of her possessions.

[14025] No. 141.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 35. Confidential,)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, April 16, 1911.*

I MENTIONED to M. Cruppi this morniug the information contained in Sir F. Cartwright's telegram No. 26 of the 14th instant, in regard to German action at Vienna in connection with the situation in Morocco.

His Excellency told me, for your confidential information, that the news received from Morocco is not good, This will, however, probably appear in the newspapers to-morrow. The Makhzen is very much disliked by the tribes in the neighbourhood of Fez. Major Brémond has retired on the capital, not having been able to hold his position in the Sherarda district, and it is feared that Fez will shortly be surrounded and besieged by the tribes, who have already cut the French communications between Fez and the coast.

M. Cruppi recently learnt that a Spanish colonel was proceeding with twenty men from Casablanca to Marakesh. He thereupon made representations to the Spanish Government deprecating such a dangerous proceeding, and was informed that the object of the expedition was the purchase of horses. The party had reached Marakesh, where it has caused excitement.

M. Cruppi said that the Spanish Government seemed to be seeking to create an incident, and, he fears, at the instigation of the German Government. He wished me to assure you that he intends to use great prudence in dealing with the situation.

[14234] No. 142.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 172.)
Sir, *Paris, April 17, 1911.*

THE following résumé of a letter, dated the 9th April, and forwarded to the "Journal" by M. Christian Houel, correspondent of that paper in Morocco, may be of interest in connection with the withdrawal of Major Brémond's mehalla from the Sherarda country, announced to me yesterday by M. Cruppi and reported to you in my telegram No. 35, Confidential.

M. Houel states that he is camping on the borders of the Beni-Hassan and the Sherarda. The country round is agitated and ready for revolt. He hears no condemnation of the movement against the Makhzen; on the contrary, the action of the revolting tribes is praised, and the Makhzen is unanimously blamed for allowing El Glawi to ruin the people by enormous impositions. One of the principal chieftains of the Gharb expressed the conviction that the movement against the Sultan was extremely serious, and that it might spread all over the north of Morocco. The only people who still remained faithful to the Makhzen were the kaïds of the Gharb.

The kaïd with whom M. Houel was conversing then asked him to tell him frankly whether the French really desired to support Moulai Hafid, or whether they would be glad to see Abd-el-Aziz again on the throne. He said that the tribes wished to replace the latter in power, for the present Sultan was unpopular and Abd-el-Aziz was regretted. He, at any rate, did not have Ministers like El Glawi. All the tribes

would soon proclaim Abd-el-Aziz, and those who did not follow suit would suffer. The kaïds of the Gharb feared, however, that the French meant to support Moulai Hafid to the end, and that a revolt against him might be disastrous to them.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[14629] No. 143.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, April 19, 1911.*

FROM information I have obtained from the French Legation, it would appear that Colonel Silvestre informed General Moinier of his intention to visit Marrakesh, and asked him whether there would be any objection to his going there with twenty men. He said his object was to purchase horses. General replied that as he understood they would not travel in uniform he had no objection; as, however, they wore uniform, their arrival caused considerable excitement among the native population.

It was absurd to attribute object of journey to desire to purchase horses, the best districts for that purpose being Dukalla and Abda.

When French officers and men visit Tetuan or Laraiche in future they will also be sent in uniform.

[14636] No. 144.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 174. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, April 18, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch which I have received from Colonel Fairholme, the military attaché to this embassy, relating to French and Spanish reinforcements for Morocco.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 144.

Colonel Fairholme to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 6. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, April 18, 1911.*

WITH reference to Sir Maurice de Bunsen's telegram No. 11 of yesterday on the subject of reinforcements for the French and Spanish garrisons on the Moroccan coast, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I had an opportunity this afternoon of gaining some information from the French Minister for War which may prove of interest.

M. Berteaux informed me that he had been somewhat anxious about the situation in Morocco, and that he therefore thought it well to reinforce the French expeditionary force in the Shawia district by four battalions. This represents about 2,000 rifles, and he observed that the strength of the French garrison, which had at one time been 15,000 strong, had been gradually reduced to no more than 5,000 men.

I remarked that it is some distance from Casa Blanca to Fez, whereupon M. Berteaux replied, "Yes, one would have to go by Rabat"; from which I concluded that the French War Minister does not look upon intervention in Central Morocco as out of the question.

M. Berteaux said that an additional reason for sending the present reinforcements was the necessity for punishing the tribes on the southern boundary of the Shawia, who had not long ago been guilty of the treacherous murder of a French gendarmerie officer, and your Excellency will remember that the French Government has for some time past been threatening to take the law into its own hands with regard to this outrage unless the Makhzen undertook the punishment of the culprits, which there is no prospect under present circumstances of their being able to do.

As regards Sir Maurice de Bunsen's statement that the Spanish Government

continues to reinforce the garrisons of the ports facing the Moroccan coast, the French military attaché in Madrid, who visited Melilla last month, told me when I saw him a few days ago that the garrison of that place had, at the time of his visit, been reduced to 16,000 owing to the dismissal to their homes of a large batch of time-expired men, but that it was to have been made up again to its normal strength of 20,000 or 21,000 men.

It seems possible that the reinforcements alluded to by His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid may to some extent be accounted for in this manner.

Major Paris further told me that the Spanish garrison of Melilla gave him the impression that they believed in a forward move being contemplated.

In his opinion, the Melilla force compared very favourably with any troops he had seen in Spain as regards training and fitness. The newly-formed cavalry regiment of Taxdirt has six strong squadrons, and is well mounted on wiry and active Spanish horses.

When Major Paris, on his return from Melilla, congratulated King Alfonso on the good work done by the Spanish engineers in constructing new works to defend the Spanish territory, His Majesty replied, "Yes, but they have made far too many; they will only get in our way if we advance!"

I have, &c.
W. E. FAIRHOLME, *Colonel*,
Military Attaché.

[14759] No. 145.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, April 20, 1911.*

TELEGRAMS received by French Ambassador during last few days depict a situation of increasing gravity at Fez. His Excellency was yesterday instructed to inform Spanish Government that at the urgent demand of the Sultan an Imperial mehalla is being formed in the Shawia to proceed to the relief of Fez, and that a French force will be held in readiness at some point not specified, in order to overawe the tribes and co-operate with the mehalla if necessary.

An official communiqué to the Spanish press states that the Spanish Government have counterordered purchase of horses and fleet firing exercises, so as to disprove the warlike intentions attributed to them in some quarters, and that measures taken merely have in view the possibility that a French advance might create agitation in the Spanish sphere.

(Confidential.)

French Government have, I hear, urged Shereef of Wazan to proceed to Fez. French Ambassador tells me this is because his Government think the Shereef might, in case of need, be able to provide for the conveyance of Europeans to the coast, and that in any case his influence might be useful in the protection of life and property.

[14751] No. 146.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, April 20, 1911.*

FRENCH consul at Fez has transmitted to French Government request from Sultan Morocco that a force of Shawia tribesmen and others should be organised and come to his assistance. A force numbering about 2,500 men, commanded by French officers and strengthened by several companies of French troops, will leave Casa Blanca for Rabat *en route* for Fez, taking with it guns, ammunition, and supplies for garrison there. Reinforcements from the Oran division will also be sent to the French posts on Algerian-Moroccan frontier.

[14751] No. 147.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April 20, 1911.*

FRENCH Minister here has made a communication which is practically identical with that reported in Madrid telegram No. 12 of to-day. In making this communication, M. Daeschner emphasised the fact that the force to be sent to the relief of Fez was being organised at the Sultan's special request, and would be composed entirely of Moors.

I should be glad to learn whether the information contained in your telegram No. 37 of to-day was derived from a communication made to you officially by the French Government, as it appears from your telegram that the relieving force is to contain a certain quantity of French troops and is to be commanded by French officers.

[14802] No. 148.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 175. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, April 19, 1911.*

THERE are various signs that efforts are being made here to accustom French public opinion to the idea of an expedition to Fez. The "Temps" of yesterday evening, for instance, discussed in its leading article, *à propos* of the dispatch of four battalions of colonial infantry to Casa Blanca, whether or not an advance on Fez—which France had the right and might feel it her duty to effect—should take place from the Atlantic sea-board. The article observed that there was no difficulty in getting to Fez; the military problem would be how best to secure communications with the base, and that when there was a choice between a maritime base and a continental one the latter was always preferable. Hence an advance from the Algerian frontier and not from Rabat or Casa Blanca would commend itself.

The "Matin," which is frequently directly inspired by the Quai d'Orsay, gives prominence to a statement this morning on the subject of Morocco. This statement gives a short résumé of the present situation. The Shereefian troops, 2,000 in number, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Mangin, are shut up in Fez, and are probably short of ammunition and supplies. Another Shereefian force of 3,000 men under Major Brémond has been recalled to Fez from the Sherarda country, but was fortunately first able, owing to the energy of the French consul at Alcazar, to receive supplies from Tangier. The route from Fez to Tangier is no longer open, and the French instructors and the Europeans at Fez are exposed to danger. It is the duty of the French Government to come to their assistance, and this eventuality is being considered. It would seem preferable to employ for this purpose African rather than European troops, as the former would be less likely to stir up the fanaticism of the Moors. For the moment, the statement in the "Matin" continues, it is impossible to predict the turn of events, but France will not hesitate, if need be, to send an expedition to succour those besieged in Fez. The expedition would leave "sans aucune arrière-pensée," as all the foreign Governments know that French policy in Morocco is open and loyal, and that France will not disregard her treaty engagements.

The above extracts from the "Temps" and the "Matin" are only two examples of the way in which various leading French papers are now expressing themselves on the subject of active intervention in Moroccan affairs, but it will be seen from them that the question now discussed is not so much whether an expedition should be sent to Fez, but how it should be done. Nothing is said, except in the Socialist papers, as to the dangers attendant on interfering with what M. Clemenceau once called the "Moroccan wasps' nest," or the objections to having French forces locked up in the interior of Morocco for an indefinite time. The only voice of any weight which has of late been raised against such a policy is that of M. Ribot in the Senate on the 7th instant (reported in my despatch No. 159 of the 8th instant), when he criticised the idea of an expedition to Fez, and of France attempting to maintain order throughout the whole of Morocco, which morally meant undertaking the conquest of that country. It may, in fact, be said that the point of view in France as regards intervention in Morocco is undergoing a complete change. M. Pichon's policy, in which he was

actively supported by M. Clemenceau, and presumably also by M. Briand, although the latter Minister made few public utterances on foreign policy, was non-intervention in the intestine quarrels of the Moors. M. Pichon was much attacked in 1908 for not actively supporting Abd-el-Aziz against Mulai Hafid, who at that time was supposed to be the German candidate for the throne. The French Government, however, persisted in their policy of abstaining from openly taking sides against the revolting tribes who were seeking to raise Mulai Hafid to power, although it was obvious that the fall of Abd-el-Aziz was viewed with great anxiety by them as likely to be harmful to French interests. The French Government at this time were evidently afraid of being drawn into complications in Morocco, and the question of an expedition to Fez was never mooted in any responsible quarter. M. Pichon, in one of the last public utterances made by him on Moroccan affairs, explained his line of policy as follows:—

"Notre programme n'est pas toujours d'une exécution facile. Il a contre lui ceux qui, de parti pris, sont hostiles au développement traditionnel de notre politique africaine, et ceux qui lui reprochent, au contraire, d'être trop modeste . . . . Il se heurte aux impatients et aux timorés. Mais il correspond, j'en suis sûr, à ce que commande l'intérêt de la France, à ce qui est compatible à la fois avec la préoccupation de nos ressources et les exigences de la volonté nationale et avec le souci de notre situation européenne. Rien ne serait plus facile pour nous que le succès de telle ou telle opération militaire, nos troupes nous y ont accoutumés, mais c'est l'opération elle-même qui, étant pour le moins inutile, serait condamnable dans son principle."

There has always been a strong party in France advocating a forward policy in Morocco, and the nationalist papers who pretend to represent the interests of the army frequently in the past abused M. Pichon for holding back the generals either on the Algerian frontier or in the Shawia district. The "Temps" has also advocated a more forward policy than what former French Cabinets would sanction, and was one of the first papers to mention, when the present Sultan's military difficulties became apparent, the possibility of an advance on Fez.

M. Cruppi apparently adopted the view that an expedition to Fez might become necessary, and his declaration in the Senate on the 7th April (reported in my telegram No. 27 of the 8th April), to the effect that, if the security of the European colonies at Fez were menaced, it would be the duty of France to endeavour to relieve them, gave a great impetus to the desire of the forward party for energetic action. A "dash to Fez," as it is called is now to all appearance eagerly anticipated by the latter, and would doubtless be highly popular with the military authorities on the Algerian frontier. The fact of the Chamber having adjourned until the 23rd May frees the Government from the contingency of embarrassing debates in Parliament should they decide on a military advance on Fez. As far as the effect of such a step on French public opinion is concerned, it may be said with certainty that the Government would carry it with them if it appeared that the lives of French officers were endangered by the capture of Fez by the revolting tribes. Since the practice of allowing the French instructors to command the Sultan's mehallas in the field has prevailed, the French Government have run the risk of being placed in the dilemma of either abandoning these officers, in the case of defeat, to the mercy of the tribes or of rescuing them. This danger was pointed out by M. Jaurès in the Chamber, and he urged that instructions should be sent to them to restrict themselves to training the Sultan's troops, and not to take command in operations against the revolting tribes.

A telegram to the "Matin" from Blida, near Algiers, dated yesterday, states that a battalion of Algerian troops has received orders to mobilise for service in Morocco.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[14805] No. 149.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 178.)
Sir,
Paris, April 20, 1911.

M. RAYMOND RECOULY, foreign editor of the "Figaro," who is in touch with Government circles, publishes this morning the enclosed statement which gives an

explanation of the intentions of the French Government in arranging for the dispatch of a mehalla commanded by French officers, and strengthened by a few companies of French troops from Casablanca viâ Rabat into the interior.

The presence of this mehalla on the lines of communication between Fez and the coast will, so M. Recouly states, act as a counter-irritant and relieve the pressure round the capital. The French Government, he declares, do not desire to undertake, at the present moment, an expedition to Fez, and are aware of the numerous objections to such a proceeding. They are anxious to avoid it while, at the same time, taking measures to assist those beseiged in Fez. A march on Fez would only be sanctioned if circumstances imperatively demanded it.

It appears likely that the French Government have been glad of the opportunity afforded them, by the message sent from the Sultan through the French consul at Fez, to adopt a middle course between ordering an advance of French troops on Fez, and maintaining an attitude of inaction. The strengthening of the French forces on the Algerian frontier, however, clearly shows that they are ready to take military measures on a larger scale if circumstances render it in their eyes advisable.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[14939] No. 150.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, April 21, 1911.*

THE information contained in my telegram No. 37 of yesterday represents what I understood M. Cruppi to say regarding military preparations for the relief of Fez, but on receipt of your telegram No. 62 of the 20th instant I requested Colonel Fairholme to enquire of the French general staff whether any French contingent would accompany the expedition from the Shawia, which is to march on Fez. The general staff stated that they could not make any definite statement on the subject, as the situation was constantly changing, but they would not deny the possibility of a French contingent.

I will enquire further at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but there appears to me to be no doubt that the Mehalla will not be sent into the interior without being stiffened or supported by French troops of some description.

[14942] No. 151.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, April 21, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 38 of to-day.

Political Director at Ministry for Foreign Affairs states that French Government are anxious that force from Casa Blanca district should have entirely character of a Moorish one. The French officers will not ostentatiously be in command. He seemed to think that French units would not accompany it, and that French trained native soldiers would be sufficient to give it consistency. All arrangements, however, depended on turn which events might take.

The "Temps" of this evening attacks the Government for taking insufficient measures. It says that Shawia force, if not strongly stiffened, will be incapable of fulfilling its task. If it is to be so stiffened it is better to say so frankly, and to discard "the Shereefian mask." The "Temps" declares that it would be a national humiliation if French mission at Fez were allowed to perish.

[14926] No. 152.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 138.)
Sir,
Foreign Office, April 21, 1911.

THE French Minister called yesterday and showed to Sir A. Nicolson a telegram from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that, in view of the situation at Fez which was daily becoming more critical, and at the urgent request of the Sultan,

orders had been sent to French agents in Morocco to assist in the formation of a mehalla in the west (Shawia), which should proceed to the capital. A French column would also be prepared to advance for the protection of Europeans should the necessity arise.

M. Daeschner laid stress on the fact that it was a purely Moorish mehalla which was being formed and that it was at the request of the Sultan that the French would assist in the formation thereof. He was unable to give any information as to how the men for the mehalla would be recruited, and how they would be assembled together; but he recognised that some time must necessarily elapse before the force could be got together, and that the country to be traversed from the Shawai to Fez was by no means easy.

Sir A. Nicolson enquired if the French Government had acquainted the German Government with the above information; and M. Daeschner replied that the telegram he had received appeared to be a circular.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14993] No. 153.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 22.)

(No. 82.)

Sir, *Tangier, April* 13, 1911.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 21 of the 10th instant, the meeting of the corps diplomatique to discuss the mining regulation was held on the 10th instant. The acting doyen opened the proceedings with a short speech of explanation, at the conclusion of which the German Minister stated that his instructions were to adhere to the draft regulation *en bloc*. My Spanish and French colleagues and I said that we had received similar instructions, as did the Austrian, Belgian, and Portuguese representatives.

The Dutch Minister (acting doyen) stated that as the "règlement" contained certain clauses which might injure the important Dutch mining interests in Morocco, his Government could not accept it in its present state, and maintained the amendments which had already been communicated to the Powers whose delegates had drawn it up.

The Italian Minister stated that his Government accepted the "règlement," and had no amendments to propose; they admitted, however, the principle that the corps diplomatique had the right to discuss it.

The American Minister said that he could only accept the "règlement" *ad referendum* in view of the announcement made by the Dutch Minister that his Government had certain amendments to propose.

The French chargé d'affaires proposed that the matter might, for the moment, be taken out of the hands of the corps diplomatique, in order that the various points of divergence might be discussed between the Cabinets. This proposal was adopted.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[14995] No. 154.

Mr Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 22.)

(No. 84.)

Sir, *Tangier, April* 14, 1911.

WITH reference to Mr. Lister's despatch No. 74 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of two further despatches from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador relative to the visit of the Spanish consul to Ifni.

There is little doubt that the French consul has substantial grounds for the apprehensions expressed by him to Mr. Johnstone, to the effect that Spain is endeavouring to enlarge the scope of the original cession of Ifni. As Mr. Lister reported by telegraph, he was informed by M. de Billy that the Spanish consul, in his conversation with the notables of the district, no longer talked of the establishment of a mere fishing station.

As regards the fears expressed by M. Marc, that in the event of Spain establishing a port at Ifni strictly protective measures would be adopted in favour of Spanish commerce, the present attitude of the authorities at Melilla towards foreign enterprise

is of some significance. As reported by Mr. Lister in his private letters, the conduct of the Spanish authorities, both at Melilla and Ceuta, has been of the most arbitrary nature, and is at the present moment forming the subject of an acrimonious correspondence between the Spanish Government and the Union des Mines. The latter declare that their agents in the Riff, while engaged on perfectly legitimate enterprise, have been interfered with by the Spanish authorities in the most outrageous manner; it is alleged that the correspondence of these agents has been opened and read, while they themselves have been arrested and prevented from the accomplishment of their duties. Whatever truth there may be in these allegations, there is little doubt that the Spanish authorities at Ceuta and throughout the Riff regard with the greatest disfavour any increase of foreign enterprise in that region, and do their best to hamper it in every possible way.

M. de Billy told me to-day that his Government would certainly oppose the establishment by Spain of a port at Ifni. In view of the opinion expressed by you in your despatch No. 15 of the 2nd ultimo, I observed that as the territory conceded to Spain extended to some 65 miles, it would seem practically impossible for the French to contend that in agreeing to the cession of so large a tract of country they merely contemplated the formation of a fishery establishment. M. de Billy, however, replied that whenever the question of the cession had been mentioned, it had been expressly laid down that it should be strictly limited to the establishment of a fishing station, and he quoted to me various references to the subject in the correspondence which had taken place between the Spanish and Moorish Governments, which bore out his contention.

I observed that as the Spaniards seemed determined to extend the scope of the concession it would perhaps be advisable, in order to avoid the likelihood of a dispute with Spain, to secure the opening of the port of Agadir, which would go far to neutralise the effects of a Spanish port being established at Ifni. M. de Billy said that he had received instructions from his Government to report on the general question of the opening of Agadir, and understood from them that they had been approached by you on the matter.

He stated that he was endeavouring to obtain the views of the French merchants at Mogador as to the probable effects upon their trade of the opening of Agadir. I told him that we had also sounded our local firms, and had found that they were on the whole distinctly favourable to the project; doubtless the French merchants would take much the same view. He replied that this would probably be the case, and that he himself was quite favourably disposed to the proposal. He did not, however, wish to raise the question for the moment, in view of the critical situation at Fez, but thought that when things had quieted down it might be expedient to propose a discussion of the subject. The chief difficulty he anticipated in establishing a new port would be found in the question of the Customs control. I reminded him that provision was made in the loan agreement of 1904 for the establishment of the Customs control "dans tous les ports existants et à créer," but he said that in spite of this he feared considerable difficulties would be raised by Spain.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 154.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Mr. Lister.

(No. 22.)

Sir, *Mogador, April* 6, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 21 of the 1st instant relative to the visit of Don Gustavo de Sostoa to Ifni, I have the honour to report that the French consul at this port has acquainted me with a further version of the incident.

M. Marc has been told that the Spanish consul landed at Ifni and had an interview with Kaïd El Bashir and several notables, in the course of which interview the consul pointed out what an advantage the opening of a port would be to the inhabitants of Ait Bu Amran and Sbouia, since the long and expensive journey to Mogador with its road dues would be rendered unnecessary, and the business of importation and exportation from and to Europe would be immensely facilitated. After some discussion it is said the Kaïd agreed that if a letter were brought from the Sultan and "umana" there should be no opposition on the part of the tribes to the opening of the port.

M. Marc states that he is convinced that the Moorish Government, in consenting

to hand over to Spain Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, only intended that Spain should benefit by it as a fishing base, not as a trading port. The French consul is uneasy, since if a trading port is opened by the Spanish in the "Sûs" country it is most probable that strictly protective measures will be adopted in favour of Spanish commerce as distinguished from that of other nations.

The "chancelier" of the Spanish consulate informed me on Sunday that M. de Sostoa is at present in Spain, and is not expected to return to this port before the 17th of this month.

I have, &c.
H. B. JOHNSTONE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 154.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Mr. Lister.

(No. 23.)

Sir, *Mogador, April* 8, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 22 of the 6th instant relative to the visit of the Spanish consul to Ifni, I have the honour to report that Sheikh Muhammed, from Ait Bu Amran, mentioned in my despatch No. 21 of the 1st instant, came to visit me this day, and furnished me with a further edition of the affair.

Sheikh Muhammed informs me that M. de Sostoa, when he landed at Ifni, did not see Kaïd El Bashir, but interviewed thirteen sheikhs, as Ifni does not belong to the Kaïd, but is vested in the tribe. Sheikh Muhammed states that the Spanish consul arrived at Ifni on the 22nd of the Moorish month (Rabih-el-Awal) and stayed for ten days, sleeping on board his ship, which is described as a "fregata." The consul is said only to have landed once and then returned to the ship, but M. Andrea Ratto, who accompanied the consul as interpreter, spent two nights on shore, and the consul's Moorish servants spent the whole time on shore. My informant told me that the "fregata" was joined later on by a steam-ship, which stayed three days at Ifni and then left. Before M. de Sostoa left Ifni six sheikhs went on board his steamer, and he read to them a letter from the Sultan, and distributed to them 3,000 dollars. Sheikh Muhammed, who has furnished me with the letfer, of which I have the honour to transmit a translation, states to me that the natives of Ait Bu Amran would much prefer the English to the Spaniards at Ifni.

Andrea Ratto and the Spanish consul's Moorish servants returned to Mogador yesterday. The Spanish consul himself is reported to be in Spain.

Sheikh Muhammed has further told me that M. J. L. Ratto has told various natives of Arksis, who are at present in Mogador, that Dr. Dorpinghaus and Herr Bock, both of the Mannesmann enterprise, who left this port by the Royal Mail Steam-Packet Company's steam-ship, the "Agadir," on Thursday last for the Canaries, will shortly arrive at Arksis. Mr. G. Broome still claims that the concession of Arksis, granted to him and Mr. Curtis in 1881, referred to in my despatch No. 17 of the 18th ultimo, holds good.

M. de Sostoa is stated to have left his tent and baggage at Ifni.

I have, &c.
H. B. JOHNSTONE.

Enclosure 3 in No. 154.

Letter communicated to Vice-Consul Johnstone by Sheikh Muhammed.

(Translation.)

FROM the tribe of Mossa, namely, Sheikh Ali-ben-Haddos, Hamed-ou-Hamo, El Hassan-ben-Embark, El Hassan-ben-Hamed, Muhammed-ben-Mesod, Yahia-ben-Embark, Embark-ou-Beloush, and others of the same tribe.

We send greetings to Sheikh Muhammed and Sheikh Atman, and inform them that we are all well.

The steamer that came to Ifni brought us 100 bags of barley; we got three bags. We gave it, *i.e.*, the steamer, a delay until it brings us the Sultan's authority. It left its tents behind and also baggage, until he brings us what we demanded. Speak to the English about our country and our business in mining and all the other business. We prefer him, that is, the English, to any other nation, if we can get them. If we cannot get them it cannot be helped.

[14996]

No. 155.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 85.)

Sir, *Tangier, April* 15, 1911.

THE French chargé d'affaires informed me to-day that the mehalla lately operating in the Sherarda had retired to Fez on the 12th instant. As the withdrawal of this force has closed the only road hitherto left open, communications are for the moment completely cut off between Fez and the coast, and it is therefore impossible to ascertain the reasons which led Captain Brémond, who was commanding the troops in the absence of Colonel Mangin, to order their retirement. M. de Billy told me an unconfirmed report had reached him that the Sultan, in fear of an attack on the capital by the Beni M'Tir, had hastilly recalled the mehalla. There is, as I pointed out to M. de Billy, a more probable reason for the recall of the troops to be found in the Sultan's desire to get rid of El Glawi. With a large army at his disposal, he might very likely overcome his fear of the all-powerful Grand Vizier and venture on a *coup d'Etat*, such as the arrest and imprisonment of his hated Minister. M. de Billy agreed that this was very likely, all the more so as for some time past he had received reports from Fez pointing to the fact that the Sultan was beginning to realise that he was chiefly indebted to El Glawi for the present rebellion of the tribes, and would get rid of him if he dared. There is little doubt that the imprisonment of El Glawi would go far to conciliate the Berbers, who have been groaning under his exactions, and the Sultan would thereby gain great popularity; moreover, such a signal proof of his strength, as would be afforded by his venturing to imprison El Glawi, could not fail to considerably increase his prestige throughout the country.

Whatever the reasons for the recall of the mehalla may be, it is to be feared that the immediate effects will be disastrous. It will no doubt be interpreted as a further sign of weakness on the part of the Makhzen, and will almost certainly encourage the tribes to maintain their rebellious attitude. M. de Billy fears that the Beni Hassan in particular will profit by the withdrawal of the mehalla to invade the Gharb, which has till now remained loyal, and compel the tribes of that district to join in the rising. He asked me, therefore, to request Menebhi to write at once to Raisuli and urge him most strongly to show his loyalty to the Makhzen by advancing with a part of the 600 men under his command to Alcazar, where he would be in a position to prevent any irruption into the Gharb by the Beni Hassan. He told me at the same time that he intended to advise the Makhzen to send a small army, at present at Rabat, to Kasbah Kenitra, a strategic point from which he would be able to threaten the rear of the latter tribe.

M. de Billy went on to say that to a great extent he imputed the responsibility for the present serious situation to Raisuli. Immediately after the reverse inflicted on the Sultan's troops near Fez, he had sent Captain Moreau and some of his junior officers to Raisuli to assist in training his troops, and two convoys of ammunition and money, which were urgently needed for the Sultan's forces, had also been dispatched to him, with the request that he would escort them as far as the point occupied by the mehalla in Sherarda. Raisuli's attitude had been most unsatisfactory, and he had refused to send an escort for the convoys in question on the grounds that they could never get through in safety. Finally M. de Billy had been compelled on the 12th instant to ask Mr. Lister to warn Raisuli, through the agency of Menebhi, that any further delay in sending the escort would be on his responsibility; that it was ridiculous to say that the escort could not get through, as several caravans, amongst others that of Ben Ghabrit, had arrived safely at Fez; and that in any case he had nothing to do but carry out the orders of the Makhzen and not question their wisdom.

These representations had proved successful, and the convoys had at length been dispatched. When, however, they got to the Sherarda country they discovered that the mehalla had been withdrawn, and were forced to retire to Alcazar.

M. de Billy at first requested me to ask Menebhi that, in writing to Raisuli, he should point out to him that he had seriously compromised the safety of the capital by delaying to send on the ammunition, and that should any disaster overtake the Makhzen as a result of his conduct, the French would lay the entire responsibility at his door. I ventured to warn M. de Billy that the effect of such a message might be to drive Raisuli into the rebel camp, as, if he thought he had incurred the anger of the French, he would very likely feel that as soon as order was restored he would be arrested, or at any rate lose his post. If, therefore, his co-operation was of importance, I would suggest that he might be told that his delay in sending on the convoys had been of

serious consequence, and that he was now to be given a chance of proving his loyalty and devotion to the Makhzen by advancing to Alcazar as desired. M. de Billy agreed that this was perhaps the wisest course.

Menebhi came to see me in the afternoon, and I gave him M. de Billy's message. He at once promised to do all he could with Raisuli, and wrote immediately urging him to do as requested. In regard to the suggested advance of the Rabat mehalla, however, he expressed his conviction that such a move would result in its entire annihilation, and said that he himself would not guarantee to hold Kasbah Kenitra with 10,000 men instead of the 500 miserable troops forming the Rabat mehalla. Mr. Irwin, whose knowledge of the country is fully as great as that of Menebhi himself, suggested that perhaps the object would be attained if the troops were merely to advance along the coast as far as Mehedia, a strong walled town, where they would be perfectly safe, and whence they could equally well threaten the rear of the Beni Hassan. Menebhi agreed that this was quite feasible, and I therefore asked M. de Billy to come round at once, and communicated Menebhi's warning to him. He agreed to the alternative plan suggested by Mr. Irwin, and said he would order a cruiser to protect the march of the troops along the coast.

It is of course possible that the withdrawal of the mehalla may mean that the Sherarda tribe has returned to its loyalty, but this view is not held by M. de Billy, and it is significant that there is no further news from Fez, and the communications appear to be cut.

Mr. Harris informs me that, in conversation with the Spanish Minister, the latter assured him that the last thing the Spanish Government desired was to adopt an aggressive attitude, but in this connection the recent movements of Spanish troops and the strengthening of the garrisons in the Presidios, which has lately taken place, appear very significant.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

P.S. *Monday morning.*—Mr. Irwin learnt last night from M. de Billy that, shortly before retiring from Sherarda, the mehalla had been attacked by a mixed force of Sherarda and Beni M'Tir, who were repulsed with considerable loss. This of course renders the situation more favourable for the Makhzen than it had at first appeared.

[14997] No. 156.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 22.)

(No. 86.)
Sir, *Tangier, April* 15, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch received from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca, relative to the movements of the agents of Mannesmann Brothers in the south of Morocco.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

Enclosure in No. 156.

Consul Madden to Mr. Lister.

(No. 69.)
Sir, *Casa Blanca, April* 10, 1911.

THE vice-consul at Mogador reports to me that two of the Mannesmann agents, named Dr. Dorpinghaus and Herr Beck, left that port recently for the Canary Islands, accompanied by several natives of the Soos country.

Mr. Vice-Consul Johnstone adds that he hears on extremely good authority that the above-mentioned agents intend visiting the Soos country, but his informant stated he was not at liberty to divulge their actual destination in the Soos. Rumour attributed their destination as Ifni, but Mr. Johnstone does not believe this is true.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

[15001] No. 157.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 22.)

(No. 183.)
Sir, *Paris, April* 21, 1911.

PESSIMISTIC rumours are current in Paris to-day with regard to the position of the mehalla under Major Brémond which is on its way from the Sherarda country to Fez. The mehalla is said to be unable to progress further south, owing to the attacks by tribesmen and to floods.

The "Matin" reproduces information from what it describes as a sure source to the effect that the French officers with the mehalla consider themselves in desperate straits, and a friend of Major Brémond has, it is stated, received a letter from him ending: "Non, pas au revoir, mais adieu."

No news has been received as to the situation at Fez since the 13th April.

A telegram to the "Matin" from Oran states that the Beni-Houarin tribe, which inhabits the region between the Moulouya and Fez, are in a state of fanatical and bellicose excitement at the news of the defeats suffered by Mulai Hafid, "the French Sultan."

I enclose herein details given by the "Matin" of the movement of French troops to the frontier. It is stated that a column of 9,000 men will be ready next week to move forward if required.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 157.

Extract from the "Matin," April 21, 1911.

VOICI le détail des troupes qui vont être dirigées vers la frontière algéro-marocaine :—

Un bataillon du 2e Régiment de Zouaves, d'Oran, à effectif de 15 officiers et 600 hommes, qui partira samedi matin par train spécial ; un autre bataillon du 2e Zouaves, avec même effectif, formé par un demi-bataillon de Marnia et un demi-bataillon d'Oudjda, qui rejoindra directement ; un bataillon du 2e Régiment de Tirailleurs, d'Oran, à effectif de 15 officiers et 600 hommes, qui partira dimanche matin par train spécial ; un bataillon du 1er Régiment étranger, de Sidi-bel-Abbès, qui partira demain matin avec un effectif de 15 officiers et 600 hommes ; un escadron du 2e Régiment de Chasseurs d'Afrique, de Tlemcen, à effectif de 4 officiers et 125 hommes, qui partira samedi ; un escadron du 6e Chasseurs d'Afrique, de Mascara, à effectif de 4 officiers et 125 hommes, qui partira lundi ; un escadron de Spahis de la smala de Chaba, près de Marnia, à effectif de 4 officiers et 125 hommes, qui rejoindra directement ; une batterie d'Artillerie de 75 de Campagne, d'Oran, à effectif de 7 officiers, 127 hommes et 135 chevaux, qui partira demain matin à 4 heures par train spécial ; une batterie d'Artillerie de 75 de Campagne, de Saïda, avec même effectif que la précédente, qui partira samedi ; une section de 75 de Montagne, de Tlemcen, qui partira dimanche.

Toutes ces unités formeront un effectif total d'environ 3,000 hommes. Il y a déjà 2,400 hommes dans la zone de Taourirt et 300 dans le reste de l'amalat d'Oudjda.

Comme on compte qu'il faudra six ou sept jours pour conduire à destination les troupes en manœuvres qui serviraient éventuellement de renforts, c'est donc près de 9,000 hommes qui, la semaine prochaine, seront, vers la Moulouya, prêts à remplir le rôle qui leur sera assigné.

[15098] No. 158.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 22.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, April* 22, 1911.

MY telegram No. 38 of yesterday.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs informs me that Senegalese Rifles will be sent to Shawia.

El Mokri, [illegible] Paris, at interview with press representative states that he is

certain that Fez cannot be carried by assault. Town has supplies of ammunition and food, and tribes will probably retire to their territories, having exhausted their own supplies. In his view the mehalla from Shawia is quite capable of relieving Fez. A French expedition from Algeria would, on the contrary, encounter great difficulties.

[15096] No. 159.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, April 22, 1911.*

I AM informed by the French Ambassador that he yesterday discussed the Morocco question with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and endeavoured to find out the latter's views on the actual situation and on the possible eventuality of the French Government intervening. The Marquis Pallavicini intimated that it was desirable that France should take no precipitate action in Morocco, but at the same time he avoided expressing any definite opinion on the subject. He pointed out to M. Crozier that the attitude which Germany may adopt is indicated by certain violent articles which have been published here lately in the Pan-German press attacking the alleged French schemes in Morocco.

It is evident that the Marquis Pallavicini, in the absence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, is afraid to express a definite opinion as to the policy which his Government would adopt if an acute crisis were to occur in Morocco.

[15097] No. 160.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 31. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, April 22, 1911.*

I HAVE received the following most confidential information in regard to the Morocco question:—

I learn that the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin has been informed by the German Chancellor that the German Government hold the view that the whole Morocco question would be reopened in the event of the occupation of Fez by the French Government, for the Sultan would thus be rendered absolutely dependent upon France, which would involve the disappearance of the basis of the Act of Algeciras, which, in the view of the German Government, is founded on the assumption of the Sultan of Morocco's independence. The Austrian Ambassador enquired whether the Chancellor had explained to the French Ambassador in Berlin the view taken of the question by the German Government, to which the Chancellor replied that his language to M. Cambon could have been interpreted in that sense if the latter had liked.

From information given to me by the French Ambassador here, I gather that M. Cambon came away from his interview with the Chancellor holding views (in regard to the attitude adopted in the Morocco question by Germany) of a somewhat optimistic nature.

My information here leads me to believe that an attempt is being made by Germany to alarm Spain by telling her that France intends to make a second Tunis out of Morocco, and that Spain will be deprived of the benefits assured her under the secret agreement (that is to say, that, should the Moorish Government break down, Morocco shall be divided into spheres of influence) by the maintenance by France of a merely nominal Sultan. It is impressed by the German Ambassador here on the Austrian Government that it is France's intention to abolish the open door in Morocco as soon as she can, and to do away with the system of equal chances in that country.

Count Aehrenthal returns to Vienna in the middle of May, and before that date nothing will apparently be done in regard to Morocco. The Marquis Pallavicini declares that he understands nothing about the question.

[15099] No. 161.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 41. *En clair.*)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 23, 1911.*

COMMUNIQUÉ to the press states that Cabinet has approved instructions to general commanding Shawia district to concentrate native goumiers from Shawia on Bou Zaika, whence to be advanced beyond Rabat. This force to be supported by flying column which General Moinier will form in the Shawia ready to advance. Troops from Oran division will be concentrated round Taourirt. Sufficient reinforcements for eventual rescue of foreign colonies will be sent to Casa Blanca. Press explains that flying column will be composed of French and Algerian troops, and that reinforcements for Casa Blanca will amount to over 10,000 men, raising General Moinier's force to over 21,000 troops.

[15216] No. 162.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 50.)
Sir, *Madrid, April 20, 1911.*

WITH reference to My telegram No. 12 of to-day, I have the honour to report that an official communiqué appeared in yesterday's newspapers giving the following account of the intentions of the Spanish Government in respect of events in Morocco:—

Señor Canelejas stated to the representatives of the press that he had noticed, with great regret, that an absurd rumour had been current to the effect that Spain was disposed to send to Morocco an army, which, acting with the French army, would march on Fez, and that these proposals had not been carried out owing to the intervention of Germany. At the same time the Government policy as regards Morocco was spoken of as being mysterious. He considered that the situation was absolutely clear, and both he and the Foreign Minister had already described it in the Chambers. He declared that there had never been any question of the formation of a mixed force for the occupation of certain fixed points of the Morocco Empire, nor had France ever made proposals to the Spanish Government in this sense. All rumours to this effect were absolutely devoid of foundation, and the action of the newspapers in giving currency to such stories was antipatriotic and inconvenient alike to France and Spain. What France had done had been to notify the Spanish Government and the Powers that, in the case of events at Fez taking a turn for the worse and the lives and property of Europeans becoming endangered, it would become necessary to intervene in order to protect the Europeans living in Morocco. But this did not mean that the formation of a mixed army of occupation was being considered.

Moreover it must not be forgotten that internal disorders in Morocco frequently immediately assume a religious character, extending rapidly from one extremity of the Empire to the other, and that, accordingly, Spain had to be prepared in case the insurrectionary movement should extend to districts where she had special interests and influence. It would thus be only logical that, in districts where Spain had undertaken police duties, she should intervene for the protection of Europeans, while the same applied to disturbances occurring in the neighbourhood of Spanish fortresses or occupied territories.

No intervention would take place, unless it was called for by events, and the Government had not the smallest desire that it should take place or that such a situation should be brought about.

The irresponsibility of the press in alluding to what is passing, had given rise to the reports current abroad of thousands of troops being dispatched to the south of Mellila and of a brigade occupying Alhucemas, while telegrams have been published such as the one appearing in the "Times," which talks of bodies of Spanish troops carrying out route-marches with the object of provoking the Moors.

There was no necessity to contradict the two former reports, while as regards the latter the Government had telegraphed to General Alfan who had categorically denied it.

It was, indeed, the case that the Government was prepared for eventualities, and were it not prepared it would be deserving of all censure, but on the other hand there

has been no thought of embarking on a policy of adventure; a policy that would be one of sheer madness. The attitude of the Spanish press as regards the situation was inconsiderate and calculated to damage the public credit and the good name of the country.

The President of the Council concluded by saying that he had contemplated buying some thousands of horses which the mounted forces had long required, but in view of the press campaign, it would be necessary to suspend these purchases, while he had also countermanded the firing exercises which the fleet was about to carry out.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[15097] No. 163.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 67. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April* 24, 1911.

MOROCCO. Vienna telegram No. 31 of the 22nd April.

Please take an opportunity of conveying very confidentially to M. Cruppi the substance of the first paragraph of Sir F. Cartwright's telegram No. 31. It would be interesting to know whether the French Government have received similar information from their representative at Berlin.

We understand that the French Government are communicating frankly and fully with the Madrid Cabinet.

[15349] No. 164.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 51. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, April* 21, 1911.

I TOOK an opportunity to mention verbally to-day to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, as directed by your telegram No. 8 of the 13th instant, that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government the publication of the secret treaty between France and Spain of October 1904 was very undesirable at the present time, inasmuch as knowledge of its terms would produce a bad effect on the native mind in Morocco.

It was at the request of the French Ambassador that I deferred making this communication till to-day, his Excellency having himself put off till the day before yesterday, informing the Spanish Government of the objections to publication entertained by the French Government.

Señor Garcia Prieto said he would bear in mind your view of the matter, which he felt sure was prompted by a friendly regard for the interests of Spain, but the events which were now taking place in Morocco seemed to him to be of the nature of those contemplated by the secret treaty as involving, when they should occur, and by consent of the parties the partition of Morocco into definite spheres of influence between France and Spain.

I gathered that he did not intend for the present to press further for publication.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[15350] No. 165.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 52.)
Sir, *Madrid, April* 22, 1911.

I FOUND the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his weekly reception yesterday much preoccupied with the situation in Morocco. His Excellency said he still hoped that Spain might be spared the effort and expense of having to take part in the pacification of the insurgent tribes. These were only too likely to become still further agitated as the consequence of the measures which France was being compelled to take for the relief of Fez. But so far the disturbances had not spread into the Spanish

sphere, and so long as the latter remained quiet there seemed to be no call for Spanish intervention. What he feared was that the excitement in the Gharb might cause the population around Alkazar to rise. If this should happen, the Spanish Government, which had undertaken the task of instructing the police in the neighbouring port of Larache, and was therefore implicitly responsible for the maintenance of order in the whole of the adjoining region, could not look on unmoved, nor could they allow a French force, or a Moorish force under French instructors, to restore peace at Alcazar. That duty would naturally fall on Spain, and she must be prepared to carry it out at any moment. This was the main object of the present military preparations at the southern ports of Spain.

Señor Garcia Prieto added that he could not conceal from me the apprehension which the Spanish Government continued to feel as regards the unprotected position of Ceuta. In the recent convention with Morocco provision had been made for the establishment of a frontier police force, charged, under a native kaïd of high rank, with the task of keeping things quiet within a specified radius of Ceuta; but, while the Sultan was isolated at Fez and the Makhzen crippled by the rebellion of the tribes, there was no prospect of setting this very necessary force on foot. Ceuta therefore remained in the same undefended situation as before the conclusion of the convention of the 16th November, 1910. His Excellency assured me that all parties in Spain would approve a movement of the Ceuta garrison designed to place the security of the fortress beyond question. Señor Maura, the Conservative leader, thought some action in this direction could not long be deferred. Even Señor Azcarate, the Republican leader who had so often spoken in the Chamber of Deputies against a policy of adventure in Morocco, was of the same opinion. The army was unanimous in pressing for early action, and the Government might feel compelled sooner or later to defer to the body of opinion which was urging them to make this important Spanish fortress secure not only against an organised attack, but against the petty vexation to which persons proceeding peacefully beyond the Spanish limits were daily exposed under present conditions.

I said I did not think a Spanish advance in the Ceuta region would be understood or held by the Powers to be justified except under the pressure of immediate peril, such as certainly could not be said to exist at present. His Excellency then repeated that he personally was opposed to any unnecessary display of force by Spain, but that events were taking place the development of which could not be clearly foreseen, and which imposed upon Spain the duty of placing her forces in a position of readiness to respond to any sudden call for their services.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[15345] No. 166.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 184. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, April* 24, 1911.

A MINISTERIAL conference was held yesterday at the Ministry of the Interior at which the chief of the staff, General d'Amade, who was General Moinier's predecessor in the Shawia district, and General Dubail, Director of the Military Cabinet at the Ministry of War, were present.

A telegram was considered which had been received from General Moinier to the effect that the flying column, which the communiqué of the day before yesterday stated would be formed to support the Moorish mehalla, was ready to advance. This information was contrary to anticipations, as the 26th April had been contemplated as the earliest date when the column would be ready.

The "Matin" of to-day announces that the Government have decided that the flying column shall at once advance towards Fez without waiting for the Moorish mehalla and the native "goum," which are not ready for action but which will follow the flying column in the course of the week.

The "Matin" further announces that a second column will be formed when the reinforcements arrive at Casablanca, and that it will follow the first column and will establish posts in its rear by the aid of which communications with the base will be kept open.

I have not as yet any official confirmation of the above-mentioned announcement,

but in view of the close relations between the "Matin" and Government circles, the former's information is usually accurate. The Minister of War, who is the predominant personality in the Cabinet, and the Generals attending the Ministerial Conference have evidently persuaded the Government of the need for sending assistance to the French Military Mission in the interior of Morocco by some more rapid and effective means than those at first contemplated, viz., a Moorish force supported by a flying column in the rear. The mehalla and the "goum" were apparently not ready for immediate action as soon as the flying column, and the danger of delay has probably determined the Government to alter the original plan.

The vigorous campaign in the "Temps" and various other organs of the Press against any half measures has had its effect. Should the French officers in the interior of Morocco perish, the effect on public opinion is easy to foresee as well as the result on the position of the Government, if they laid themselves open to the charge of dilatoriness and want of energy in saving their lives.

The present Cabinet is bitterly opposed in many quarters, and has powerful interests hostile to it on account of its Socialist-Radical complexion and its internal policy. Any opening given to its adversaries by a catastrophe in Morocco would be eagerly seized upon, and an agitation headed by the "Temps" and other important organs on patriotic lines might make its position untenable. The impression in Paris is that the object of the present operations is solely the rescue of the French officers and the foreign communities in danger at Fez, but if a French force relieves Fez and then withdraws with the French instructors and foreigners, Mulai Hafid, deprived of the assistance of these officers and exposed to the vengeance of the tribes whose fanaticism and hatred of the Sultan will infallibly be increased by the presence of a European force at Fez, may not be able to maintain himself in power and French influence in the Moorish capital will collapse. The French Government were vehemently attacked in Parliament at the time of the fall of Abd-el Aziz for what was called a cowardly desertion of their protégé, a course which was declared to have weakened their prestige in the eyes of the tribes. The present Government would be certain to be attacked more vehemently still if, after what has already occurred, they abandoned Mulai Hafid to his fate.

If, on the other hand, the Sultan be bolstered up with ammunition, guns and supplies, and be allowed to retain at Fez the French instructors while the French relieving force is withdrawn, there can be no security against a repetition of the present situation.

If a French garrison be maintained at Fez to keep the Sultan on the throne, the international situation as regards Morocco would be radically altered, and the French Government may meet with objections from Spain and Germany, supported by one or two other Powers, a situation for which the French public is not at all prepared. As M. Ribot stated in the Senate recently, a certain line of action in Morocco entails a conquest of the country, and this was an eventuality which Parliament could not approve. It may be added that public opinion will not view with complacency a continuance of large expenditure in Morocco unless some tangible advantages can be shown to accrue to France.

There is no reason to believe that the present Ministry has any wish to pursue "a policy of adventure" in Morocco. M. Cruppi has already disclaimed such intention. It was clearly its desire, when confronted with the present situation at Fez, to aid the Sultan in a manner which would avoid the danger of an anti-foreign movement in Morocco. For this reason it was first decided to despatch a Moorish force to Mulai Hafid's aid and to keep French troops in the background. But the absence of satisfactory news from Fez, and the anxiety of public opinion increased by the attacks of the "Temps" and other papers on the Ministry, appear to have made the latter realise the extreme danger of temporizing.

Any news from Fez of a satisfactory nature would probably modify at the last moment any decision to despatch French troops into the interior.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

[15474] No. 167.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 25.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, April* 25, 1911.

SPECIAL courier dispatched from Alcazar last night has just arrived with letters from Consul MacLeod and Sergeant Balding. Former states Fez still quiet on 20th, and tension relieved by arrival of grain and cattle. Indecisive fighting took place round town on 19th. Balding states mehalla moved short distance on 21st, but was at once attacked by rebels in force, who occupied position just vacated by army. They were driven off, but Balding states army is completely surrounded by hostile tribes and ammunition badly needed. French consular agent left Alcazar with convoys for army few days ago, but Carleton hears he is having great difficulty in getting through.

[15478] No. 168.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 25.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, April* 25, 1911.

CONSULS at Fez have agreed that, if road is reopened through Jama tribe, all Europeans who are willing to leave should start at once for coast. Remaining British subjects will take refuge in Menebhi's house, should necessity arise, under protection of Aissa-ben-Omar and an important shereef, who have friendship of Beni-M'Tir kaïd. Consulate will be also guarded by Aissa-ben-Omar. French are sending to-day one of the Wazan shereefs to arrange safe conduct of Europeans.

[15494] No. 169.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 25.)

(No. 42. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, April* 25, 1911.

I SPOKE to M. Cruppi to-day in regard to the attitude of Germany on the Moroccan question, as reported in Sir F. Cartwright's telegram No. 31, Secret, of the 22nd instant.

His Excellency told me that the German Chancellor had, in conversation with the French Ambassador at Berlin, held language from which it might be inferred that, should there be a French occupation of Fez and there ensued a change in the position of the Sultan involving the loss of his independence, the question of Morocco and the Act of Algeciras would not be regarded in the same light as at present.

Not only have the German Government raised no objection to the preparations being made by France for the relief of Fez with the aid of French troops, but the Chancellor has gone so far as to express the opinion that the tribes in revolt ought to be severely punished.

Though M. Cruppi does not anticipate that the German Government will show direct opposition to French action, they are doing their best, he is aware, to instigate the Austrian and Spanish Governments to make objections to French action. In the case of the former, he does not think they have much prospect of success. As regards the latter, he tells me that he is in frank and full communication with the Spanish Government through the Spanish Ambassador here and the French Embassy at Madrid. The Spanish Government should have no cause for remonstrance or complaint, as the French Government have every intention of observing strictly all the provisions of the Act of Algeciras and their other treaty obligations towards Spain, Great Britain, and Germany. Difficulties may, however, arise in regard to the secret convention between France and Spain, as certain parties in Spain are anxious to take advantage of the present situation in Morocco, and of the fact that the French Government find themselves obliged to send a relief expedition to Fez to bring into force or partly to act on the provisions of that convention, and to this the French Government cannot consent. The French Government have no ulterior object in effecting the relief of Fez, and they desire to maintain the Sultan in the same state of independence as he has hitherto enjoyed under the Act of Algeciras.

The Spanish Ambassador is only just recovering from a severe operation, but M. Cruppi has seen him and explained the situation to him and the attitude of the French Government, and has assured him of their determination strictly to observe their treaty engagements. M. Perez Caballero enquired whether the French Government intended to dispatch French troops to Taza, implying that should such be their intention his Government would be justified in sending Spanish troops to Tetuan. M. Cruppi replied that he could not say whether it would be found necessary to send French troops to Taza, but the Spanish Government would not be justified thereby in moving on Tetuan, a proceeding to which the French Government could not consent. The French Government were bound by their treaty engagements merely to notify the Spanish Government in the event of their contemplating taking action within the French sphere, whereas the Spanish Government were under an obligation to obtain the consent of the French Government to any action on their part in the Spanish sphere.

M. Cruppi expressed to me the hope that His Majesty's Government will continue to exert their influence at Madrid with a view to preventing the Spanish Government from giving ear to bad advice, and as a consequence embarking on imprudent action. His Majesty's Government have, he is glad to say, already been instrumental in securing the abandonment by the Spanish Government of their proposal to publish the secret Franco-Spanish agreement, and it would be of the greatest advantage if British counsels could impress on the King of Spain that those who pretend that the French Government have in view the "Tunification" of Morocco are misrepresenting the objects of French policy. France is firmly resolved to observe the agreements by which she is bound to Spain and England on the subject of Morocco.

[15496] No. 170.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, April 25, 1911.*

SPANISH Prime Minister informed the press yesterday that news from Morocco pointed to an extension of the area of disturbance to Alcazar. Spanish Government would probably be compelled to send a cruiser to Larache. Active preparations continue at San Fernando and Cadiz, where a force of marine infantry is now ready to take the field—its supposed destination being Larache. A little fleet of Spanish war-ships is also held in readiness at Cadiz.

The present attitude of the Spanish Government cannot be regarded, M. Geoffrey tells me, as unsatisfactory as far as France is concerned.

The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has, in fact, addressed to him a semi-official letter dated the 20th April, in which it is stated that the Spanish Government have no reason to complain of France taking military action to relieve Fez, as long as the Spanish sphere is in no way encroached on. In this sphere, M. Garcia Prieto states, the Spaniards will themselves be able to maintain order.

The letter concludes with the request that France will proceed in agreement with Spain, in the event of the Morocco crisis assuming a turn which would necessitate the further strengthening of the French hold on the country.

[15606] No. 171.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, April 25, 1911.*

VIENNA telegram No. 31: Morocco.

The recent articles in "Cologne Gazette" and other German papers afforded me a pretext for referring to Morocco in conversation with Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. In reply to my enquiry as to whether he had any reason to suspect that French military action would lead to any move on the part of Germany, his Excellency replied that though he had noticed the press articles I had referred to, he had so far not been able to detect any indication of such intention on the part of

Germany. He was of opinion that while she would be uncompromising in economical issues, she was disposed to adopt a conciliatory attitude as regards political ones. Moreover, he thought that France must have assured herself that Germany would not raise opposition before contemplating active intervention.

[15499] No. 172.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 87.)
Sir, *Tangier, April 18, 1911.*

IN continuation of my preceding despatch, I have the honour to report that the French chargé d'affaires came to see me again to-day and asked me to once more obtain the intercession of Menebhi. The Oolad Jama had now joined the rebels, and Fez was therefore completely surrounded. Something must be done at once to relieve the situation, and he would ask me to induce Menebhi once more to write to his influential friends amongst the hostile tribes, begging them to return to their allegiance, and assuring them that, should they do so, the obnoxious Grand Vizier would be removed from power.

I told M. de Billy that I was loth to place Menebhi in a position of great personal danger such as would inevitably arise from the action he was desired to take, unless I could give him a definite assurance on the part of the French that, in the event of things quieting down, El Glawi would not be left in power. Were he to remain at the head of affairs, he would inevitably learn of Menebhi's action, would at once become his mortal enemy, and would not hesitate to have him assassinated. M. de Billy said that his Government were determined to take all real power out of the hands of Glawi upon the re-establishment of order, but they could not insist upon his actual removal from office, should the Sultan oppose his dismissal. Upon receiving this assurance, I promised to sound Menebhi as to the proposed action, but my own opinion was that it was too late for half-measures of this nature, now that the tribes had learnt their strength. I thought the only hope for the Sultan—exclusive of a French expedition—lay in an important victory by the Shereefian troops, or in the arrest and imprisonment of Glawi; the rebels would then see that the Sultan was ready to redress their grievances.

Menebhi came to the legation at my request, and I laid before him M. de Billy's proposal. He was evidently very averse from undertaking the task in question, though he said he would certainly do so if I pressed him. Apart from the danger to himself, he felt sure that little good would result from his intervention. The time had gone by for such a solution of the crisis. Had M'tougi, when sent to negotiate with the Berbers, been empowered to assure them of the dismissal of El Glawi, all would have been well. But though M'tougi had himself begged the Sultan to decide on this course, His Majesty would not hear of the proposal, and the consequence was that the rebels broke off negotiations.

As regards the danger to himself, he was prepared to take the risk, but could only tell me that he believed El Glawi had already represented to the Sultan his former action—which he had taken at the request of Mr. Lister—as an intrigue to obtain the direction of affairs for himself. I replied that M. de Billy had to-day renewed his promise to me that Menebhi's conduct should be represented to the Sultan in its true light. However, as I agreed with him that little good could result from the proposed action, I would try and persuade M. de Billy to let the matter drop. On my communicating to the latter the views of Menebhi, he said that in that case he would merely ask him to write again to his friends in the Gharb, begging them to prevent their people from joining the rebel movement. This I promised that I would request him to do.

Meanwhile, I have just heard from M. de Billy that his consul at Fez, writing on the night of the 13th instant, informs him that the mehalla on the previous day gained a notable victory over the tribesmen, eighty of whom were captured and over forty killed. This victory should have a most excellent effect. No further details of the fighting have been received, but it is thought that it occurred during the advance of the mehalla on the rebel camp at Ras-el-Ma. The Sultan has apparently given orders that, in view of the critical situation created by the defection of the Oolad Jama, the mehalla should take the offensive against the Beni M'Tir, the leaders of the rebel movement. It is hoped that a decisive victory over them would in one blow put an end to the rebellion, and there is certainly a good deal to be said for this view.

Menebhi informs me that Raisuli has agreed to advance to Alcazar, but has asked for further supplies of ammunition, &c. On my communicating this to M. de Billy, he said that the ammunition would be immediately placed at his disposal. He added that Raisuli's attitude had completely changed since the last representations by Menebhi, and he felt this result was largely due to my intercession. I thanked him, but said I could not, I feared, accept any praise for Raisuli's conversion, as it was entirely the result of Menebhi's action. I hoped he would now be convinced of the latter's sincere desire to co-operate with the French and the Maghzen. I added that his conduct was all the more praiseworthy as he could hope for no gain from it, having definitely decided to take no further part in public affairs in Morocco. I thought it well to emphasise Menebhi's services, as the French Legation have been somewhat too inclined to believe allegations of Menebhi's disloyalty, supplied to them by various Moors, who desire to *embrouiller* him with the French authorities.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[15498] No. 173.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 185.)
Sir, *Paris, April* 24, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch which I have received from Colonel Fairholme, military attaché to this embassy, relating to the military situation in Morocco.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 173.

Colonel Fairholme to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Paris, April* 24, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to furnish, for your Excellency's information, the following summary of the military situation in Morocco.

I have found the French War Office very reticent on the subject of the contemplated movements of troops, so that my information has been almost entirely obtained from the press.

The mehalla of the Sultan of Morocco, commanded by Major Mangin, the strength of which has been estimated at 2,000 men, has been isolated in Fez since the 13th April, and is being besieged by the revolted tribesmen. Its position is considered precarious.

A second mehalla, about 2,500 strong, under Major Brémond, which had been guarding the communications with the coast until summoned to the relief of Fez about the 11th April, has, after several encounters with the tribes, been immobilised about 20 miles to the north of Fez, and is apparently in a very critical situation owing to shortness of provisions and ammunition.

There is at least one other French officer, Captain le Glay, besides at least five non-commissioned officers, with the above forces at this moment. The whole French military mission in Morocco consists of seven officers and eleven non-commissioned officers.

Popular opinion in France having become alarmed at the position of the members of the mission, as well as of the French and other European residents in Fez, of whom there are altogether about forty, including the mission, the French Government has decided to intervene.

Although the situation appears to have remained unchanged in the meanwhile, the intentions of the French Government, as announced in the press, have undergone three distinct phases:—

1. In the first place, on or about the 20th April, it had apparently been decided, at the request of the Sultan of Morocco, to organise a mehalla from amongst the Moors of the Shawia province, and to send it forward, stiffened by an admixture of French officers and men and some artillery, to the relief of Major Brémond's column, and ultimately of Fez.

At the same time, orders were issued for the French expeditionary force in the Shawia to be brought up to a total of about 11,000 by the immediate dispatch, from France and Algeria, of 2,400 men, whilst on the Algerian–Moroccan frontier a demonstration was ordered to be made to the Mouloya River by some 8,000 men from the Oran division. Part, if not all, of these latter troops would in any case have been employed in manœuvres and exercises away from their garrison at this time of year. They constitute about one-third of the Oran division.

2. The second phase was reached on the 22nd April, when it was decided at a Cabinet Council (*a*) to support the Shawia mehalla, which was expected to start on its march on Fez a few days later, by a light column composed entirely of French troops, and (*b*) to send fresh reinforcements to the Shawia of probably at least 10,000 men, which were to include 1,500 black troops from Dakar.

Thus it was the intention on the 22nd April to move the following categories of troops from the Shawia on Fez:—

(*a.*) A mehalla composed of Shawia tribesmen, with some French officers and artillery.

(*b.*) About 1,500 Moroccan "goumiers," who had some previous military training from French officers.

(*c.*) A column of purely French and Algerian troops.

3. The third and most recent phase was reached yesterday, when it was apparently decided by a Cabinet Council, acting on expert military opinion, to make a purely French column precede the Moorish irregulars, and to order its immediate advance on Fez.

It is also reported to have been decided to organise a second column of regular troops, on the arrival at Casa Blanca of the reinforcements alluded to above in (1), to follow up and support the first column, and to form strong posts on the line of communications.

This modification of the previous plan appears to have been due to a telegram from General Moinier, commander of the French forces in the Shawia, reporting that the French column had been got ready by the 23rd April, three days earlier than he had anticipated, while the native levies would not be ready to move for some days to come.

Meanwhile, the continued absence of news from Fez has increased popular anxiety.

A telegram from Casa Blanca, dated yesterday, gives a very unfavourable account of the progress made with the formation of the Moorish contingent, which appears to be composed mainly of men of inferior physique and entirely without military training.

The regular column now starting was concentrated at Bou-znika, on the coast between Casa Blanca and Rabat, 33 miles from the former and 22 miles from the latter place. Its strength and composition have not been stated.

The route chosen is the Rabat–Fez road, and the distance from Bou-znika to Fez viâ Rabat is about 140 miles, which General Moinier hopes will be covered in about a week.

There does not appear to be any present intention of a move into Moroccan territory on the part of the French troops from the Algerian side. The force of 8,000 men, alluded to in (1) above, will apparently content itself for the present with executing the demonstration on the River Mouloya. It is concentrating at Tauirt, which is about 55 miles south-west of Udja. Thence to Fez is about 145 miles over a most difficult country; whereas, from Rabat to Fez is only 120 miles over an easier route.

There are also obvious objections of a political nature to an advance from the east, owing to the closer proximity of the Spanish garrisons and zone of influence.

As regards the resistance to be anticipated on the part of the insurgent tribes, it might seem probable that the advance of a European force would arouse a storm of fanaticism, and that the tribes would all unite to repel the intruders, but the opinion has been expressed in the British general staff report on the armed forces of Morocco, dated 1909, that, in view of local jealousies, combined action on a large scale in such a case is absolutely out of the question, and that some of the tribes might be expected to ally themselves with the invader in the hope of gaining some advantage over their native rivals.

The report goes on to say that, "Judging from history it is not likely that more than 30,000 or so, at the outside, would ever be gathered together at one time even to repel the hated Christian."

The above estimate was based on the assumption that the Sultan and his mehallas were fighting side by side with the tribes against the foreign invasion. In the present case, therefore, a considerable reduction must be made, so that, if the above estimate is

correct, the French are not likely to be opposed by more than 15,000 or 20,000 Moors, if by as many.

The tribesmen are without artillery, and are armed for the most part with native flint-lock muskets, a proportion only having breech-loading rifles. Their tactics, though formidable in guerilla and mountain warfare, would not be very dangerous to a European force in the open country.

It may be predicted, therefore, that a French expeditionary force, constituted as proposed in (3) above, would have little difficulty in relieving Major Brémond's mehalla and the garrison of Fez, provided these are able to maintain themselves for another week. The danger appears greater in the case of the former force, which is reported to be very short of provisions and ammunition, whereas, according to the Moorish Minister, El Mokri, Fez is able to take care of itself for some time to come.

What further complications, political and military, will ensue after the arrival of the French expedition at Fez it is at present impossible to foretell. It hardly appears likely that the present Sultan will be able in the future to maintain his authority in the country without permanent and active foreign military support, even should it be now re-established as a result of the French operations.

I have, &c.
W. E. FAIRHOLME,
Military Attaché.

[15558] No. 174.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, April 26, 1911.*

IT is practically certain that Mequinez has been captured by Zemmour tribes, who are reported to have proclaimed Moulai Zin, a brother of Sultan.

[15610] No. 175.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, April 26, 1911.*

I LEARN from M. de Billy that the convoy of money and ammunition intended for the mehalla in Sherarda which left Alcazar some days ago has been compelled to return to Sok-el-Arba, the country between that place and the mehalla having joined the insurgents. The last chance of succouring them, therefore, has, in his opinion, failed, and orders have been given to the mixed force from Shawia, which includes French troops, to advance. They will camp on the north side of the Buregreg river to-morrow night.

Reports received from Major Brémond by French Legation state that mehalla, when moving camp, was attacked with great persistence by force of 5,000 rebels. The attacks were, however, successfully repulsed.

[15711] No. 176.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 28. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 26, 1911.*

THE Spanish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office to-day, and Sir A. Nicolson took the opportunity of giving his Excellency the substance of the assurances which M. Cruppi had communicated to Sir F. Bertie in regard to French action in Morocco, and remarked that those who stated that the French Government intended to *tunifier* Morocco were misrepresenting French policy, and that France was firmly resolved to observe her agreements with Spain and Great Britain. Sir A. Nicolson added that he trusted that Spain would close her ears to any whisperings in a contrary sense, and enquired whether Germany, for instance, had been speaking at Madrid on the subject.

The Ambassador observed that Germany had informed the Spanish Government that she had stated to the French Government that she considered that there was no

necessity for French troops to proceed to Fez, and that if French troops did advance to the capital there would arise not only the danger of serious troubles occurring throughout Morocco, but there would also be a *répercussion* in Europe affecting the political situation there.

His Excellency added that if France occupied Fez it was clear that she would remain there, whatever she might say to the contrary, and that, therefore, the Sultan and the Moorish Government would be completely under French influence, and the Sultan would very soon be in the same position as the Bey of Tunis. In these circumstances, Spain would consider that the independence of the Sultan had vanished, and that she would be fully justified in putting into operation the clauses of the secret treaty which empowered Spain to take over certain districts in Morocco.

Sir A. Nicolson remarked that this would amount to a partition of the country and would open up the whole Morocco question, which was most undesirable. Señor de Villa Urrutia said that this might be so, but it would be impossible for Spain to acquiesce passively in the establishment of French domination at Fez over the Sultan and his Government. It was all very well for the French to say that they were merely going to relieve the capital and succour Europeans, for, once there, they would not be able to leave. Spain had explained her point of view very clearly at Paris, and though she did not for the moment intend to do more than make the necessary preparations, she would probably be compelled to take further action if the situation were to develop on the lines he had indicated. His Excellency doubted whether it would even be to the interest of England to have a French colonial empire extending from Tunis to the Atlantic seaboard, although for the present British relations with France were amicable. Were France to establish herself on the Moorish coast opposite to Spain, either directly or through a vassal Sultan, it could not be to the advantage of England, and would of course be quite inacceptable to Spain. There could be no possible danger to British interests were a weak Power like Spain to be at Tetuan, Laraiche, &c.

Sir A. Nicolson observed that in any case it would be necessary to wait and see how the situation developed, and that his Excellency's arguments afforded food for reflection. He trusted, however, that Spain would take no hasty action, and that she would confide in the sincerity of the French Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15608] No. 177.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid April 26, 1911.*

FRENCH Ambassador has to-day informed Spanish Government that, in view of unfavourable reports from Fez up to 20th April, and from Major Brémond's mehalla up to 22nd April, French Government have dispatched additional troops to Casa Blanca. The Shawia mehalla, supported by a French column, are to proceed at once towards Fez by right bank of Wady Buregreg, making Sali their base of operations. Rabat will not be occupied. French Ambassador explains further that there is no intention to occupy fresh territory, but merely to rescue Europeans in Fez and to assist Sultan to hold his own against insurgent tribes without any infringement of Algeciras Act.

Spanish Prime Minister stated to-day at a private interview that Spanish man-of-war now at Laraiche had merely been sent to obtain information as to state of country, and that he was averse from sending troops there or spending money unnecessarily at a time of great financial pressure.

[15715] No. 178.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, April 27, 1911.*

FURTHER letters received from Major Brémond, dated 21st and 22nd April, night. Mehalla is slowly making its way to Ras-el-Ma by order of Colonel Mangin. Its progress is much hampered by rebels, but there seems good prospect of its being able to get through to Ras-el-Ma. Major Brémond reports that he is in urgent need to money, but has still 214,000 cartridges, 500 shells, and 35 boxes of cartridges for

Maxims. With this amount of ammunition the army should be able to attack Beni M'Tir. Major Brémond states that the rebellion is gradually assuming anti-foreign character. French column 2,000 men, with 1,500 goum and Moorish harka of 1,500 men, have left Casa Blanca for Kasbah-Kenitra, where they will arrive on 30th April. They will stay there pending further news from Fez as to result of operations of Major Brémond's army. If latter is successful they will probably not leave Kasbah-Kenitra. Letters dated 25th April report absolute calm in Gharb, and there is certainly no excuse for any Spanish action at Laraiche.

[15713] No. 179.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, April 27, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

I went to see M. Cruppi at his request this morning, when his Excellency told me that he had received further disquieting news from Morocco, in addition to the information already communicated by the French Embassy to Sir A. Nicolson. Colonel Mangin wrote to Major Brémond on the 19th April, begging him to hasten to the rescue of Fez. Major Brémond states, in a communication dated the 21st instant, that the whole country is in revolt, and that he has been violently attacked by the tribes. He has been compelled to retire to Sidi Malek, and Consul Boisset, whose relief expedition had reached Douaf, has been obliged to withdraw to Souk-el-Arba.

It is reported that the rebel tribes have captured Mequinez, and they are said to be considering the proclamation as Sultan of Mulay-el-Zin, the brother of Mulay Hafid.

[15735] No. 180.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 44. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, April 27, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

I have been requested by M. Cruppi to inform you that a report has been received from the French consul at Laraiche to the effect that six Spanish officers in plain clothes and six non-commissioned officers in uniform have been landed at that port by the Spanish cruiser "Rio de la Plata." The Pasha is very much perturbed at this, and it would seem as though the Spanish Government were anxious to create an incident which might justify them in making an installation there. It is further reported that the Spanish Captain Obilo left for Alcazar on the 24th instant with his "tabor."

The French chargé d'affaires at Tangier has telegraphed that it is rumoured that the Spaniards intend to take some action at Tetuan. M. Cruppi told me that, although he does not attach undue importance to this rumour, he has been forced to conclude, from information which he has received from various sources, that the Spanish Government are bent on bringing about a situation calculated to serve as a pretext for the occupation by Spanish troops of portions of Moorish territory. Such action would raise afresh the whole Moroccan question, and M. Cruppi hopes that His Majesty's Government will use their influence to dissuade the Spanish Government from doing anything which might afford an opportunity for the intervention of other Powers.

[15494] No. 181.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April 27, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

It is left to your discretion to take such action as your Excellency may consider prudent in the sense of the last paragraph of Paris telegram No. 42 of the 25th instant.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 73; Berlin, No. 46; Vienna, No. 7; and Tangier, No. 20.)

[15758] No. 182.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 2. Confidential.)

Sir, *Fez, April 7, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to resume the narrative of events hereabouts from the date of my despatch No. 1 of the 13th February.

From the middle to end of February rumours spread of an agitation having arisen in Beni M'tir, a large Berber (aboriginal) tribe dwelling south-west of the line Fez–Mequinez.

The Beni M'tir were, it was learned later, highly enraged by the imprisonment of some of their leading men for refusing payment of levies of money and of men to serve in the army under the new regulations. It was complained that the men in prison had paid high sums for their posts as kaïds or sheikhs, that these sums had been collected from the tribe, and that the demand for further levies and of sums for the release of the prisoners was intolerable.

The Beni M'tir also protested that they could not find men to serve voluntarily as soldiers for four years, and they protested angrily against the new military regulations, particularly the executions of men for desertion and robbery, the nude medical examination imposed on recruits, and the dark-coloured clothes and boots, all of which were unbearable.

Bitter complaints were also made of the quartering upon them of groups of emissaries of the Grand Vizier pressing for money, who extorted, for themselves and the Vizier's secretaries, gifts in kind and in money.

(It will be remarked that the exaction of soldiers from Berber tribes has been all along a headstrong idea of the Sultan, which he did not seem to realise he could not enforce, and which, in any case, was scarcely worth all the trouble and risk entailed, so few were the soldiers and so great was their propensity to desert.)

Amongst the Sherarda and certain other Makhzen "Arab" tribes north-west of Fez, also under the immediate rule of the Grand Vizier, a somewhat similar agitation arose. The Makhzen sent a small mehalla to exact a levy of 25,000 dollars and sixty days' maintenance of the mehalla from the Sherarda towards the expenses of the Sultan's coming journey. Of this, 18,000 dollars were paid up, and the balance, according to the tribesmen, was rebated, but according to the Makhzen was merely deferred. The tribesmen had made gifts to the Vizier and the latter's emissaries, and at any rate thought the remainder of the levy would not be exacted, and the mehalla proceeded on its collecting round to Fichtala and other hill tribes.

Later in February the Grand Vizier's emissaries, mostly Berbers, returned afresh, and, passing from village to village, exacted heavy supplies for themselves in money and in kind, and aroused exasperations by violations of the villagers' women-kind, seizures of animals or other effects which they fancied and the like, to complaints about which neither the chief emissaries of the Vizier nor the Vizier himself would afford any redress. It would be tedious to relate the numberless instances of such proceedings, but one case, that of a man named Ben Ginawi, in Hejowa, may be cited. He had paid the levies upon him, but complained of the violation of one of his women by one of the Vizier's men. The Vizier's emissary, instead of punishing the criminal, sent the complainant in irons to Fez as a rebel. He procured his release on payment of a large sum (said to be 2,000 dollars) to the Vizier and the latter's staff, but went back to his tribe, and then, through Sherarda and Beni Hassan, declaiming on his wrongs. Meetings to organise resistance were held and messages exchanged with other tribes, the discontent being so great as to produce an alliance between such ancient foes as the Berber Beni M'tir and the Makhzen Arab Sherarda, Oudaya, and Hejowa tribes, an alliance so unthinkable and strange that (as the Spanish consul here remarked the other day quite truly) had the Sultan consciously tried to bring it about it would have been beyond his power!

The season was most opportune, crops being still too green to burn, and the "Mulud" festival approaching when tribal deputations from all over Morocco come to the Sultan, and the Aissawa and Hamatcha devotees repair from far and near to Mequinez.

The Sherarda then began the revolt by pillaging the village of one of their kaïds who had died, and various farms of the Grand Vizier, and treating contumaciously such officials as were sent to remonstrate.

The Oudaya and Beni M'tir started pillaging on the Fez–Mequinez road and on

the west and middle routes (*i.e.*, the regular courier and trade routes) between Fez and the coast.

The forces available were some 3,000 of the troops newly organised by the French military mission, and whose training was still far from complete, and some 2,000 of the old non-reorganised soldiers, *i.e.*, the mehalla in Fichtala, plus such mounted tribesmen as the Makhzen might get from Sheraga and Ulad Jama. Most people thought that the best course for the Sultan would have been to treat with the Sherarda and their neighbours all tribes so regularly loyal that redress of their grievances would probably have appeased them.

Commandant Mangin and the French consul strongly urged this course, but, pressed by the Grand Vizier, the Sultan decided to send nearly all the new troops, accompanied by most of the foreign instructors, including the British instructors Balding and Redman, to Sherarda at once. The grounds for this step were the necessity of at once reopening the usual trade routes to the coast, the great indignity to the Sultan should the tribal deputations from the south and elsewhere be unable to come to Fez at the feast, and the probability that a show of force would at once overawe the Sherarda into submission.

The mehalla from Fez therefore left Fez on the 28th February for Sherarda, nominally under the Minister of War (a very young man, son of the Grand Vizier), but really under Commandant Mangin, head of the French military mission. It will be referred to hereinafter as the Sherarda Mehalla.

The poor condition of the transport animals and the rainy weather made its movements slow. The Fichtala Mehalla was then summoned to Hajra Sherîfa to co-operate against Sherarda.

Meantime, all along the Fez–Mequinez and Fez–Hejowa–Sherarda roads the usual Moorish evidences of disorders, robberies of couriers, pillaging of cattle, farms, &c., began to be manifested daily. Postal services to Mequinez had to be suspended, and the mails to the north had to be sent (taking the letters for the south as well) by the one route still open, *i.e.*, viâ Sherarga and Ulad Aissa, a road so hilly and muddy as to necessarily entail some delay to couriers, and to be often unsuitable for heavily laden caravans.

On the 3rd March, some 17 miles north-west of Fez, the Sherarda Mehalla was attacked by the insurgents, who were repulsed, the mehalla then marching to Sok Sebt of Oudaya. On the 7th March the mehalla moved against a large body ("harka") of various insurgents, including parties of Beni M'tir, who were believed to be about to attack the mehalla, the Fichtala troops having meanwhile been summoned to assist. In the fighting which then ensued the latter troops were somewhat badly routed, but the Sherarda Mehalla beat off all three attacks of the enemy, losing only one man killed and six wounded, while the enemy left upwards of eighty dead on the ground.

Since then the Sherarda Mehalla has been at "Dar Kaïd Hafid," in Sherarda, and, with the exception of one very slight attack, has since been unmolested. The local insurgents have been submitting in small parties, and negotiations, whether genuine or merely to rest and spy seems doubtful, with the rest of the Sherarda have been in progress. So far, however, no result has been arrived at, the Sherarda in the main insisting that, as all their movables are with their Beni Hassan allies, they cannot surrender without the latter's and the other insurgent tribes' consent.

On the 11th the most of the Fichtala troops returned to Fez, in number a few hundreds only. All reports from the country were to the effect that the insurrectionary movement was spreading. The Vizier, alleging indisposition, remained indoors, and the Sultan, not even alleging illness, did not attend Friday prayers on the 10th.

The Beni M'tir meantime formed a small camp at Ras-al-Ma, about 9 miles west of Fez. Towards sunset on the 11th a party of them raided some cattle within a mile to the south-west of the Palace, and a party of the Ait Yusi Berbers, that tribe having joined the movement, plundered sheep, &c., on the roads to the south of Fez, and farms of the Grand Vizier, about 7 miles west of Fez, were also raided.

It will be remembered that the troops at Fez were, and are still, encamped close to the west of the city, with the Imperial tent, &c. ("Afrag") pitched there some weeks ago in preparation for the Sultan's departure from Fez.

On the 12th the Beni M'tir raided and burned a number of villages to the west and north-west, but were driven back when they had begun burning the village of Nzala Faraji, some 3½ miles to the west of the Palace.

The 14th was the day of the Mulud Festival, but although such small parade as

could be mustered assembled as usual, the Sultan, on the excuse of the inclemency of the weather (really very rainy), did not go out, a circumstance unprecedented within living memory at Fez, as was also the circumstance of the Aissawa and Hamatcha being unable to go to Mequinez, and the cancellation of the usual "Hedia" (tribute-offering) ceremonies on the remaining days of the festival. All these derangements were obviously due to the Makhzen's apprehension of attacks by the insurgents and consequent panics in the town.

Meantime, the prices of the necessaries of life rose in many cases 50 per cent. or so, especially such commodities as come from the coast. As regards native articles (*e.g.*, grain, charcoal, cattle, and sheep), this rise was less than might have been expected, which was due to the insurgents usually contenting themselves with exacting ("sattat") safe-conduct money from the caravans with such things, added to the looted grain from Sherarda and Hejowa.

On the 15th, Kaïd M'Tugi went to the Beni M'tir's camp and began negotiations which ended, or rather appeared to end, on the 18th, in the Sultan's releasing all Beni M'tir prisoners, giving them presents of clothes, &c., and in one case of 100 dollars, a horse, and a rifle as well, excusing the tribe from giving levies of soldiers, and promising refund of some 8,000 dollars said to have been extorted from certain of the prisoners, the Grand Vizier to have nothing to do with that tribe in future, and the Sultan's receiving, and apologising to, the prisoners.

At Mequinez the apprehensions of trouble at the feast were even greater than at Fez, but in the event all passed off quietly, the insurgents contenting themselves with exacting money from the Jews for guarding the vicinity outside their quarter.

The concessions made by the Sultan unfortunately only stimulated the Beni M'tir to further efforts, and to insist that the foreign military instructors be dismissed, and (I suspect) that the 8,000 dollars referred to be paid, and, even during the negotiations, they were making overtures to Hyaina to join their movement.

On the 21st, in the belief that peace had been restored, postal couriers set out for Mequinez. These were robbed, however, about 8 miles out, and in the forenoon the Beni M'tir, approaching unobserved behind the aqueduct, made a most audacious raid, carrying off cattle at the south-west corner of the Palace parks. All available forces from the Sultan's Mehalla and the Palace were rushed out against them; the guns at the Palace battery and at the mehalla opened fire. A panic ensued all over the city. Decent citizens hurriedly shut their shops, while the town riff-raff (moved by a false rumour that the Beni M'tir had captured the Jews' quarter), with clubs and knives, began to gather in anticipation of chances of looting.

By about 2 P.M. the excitement subsided. The Makhzen losses were, probably, about twelve killed and twenty or so wounded.

Commandant Mangin returned on the 22nd from the Sherarda Mehalla, his post there being taken by Commandant Brémond.

On the 23rd, the remains of the Fichtala Mehalla reached Fez, and were utilised to reinforce the Sultan's camp here. A party of Ait Yusi insurgents appeared about 4 miles south of the town and set fire to a village, but made off before the troops sent out could reach them.

Raiding of cattle and sheep between three-quarters of a-mile and 3 miles to the north-west of the city by the Beni M'tir occurred on the 24th.

On the 25th, Ait Yusi raiders appeared about 2 miles east of the town, but made off. They were members apparently of a "harka" of Ait Yusi and Beni Sadin people who had camped about 7 miles to the south-south-east.

It having been reported that a large proportion of the Beni M'tir had gone off towards Mequinez, the Makhzen made a sortie on the 26th to capture the insurgents' camp at Ras-al-Ma, some 9 miles to the west, but were driven back to the town with a loss of some fifty to sixty killed alone besides many wounded, and losing some 200 to 300 rifles and 2,000 rounds of ammunition. The enemy also were said to have suffered considerably, but the result withal was the most severe and depressing blow the Makhzen has yet had in the course of the insurrection. Since then, though some small fights have occurred, the Makhzen have been acting only on the defensive.

The Makhzen then began to release prisoners of the tribes to the north-east and east (*e.g.*, Fichtala, and Hyaina), with the view of getting contingents from those tribes, or, at any rate, securing their not attacking the tribes who are still loyal, and through whose lands lies the remaining route to the coast.

Meantime, parties of Beni M'tir went to Mequinez, and, it is said, offered to proclaim as Sultan a shereef named Mulai Abderrahman-ben-Suleiman, whose father and grandfather had aspired to the Throne, and who is a great-grandson of the Sultan Mulai Suleiman (reigned 1794–1822).

This shereef, however, refused the offer, and the Beni M'tir retired. The insurgents are said to have demanded and been refused delivery of the arms and ammunition in Mequinez, but to have extorted a sort of black mail of 2,000 dollars to refrain from looting in the vicinity of the town.

On the 29th further village burning by Beni M'tir and skirmishing with the troops occurred about 4 miles to the west, on the slopes of Jebel Taghat.

The Sultan then began negotiations towards hiring the services of tribal contingents from Beni Warain (Berbers never in submission to the Government), and other like tribes to the east and south-east.

During all this the Grand Vizier remained indoors, alleging illness, but really busy with his plans towards establishing his position at the Court, which had, of course, become shaky through the troubles attributed everywhere in so great a degree to his conduct. Indeed, for some days his arrest, or an attack on him, might quite easily have occurred, had he not acted so cautiously.

On the 30th and 31st March and the 1st and 2nd April parties of Ait Yusi pillaged the roads 2 miles to the east of the city, with little hindrance till the 2nd, when parties of soldiers and some rounds of shell from the south bastion drove them off. On the afternoon of the 2nd an attempt was made by large parties of Beni M'tir and Zarhon people to rush the Sultan's camp (close to the west of the city), but these efforts were frustrated by troops who went out 2 miles or so, and who were supported by the fire of long-range guns at the Palace battery and the mehalla. The Makhzen are said to have had some twelve killed, but by all accounts in this affair the enemy's loss was much heavier.

Meanwhile, delegates both of the Makhzen and of the insurgents had been canvassing actively for the support of tribes to the east, and on the 3rd and 4th several hundred horsemen from the south-east, chiefly Beni Warain, arrived. So far, however, the attitude of Hyaina seems to be doubtful, and is of particular importance. It will be seen from the accompanying map* that Hyaina adjoins the hitherto loyal districts of Sheraga and Ulad Jama. So, should the Hyaina join the insurrection, the normal development would be their pressing their western neighbours to do so also, or have their lands raided. In the latter case this would obviously be to render the remaining route between Fez and the coast unsafe for ordinary traffic.

Trade and employment have been, of course, much injured by all these commotions.

As regards foodstuffs and fuel, the Berbers' customs modify the suffering considerably, as they content themselves by letting supplies pass to the town upon payment of heavy rates of "sattat," *i.e.*, safe-conduct money. In other words, they simply apply to the areas they have occupied the normal practice of their own lands. The quantities of grain taken as spoil by the troops in Sherarda, or brought in and sold to avoid risk of looting, have tended also to increase stocks and modify prices, though, of course, prices are still 50 per cent. above normal.

The pass to which things have now come seems to be that of absolute distrust by all the insurgents in any concessions or promises by the Makhzen, so long, at any rate, as the Grand Vizier remains in office.

On the one hand, the insurgents are unable to do more than spread disorders in the country and partially harass the city of Fez; and, on the other hand, the Sultan, with only one real force at his disposal, *i.e.*, the Sherarda Mehalla, is unable to enforce any terms of his own upon the insurgents, or do more, locally, than keep order in Fez itself and its immediate environs.

Under these circumstances, the French consul has made overtures to the Sherarda through Commandant Brémond and Kaid Mohammed Bagdadi, after obtaining the Makhzen's consent, in the sense that the consul will guarantee—

1. The safety of the Sherarda leaders if they come to Fez and submit to the Sultan.
2. The due fulfilment of the terms which will be arranged and which will include elimination of the Grand Vizier from their affairs, appointment of kaïds of their own tribe to rule them, and fixation of the amounts and dates of contributions to be paid in future.
3. Amnesty to all concerned for the revolt.

The Sherarda's answer is now awaited.

* Not printed.

Immediate Outlook.

As regards the immediate outlook, the issue would seem to turn on the Sherarda's decision. If they can be induced to submit, the effervescence of the Berber tribes will be of little importance. They can never maintain outside their own lands more than small numbers at any spot for more than a few days at a time, and the custom is for members in each tribe to take it in turn to serve for a few days, carrying their food with the "harka," or camp of the assembly.

The result is a small but very representative force, a dispersal of which has an effect of further reach than one might readily suppose.

Should, however, the Sherarda decline all terms, the situation of the Sultan cannot but become one of much harassment and pressure, and, should the threatened Hyiana defection come to pass, might even become highly critical, in view of the growing distress in the city, the poor troops here, and the presence of many disorderly "friendlies," with both troops and "friendlies" sympathising at heart with the insurgents' grievances.

Resistance to their demands might, under such circumstances, be most dangerous to the whole present régime.

The elements in the Makhzen's favour are their skill in sowing dissensions amongst the tribes, the latter's propensity to quarrel with each other sooner or later, and the tribesmen's fears for their crops, as week by week these are ripening, and become more and more easy to burn.

The after-problems which the situation presents are difficult, but not, I think, insoluble. An army is needed to keep order. An army of the old style (*i.e.*, a mere mob strong only by its numbers, corrupt and extremely costly) the Makhzen has not the means to maintain.

The training and augmenting to sufficient degrees of a proper army, if not designed and carried out guardedly enough as regards native prejudices, may raise more disorder than the army can suppress. So long as no fair and reasonable system of tax collection obtains, such an army might, further, become an instrument of extortion and provocation to rebellion rather than a means to maintain tranquillity. Army reform and tribal mis-government, obviously, cannot be carried on simultaneously with any degree of public safety.

With foreign insistence a proper financial system at the court (I mean at the court exclusively and not all over the country to start with, such system as could be supervised with the minimum of European assistance) and in the collection of taxes could be instituted which would do much to avert such extortions as are herein described.

As regards the army, a scheme in which as regards such details as clothes, pay, discipline, and penalties, nothing was included which could give any avoidable offence to native prejudices, or violate Moorish laws, should not be at all impossible to draw up. The great mistakes into which all foreign officers who have hitherto attempted military reforms in Morocco have (it seems to me) fallen hitherto have been their not realising the fragileness of the Sultan's authority, even in the best of times, their studying rather to Frenchify, or Anglicise, or Germanise the army than to popularise it. Neither the men nor the tribes from whom they are drawn have any dislike to learning such military essentials as drill and shooting, and are, on the whole, responsive to just treatment. Moorish laws and customs afford, even omitting capital punishment, such a wide range of humane penalties as should, surely, suffice for disciplinary requirements, but which have never yet had fair trial by being regularly and incorruptly enforced.

The great general importance of the question will, I trust, be held to excuse this digression into a subject which may seem to be one rather for military experts to comment upon, for the events of the last few weeks have, I would suggest, shown beyond dispute that persistence in the various courses herein described may quite possibly result in a period of anarchy, with, thereafter, either the setting up by the interior tribes and towns of a Sultan to their own mind, or the maintenance of the Sultan's authority by great extensions of the areas under foreign occupation.

Safety of British Subjects.

There are only nine non-official (European) British subjects here, and these, with one exception, are all women and children. I have from time to time pointed out to them the risks of the remaining road to the coast being closed and the critical

situation which might ensue thereafter, particularly should distress and disorders become rife in the town, and the weakness of the Makhzen, but all concerned have hitherto refused to leave Fez. They allege the risks attendant to all roads at present, the extremely inclement weather, flooded rivers, &c., of these few weeks, the entirely friendly spirit of the townspeople so far (which is the fact), and their confidence that in any emergency they would not be molested. The same advice has been given by my French and Spanish colleagues to their compatriots, and the latter made the same answer.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

[15759] No. 183.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Fez, April* 8, 1911.

CONTINUING the narrative of my despatch of yesterday, I have now to report that a sort of truce has been effected between the Beni Warain Berbers (for the Makhzen), and the Beni Mtir for the insurgents, for six days.

Discussions have begun between the leaders of these two tribes, and to-day Mulai Dris Ben Abdselam Al Amrani has gone to the Beni Mtir camp to try and bring the insurgents to some reasonable settlement.

This has led to suspension of fighting locally, but, on the other hand, all manner of lawless acts continued to be committed, robberies even in the streets by the Beni Warain and other "friendly" Berbers.

Then the Ulad Jama tribe has now at last joined the insurgent tribes, and to-day their kaïd (Saïd Bagdadi) had to retreat to Fez with his following.

As this renders the remaining route to the coast insecure much interruption of couriers and caravan traffic may follow.

I am hopeful, however, that it may be possible to keep the courier services going by the assistance of influential foreign protégés in Ulad Aissa.

What exactly are the insurgents' demands now cannot be stated for certain until particulars of the present discussions are received; but, according to all general reports, they include:—

1. Dismissal of the Grand Vizier Glawi.
2. Dismissal of the French military mission, or at least its reduction to the functions and proportions it had in Mulai Hassan's reign.
3. Abolition of the new military regulations.
4. Fixation of amounts of taxes from each tribe.
5. Appointment of kaïds over each tribe from that respective tribe.
6. Repayment of sums recently extorted from the Beni Mtir and other tribes.

The three last demands would seem to be at least negotiable. The first presents the dangers of a rising in the south by Glawi's partisans, and, as regards the second and the third, it would seem impossible for the Sultan to concede them unless with the previous assent of the French Government.

All this would appear, even if assented to, to imply a reversal of the French Government's policy of "strengthening." The tribes' whole case is briefly that the Sultan's Government is already far too "strong," strength and oppressiveness being, in their experience, one and the same thing.

Letters of the 6th, received to-day from the Sherarda mehalla, report no change there.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

[15760] No. 184.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 4.)
Sir, *British Consulate, Fez, April* 9, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 3 of yesterday, I have the honour to report that quarrels and fighting broke out last night both amongst the Beni Warain themselves and between them and the ordinary soldiers.

The Beni Warain made an attempt to possess themselves of Dar Dabibagh, but were repulsed; thereupon they moved off, carrying with them everything, such as tents, &c., supplied to them by the Sultan, and joined the Ait Yusi "Harka," about 6 miles to the south-east of Fez.

While doing so they were followed after daylight by musketry and cannon fire. About noon they returned to outside the Bab Ftuh district, when they caused considerable alarm, but were driven off about 2 o'clock. At Sboo bridge some fighting was reported between the Beni Warain and Hiayna, which is the course of a blood feud which started during the Beni Warain's journey to Fez.

I am sorry to report that the little town of Sefroo, 18 miles south of Fez, which had been temporising with the Berbers, has now had to make terms with them, by which the deputy-governor has become governor ("sheikh-erbea") on behalf of the insurgents.

The place is quiet, however, and no harm has befallen, so far as I know, to the American missionaries, who are the only Christians there, and who have many friends amongst the Berbers.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

[15761] No. 185.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Fez, April* 10, 1911.

THE French and German consuls here have received unofficial news from Mequinez that on the 8th instant the townspeople of Mequinez decided to depose the governor, and instal a governor on behalf of the insurgents.

The first man to whom the "provisional" governorship had been offered had, however, refused to take it, and now another was being looked for.

One cannot of course take this as authentic until confirmed.

Mulai Dris Amrani returned from the Beni Mtir camp to-day, but with what result I have not, up till time of writing, been able to ascertain.

I have, of course, been seeing the other consuls here constantly these days, and had an exhaustive discussion of the situation to-day, first with the French consul (M. Gaillard), and later with Dr. Vassel, German consul.

None of us could see any improvement, but rather the reverse, in the outlook, but much will depend of course on the issue of Sid Amrani's negotiations. The most absolute reticence is observed in Makhzen quarters as to what the insurgents' real demands now are, but from general reports the size of the rebel camp seems to be increasing considerably.

The Beni Waraiu "ex-friendlies" remain at the Ait Yusi "harka."

To-day, however, some thirty horsemen, with a Wazzani shereef, arrived from Hiayna, and their report is that Hiayna is decided not to join the insurgents. Couriers from Tangier continue to arrive through Ulad Jama, the fighting in which tribe now appears to be amongst themselves as to whether or not to join the insurgents.

I am, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

P.S.—Abnormally heavy rains still continue.

J. M. MacL.

[15762] No. 186.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 6.)

Sir, *Fez, April 11, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to state that Mulai Dris-al-Amrani's negotiations with the Beni Mtir have come to a stand, unfortunately, but whether they are actually broken off seems still not quite certain.

Late this afternoon the French consul called, and, with much disappointment, told me he had just heard through Sid Aissa-ben-Omar that Sid Amrani had come back from the Beni Mtir camp, having been dismissed with contumely and robbed of all his effects after he had paid over a sum of money sent by the Sultan to the leaders, apparently the money promised, but not paid, through Kaïd Mtugi, and had reached the Sultan's camp on foot and stripped of nearly all his clothes.

I called on Sid Aissa-ben-Omar, and he and his retainers confirmed this. Sid Amrani had meanwhile gone to the palace. After learning that Sid Amrani had returned to his own house, I sent him a message of regret for what had befallen him, and then called upon him late in the evening, and he gave me the following account of what had happened :—

The Sultan sent him to treat with the Berber leaders with a letter of credentials. After much discussion, he came to terms with them yesterday—what exactly he would not say, but only that the terms included the retention of the French military mission, the payment of the money referred to, and amnesty and confirmation in their posts of the leaders. Just as this had been done, however, an intercepted letter from Dris-ben-Bushta (Khalifa of the Hajib) addressed jointly to Kaïd Akka, of Beni Mtir, and Kaïd Boozooma, of the Sais, &c., Arabs, written apparently by the Sultan's order, was produced and made much uproar. The letter said that if they would withdraw their people and attack the rest of the insurgents near here, the Sultan would make a much better settlement with them. The leaders upbraided Sid Al-Amrani for deceiving them. He convinced them of his innocence, however, as did also Kaïd Akka of his, but Boozooma was dismissed from his post, and sentenced to have his beard shaved or redeem it by a heavy fine. Subsequently, however, the leaders said they would consult with the tribe about the settlement and let Sid Amrani know the result in a day or two, and they trusted it would be accepted.

Sid Amrani returned and reported this to the Sultan, who to-day, impatiently, insisted on his going out to hear what had been decided. When he was about 3 miles out, firing was heard to the north-east (tribesmen firing on a convoy coming back from the Sherarda Mehalla), and he met a large force of Beni Mtir, raised thereby, coming as if to attack the Mehalla, but really to see what was the matter, and presently fire was opened upon them from the Mehalla, and the Beni Mtir angrily asked what this meant. It was a breach of the truce, &c. He assured them it was a mistake, and hurrying back to Fez, got the firing stopped, and reported to the Sultan. The latter thereupon insisted on his taking out the money straight from the palace. (The Beni Mtir leaders did not know the money was coming.) When about 3 miles out, he and his attendants met a party of eight horsemen, whose identity was unknown to them, and who robbed them of nearly everything they had, and made off, but not in the direction of the Beni Mtir camp. Sid Amrani said he could not yet, therefore, be sure whether it was an isolated case of robbery or an intentional affair on the part of the Beni Mtir leaders, as a public insult to the Sultan. Sid Amrani's brother (Mulai Saïd) is still in the Beni Mtir camp, with Sid Amrani's belongings. If the affair was intentional, these will be robbed, too, of course. If otherwise, then, by tribal custom, there should be restoration, apology, and punishment of the thieves, and this will be seen by to-morrow's events.

Sid Amrani said the leaders would not present any definite statement of demands, but were bent apparently, so far, on having a decisive fight with the Sherarda Mehalla and with the Makhzen. At first they had talked only of the French military mission being withdrawn, but now spoke vaguely about all Christians going away. They had not mentioned the obnoxious "Enkass" tax. Sid Amrani, however, was most elusive on all this, fearing, I suppose, to compromise himself as toward the Sultan, or the Grand Vizier, or the French.

It is obvious that the affair has a most unsatisfactory look, and we await the next developments with some anxiety. Money may, perhaps, pacify the Beni Mtir leaders, but their followers may require some such satisfaction as the withdrawal of the French officers, or even of Europeans in general.

Sid Aissa Ben Omar has kindly assured me that I can count upon him furnishing me with half of his men (the other half he keeps for the French consul) as guards, should any disturbance arise in town.

To-day's incidents have, naturally, much perplexed the French consul, the problem of what to do with the French officers, and even civilian French persons, here being increasingly difficult.

We are in treaty for a good escort for Mrs. Verdon and family to leave in two or three days, should the road still be clear, and I shall offer the opportunity to any of the other British subjects who may desire to leave.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

P.S.—The town so far is quiet, but, of course, one cannot tell what change of Government or the like such excitements may lead to. The Beni Warain people have now gone home. Sid Amrani says that only Beni Mtir are encamped to the west. The Hiayna are still quiet.

J. M. MACL.

[15739] No. 187.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 88.)

Sir, *Tangier, April 21, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that up to the present the critical situation of the Makhzen in the north of Morocco has had very little effect on the tribes of the south. This would at first sight appear remarkable, but history has shown that the south of Morocco has always remained completely indifferent to what is happening in the north, and *vice versâ*, except in the case of a dynastic struggle such as that between Mulai Hafid and Abdul Aziz. A further explanation of the relative tranquillity which prevails in the south is to be found in the occupation of the Shawia by the French. Their administration of this district has created a dividing line between north and south Morocco, and though they have made but little effort to extend their authority beyond the Shawia, at the same time the peaceful organisation of this region has without doubt had a very pacifying effect upon the surrounding tribes. Moreover, the fact that Hadj Thami Glawi, the Viceroy at Marrakesh, is a man of great strength, enjoying exceptional power and prestige among the southern tribes, has no doubt contributed very greatly towards the maintenance of tranquillity in the districts under his administration. It is, however, regrettable that the example of Hadj Thami's brother—the Grand Vizier—appears to be having an evil effect upon him, and he is reported for some time passed to have been engaged in extorting vast sums out of the tribes, which he sends up for safe keeping to his castle in the Atlas Mountains. Should he continue this course, he will no doubt make himself as much hated as his brother, and will thus create a further rebellion in the south.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[15740] No. 188.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 89.)

Sir, *Tangier, April 22, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Casa Blanca reporting the departure of Colonel Silvestre, Commandant of the Spanish Police, on a circular tour through Azemur, Mazagan, Saffi, Marrakesh and thence through the Showia to Rabat and back to Casa Blanca.

As I reported by telegraph, the French chargé d'affaires informed me that the arrival at Marrakesh of Colonel Silvestre and some twenty men in uniform had caused considerable excitement in native circles. He was very annoyed at the conduct of Colonel Silvestre in travelling about through the country in uniform, and said that such folly could only be explained by the desire to create an incident of some sort. Before leaving Casa Blanca, Colonel Silvestre had asked General Moinier if he had any objection to the proposed journey, the object of which was to buy horses at Marrakesh

for the Spanish troops. General Moinier replied that he had no objection, though he considered it somewhat strange that it had been decided to buy horses at Marrakesh rather than in the Abda or Dukala districts, which were much nearer, and where horses were more easily procurable. Had he, however, had the slightest idea that Colonel Silvestre proposed to travel in uniform, he would certainly have objected very strongly. M. de Billy added that the next time French officers or men paid a visit to Tetuan, Laraiche, or other places in the Spanish sphere of influence, they should go in full uniform.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

P.S. *April* 24.—I have the honour to transmit a further despatch from Mr. Madden reporting the return of Colonel Silvestre to Casa Blanca, and giving the substance of a conversation which he had with him on the subject of his journey to Marrakesh.

F. R.

Enclosure 1 in No. 188.

Consul Madden to Mr. Rattigan.

(No. 71.)
Sir,

Casa Blanca, April 15, 1911.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SILVESTRE, Commander of the Spanish native police force at Casa Blanca, recently left this place on a tour of visits to Azemur, Mazagan, Saffi, Marrakesh, and from there to the Showia and by the French military posts to Rabat, and back to Casa Blanca. Colonel Silvestre told me he is making the tour with the permission of the Spanish Government, but I had not an opportunity of asking him before he started whether he is travelling officially. I hear from the vice-consul at Marrakesh that the colonel had arrived in the city accompanied by a squad of police in uniform, and that their arrival had given rise to a good deal of comment in the town.

I heard from the vice-consul at Mogador, and also from another correspondent, an account of a scare that occurred in that town recently, The police had a kind of sham fight, and sounded an alarm, firing a cannon. The Moors and Jews in town were greatly alarmed, some thinking that Kaïd Anflus, others that Kaïd Koreimi had attacked the town, as the gates were all shut. The commander of the police recognised he had made a mistake, and I understand he went to the British vice-consulate to explain matters, and sent a police guard to the French and British consulates. I wrote to Mr. Vice-Consul Johnstone that I thought it would be well in future to warn the population by means of criers or otherwise, so as to avoid similar panics.

The vice-consul at Rabat tells me that the French commander of police there had paid a visit to the camps of the southern Khalifas who are detained at Rabat, owing to the disturbed state of the roads, unable to continue their journey to Fez, and asked for lists of the number of their men, horses, rifles, &c. The men demurred, but were told by the commander that they must give the lists required, or they would be sent away, and the information was therefore supplied.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 188.

Consul Madden to Mr. Rattigan.

(No. 76.)
Sir,

Casa Blanca, April 21, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 71 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report that Lieutenant-Colonel Silvestre, commander of the Spanish police, who has been on a visit to Marrakesh, returned to Casa Blanca direct by way of the river Um, or Robia, and the Showia, having cut short his proposed visit to the eastern Showia military posts and Rabat. He tells me that owing to the rumours of intervention he hastened back to resume possession of his post.

Colonel Silvestre travelled to Marrakesh with an escort consisting of a Kaïd el Mia (captain of 100), and eighteen policemen, and had with him a Spanish cavalry instructor. I learn from a private source that on the way up country from Saffi to Marrakesh the

tribesmen came down at two places, some of them being armed, and stopped the colonel, believing that he was going to Marrakesh to instal the police there, but after explanations the natives withdrew, and the party proceeded to the city. At Marrakesh, however, the native populace showed itself distinctly hostile to the policemen whom they called "Christians" when they were seen in cafes and elsewhere. Nothing untoward, however, happened.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

[15741] No. 189.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Orey.—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 90.)
Sir,

Tangier, April 22, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Casablanca, reporting the cession of certain lands in the Shawia to the French.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

Enclosure in No. 189.

Consul Madden to Mr Rattigan.

(No. 73. Confidential.)
Sir,

Casa Blanca, April 18, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that portions of the Kabyles of the Oolad Said and the Oolad Hariz have been ceded by the landowners to the French, by formal notarial documents of gift drawn up by aduls and signed by the cadis of the two Kabyles, and by the cadi of Settatt, the French officers of the Bureau Arabe stationed in the Oolad Said and the Oolad Hariz being present, the natives in ceding the lands stating that they do so out of friendship for the French. The documents drawn up are documents of "Lehaba" (from "wahab"), meaning a gift, and, also, a legacy, and are legal according to Moorish law.

The papers were then transmitted to the cadi of Casablanca (who is an official appointed by Mulai Hafid), and he was requested to legalise the signatures of the country cadis above mentioned. He however declined, giving as his reasons that the three country cadis are not officers appointed by Hafid (apparently they have been put in by the French), and that the lands of the Kabyles belong to the Makhzen, and cannot be ceded. In spite of pressure from the French general and consul, the cadi persisted in his refusal, but ultimately gave way on receiving written orders from the Viceroy, the Shereef Mulai-el-Amrani, to sign the papers.

I could not ascertain definitely the extent of the ceded lands, but it is said to be large; and it is evident, from what I have stated above, that the French authorities attach importance to the matter. One of the natives ceding his lands is a French semsar of the well-known Berchid family.

The effect of this cession will, no doubt, be to enable the French to create an enclave in Shawia which they can deal with as it suits their own purposes, the object presumably being to prevent foreigners other than French from obtaining too much property in the province. The Kabyles of Oolad Said and Hariz are situated in the great grain-growing district of Shawia.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

[15742] No. 190.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 91.)
Sir,

Tangier, April 23, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that the situation at Fez has somewhat improved during the past week. According to letters dated the 15th which have been received from Commandant Brémond, it appears that the mehalla was unable, owing to the

flooded state of the country, to return to Fez, and was remaining in the Sherarda pending an improvement in the weather. Further details have reached the French Legation in regard to the victory obtained over the tribes on the 12th, which I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 87 of the 18th instant. It appears that Commandant Brémond dispatched a flying column of some 1,300 men with a few guns under the command of Captain Leglay to clear the way for the return of the mehalla to the capital. This column came into contact with a body of some 4,000 tribesmen from Sherarda and Beni M'Tir near Mounat Tselfats, and after a severe fight succeeded in driving off the enemy with a loss of some 200 killed and wounded. According to the earlier information from the French consul at Fez, eighty prisoners were reported to have been captured, but this is not confirmed by the latest reports from Commandant Brémond. In any case the victory was—for a Moorish battle—unusually decisive, and should have important results.

A large body of tribesmen advanced on the 12th instant from the rebel camp at Ras-el-Ma and delivered a somewhat determined attack on the Shereefian troops encamped outside the western gates of Fez. The latter, supported by artillery fire from the walls, repulsed the attack after a sharp fight and drove back the rebels for a distance of 3 or 4 miles. This success has considerably relieved the tension within the walls, and it is hoped that the rebels will have been deterred from any further attack until the return of the mehalla from Sherarda. The latter will advance into the Benir M'Tir country as soon as the state of the roads permits of the transport of guns and ammunition.

Meanwhile, Mr. MacLeod informs me that he is making arrangements with certain important shereefs for the safe conduct to the coast of the British subjects in Fez should it become necessary for them to leave. While approving his action, I have instructed him not to arrange for the departure of British subjects until they are in danger, as there can be no certain prospect of their being allowed to pass in safety through the rebellious tribes, and I consider that they will for the present be safer inside the walls of the capital. Even in the event of a disaster to the Shereefian forces, it is very improbable that the city will be taken by the Berbers, and in my opinion the chief danger to Europeans lies in a riot among the populace of the town. There has been, I believe, for many hundreds of years no single instance of an important town being captured by the Berbers, though the Government of the time has often been in situations of the most precarious nature. I have, however, told Mr. MacLeod that I leave the decision in the matter to his own discretion, as he is naturally better able to judge of the actual state of affairs in Fez and the prospects of a caravan of Europeans being allowed to reach the coast.

In regard to the situation in the Gharb, Mr. Irwin learns from the French Legation that Captain Moreau, having heard of a tribal meeting which was being held at Sok-el-Arbaa to consider the advisability of joining the rebellion, sent a small body of troops to the meeting place. Upon their arrival the tribesmen at once peacefully dispersed, and it is hoped that any idea of the Gharb going over to the rebels has been for the moment nipped in the bud.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

P.S.—I have just received a note from Mr. MacLeod, dated the night of the 15th, in which he reports that the town is quiet, and that the return of the mehalla is awaited from Sherarda.

He adds that the attitude of the Fez populace towards Europeans is remarkably friendly.

F. R.

[15743] No. 191.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 92.)
Sir, *Tangier, April* 23, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca relative to the dispatch of a force from the Shawia to assist in subduing the rebellion amongst the northern tribes.

The French chargé d'affaires informed me a few days ago that there was at present no intention of including any French troops in this force, though it would be

under the command of French officers. Everything for the moment depended on whether the convoys of money and ammunition could be got through to the mehalla in Sherarda. If that could be achieved, there would probably be no necessity to send any further force to Fez. In any case no French troops would be used unless the situation of the Europeans at Fez became desperate. There is no doubt that the advance of French troops into the interior would at once unite all the tribes, both Berber and Arab, who would compose their differences in order to attack the Christian enemy, and the rebellion would forthwith assume the character of a holy war. The Sultan would be universally regarded as the enemy of his co-religionists, and would excite the hatred of the entire country as the friend and puppet of the Christian foe. The moment a French force started for the interior the position of the Europeans at Fez would become critical, and it is very doubtful if they could hold out until the arrival of the relieving column. Moreover, even after the French had succeeded in putting down the rebellion, they would in future be unable to work behind the cloak of the Sultan, and would have to face the task of subduing the whole country before there could be any hope of peace and order being restored. Estimates of the force needed by the French in an advance on Fez vary considerably. Menebhi, for instance, assures me that they would have to employ at least 50,000 men, while Kaïd Maclean is of opinion that 8,000 with a few good guns would be amply sufficient. I am inclined to agree with Kaïd Maclean as to the actual advance on Fez, but am convinced that a far larger force would be required for the ultimate restoration of order throughout the country.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

Enclosure in No. 191.

Consul Madden to Mr. Rattigan.

(No. 77.)
Sir, *Casa Blanca, April* 21, 1911.

I LEARN, on good authority, that the Shereef Mulai-el-Amrani, Viceroy of the Showia, has received Sultan's orders to place himself at the head of a Showia "harka" (expeditionary force); and that the Bureau Arabe has notified the Showia kaïds, of whom there are about twenty-two, to prepare to proceed at once on active service with their "goum" (horsemen) and baggage corps. These kaïds, I am informed, possess from fifty to a hundred horsemen a-piece, according to size of their kabylas. I am told that the orders given are very unpopular with the Showia governors, who have got accustomed to a peaceable existence under French protection, and have lost their traditional love of fighting.

Besides this mobilisation, the French are, I hear, to lend their Showia native levies, goum and footsoldiers for service with the "harka." These levies, according to a recent report, consist of about 2,500 men, of whom a third are mounted.

There are reports that the "harka" will be stiffened by 3,000 French regulars, but I am not in a position to confirm this. It is admitted that very important communications have been passing between the general and the French Legation; and the cruiser "Forbin" arrived yesterday with further urgent despatches for the general.

The forthcoming arrival of French reinforcements of 4,500 men, including artillery, is announced, the troops to begin disembarking about the 28th instant. These additions will bring up the strength of the corps of occupation to between 12,000 and 13,000 men. The last French steamer from Oran brought an auto-mitrailleuse for the use of the French military.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

[15745] No. 192.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 188. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, April* 26, 1911.

M. CRUPPI told me to-day that the news from Morocco were neither good nor bad. Preparations were being completed for the relief of Fez. He trusted that it

would not be necessary for French troops to go as far as that city. He hoped that the relief column would get into touch with Major Brémond's mehalla to the west and north-west of Fez and furnish him with the necessary supplies to enable him to get the better of the revolted tribes; but if the relief could not be thus effected, the French troops would have to go to Fez itself.

On my asking whether he had any reason to suppose that the German Government would raise any question in regard to French action in Morocco, M. Cruppi said that although the German Government were endeavouring to instil distrust into the mind of the Spanish Government, he hoped that they would not succeed, and he felt that His Majesty's Government could be of great assistance in dissuading the King of Spain from listening to the evil counsels of those who were endeavouring to persuade him that France was playing false to Spain. He had no proof that His Majesty was being influenced that way, but he could not help thinking that there might be an inclination to listen to such advice. He could assure me that the policy of the French Government was perfectly straightforward. They had no hidden designs. The relief of Fez was a duty to humanity and to the honour of France. They were resolved to keep strictly to the terms of the Algeciras Act and within the limits of their rights and their engagements to England, Spain, and Germany, and to action within those rights and engagements Germany could have no right or ground for objection.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[15875] No. 193.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, April* 28, 1911.

FRENCH chargé d'affaires has received telegram from the French Embassy at Vienna, which he has shown me. It confirms the report of Sir F. Cartwright in his telegram No. 31 as to the language used to Austrian Ambassador at Berlin by the German Chancellor. French Embassy thinks the Austrians may endeavour to profit by situation to bargain over Franco-Austrian tariff arrangements.

I have repeated the foregoing to His Majesty's Embassy at Vienna.

[15876] No. 194.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, April* 28, 1911.

VICE-CONSUL RABAT telegraphs message from Consul MacLeod, dated noon, 22nd April, 1,500 Tazza tribesmen are in Fez helping Sultan. Town quiet. Three guns reported taken from Mequinez by tribesmen.

[15874] No. 195.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 45. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, April* 28, 1911.

THE following communication was made to me by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who called this morning at the embassy:—

According to information received from Morocco, active military preparations are being made at Ceuta for, it is thought, occupying Tetuan. The French Ambassador at Madrid has reported that the most friendly sentiments for France have been expressed to him by the King, who wishes to work in concord with the French Government. M. Geoffray, however, also reports that the Spanish Government have made, or intend to make, representations to His Majesty's Government that the existing anarchy in Morocco and the march on Fez of the French troops bring into operation the secret Franco-Spanish agreement or the assembly of a conference as an alternative. If this report be compared with statements in some

of the German newspapers, M. Cruppi cannot but suspect that suggestions have been made by Germany to Spain or that pourparlers have passed between the two Governments.

M. Cruppi expects to receive a communication to the same effect as that contemplated to you from the Spanish Ambassador, whom he is to see this afternoon. He intends to inform the Ambassador that the advance on Fez is solely for the purpose of furnishing relief to the Sultan to enable him to deal with the rebel tribes and of rescuing the Europeans there; that the French Government have no intention of remaining permanently at Fez or of taking advantage of the present situation for territorial purposes; that it cannot be admitted that Morocco, and especially not the Spanish sphere, is in a state of anarchy; that, as bound to do by the Act of Algeciras, the French Government have communicated their intentions to the Spanish Government, and that the latter, under that Act, are precluded from taking any measures—military or others—within the Spanish sphere unless the French Government concur. If there are circumstances which, in the judgment of the Spanish Government, bring the secret agreement into operation, he would ask what they are. He does not intend to lay much stress on the proceedings of the Spanish at Ifni and the mission to Marakesh for the purpose, it was said, of buying horses, nor on the march of Captain Obilo with his "tabor" from Laraiche to El Kasar, though it was dangerous and unnecessary, and such performances were likely to provoke incidents. He will put them aside in order to consider without prejudice the desires of the Spanish Government. It is particularly essential that no condition of affairs should arise between France and Spain which would afford an opportunity for the raising of an European question or the intervention of Germany. In view of these considerations, M. Cruppi intends to suggest that the British Government should be an intermediary with whom the French and Spanish Governments should confer in order to ascertain what the grievances of the latter are and to what extent they can be satisfied without infringing the provisions of the secret agreements between France and Spain, England and France, and England and Spain, and of the Act of Algeciras.

In M. Cruppi's opinion it is urgent that England, France, and Spain should work together in complete accord in regard to this question of Morocco.

M. Cruppi has given me confidentially a communication from the Spanish Ambassador, which I am sending by post.

[15873] No. 196.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 28.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, April* 28, 1911.

SITUATION in Morocco.

I have been informed by French Ambassador that he communicated to Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter to-day the assurances of his Government in respect to the scope and aims of the French expedition, and that he laid special stress on the fact that they intended to withdraw the expedition once its objects had been attained.

Secretary of State, in reply, expressed satisfaction at these assurances, and gave M. Cambon to understand that the German Government would put no difficulties in the way of the dispatch of the expedition. Herr von Kiderlen, after drawing attention to the great difficulty of deciding exactly when order could be considered to have been restored, expressed at the same time considerable doubt as to whether it would be possible for the French Government to carry out at an early date their intended withdrawal of the expedition.

Secretary of State then added that the French Government should remember in any case that if the occupation was indefinitely prolonged the Act of Algeciras would come to an end, and this would lead to the resumption of her entire liberty of action by Germany.

M. Cambon informed me that the Chancellor used similar language to him, but spoke with even more scepticism as to the French Government's ability to withdraw their troops as intended.

[15715] No. 197.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April* 28, 1911.

MOROCCO.

Mr. Rattigan's telegram No. 39 of the 27th April states that Major Brémond's mehalla is making its way slowly to Ras-el-Ma. This statement does not quite tally with information contained in your telegram No. 43 to the effect that Major Brémond has been compelled to retire to Malek.

Please endeavour to discover what present position really is.

(Repeated to Tangier, No. 23; Madrid, No. 23; and Berlin, No. 50.)

[15977] No. 198.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April* 28, 1911.

MOROCCO.

Spanish Ambassador here stated to-day that the Austrian and German representatives at Paris had been instructed to inform the French Government that their Governments would view with displeasure a French advance to Fez, as such a step might lead not only to a conflict at that place, but also possibly to a holy war throughout Morocco.

(Repeated to Berlin and Vienna.)

[15922] No. 199.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 29.)

(No. 191. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, April* 26, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 45 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the annex to a communication made to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Spanish Embassy in Paris on the 18th instant. This annex is referred to in my telegram above mentioned. It contains proposals of the Spanish Government for future arrangements respecting police, finance, and railways in Morocco.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 199.

Annexe à la Communication de l'Ambassade d'Espagne à Son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, en date du 18 *avril*, 1911.

(Sécret.)

1. LES deux Gouvernements proposeront d'ores et déjà aux autres Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras et, le jour venu, au Gouvernement de la Confédération helvétique et au Makhzen, le renouvellement du mandat des instructeurs et de l'inspecteur général de la police des ports marocains dans les conditions que ledit pacte établit. Eu égard aux circonstances de Casa Blanca, le cadre des instructeurs de la police n'y sera pas mixte, mais français. En équivalence, le cadre des instructeurs à Tanger ne sera pas mixte, mais espagnol. Il sera prévu l'existence d'une police de 100 hommes dans chacune des villes de Alzila, Alcazar et Azemur; le cadre des officiers sera espagnol dans les deux premiers points et français dans le troisième. La commission du règlement fera les rectifications que l'on croira utiles dans le chiffre des contingents des divers ports, en s'en tenant toujours à l'Acte d'Algésiras.

2. Pendant le délai pour lequel est renouvelé le mandat de la police, le

Gouvernement de Sa Majesté n'insistera pas sur ce que le Sultan admette des instructeurs espagnols pour ses forces militaires à la condition que—

(*a.*) Les instructeurs français n'interviendront pas dans le paiement, l'instruction ni l'organisation des garnisons ou mehallas du Sultan dans la sphère d'influence espagnole;

(*b.*) Si pour la coordination de ces garnisons ou troupes avec la police, quelque intervention était nécessaire pour leur paiement, instruction ou organisation, elle appartiendra aux instructeurs espagnols de la police.

3. Lors de l'examen par le conseil d'administration de la Banque d'Etat du Maroc de l'idée d'avance de 15,000,000 de francs au Makhzen pour les besoins de la force chérifienne pendant une période de trois ans, l'administrateur espagnol manifestera, conformément aux instructions de la banque qu'il représente, que le Gouvernement de son pays a besoin de faire des réserves formelles quant au tertib ou contributions des tribus de la région qui fait l'objet de la convention hispano-marocaine du 16 novembre, 1910, et à la nécessité dans laquelle le Cabinet de Madrid peut se voir de demander au Makhzen que les ressources analogues des autres frontières (et à Ifni il va s'en créer une autre par suite de l'établissement de l'Espagne sur ce territoire) soient appliquées à une organisation éventuelle de forces de police, étant donné que la tranquillité de ces régions est une affaire que le Cabinet de Madrid doit régler directement et exclusivement avec le Makhzen. Le Gouvernement français emploiera les moyens à sa portée pour que cette réserve soit accueillie favorablement par les membres du conseil d'administration qui représentent des intérêts français.

4. En outre, le Gouvernement français (et la présente clause restera secrète entre les deux Cabinets, mais en donnant connaissance aux administrateurs français de la Banque d'État du Maroc, ainsi que cela fut fait de l'accord du 23 février, 1907, entre les deux Cabinets), que les ressources du tertib ou des anciennes contributions équivalentes des tribus, dans la sphère d'influence espagnole, mais dans des régions qui n'auraient pas le caractère de frontières, soient considérées dans la situation suivante: leur montant à partir de la quatrième année contribuera à l'entretien des forces chérifiennes dans la sphère d'influence espagnole et ces forces devront être organisées dans la forme prévue au No. 2.

Lorsque le montant total du tertib dans l'Empire (exclusion faite de la partie qui sera perçue dans les conditions mentionnées au No. 3, c'est-à-dire dans les régions frontières) dépassera le nécessaire pour l'entretien des forces chérifiennes, il sera entendu que son produit dans la sphère d'influence espagnole (sauf, toujours, ce que dispose le No. 3), doit être inclu, par moitié dans la partie qui correspond au Makhzen et dans celle qui correspond à des travaux publics, sans servir, par conséquent, de garantie à l'emprunt ou avance de 15,000,000 pour l'organisation des forces marocaines dans la sphère d'influence française.

5. Les Gouvernements espagnols et français entreront immédiatement en communication pour fixer en quels termes, avec quelles garanties et à quelles conitdions pourrait se faire la cession réciproque des droits que chacun d'eux a obtenu du Makhzen dans la sphère d'influence de l'autre, pour assurer le paiement de ses dépenses militaires et navales. Une fois l'échange fait, des négociations seront entamées avec les porteurs du futur emprunt de travaux publics et de liquidation de dettes de Makhzen et avec la Banque d'Espagne pour que, si besoin était, ils acceptent à leur tour l'échange de garanties, étant donné que le Gouvernement français désire faciliter avec celle qui lui revient l'obtention de ressources déterminées par le Trésor chérifien.

6. Le Gouvernement espagnol ne fait pas d'objection à la construction d'un chemin de fer Tanger–Arzila–Larache–Alcazar, et il n'en fera pas à sa prolongation éventuelle à Fez. Le Gouvernement français, se conformant à la convention du 3 octobre, 1904, ne met pas non plus d'obstacle à ce que l'Espagne provoque un accord direct avec le Makhzen pour la construction d'un chemin de fer, dont la longueur est calculée de 42 kilom., entre Ceuta et Tétouan. Les ressources pour ces travaux seront cherchées par les Gouvernements de Madrid et de Fez, sans qu'ils pèsent sur les fonds de la Caisse spéciale. Les études seront confiées à l'ingénieur adjoint à la Direction des Travaux publics du Makhzen, M. Llorens, et M. Porché lui laissera toute l'autonomie pratique nécessaire pour que ce soit lui qui formule d'une manière effective le projet, le cahier des charges, &c., et règle tous les détails de l'affaire. La construction sera faite par voie d'adjudication.

7. Le contrôle financier dans le chemin de fer Tanger–Fez, exclusivement dans le tronçon compris dans la sphère d'influence espagnole, sera exercé par des fonction-

naires espagnols et dans des conditions qui seront concertées d'avance entre les Cabinets de Madrid et de Paris.

8. Les droits de ports et de phares au Maroc seront distribués entre les travaux affectant le port ou la partie de côte interéssés.

9. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne fait pas d'objection à ce que le 5 pour cent des recettes de douanes de Tétouan, Tanger et Larache, qui est encore réservé au Makhzen ou répond d'avances à bref délai faites par la Banque d'État, serve de garantie à l'emprunt de liquidation des dettes. Néanmoins, les deux Cabinets étudieront si ce 5 pour cent peut lui être laissé de nouveau libre, en le comprenant dans l'arrangement auquel a trait le numéro 5.

10. Seront exclus des avances et emprunts qui vont être faits maintenant les fonds nécessaires pour l'entretien de la police, soit en 1912, soit pendant une période plus longue, jusqu'à ce qu'aient été convenus avec les autres Puissances le renouvellement du mandat des instructeurs et de l'inspecteur et l'application de l'article 6 et de l'article 35 de l'Acte d'Algésiras dans des conditions analogues à celles qui ont été observées jusqu'ici.

[15946] No. 200.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, April 28, 1911.*

OUR telegram No. 75 of 28th April to Sir F. Bertie.

French chargé d'affaires confirms statement that Major Brémond is making his way to Ras-el-Ma by order of Colonel Mangin.

[15877] No. 201.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, April 28, 1911.*

PART of Shawia harka with Shereef Amrani arrives to-day at Kenitra; French column should be there to-morrow.

[15912] No. 202.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, April 28, 1911.*

PARIS telegram No. 44 of 27th April.

Minister for Foreign Affairs assured both French Ambassador and myself to-day that no movement of Spanish troops in Morocco is at present contemplated, and that Spanish Government would be glad to avoid disagreeable and expensive necessity of sending troops. They feel bound, however, to have a force ready, for no one can tell what will come of the French movement on Fez, and Spain must be prepared to act within her own sphere if disturbances arise.

I took the opportunity to inform his Excellency, as authorised by your telegram No. 19, that French Minister for Foreign Affairs had given the British Ambassador at Paris the most positive assurances as to the intention of the French Government to respect the Algeciras Act and other conventions, and not to follow Tunis precedent. I begged his Excellency to communicate the above to the King of Spain as from myself, when he sees His Majesty to-morrow.

Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to do so, saying that he did not doubt good intentions of France, but events might be too strong for her.

(Repeated to Paris and Tangier.)

[16010] No. 203.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, April 29, 1911.*

CONSULAR agent, Alcazar, informs me in letter dated yesterday that he learns from Fez that Brémond's mehalla arrived there on 26th.

[16020] No. 204.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, April 29, 1911.*

HADJ MIKWAR, an influential British protégé at Mequinez, has written me that a decision has been taken at a great tribal meeting held by representatives of practically all the tribes of Northern Morocco to depose Mulai Hafid and restore Mulai Abd-el-Aziz, under the protection of Great Britain and Germany.

Mequinez itself appears to be in the hands of the Berber tribes.

The letter is dated the 10th instant.

[16014] No. 205.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 47. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, April 29, 1911.*

I HAVE seen M. Cruppi to-day and informed him of the substance of your telegram No. 76, Confidential, of yesterday, relative to the attitude of Germany and Austria in regard to French action in Morocco.

His Excellency told me that he was sending a message to the French Embassy in London, which should be received at about 7 o'clock this evening, instructing the embassy to inform you of interviews which the French Ambassador at Berlin had had with the German Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The result of these interviews appears to be that the assurances given by M. Cambon have satisfied the German Government for the moment, but the latter will maintain an attitude of expectancy, and will watch the extent to which the French Government may be in a position to carry out the intentions which they have proclaimed. The German Government will, they state, consider that the Algeciras Act has become inoperative, and they will resume their full liberty of action, should the French forces effect anything more than quite a temporary occupation of Fez, and should any alteration occur in the situation in consequence of the revolt of the tribes against the Sultan and the intervention of France.

The German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors have not made any communication to M. Cruppi. I am to see his Excellency again to-morrow morning.

[16015] No. 206.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 48. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, April 29, 1911.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding telegram of to-day's date, and to your telegram No. 76, Confidential, of yesterday, in regard to Morocco, I learn from M. Cruppi that the French Embassy in London has further been instructed to communicate to you a full account of the interview with the Spanish Ambassador here which, as stated in my telegram No. 45 of yesterday, was arranged to take place that afternoon.

Señor Perez Caballero said that the state of revolt in the neighbourhood of Fez, the troubles elsewhere in Morocco, and the French advance on the capital had brought the Secret Franco-Spanish Agreement into operation. The Spanish Government

accordingly proposed to act on it, or, should they meet with opposition from France, to denounce the agreement and appeal, if necessary, for support to another Power, whose name the Ambassador did not mention, the result of this would be that a question would be raised which would have to be settled by Europe.

M. Cruppi suggested to the Ambassador that His Majesty's Government should be asked to concert with the French and Spanish Governments in regard to the situation and the desires and proposals of the latter Government; but the Ambassador showed much embarrassment at the suggestion, and criticised in an unfriendly manner the attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government. He also showed himself most uncompromising when M. Cruppi held the language which, as reported in my telegram No. 45, he told me yesterday he intended to adopt in speaking to the Ambassador.

Information has reached M. Cruppi that the German Ambassador here has been advising Señor Perez Caballero to recommend to his Government that they should either assert the rights secured to Spain by the Secret Franco-Spanish Agreement of 1904, or else appeal to the Powers for the reconsideration of the Moroccan question, in which event the claims of Spain would have the support of Germany.

[16070] No. 207.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 30.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, April* 30, 1911.

MY French colleague has shown me the full accounts which his Government have sent him of the conversations which took place between M. Cruppi and the British and Spanish Ambassadors in Paris (see Sir F. Bertie's telegrams Nos. 45 and 46).

In presenting a memorandum to the French Government on the 28th April Señor Perez Caballero seems to have used very violent language, which is severely commented on in the despatches shown to me by the French Ambassador. To-day M. Geoffray, in a friendly manner, reproached the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs for the apparent discrepancy between the language used by the latter to the French and British Ambassadors at Madrid and the threatening expressions employed by Señor Perez Caballero on the same day in Paris. Señor Garcia Prieto replied to this that he had already telegraphed to the Ambassador in Paris, pointing out how the latter had greatly exceeded his instructions.

Although the French Ambassador regards these similar assurances of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs as satisfactory, yet the pro-German attitude of a portion of the Ministerial press is causing him some annoyance, as are also the excited declarations of Señor Canalejas, who continues to harp on the grievances which the various Spanish communities in Morocco allege they have against the French.

My French colleague desires to deprive the Spanish Government of the slightest pretext for breaking away from their understanding with France and England, by showing himself ready to welcome any reasonable demands which the Spaniards may put forward, and he is suggesting that his Government might use their influence in order that I should be associated with him in discussing fully with the Spanish Government the question of the arrangements which it may be expedient to make, and the whole question of the altered condition of affairs in Morocco.

Meanwhile I have promised to see Señor Canalejas to-morrow, and to endeavour to induce him to view the question from a calmer and more reasonable standpoint.

At the same time, French Ambassador will tell M. Garcia Prieto to-morrow that his Government cannot see their way to consenting to a general modification of the secret convention, but that if the Spanish Government will specify the points on which they desire to receive satisfaction, French Government will be prepared to meet them handsomely.

[16148] No. 208.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 1.)

(No. 53. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, April* 25, 1911.

I MENTIONED in my telegram No. 13 of to-day that the French Ambassador at Madrid is now not dissatisfied with the position which Spain seems disposed to take up

in respect of events in Morocco. When it was first realised that the French Government were preparing to take military action in response to the Sultan's appeal from Fez for assistance the Madrid press assumed a tone of bitter hostility towards France, implying that the disturbances round Fez had been engineered to provide a pretext for the establishment of a French protectorate. Some papers clamoured for a simultaneous Spanish advance on Fez, and others for the immediate military occupation of strategic points within the Spanish sphere, such as Tetuan, Laraiche, and Alhucemas. The former suggestion no longer finds supporters, but there is still a remarkable concensus of opinion in the press in favour of a strict reservation of the entire Spanish sphere of influence to the exclusive action of Spain. The extent of that sphere is only vaguely realised, but all are agreed that it extends southwards beyond Alcazar, and that within its limits it behoves Spain alone to provide for the maintenance of order. The independent "Correspondencia" stands alone in proclaiming that nothing abnormal is happening in Morocco, and that there is no likelihood of Spanish intervention being called for. The "Manana," though a Government organ, is conducting a vigorous campaign in favour of an undertaking with Germany, which it seeks to prove would be more useful to Spain than a continuance of the *entente* with France. Señor Canalejas has disavowed this proposition, and judging from the more recent declarations of Spanish statesmen, there is no present reason to apprehend a departure from the avowed policy of proceeding in the development of affairs in Morocco hand in hand with France.

This policy is again asserted in a semi-official letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 20th April, and written in reply to a notification from M. Geoffray that the French Government intended to take military measures. M. Geoffray has had the goodness to allow me to read this communication, which disclaims any jealousy of French action for the relief of Fez, provided the French forces and Moorish mehallas under French direction are kept outside the regions in which Spain has a special interest, as defined in article 2 of the secret treaty of October 1904. It concludes with the expression of a confident belief that, should events compel France to assume a more extensive control over the government of Morocco than is at present contemplated, she will first come to a full understanding with Spain as regards the new situation which would thus be created.

M. Geoffray considers this letter fairly satisfactory. He continues to be an advocate of a settlement of the Morocco question on the basis of the above-mentioned secret treaty. If he opposes its publication, it is because he believes that thereby the whole Morocco question would be reopened, and that the result would be a set of new arrangements less favourable than the present ones to both countries. So long as the secret treaty remains unpublished, it is open to France and Spain to apply its terms in so far as they are not manifestly at variance with the general Act of Algeciras. His Excellency desires to continue acting as long as possible on the assumption that the general Act of Algeciras still holds good. At the same time, he often expresses to me his view that this assumption can only be maintained by putting a considerable strain on the theory which underlies it, namely, that of the existence of an independent Sultan, assisted by a strong Makhzen.

In reality, M. Geoffray considers that the above theory has long since broken down. For some time both Sultan and Makhzen have been prompted by France, and have owed to her the very limited authority they have been able to exercise. Before long it will be impossible, in his Excellency's opinion, to resist the admission that the above relation amounts to a French protectorate, and it will then become necessary to arrive at some fresh international understanding which will recognise the new order of things.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[16099] No. 209.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 1.)

(No. 112. Very Confidential.)
Sir, *Berlin, April* 28, 1911.

M. JULES CAMBON, my French colleague, came to see me yesterday and talked to me for some time on the subject of Morocco. He told me that at the outset of the present situation he had found Herr von Kiderlen difficult to deal with, and inclined to

take a rather high and blustering line. After he had talked the matter over with the Chancellor, however, he had modified his tone considerably, and discussed the subject of the expedition quite reasonably, but always with a note of warning in his remarks. Then the Easter holidays had come, and both Herr von Kiderlen and the Chancellor had gone away. During their absence he, M. Cambon, had, by instructions from his Government, informed the Under-Secretary in charge of the Imperial Foreign Office that it had been definitely decided, owing to the news from Morocco, that the expedition should be sent. M. Cambon had subsequently received instructions to communicate to the Imperial Government the objects and scope of the expedition, and to inform them at the same time that the expedition would be withdrawn as soon as its object—namely, to secure the lives and property of Europeans and to restore order—had been attained. He was also to give the Imperial Government every assurance that nothing would be done contrary to the Act of Algeciras, or which might in any way affect the commercial and trade interests of other Powers. Owing, however, to Herr von Kiderlen having prolonged his leave of absence, he had not yet been able to deliver this message, and M. Cambon gave me to understand that although he had written to the Chancellor to say that he would like to see him, his Excellency had not shown any alacrity to see him before Herr von Kiderlen's return. M. Cambon said that in his opinion the dilatory proceedings on the part of the Chancellor and the Secretary of State reflected the whole German attitude on this question, which was one of premeditated silence; in fact, the same sort of attitude as that adopted by the German Government in 1904. He could not help thinking that they were hanging back in the hope that something might occur which would give them an excuse for interfering and turning the situation in some way or another to their own advantage. I asked M. Cambon what the Chancellor had said when he had first spoken to his Excellency about the expedition. M. Cambon told me that the Chancellor had pointed out that any action such as the occupation of Fez, which resulted in a change in the position of the Sultan and the loss of his independence, would necessarily alter the basis on which the Algeciras Act was founded, and lead to the reopening of the whole Morocco question. In answering the Chancellor, M. Cambon laid before his Excellency the reasons which rendered an expedition absolutely necessary, and expressed his conviction, especially in view of the great responsibility which might, under certain circumstances, rest upon those who delayed, or caused to be delayed, the dispatch of the expedition, that his Excellency would raise no objection to the action which France was bound both by her position and her engagements to take in this matter. The Chancellor had replied: "I raise no objection, but neither do I encourage you in your action." His Excellency had added that, while he was sure that the French Government were acting with the best possible motives, experience told him that when a relieving or expeditionary force once got into a place, reasons were nearly always found to render the date of its departure extremely difficult to fix. From this conversation M. Cambon gathered that the Imperial Government did not intend to raise any objections to the French preparations for the relief of Fez, but that they were watching events, and especially the attitude of Great Britain and Russia, very narrowly, and would not show their hands until the situation was further developed.

To-day M. Cambon called on me again and told me that Herr von Kiderlen had returned, and that he had communicated both to him, and subsequently to the Chancellor, the assurances of the French Government to the effect that there was no question of the expeditionary force remaining in Fez a moment longer than was necessary; that its only object was to secure the lives and property of the European residents and to restore order; that no action would be taken contrary to the Act of Algeciras or the agreement of 1904; and that in no case would anything be done which could in any way affect the commercial interests of Germany or any other Power.

Herr von Kiderlen, in reply, had said that the Imperial Government received these assurances with satisfaction, and would make no difficulties with regard to the dispatch of the expedition, although, he must confess, it had not escaped their notice that the expedition was now on a very much larger scale than when it was first mooted. He was absolutely sure that the assurances of the French Government were made in good faith, but he could not conceal his doubts whether they would be able to carry out their intention of leaving Fez as soon as possible. They might wish to leave, but, what with public opinion and other forces behind them, he doubted their ability to do so. He sincerely hoped everything would go right, and that the French Government would be able to fulfil their assurances; but if the contrary occurred, and the occupation became indefinitely prolonged, that would mean the end of the Act of Algeciras and the consequent resumption by Germany of her full liberty of action.

M. Cambon told me that the Chancellor, whom he saw immediately afterwards,

held similar language, though, if anything, he was a little more sceptical even than Herr von Kiderlen with regard to the prompt withdrawal of the expedition after the attainment of its primary objects.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a summary, which has been prepared by Mr. Chilton, of the articles published by the chief Berlin newspapers upon the present phase of the Morocco question.*

Up to the last few days their reticence on the subject was remarkable.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[16355] No. 210.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 1.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, May* 1, 1911.

DURING a conversation with Secretary of Austrian Legation yesterday he let slip that Germany would like to obtain Mogador. French chargé d'affaires, whom I told of this, said that it had always been his opinion that the price that would be demanded for Germany's support of Spain in reopening the Moorish question would be Mogador and possibly Ifni.

I venture to report this remark to you for what it may be worth.

[16354] No. 211.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 1.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, May* 1, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 33 of to-day: Morocco.

Although I have already spoken to the Prime Minister to-day in the sense of your telegram, I will at once communicate your observations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This will be opportune, as the French Ambassador had to-day an interview with Señor Garcia Prieto, and my communication will serve to drive his warning home, affording, as it does, a further proof of the solidarity of British and French policy in this crisis.

French Ambassador tells me that he is replying to the Spanish Government's last two semi-official letters, stating that his Government feel they cannot consent to the modification of the 1904 secret convention, but that they are ready to listen to and to discuss, in conjunction with the British Government and in a spirit of entire friendliness, any reasonable proposals which the Spanish Government may put forward in regard to action which they feel to be desirable to take in the Spanish sphere of influence.

In my interview with the Spanish Prime Minister to-day, his Excellency showed me that he shared the general opinion in Spain that the French advance on Fez is not really justified by the seriousness of the situation, and that, once there, France is likely to render her occupation a permanent one.

I trust that my arguments went some way to convince his Excellency of France's true intentions.

He assured me that, in spite of what was being said to the contrary, he was wholly desirous to act in harmony with France and Great Britain with regard to the Morocco crisis.

[16329] No. 212.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 1.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, May* 1, 1911.

COMMUNIQUÉ states no official confirmation of Major Brémond having reached Fez, but report believed. Advance of French column on Fez will continue for supply purposes.

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* Not printed.

[16330] No. 213.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, May 1, 1911.*

"TIMES" correspondent informed at Ministry of Foreign Affairs that, on relief of Fez, steps will be taken to restore order in Mequinez, where some foreign post-offices are said to have been pillaged.

[16322] No. 214.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, May 1, 1911.*

A GRADUAL disclosure of the point of view taken up by this country regarding the Morocco question is taking place through unofficial channels, though in official circles a pretence of indifference is still kept up.

The French Embassy has received repeated visits from a person who is an undoubted emissary from the Ball-Platz, though he is not openly recognised as such. In the course of the conversations held by him with the French Embassy in discussing Morocco, a point which was very much emphasised was the probability that, on the one hand, displeasure would be shown in Berlin at France's action; while, on the other hand, it would be regarded from Vienna with continued good-will, even to the point of giving France encouragement to continue her own way undaunted.

The inference which it is natural to draw from this is that difficulties between France and Germany would be welcome to Austria, who would act as intermediary and claim as a reward nothing less than the opening to loans for Austro-Hungarian armaments of the French market. It is difficult to say whether Austria is in agreement with Germany in acting thus, but it is possible that the two Powers are combining in this form of blackmail, in view of the fact that Germany needs French money for the completion of the Bagdad Railway.

The French Embassy, on hinting that St. Petersburgh would be a more fitting intermediary between Germany and France, was promptly told that no assistance could possibly be hoped for from that direction owing to the intimacy which had sprung up between Germany and Russia since the Potsdam meeting.

[16438] No. 215.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May 1, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

Please take an opportunity of informing the Spanish Government that I consider it would be quite premature for Spain to act as if the action which the French are taking were threatening the integrity and independence of Morocco. It is necessary to assure the safety of the Europeans at Fez, and the French expect that the crisis will have passed, order will have been restored, and a settlement will have been effected with the tribes in a short time. The French will then withdraw any force at or near Fez. Spain will only have ground for claiming the execution of the secret agreement of 1904 if these expectations fail to be realised, and it would be most unwise for her to precipitate partition of Morocco. The political consequences would be deplorable.

[16369] No. 216.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 55.)
Sir, *Madrid, April 29, 1911.*

SPEAKING to me yesterday of the recent developments of events in Morocco, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed some credit for having used his influence to prevent, or at least postpone, the dispatch of a contingent of troops to Morocco. The

Government, though very unwilling to intervene, were strongly urged from many quarters to do so, and public opinion in Spain would not forgive them if they failed to uphold, during the complications which were only too likely to occur, the claim of this country to exercise a preponderant influence in what is commonly called the Spanish sphere of influence.

To my remark that all seemed very quiet in that region, he replied that there were signs here and there of incipient trouble. The cruiser "Rio de la Plata" had been sent to Laraiche to obtain accurate information concerning affairs in Laraiche and Alcazar districts, in which it was only too likely that the effervescence in the Gharb would be increasingly felt. The report of the persons charged to make this enquiry had not yet been received, but information was daily reaching the Government which showed that robbery and violence were rife in the country lying between Ceuta and Tetuan, and that the concentration of the French forces on the right bank of the Maluya was already causing some agitation among the tribes of the Riff. The military governors of Ceuta and Melilla had been instructed to do all they could to prevent the agitation spreading, and especially to avoid any semblance of provoking an incident which might call for repressive measures. At Ceuta much self-restraint was required to abstain from inflicting immediate and summary punishment on the marauders, and the difficulty of the governor's position was increased by the non-existence of the police force, which, under the terms of the convention between Spain and Morocco of the 16th November, 1910, was to maintain order within a specified radius of the Spanish fortress. His Excellency thought that, in view of the incapacity of the Makhzen to keep its engagements in this respect, Spain would be fully justified in herself taking what steps might be necessary to provide for the safety of the region affected. He said he expected that he would shortly have to make some announcement on this point.

As already reported in my telegram No. 15 of the 28th instant, I took the opportunity to inform Señor Garcia Prieto of the upshot of the explanations concerning French policy in the present crisis, which His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris reported to you as having been made to him by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 25th instant. In view of M. Cruppi's clear and straightforward declarations to Sir F. Bertie, I said that it was impossible to doubt that the French Government were only yielding to a most unwelcome and inconvenient necessity in dispatching an armed force to the relief of the Sultan and of the European inhabitants of Fez, and that they were resolved to observe strictly the requirements of the general Act of Algeciras without forgetting their special convention with Spain. As France was often accused in the Spanish press of harbouring the desire to convert Morocco into a second Tunis, I was glad, I said, to be able to inform his Excellency that M. Cruppi had in express terms denied having any such wish or intention.

I added that I hoped King Alfonso was under no misapprehension as to the true character of French policy. Señor Garcia Prieto was good enough to promise that he would to-day convey to His Majesty my account of what the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the British Ambassador in Paris. He assured me, however, that there was no disposition on the part of the King or of the Spanish Government to question the good faith of France. She would no doubt desire to escape as soon as possible from the hornet's nest of Fez. But his Excellency said that it was impossible to resist the reflection that events might occur which would compel her to maintain, however unwillingly, a hold on the Moroccan capital. The little that even now remained of the independent authority of the Sultan would in any case tend to diminish almost to vanishing point as the result of the measures taken by France to keep him on the Throne. Morocco would become a French protectorate in all but the name, nor would it be long possible to disguise the evident fact by protestations of fidelity to the arrangements of Algeciras.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[16350] No. 217.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 195. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, April 29, 1911.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Szecsen, whom I knew well at Rome when he was Ambassador accredited to the Vatican, came to see me yesterday

afternoon. After some preliminary conversation of no importance he plunged into the real object of his visit, viz., enquiries as to the position of the French in Morocco, what they might be expected to do and not to do, and how their probable acts as he anticipated them would be regarded by Spain and the other Powers more or less interested in Morocco. According to Count Szecsen French intentions—those announced—had been unimportant at first, but they had increased as time went on and now instead of a Moroccan force under French instructors it was a French column which was advancing on Fez. If French troops occupied that city they would probably remain to maintain in power the Sultan whose support by foreign troops would render him still more unpopular than he was already. The whole country was in revolt and it seemed impossible that the present Sultan could hold his own except with the military aid of France. This would prolong the French occupation of Fez and it seemed doubtful that the French troops would be withdrawn whatever might be the present intentions of the French Government. This would entirely change the aspect of the Morocco question. It would become a matter for European discussion. If the French became dominant in Morocco they might close the open door stipulated in the Act of Algeciras. The Spanish Government were alarmed at the proceedings of the French in Morocco and seemed to contemplate action of some sort in that country. Count Szecsen asked me what my opinion was on the subject of the assurances which the French Government had given as to their intentions and their ability to carry them out if those intentions were genuine.

You will remember that Sir Fairfax Cartwright (in his telegram No 31, Secret, of the 22nd April), informed you that he learnt that the German Government in their communications with the Austro-Hungarian Government attributed to the French Government the intention to put an end to the open door and equality of chances in Morocco; and that according to the Spanish Ambassador in London the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors had instructions to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that their Governments would view with displeasure an advance of French troops to Fez, a proceeding which might lead to a holy war in Morocco. M. Cruppi had not, when I saw him this morning, received any such communication from those Ambassadors. There had been conversations between the French Ambassador and the German Minister for Foreign Affairs and the German Chancellor of which M. Cruppi had informed me and I reported to you, but there had been no representation from the Austro-Hungarian Government. It is, I think probable, that the instructions which were sent to those Ambassadors were not of so positive and accentuated a character as the Spanish Ambassador intimated to you and the Spanish Government desired, and that, whereas, a short time since it was Germany who prompted Spain to assert herself in Morocco, it is now Spain who is hoping to make use of Germany to offer opposition to France in the interest of Spain.

In replying to the several enquiries which Count Szecsen had made, I told him that what I might say must be taken by him as my personal opinions, and that they were given to him as a friend and not as the Ambassador of Germany's ally, and if he accepted them in that spirit I would speak freely and without reserve. Count Szecsen said that he would like me to express my opinions without reserve, and he would regard them as personal and privately imparted to him. What I thereupon said to Count Szecsen was to the following effect: the French Government had given assurances that they had no desire to send French troops to Fez, they hoped that the mehalla under Major Brémond might be sufficient to rescue the Europeans, and with fresh supplies of all sorts to enable the Sultan to re-establish his authority. If, however, the relief of Fez could not be effected without the aid of French troops and their entry into Fez, the occupation of that city would be only for such a brief period as might be absolutely necessary to put the Sultan on his legs again. The French Government had no ulterior object in view in the action which they were taking. They intended strictly to conform themselves to the Act of Algeciras and their other treaty engagements, and they desired to avoid raising any European question. I believed in these assurances, for it was to the interest of France that they should be observed. What constituted a danger was the tone of a portion of the German press which urged the German Government to take advantage of the present state of affairs in Morocco to upset the Algeciras Act, and the retorts of the French press. A public opinion might be created in Germany which might push the Government further than it was at present intended to go in its objections to French action in Morocco. If I were a German I should be glad to see a state of affairs which would enable me to hope that the Morocco question might be reopened with a possible opportunity to get something for Germany, and I quite understood the anxiety of the Pan-Germanic press that there should be dissensions between Spain and France. Germany had created a

great navy, but her want was coaling stations, and Count Hatzfeldt had once made suggestions to Lord Salisbury in regard to Morocco which might have provided in some measure for the deficiency, but the suggestions were not entertained. If the Morocco question were now reopened, Germany might hope to profit by it. In 1905 it had brought Germany and France to the verge of war. I believe that had it not been for the conviction in Germany that France would receive material support from England, Germany would have attacked France. Luckily for the peace of Europe, Germany and France were afraid of each other at the present time. Count Szecsen interposed, saying that he did not think that Germany feared France. What she regarded with apprehension was what might be the after-effects of a successful war against France. When I suggested that in talking of war between Germany and France it must be remembered that Russia was France's ally, Count Szecsen shrugged his shoulders, and observed that Russia did not count for much.

With regard to the fear which Count Szecsen had expressed that France might close the open door in Morocco, I said that I had no such apprehension in present circumstances for such a proceeding on the part of France would alienate the sympathies of the British public and lose her the support of His Majesty's Government, and whatever might be the desire of the French Government in regard to the door, they could not afford to break their engagements and so to isolate themselves by closing it in the face of England, and to raise a European question in which they would be opposed by her as well as by Germany and others.

As to the re-establishment of the authority of the Sultan Mulai Hafid and his maintenance in his position by French arms as Count Szecsen appeared to apprehend, I said that Moroccan tribes assembled for revolt, and dissolved when goods to be pillaged and supplies run short in an unaccountably rapid manner. Harvest time was approaching, and the hostile tribes might for one reason or another disappear from around Fez. I thought that if the French Government found that the present Sultan was quite unacceptable to the bulk of the people of Morocco, and that he could not maintain himself when set on his legs, they would be ready to recognise some other Sultan preferred by the Moors. Mulai Hafid was to be given an opportunity of re-establishing his authority, but there was, in my opinion, no idea on the part of the French Government of forcing him on the country.

Count Szecsen thanked me for having spoken freely to him, and after some further conversation on other matters of no importance, he left me to pay a visit, he said, to the Spanish Ambassador. My impression is, that Count Szecsen has been made fully acquainted with the views of the German Government, and their communications to the Austro-Hungarian Government, and that he has been instructed to ascertain if he can, what are the real intentions of the French Government in regard to Morocco, and how far they are likely to give way to German objections, but that he has not yet received directions to make any representations to the French Government.

As indicative of the opinions professed at the Embassy of Germany's ally, I may mention that at a luncheon party to-day, where everyone except Colonel Fairholm was a subject of the Emperor Francis Joseph, an Austrian Secretary of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy observed to him with some asperity, that the troubles in Morocco had been entirely brought about by French interference; that had they not interfered, the tribes would not have revolted to such an extent, and that he was convinced that if Major Brémond and the other French officers were to offer to clear out, they would be given a free pass, and be allowed to proceed unmolested to the coast, and the tribes would then accept the authority of the Sultan.

I informed M. Cruppi to-day of my conversation with Count Szecsen, and he thanked me for what I had said to the Ambassador. I also acquainted his Excellency with the information which I had received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid (see his telegram No. 15 of yesterday) that with your authority Sir Maurice de Bunsen had informed the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs that I had received the most positive assurances from the French Government of their intention to respect the Algeciras Act and their other treaty engagements in regard to Morrocco, and not to follow the precedent of Tunis, and that the Spanish Minister had undertaken to communicate to King Alphonso that information on behalf of Sir Maurice de Bunsen; and that M. Garcia Prieto had said that he did not doubt the good intentions of the French Government, but he thought that events might be too strong for them. M. Cruppi expressed his gratitude at the communication which Sir Maurice de Bunsen had made by your authority.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

P.S. *April* 30.—I have seen M. Cruppi this evening. He has not received any representations from either the German or Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors. He does not think that the German Government will make any further objections than those communicated to the French Ambassador at Berlin, or that the Austro-Hungarian Government will make representations of any importance. He has no official confirmation of the reports that Major Brémond has reached Fez with his relief mehalla. He is greatly satisfied at the reply which Sir Arthur Nicolson has informed the French Ambassador has been made on your behalf to the communication on the subject of Morocco made to His Majesty's Government by the Spanish Ambassador analogous to the one made to the French Government by the Spanish Ambassador at Paris.

F. B.

[16866] No. 218.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 32.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 2, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador came to see me to-day, and I impressed upon him that the intention of the French Government was not to disturb the political *status quo* in Morocco. Their hope and expectation was that their expedition would result in communications being kept open with Fez, the place would be saved from starvation, a settlement with the tribes would be come to, and then the French troops could be withdrawn. It was most important that the Spanish Government should not regard what was being done as upsetting the Act of Algeciras, and that they should do nothing which would precipitate a crisis.

The Spanish Ambassador said that he was instructed to tell me what had passed in Paris. There had been a conversation between the German Ambassador there and the Spanish Ambassador. The German Ambassador had said that Germany, having declared to France that she had no political interest in Morocco, could not object to the French expedition to Fez; but that a French occupation of Fez would have a repercussion on the politics of Europe, and he feared there would be grave complications. The German Ambassador was convinced that the French intended to go ahead in Morocco, and were concealing their real intentions. He then gave as his personal opinion that, if France and Spain could come to an agreement for keeping order in Morocco and for its pacification, and would guarantee liberty of trade, Germany and other Powers would accept a proposal to that effect from France and Spain.

The Spanish Ambassador then told me what had passed between M. Cruppi and the Spanish Ambassador in Paris. M. Cruppi had advised the Spanish Government to express their wishes in London, and make them known to us. The Spanish Government were in doubt as to what this meant. Either it meant that the French Government expected the British Government to take the French side entirely, in which case Spain would get nothing, and would only be wasting her time and ours by consulting us; or else it might mean that France thought it might be easier to make some concessions to Spain if we advised them.

It appeared to the Spanish Government that the suggestion made by the German Ambassador in Paris would, if confirmed by the German Government, provide a golden opportunity for putting an end to all difficulties. France and Spain would first come to a full agreement, and then they would informally arrive at an agreement with us and Germany, so as to include all four countries. The Spanish Government were enquiring in Berlin whether the German Government endorsed the opinion of their Ambassador in Paris. They would not do anything until they heard what the German Government said about this, nor would they do anything then until they knew what we thought of the proposal.

He then explained that, under the secret agreement, Spain was in an inferior position to France, inasmuch as France had liberty of action, whereas Spain was obliged to consult France before taking any action in the Spanish sphere. In any agreement with France, Spain would require a guarantee that the action of France, military, financial, or otherwise, would not extend to the Spanish sphere; and that, in the Spanish sphere, it would be Spain who gave advice and support to the Sultan. She would also require the arrangement about Tangier to be made quite clear; it was rather ambiguous as the agreement now stood.

I said that this proposal of the German Ambassador in Paris was new to me, and I

must have time to consider it. Meanwhile, I must again impress upon the Spanish Government that they should give time to see how things went in Morocco, as well as for the consideration of what they had now put before me; and that they should not do anything which would precipitate a crisis.

The Spanish Ambassador repeated with emphasis what he had already said, that his Government would not do anything pending the result of the enquiries which were being made in Berlin and here.

He also told me that while Spain had listened to what Germany had to say, Spain had not in return made communication to the German Government of her views and intentions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16798] No. 219.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 67.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 2, 1911.

THE Italian Ambassador sounded me to-day about Morocco.

I said that I was sure the French did not wish to magnify the trouble there or to alter the *status quo*, and it was most undesirable that any Power should construe their action as being contrary to the Act of Algeciras. I felt certain that France did not wish to re-open the question of Morocco, and I agreed that it was very desirable not to raise it; for if it was reopened, we should have over again all the trouble which there was at the time of the Algeciras Conference.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16646] No. 220.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 49.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, May* 3, 1911.

MACLEOD, writing on 26th ultimo, reports that Sherarda mehalla entered Fez that day after four days' fighting; all foreign officers, including Balding and Redman, well; order maintained in town, but complete anarchy reigns outside. Total forces at disposal of Sultan now number 4,500 men and 1,500 tribal levies; latter, however, are not to be relied upon. Balding enthusiastic in praise of conduct of troops of mehalla; he is much impressed by depth of animosity of tribes to Makhzen.

[16696] No. 221.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 53. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, May* 3, 1911.

M. CRUPPI has told me this afternoon that the French Ambassador at Vienna has received indirect assurances, about which the Minister is sceptical, that the Austro-Hungarian Government are well disposed towards the French Government in the Morocco question, and are prepared to act as intermediaries and "honest brokers" in any difficulties between France and Germany. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador here has, however, been urging the Spanish Ambassador to make difficulties as regards French action in Morocco.

[16648] No. 222.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, May 3, 1911.*

IN speaking of the Morocco question to-day the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs intimated to me that unless a palpable breach of the Algeciras Act were committed by France (for instance, if she were to occupy Fez for a prolonged period), Austria would endeavour to avoid being drawn into the question, as Morocco was a country where she had practically no interests to defend. I understand from what the Marquis Pallavicini said to me that action will likewise be taken by Germany only if a similar eventuality arises.

[16801] No. 223.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 150.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 3, 1911.*

I TOLD M. Cambon to-day of the advice which I had pressed upon the Spanish Ambassador yesterday with regard to Morocco, urging that Spain should not precipitate a crisis.

I then told him that the Spanish Ambassador had informed me that M. Cruppi had advised the Spanish Government to make their wishes known in London. The Spanish Government were of opinion that, if M. Cruppi thought we should side with France and therefore Spain would get nothing, it would be a waste of the Spanish Ambassador's time and of mine to pursue this course; but if, on the other hand, M. Cruppi had advised this because he thought that it might be easier to make a compromise with Spain in this way, the Spanish Government were quite willing to do as he suggested.

I went on to tell M. Cambon that the German Ambassador in Paris had told the Spanish Ambassador there that his own personal opinion was that, if France and Spain would come to an agreement with each other as to the policing and pacification of Morocco, Germany and other Powers would accept this in return for a guarantee of liberty of commerce. The Spanish Government were enquiring in Berlin whether the German Government endorsed this view of their Ambassador. The Spanish Government would take no step until they heard from Berlin, and until, if the German Government endorsed their Ambassador's view, they knew what we thought of it. If the German Government really meant what their Ambassador in Paris had said, the Spanish Government thought that this would be a way out of all difficulties.

I observed to M. Cambon that if the German Government were prepared to say definitely that liberty of commerce was all they required in Morocco, as the German Ambassador had said, this was a very important fact.

As for Spain, her fear was that the increase of French influence at Fez, the centre of Government, would mean increased French influence in the Spanish sphere, while the hands of Spain would remain tied, because the Sultan would still be nominally independent, though really obliged to do everything under French influence. Moorish officials in the Spanish sphere would be nominally those of the Sultan, but actually those of France. I thought that it should be possible for M. Cruppi to discuss this difficulty with Spain, and to reassure her.

M. Cambon said that Spain thought it necessary to do something every time that France did anything. This was a policy of vanity on the part of Spain, but one had to take her as she was. Personally, he thought that an agreement could be come to with her. The arrangements for policing the ports of Morocco expired at the end of this year, and the discussion for the renewal of these arrangements might be made the occasion for satisfying Spain. This was his personal opinion, but he asked me whether he might say to M. Cruppi that I thought it would be wise for France to embark on a policy of this kind with Spain.

I replied that certainly he might say that. I saw no other way of getting over the difficulties.

M. Cambon showed me a telegram from the French Ambassador in Madrid, recounting what Sir Maurice de Bunsen had told him of a conversation with Señor

Canalejas, in which the latter had spoken most bitterly of French unfriendliness to Spain. Sir Maurice de Bunsen had succeeded in calming him, but had carried away from the interview an unpleasant impression.

I said that this conversation had not yet been reported to me.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16804] No. 224.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, May 4, 1911.*

GERMAN Minister has informed French chargé d'affaires that he has received letters from German consul in Fez reporting arrival of Brémond's mehalla in excellent condition. Dr. Vassel states that it is impossible that Fez should be taken and that there is now no danger to Europeans, but adds that should a French force be sent to relieve Fez he could not answer for their safety.

Baron Seckendorff has telegraphed this news to Berlin.

I have received a note from Consul MacLeod written in great haste, which gives the impression that he has no anxiety for safety of Europeans or of town. In view of these reports it appears to me desirable that the advance of the French column should be stopped, although Amrani's force would of course continue its march upon Fez, where its presence would be of the greatest utility; in this manner difficulties with Germany would be avoided.

I would add most confidentially that I gather that this is also the personal opinion of M. de Billy, but he is nervous lest his Government should yield to other counsels.

[16793] No. 225.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 21. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, May 4, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

The following is confidential.

I learn from Russian chargé d'affaires that he has received instructions from his Government to inform the German Government that the Russian Government are in complete agreement with the French Government on the subject of Morocco, and that in view of the assurances made by French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh the Russian Government have no objection to the steps which the French Government have thought it necessary to take in Morocco.

Russian chargé d'affaires has also been instructed to give expression to the hope that these views are shared by the German Government.

[16866] No. 226.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May 4, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

The Spanish Ambassador here tells me that the German Ambassador in Paris considers that if France and Spain came to an understanding in regard to the pacification and policing of Morocco, it would be accepted by Germany and the other Powers, provided that liberty of commerce were guaranteed. I understood from his Excellency that the Spanish Government were enquiring at Berlin whether this was the view of the German Government, and that in that event France and Spain might come to an agreement with each other, with which Germany and England could afterwards be associated.

The French Government, however, understand that what Spain proposes is an

immediate discussion between the four Powers, which is a different thing and undesirable; whereas the course which the Spanish Ambassador here suggested to me might result in clearing up some difficulties.

I think France would be willing to come to an arrangement which would reassure the Spanish Government on the chief points on which they have expressed anxiety and dissatisfaction. Please take an opportunity of impressing this view on Señor Garcia Prieto.

[17133] No. 227.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 156.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 4, 1911.*

THE French Ambassador informed me to-day that his Government heard that Spain was proposing an immediate discussion between England, France, Germany, and Spain for the settlement of the question of Morocco, and that in this settlement Spain would require that the policing of Tangier should be regulated. M. Cruppi viewed with great apprehension the bringing of Germany into the discussion, and also the way in which Spain was apparently working to bring Germany in.

I said that this information of the French Government was clearly one version of a communication which the Spanish Ambassador had made to me the other day, but there was an important difference in the proposed procedure. The Spanish Ambassador had been quite explicit that the first step was for Spain to make sure at Berlin that the German Government demanded nothing but liberty of commerce in return for their assent to an agreement between France and Spain. The next step would be a discussion between France and Spain to reach an agreement with each other; and not till that agreement had been reached would England and Germany be associated with it.

M. Cambon then expressed his own personal opinion that France might give Spain guarantees that, if French troops occupied Fez, and the occupation was prolonged, Spain would not be prejudiced in her sphere of Morocco. Discussion might be opened at once with Spain for a new arrangement as to the policing of the ports, seeing that the present arrangement expired at the end of this year, and the opportunity might be taken to give some satisfaction to Spain. Spain complained of the inferior position in which she was placed under the secret agreement which she had with France as to Morocco, by the provisions of which Spain might not take any action in her sphere without previously coming to an agreement with France, whereas France was not under a corresponding restriction in her sphere. The French Government might discuss this difficulty with the Spanish Government. The question of Tangier was the only one on which M. Cambon thought it might be impossible to come to terms with Spain. The most difficult tribes were in the country round Tangier. If the whole policing was given up to Spain, there would be a breakdown, and European interests in Tangier were so considerable that there would certainly be cause for intervention by other Powers.

I suggested that the question of Tangier might be reserved until an agreement had been come to on the other points which M. Cambon had mentioned. If an agreement was reached with regard to these, Spain might perhaps be induced to agree that it was necessary to continue Tangier as an exception, because of its special position, and that an agreement on the other points should not be upset by insisting upon the exclusive policing of Tangier and its district by Spain.

I told M. Cambon that I would see the Spanish Ambassador to-morrow, and explain to him the difference between the method of procedure which he had suggested to me, and that which the French Government heard was advocated by the Spanish Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[17103] No. 227*.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, May 5, 1911.*

THE Fez situation, to judge from M. Gaillard's and Colonel Mangin's letters, has taken a much more serious turn. It seems doubtful whether Brémond's force, the good tone of which has utterly deteriorated since its return to Fez from its recent successful operations, will be of any use for carrying the Sultan's contemplated attack on the Ras-el-Ma camp. The numbers of rebels are being swollen by the adhesion of various new tribes, and the investment of the town has become much stricter, as the rebel hordes have closed round since the passage of the Government troops.

His Shereefian Majesty has now completely lost the optimism he formerly maintained, and in despair, and as a last resort, has entreated France to intervene and lend him military aid. Mangin and Gaillard, who up to the present are ignorant of the fact that a French relief column has been dispatched, fall in with this view, as it appears to them that no native troops could possibly force their way through the hostile tribes. Mangin is of opinion that troops should be dispatched simultaneously from Moulouya and Shawia with all haste, as food in Fez is being sold at famine prices. Moorish money is very scarce, and the Government finds it increasingly hard to get their bills cashed. M. de Billy is telegraphing to his Government reporting the Sultan's request for military intervention. He lays particular emphasis on the fact that it was entirely on his own initiative that the Sultan sent his appeal for help.

It appears to me probable that General Moinier will receive instructions to push forward immediately.

[16965] No. 228.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 39. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, May 5, 1911.*

I LEARN most confidentially from the French Ambassador that his colleague at St. Petersburgh expressed to the Russian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs about a week ago the desire of the French Government to be acquainted exactly with the attitude which, in the event of the Morocco question assuming more serious proportions, would be adopted by the Russian Government. M. Louis was thereupon shown by M. Nératof the draft of a telegram which was to be submitted to the approval of the Emperor, and which was addressed to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin. In this telegram Count Osten Sacken was instructed to intimate to the German Government that France would be supported by Russia in the Morocco question. M. Louis was also further informed by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that in all serious matters, more especially in the event of difficulties arising between France and Germany, France could always be sure of Russian support being extended to her.

One of the most important newspapers here published on the 3rd instant an article which purported to give the views of the German Government in regard to the action which is being taken in Morocco by the French Government. I am informed most confidentially by the editor of the paper in question that the German Ambassador, after an interview with the latter, expressly requested the publication of this article, which was violently anti-French in tone and met with an unfavourable reception here. The "Kölnische Zeitung" has since published a semi-official repudiation of this article.

I think that the attitude of the German Government towards the Morocco question (see my telegram No. 34 of the 3rd May) may perhaps have been somewhat moderated by representations made in Berlin by the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors there.

It seems to me doubtful whether Count Scezsen has really been urging the Spanish Ambassador in Paris to make difficulties (as reported in Paris telegram No. 53 of the 3rd May). Señor Pérez de Caballero is not to be trusted, and it is possible that he intimated that the Austro-Hungarian Government had promised the Spanish Government their support in order to alarm the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

[16960] No. 229.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, May 5, 1911.*

SITUATION in Morocco.

Herr von Kiderlen stated, when questioned by one of my colleagues with regard to his opinion as to the present state of affairs in Morocco, that everyone was aware of the attitude of the German Government, and that he had nothing further to add on the subject. His Excellency remarked, however, in the course of subsequent conversation, that time was, under ordinary circumstances, on the French side, but that were they now imprudently to precipitate matters this would mean a change in the situation, and Germany would be the one to reap the advantage. Herr von Kiderlen also stated that he now intended to take a month's leave of absence.

According to a telegram from Madrid which has been published here, a party of German traders and engineers who have landed at Mogador are paying high prices for land which they are buying there. In this connection I learn that an enquiring journalist was informed at the Press Bureau that the German Government possessed no information with regard to the veracity of this report, but that no one could tell what the Mannesmann Company might be doing, as they often showed great activity.

[16950] No. 230.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, May 5, 1911.*

I HAVE received from Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs written answer to letter in which I had communicated to him purport of your telegram No. 33. His Excellency restates Spanish position, which is that whether France likes it or not result of her present action must be to strengthen her hold on Sultan and to prove "the persistent inability" of the Makhzen to keep order, a contingency which, by the terms of secret treaty, justifies Spain in asking for a free hand in her own sphere of influence. She desires, however, to act in agreement with France and as early as 20th April. Minister for Foreign Affairs invited French Government, in a letter addressed to French Ambassador at Madrid, to enter into mutual discussion of the situation with Spain. His Excellency trusts you to use your good offices in Paris to promote definite understanding, which should be easy in view of conciliatory attitude which he himself has taken up.

I will speak to Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon in the sense of your telegram No. 40 of 4th May.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[16962] No. 231.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No, 19.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, May 5, 1911.*

I IMPRESSED on Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon, as instructed by your telegram No. 40, expediency of Spain coming to some arrangement with France on chief points which are causing anxiety here. I added that, in your opinion, France was well disposed. French Ambassador had previously spoken in much the same sense, though he said French Government would have good cause to complain of the language of Spanish Prime Minister with regard to alleged hostility of France to Spanish interests.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would send French Ambassador a memorandum embodying Spanish demands, and he told me that he should rely greatly on your friendly support. Points chiefly dwelt upon by the Minister for Foreign Affairs are the insecurity in the neighbourhood of Ceuta and the alleged presence of 100 French officers at Alcazar. His Excellency thought accounts of the danger of the situation at Fez were probably exaggerated by French colonial party to justify advance, which was clearly no longer necessary.

(Repeated to Paris and Tangier.)

[17064] No. 232.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May 5, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

General impression which I gather from my interviews this week with French and Spanish Ambassadors is that Spain would be ready to come to an agreement with France provided she is fairly met on certain points. Of these points the most important are :—

1. To find some means of assuring Spain that French control in Spanish sphere will not be strengthened by French control of Fez. The fear of Spain is that if the Sultan is dependent on France every Moorish official in Spanish sphere will be a French nominee and look to France for support.

2. Dissatisfaction of Spain at her position under secret agreement of 1904, which limits her action in her own sphere.

I have told the French Ambassador that I think it important that France should discuss these points with Spain and find some means of assuring her that situation in

Morocco will not be altered to her disadvantage. His Excellency expressed the personal opinion that this course was not impracticable.

Spain desires also to have the exclusive policing of Tangier and districts. There are objections to this, and other points might be discussed first.

Latest news from Fez points to an improvement, and situation will be easier if French troops can after all avoid entering Fez; but I am convinced that it is very desirable for French Government to reassure Spain on points 1 and 2.

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 44, and Berlin, No. 67.)

[17420] No. 233.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 34.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 5, 1911.*

I SAW the Spanish Ambassador to-day and observed upon the difference there was between the procedure as to the discussion of the question of Morocco, which he had suggested to me, and that which M. Cruppi understood to be the proposal of the Spanish Government.

The Ambassador entirely confirmed what he had previously said to me, to the effect that his Government were first going to enquire in Berlin whether the German Government endorsed the opinion of the German Ambassador in Paris, and that the Spanish Government would then come to an agreement with the French Government, and did not contemplate a discussion with the German Government and ourselves until after an agreement had been come to between the French Government and themselves.

I told the Ambassador that I had explained to M. Cambon the two chief apprehensions of Spain to be: firstly that, if France occupied Fez and controlled the central government, every Moorish official in the Spanish sphere would really be a French agent; and secondly, that it was not fair for Spain, under the secret agreement with France, to be in a position of inferiority with regard to action in her sphere. M. Cambon had asked me whether I thought it would be wise for the French Government to discuss these difficulties with the Spanish Government. I had replied that I certainly thought it was wise and necessary to discuss them, and that I thought the French Government might find some means of reassuring the Spanish Government on these points.

The Spanish Ambassador confirmed the statement that these were the points on which his Government were anxious, and he told me that he had had some conversations with M. Cambon on the same lines.

He did not on this occasion make any mention of Tangier, but he emphasised what he had previously said on other points.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16993] No. 234.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 93.)
Sir, *Tangier, April 27, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Kaïd Maclean came to see me a few days ago and requested me to inform M. de Billy that he would gladly place his services at the disposal of the French, in the event of their deciding to send a military expedition to Fez. I did my best to dissuade Kaïd Maclean from this proposal, as I could not help feeling rather doubtful as to the reception it would meet with. However, though I urged that the fatigue and exposure which he would have to undergo might prove very serious to a man of his age, the Kaïd maintained his request. I therefore sounded M. de Billy on the subject, pointing out to him that the Kaïd, in making this proposal, was actuated merely by a desire to be of service to the French, and had no idea of attempting in any roundabout way to get back into his former position in the Makhzen's service. M. de Billy expressed himself very grateful for the Kaïd's offer, and said that he would refer it to the military authorities, who would no doubt value very highly Sir Harry's long experience of Moorish warfare, and in particular his knowledge of Berber tactics.

The Kaïd called on me again to-day, and while he was with me I received a visit

from M. de Billy, who said that for the present the French were merely sending a small mixed force from Casa Blanca, which might very possibly not be called on to proceed further than Kasbah Kenitra. The authorities therefore did not think it fair to Sir Harry to avail themselves of his offer. If, however, it was subsequently found necessary to dispatch a large French force, he felt sure that the General would be very glad to have the Kaïd attached to his staff. He finally thanked him very warmly for the proof he had given of his desire to assist the French.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[16995] No. 235.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 95. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, April 27, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Spaniards have for some time past been very active in the Ceuta-Tetuan district. Mr. Harris has lately sent two or three strong telegrams to the "Times," criticising very sharply the action of the Spaniards in this region, which he describes as almost certain to provoke an incident. He adds that it is impossible to accept the peaceful assurances of the Spanish Government, as it is a well-known fact that they have no control over their military authorities in the Presidios.

These articles called forth a storm of protest in the Spanish press, which bitterly attacked Mr. Harris, and accused him of inventing stories of provocative Spanish action, merely to serve his own purposes. Mr. Harris retorted by adducing absolute proof of two or three acts on the part of the military authorities at Ceuta, which were well calculated to provoke an incident. He stated that as the Spanish Government were apparently kept in absolute ignorance by the military authorities, he would be happy to act as their correspondent in the matter. Thus, he would inform them that on the 1st instant a colonel of engineers and twenty native soldiers arrived at Tetuan, after making a long detour through a particularly dangerous part of the country. The next day two officers—one an aide-de-camp to the Governor of Ceuta—with a military escort appeared in Tetuan. The colonel stated that he had come to choose a site for the monument to be erected to the memory of officers and men killed in the 1860 campaign, while the other officers gave as the object of their visit the desire to study the local markets, with a view to the purchase of clothes for the Spanish native troops. The colonel left for Ceuta on the 14th, and was followed on the next day by the remaining officers and men under an escort of police.

It must be remembered that Tetuan is some 25 miles distant by direct route from Ceuta, and that the road lies through a region which has for many years been properly regarded as very dangerous. It is further reported from native sources that small bodies of Spanish troops are constantly coming into Moorish territory from Ceuta, that these military promenades are having a most irritating effect upon the tribesmen, and that sooner or later an incident is inevitable.

In regard to the whole question of Spanish policy in the north of Morocco, there is, as far as one is able to judge in Tangier, little doubt that there are two distinct cross-currents, represented by the views of the civil and military authorities, respectively. The former appear to be sincere in their desire to avoid provoking any incident which would necessitate Spanish intervention. The latter are, however, without doubt actuated by the wish not to be outdone by the French, and they would, for instance, obviously welcome any incident in the neighbourhood of Ceuta, which would afford them a pretext to advance on Tetuan. The Spanish Minister, in a recent conversation with Mr. Harris, practically admitted the impotence of his Government in controlling their military authorities, and added that the latter had no consideration for the exigencies of Spanish policy in general.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[16996] No. 236.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 96.)
Sir, *Tangier, April 29, 1911.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch I have the honour to report that a somewhat significant incident has occurred at Tetuan. A few days ago a Moorish notable named Kadour Lebady—who enjoys Spanish protection—learned that one of his oxen had been stolen by the neighbouring Houz tribesmen. He at once established himself at one of the principle gates of the town and forced all the tribesmen who had come to the market to hand over to him their animals and rifles, which he said he would hold until his ox was returned.

The notables of the town on hearing what was taking place, at once went in a body to the governor and asked him to intervene without delay, as Lebady's conduct might very likely lead to a fight with the tribesmen in the town, and would in any case result in Tetuan being boycotted, if not actually beseiged by the tribes. The governor requested the assistance of the Spanish consul in dealing with Lebady—the usual procedure in cases affecting protected persons—but was told that he must restore order himself, and that the consul could not interfere. Thanks to the energetic action of the notables, a compromise was eventually arrived at, the tribesmen being given back their property, and the ox being restored to Lebady on the following day. Meanwhile, the notables have addressed a strong letter of complaint to Sid Guebbas, criticising in particular the action of the Spanish consul in refusing to coerce his protégé. They further hint that had Lebady not been pretty sure of Spanish support, in the event of his succeeding in creating an incident, he would never have dared to provoke the tribesmen in this way. There is no doubt that in Moorish circles the belief is strongly entertained that the Spaniards are striving to the utmost to create such an incident as would justify them in seizing a part of Moorish territory in the Ceuta–Tetuan region.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[16997] No. 237.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 97.)
Sir, *Tangier, April 29, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca reporting the arrival and concentration of French troops in the Shawia. Mr. Madden informs me privately that he has been much impressed by the skilful and expeditious manner in which the troops, &c., have been landed from the transports.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 237.

Consul Madden to Mr. Rattigan.

(No. 78.)
Sir, *Casa Blanca, April 26, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 76 of the 21st instant, I have the honour to report that the Shereef El Amrani, Viceroy of Shawia, has addressed a circular letter to the foreign consulates to the effect that he has received Shereefian commands to set out and take over an important duty, and that he is appointing during his absence the Basha Si Mohamed-el-Guebbas to act for him.

The mode of procedure, so I learn on the authority of the Shereef himself, is that the Shereef, at the head of the Shawia mehalla, will enter Rabat, and there address letters to the kaïds of the Gharb, calling on them to give up rebellion and rally to the Sultan's standard, adding that, should they still refuse to obey, the Sultan has designated the French to act as his representatives to compel them to do so. The The French army, concentrated at Buznika, will there await a communication from the

Shereef, according to present arrangements. There is, however, obviously very little anticipation that the revolted tribes will pay attention to the Shereef's missives.

The Shawia mehalla, 500 strong, with officers of the Bureau Arabs attached to it, has left for Rabat after concentration at Buznika, and the Shereef El Amrani, who is a very old man, left yesterday to assume command.

The first French column has concentrated at Buznika, and is some 4,000 strong, with artillery. The French Shawia force of goum, 1,200 strong, is also at Buznika. Two more French columns will, in due course, assemble at Buznika, and an officer tells me that the advance will not be made till all the columns have joined up there. An advance to Fez would, if made, so this officer told me, be by Rabat and the country between the River Sebou and Mequinez, but plans are subject to alteration according to circumstances.

General Moinier is at Buznika, but may return to Casa Blanca from time to time. Extensive preparations are going on in the French camp here, large numbers of camels having been hired for transport purposes, as well as carts, &c. The Army Pay Department has taken with it a large quantity of Moorish silver coin, for the purchase of provisions on the road.

The first reinforcements of French troops began landing here this morning from the Government transport "Vinh Long"; they consist of colonial infantry and colonial artillery, about 1,100 men in all. Two more steamers with troops are expected to-morrow morning. All these troops form part of the first batch of reinforcements of 4,500 men. But still more troops are now announced to arrive before long, bringing the number up to 10,000, and possibly up to 14,500, as it is not known yet whether the 10,000 men are to include the first batch of 4,500 or to be in addition to them, so an officer gave me to understand.

The French consul tells me that he heard a report that General d'Amade will come out to Morocco as general-in-chief, though he did not know it for certain. In this case the consul said that General Moinier would be second general in command.

I learn that all sorts of preparations are going on at Rabat and Sallee for the reception of the forces expected there from Casa Blanca, and the British vice-consul at Rabat informs me that outside the walls of the town there are some horsemen of the tribes posted to convey the news of the arrival of any French force to the tribesmen.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 237.

Consul Madden to Mr. Rattigan.

(No. 79.)

Sir, *Casa Blanca, April* 28, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report the following arrivals of French troops at Casa Blanca:—

On the 26th April the steam-ship "Meurthe," of the Compagnie Paquet of Marseilles, bringing 184 men.

On the 26th April the Government transport "Vinh Long," from Toulon, bringing 1,300 men.

On the 26th April the steam-ship "Espagne," of the Transports maritimes, bringing 1,700 men from Philippeville and Bone.

On the 27th April the steam-ship "Mouloya," of the Compagnie mixte, bringing from Oran 1,014 men.

On the 27th April the steam-ship "Aquitaine," of the Transports maritimes of Marseilles, bringing 454 men and 517 horses from Marseilles, Bone, and Philippeville.

The total number of reinforcements landed numbers up to this date 4,652 men. This includes, of course, artillery.

The transport "Vinh Long" has left again for Toulon, and the steam-ship "Espagne" has left for Dakar to bring up 1,800 Senegalese troops, being due back here on the 7th May.

The French Shawia goum and the Shawia mehalla entered Rabat the day before yesterday and crossed over to Sallee. The vice-consul at Rabat informs me that 6,000 French troops are expected at Rabat in view of the state of affairs at Fez. He

also mentions the arrival of a lot of foreigners from Casa Blanca who have gone there to open shops and cafés.

Great animation prevails at the port here owing to the landing of troops and war material, which has been carried out very expeditiously, and even by night with the aid of a cruiser's searchlights, the men being at once marched off and not allowed into town. There are also a number of merchant steamers in port awaiting discharge.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

[16998] No. 238.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 6.)

(No. 98. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, April* 30, 1911.

IN view of the kaleidoscopic changes which have taken place during the past week, I have ventured to wait until to-day in order to furnish you with a general review of the situation up to date, while recording by telegraph events as they have occurred.

The news from Fez during the last few days has been more satisfactory. Some indecisive fighting took place round the walls on the 19th, but the rebels were finally driven back without much loss on either side. In view, however, of the critical situation, the consular body came to a decision to send to the coast all Europeans who were willing to go, as soon as the road through the Ulad Jama district should be reopened. Arrangements were consequently made with certain important shereefs, enjoying great prestige among the tribes, who promised to act as escort for the caravan. Mr. Macleod at the same time decided, should the necessity arise, to remove with the remaining British subjects to the house of Menebhi, under the protection of Sid Aissa-ben-Omar and a shereef who possesses considerable influence over the tribe of Beni M'Tir. Sid Aissa further promised to guard the consulate during any disturbances that might arise. Meanwhile, on the 20th a convoy of cattle and grain got through the rebel cordon, considerably relieving the tension within the walls. Since then letters have been received reporting that the town was quiet up to the evening of the 23rd, and that 1,500 men of the Taza tribe had arrived to assist the Sultan's troops.

The torrential rains having ceased on the 17th instant, Commandant Brémond decided to effect his withdrawal from Sherarda on the 21st. He was, however, unable to proceed very far, as he was immediately attacked by some 5,000 rebels, who occupied the position vacated by the mehalla. They were driven out from this position by shell fire, but continued to harass the mehalla until nightfall. Letters dated the night of the 22nd, from Commandant Brémond, reported that by orders of Colonel Mangin he was slowly making his way to Ras-el-Ma, the site of the rebel camp near Fez. He was much hampered by the flooded state of the roads, and was being much harassed by the rebel hordes. He added that the rebellion was assuming a distinctly anti-foreign character. It is, however, very satisfactory to note that, contrary to the general belief, the mehalla had ample supplies of ammunition wherewith to attack the Beni M'Tir, though Commandant Brémond stated that he was in urgent need of money. I yesterday received a special courier from Mr. Carleton, who reports that information has reached him from Fez to the effect that Commandant Brémond's mehalla arrived there on the 26th. No actual confirmation of this report has so far been received, but three separate native couriers have just informed Sid Guebbas that they saw the mehalla very near Fez on the 25th.

Meanwhile the convoys of money and ammunition, escorted by the French consular agent at Alcazar, failed in their attempt to reach the mehalla, and were forced to retire on the 21st to Sok-el-Arbaa, where they still remain.

As soon as M. de Billy learnt of the forced retreat of the convoy, he telegraphed to his Government to the effect that, in his opinion, the last hope of rescuing the Sultan without extraneous aid had now failed, and he consequently advised the immediate dispatch of a strong mixed force from Casa Blanca, through Rabat and Mehedia, to Fez. A light column of 2,000 French troops, with 1,500 Moroccan goum, was at once ordered to proceed to Kasbah Kenitra (see my despatch No. 85 of the 15th instant), where they arrived on the 29th, the greater part of the Moorish

harka from the Shawia, under the Shereef El Amrani, having reached there on the previous day. In view, however, of the news contained in Commandant Brémond's letter of the 22nd, that he had ample supplies of ammunition and was much less pessimistic as to his chances of successfully dealing with the revolted tribes, M. de Billy informed me that he would advise the relief force from Casa Blanca to stop at Kenitra pending further developments. He hoped that if the mehalla could defeat the Beni M'Tir it would be unnecessary for the column to proceed any further. He added, in confidence, that in view of the present attitude of Germany and Spain, his Government were most anxious to avoid any active intervention, which might afford a pretext for reopening the whole Morocco question.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[16999] No. 239.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 99.)
Sir, *Tangier, April 30, 1911.*

A SOMEWHAT interesting letter, dated the 10th instant, has reached me from a certain Hadj Mohammed Mikwar, an influential British protégé at Mequinez. He reports that the Beni M'Tir have taken over the control of the town, and that a large tribal meeting, attended by representatives from practically all the tribes of the northern half of Morocco, has been held to discuss the situation. At this meeting it was decided to besiege Fez, overthrow the Sultan, and drive the French out of Morocco. It was further resolved, after this task had been accomplished, to send a body of horsemen to Tangier to bring the ex-Sultan back to Fez, and restore him to the Throne under the ægis of Great Britain or Germany, the former for preference. No doubt these plans are rather *naïf*, but they cast a somewhat instructive light upon the views of the tribal leaders, and it is evident that anti-French feeling has a good deal to do with the revolt.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[17000] No. 240.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 100. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, April 30, 1911.*

THE recent action of the Spaniards at Laraiche as well as at Tetuan (see my despatch No. 95) has been causing the French considerable anxiety. Early this week the Spanish war-ship "Rio de la Plata" arrived off the former port, and, after a delay of two days owing to the heavy seas, succeeded in landing a colonel and five officers, one of the latter being in uniform. Meanwhile the commandant of the Spanish native police, accompanied by all his mounted men, rode over to Alcazar, with what object is not known. The Spanish Legation inform me that this ride was undertaken on the commandant's own initiative, and was nothing more nor less than a kind of picnic such as we are all in the habit of making here! In any case, the effect of this action upon the Jewish and native population of Laraiche has proved far from reassuring, and on Friday night a boat arrived with some sixty Jewish refugees, who had been terrified by the prospect of a Spanish landing, with all the looting and rioting which would inevitably ensue.

There is certainly no excuse for such aggressive action on the part of Spain in the Laraiche district, as has lately been advocated in the Spanish press. It is at the present moment, perhaps, the least disturbed area in Morocco, and, should nothing be done by the Spaniards to create an incident, there is practically no danger of the troubles extending there.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[17003] No. 241.

Mr. Rattigan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 103.)
Sir, *Tangier, May 1, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that reinforcements for the Sultan's army are being sent up to Fez from Marrakesh by the governor, Hadj Thami Glawi. Reports as to the strength of these reinforcements vary considerably, but they have been stated to consist of as many as 10,000 men.

Some time ago Menebhi asked me, on behalf of Hadj Thami, to obtain permission from the French to allow of the passage of his levies through the Shawia. M. de Billy at once arranged for the authorisation to be given by General Moinier, and the advance guard of the levies is reported to be on the point of entering the Shawia. Hadj Thami has meanwhile written to Menebhi asking him to convey to M. de Billy, through His Majesty's Legation, his thanks for according the desired authorisation.

No doubt the news that large bodies of reinforcements for the Makhzen are on their way up to Fez from the south will have a very good effect on the rebel tribes.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN.

[17030] No. 242.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 200.)
Sir, *Paris, May 5, 1911.*

A COMMUNIQUÉ to the press this morning announces that the French column from Casa Blanca has received orders to proceed to Dar-Dzrari, a point at the foot of the mountainous region which dominates the environs of Fez. From this point the column will be able to be in touch with the French instructors and the Shereefian forces, and to revictual Fez which is still besieged.

The "Matin" completes the information given above, and states that the French and Moorish forces will suspend their advance at Dar-Dzrari, where they will await further instructions from the French Government and the Sultan. Dar-Dzrari is situated at the junction of two roads, one to Fez, and the other to Mequinez. The column will then be two days' march from Fez, and one day's march from Mequinez. If the situation at Fez does not in the meantime improve, a portion of the forces assembled at Dar-Dzrari will advance to Fez and, if Mequinez remained in the hands of the rebels, a portion of these forces might also proceed to that town to restore order.

The "Matin" also mentions the possibility of the column, after having effected the purpose for which it was formed, viz., the relief of Fez, being used for an operation against the Zaer tribe on the confines of the Shawia district who ambushed a French force in January last and killed Lieutenant Marchand, a quartermaster, and three troopers.

The "Echo de Paris" publishes to-day an article by Comte Albert de Mun respecting the affairs of Morocco, urging the Government to give up the vacillating policy which they are pursuing with regard to Morocco, and to occupy Fez at once. According to M. de Mun, the abandonment of Abd-el-Aziz and the hesitating protection accorded to Mulai Hafid are some of the causes which have brought about the present situation. M. de Mun's solution of the difficulties in Morocco is that the Sultan should be rendered strong, and his house be put in order for him, and all precautions taken to prevent a recrudescence of the present crisis, which would again compromise the work of pacification in Morocco.

The above is the point of view of the forward party, who are extremely opposed to the opposite theory acted upon by MM. Clemenceau and Pichon at the time of the fall of Abd-el-Aziz, which is that France must keep out of the struggle between rival claimants for the Throne of Morocco, and not impose her protégé on the tribes against their will, if there be clearly a movement throughout the country to dethrone him.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[17663] No. 243.

Memorandum communicated by Señor de Villa Urrutia, May 6, 1911.

(Translation.)

THE Military Governor of Ceuta has called the attention of the Spanish Government to the increase of robberies and disturbances on the part of Moors in the neighbourhood of that place and to the obstacles which such a state of things places in the way of the transit trade permitted under article 45 of the convention of the 20th November, 1861, between Spain and Morocco.

With a view to remedying this state of things the Spanish Legation at Tangier urged the kaïd of the district, who, regardless of his duties, used to reside until then almost continually in the town, to establish himself in the district. This he has done since the 7th March last; his presence has, however, had no effect in re-establishing security, seeing that the Kabiles recognise no other authority than that which they impose upon themselves, that they are divided by incessant quarrels, and that the kaïd has no material means of enforcing respect for the law. The kaïd, however, regularly collects what is due to him personally, the Spanish Legation at Tangier having been obliged on various occasions to ask Cid Mohamed-el-Guebbas to pay him.

The method of overcoming such obstacles is laid down in the agreement of the 16th November, 1910, between Spain and the Makhzen; but it has not been possible to put it into practice, since the organisation of the police, both in the Riff and in Ceuta, is subordinated in the agreement to the formation of an estimate of expenditure (articles 4 and 10), and this again is subject to the appointment of the pasha ("baja") of the Melilla district, who will at the same time be High Commissioner. This appointment has not yet been made, and the Sultan claims that it should be given to an official whose violent character and preconceived hostility towards Spanish interests have been demonstrated on several occasions. In view of this situation, the Spanish Government decided, without prejudice to any proposals which they might make to the Makhzen for the purpose of carrying into effect the rapid organisation of the police provided for in article 9 of the agreement of the 16th November, and pending the organisation of such a force, to authorise the Military Governor of Ceuta to devote to this service an adequate contingent from the garrison of the place, composed in large part by Riff sharpshooters, who, being natives, appear especially suited to this work.

Although this decision is fully in accord with the last part of article 45 of the treaty of 1861, and is in any case of the kind which, being aimed at the preservation of order and tranquillity in the frontier regions, is recognised as being within the exclusive competence of Spain and the Makhzen, I charge your Excellency to explain the above confidentially to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in order that he should not attribute to it any other object than the purely local and provisional one which it has in fact, nor consider that the relations between Spain and Morocco in regard to the general situation have been modified in any way.

Spanish Embassy, May 6, 1911.

[17143] No. 244.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, May 6, 1911.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 6th May.

Letters from His Majesty's consul and Dr. Verdon confirm French reports of gravity of situation.

Latter expresses opinion that only chance for Sultan to maintain his position lies in French military intervention; he is detested throughout country, hostile movement is increasing, and tribes are now too far compromised to go back.

French chargé d'affaires has communicated his information to German Minister, who professes profound astonishment, having, he says, received report from German consul, dated 30th, stating that situation remains much the same. French chargé d'affaires is convinced that German consul is acting under instructions, as so far his reports have always tallied with those of his French and British colleagues.

[17132] No. 246*.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, May 6, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 19 of yesterday.

French Ambassador's suggestion that the Spanish Government should send him a memorandum as to their desires respecting the Spanish sphere has been approved by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and M. Geoffray is anxious that I should receive official authorisation to join in the discussion which will ensue between him and the Spanish Government. He thinks that it would have a good effect if, by my participation, it were clearly shown that His Majesty's Government have a voice in any settlement affecting Morocco, notwithstanding adverse attitude of Señor Perez Caballero in his interview with M. Cruppi on the 28th of last month.

The Spanish Government also seem to expect me to take part in the discussion.

[17146] No. 246†.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, May 7, 1911.*

OCCUPATION of Ceuta heights.

I have received from the Ministry of State a copy of the statement which the Spanish Ambassador in London will make to you in explanation of the recent occupation by Spanish troops of the heights overlooking Ceuta. Although this step is characterised as "a mere police measure," it is of course simply the first instalment of the Spanish reply to the French intervention at Fez.

My French colleague has, he tells me, recommended his Government, in view of their previous assurances to the Spanish Government, that they would leave Spain liberty to take steps for the protection of her fortresses in the event of a French move on Fez becoming necessary not to raise any difficulties with regard to this occupation.

The language held by M. Canalejas, as reported in my despatch No. 57 of the 3rd instant, seemed to foreshadow some such movement, but the French Ambassador is annoyed at the Minister for Foreign Affairs not having frankly informed him at Friday's diplomatic reception of the step contemplated. M. Garcia Prieto, as my French colleague complains, gave no indication that troops would be employed at Ceuta, and simply spoke vaguely of police operations becoming necessary there in the near future.

[17144] No. 245.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, May 6, 1911.*

SIR M. DE BUNSEN'S telegram No. 19 of 5th May.

French chargé d'affaires informs me that there is only one officer at Alcazar with thirty men of Tangier police; they are superintending dispatch of convoys, and they have never patrolled town. Officer has received instructions to go on as soon as possible to Sok-el-Arba.

[17140] No. 246.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, May 6, 1911.*

I SAW M. Cruppi this afternoon, and spoke to him in regard to the situation in Morocco and the relations between France and Spain which form the subject of your telegram No. 95 of yesterday. The news which he has received from Tangier is similar to that contained in Mr. Lister's telegram No. 53 of to-day, the repetition of which reached me after my return from the Quai d'Orsay. He fears that it will not be possible to avoid the entry of French troops into Fez, but he said that, in conformity with the policy previously announced, the French Government intend to evacuate the capital as soon as may be possible after the Sultan has been fortified with supplies of all kinds.

As regards Spain, M. Cruppi is most anxious to come to terms, but he finds the Spaniards, and especially the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, most difficult to deal with. M. Perez Caballero, he says, makes all the mischief he can. He had hoped that the projected negotiations might take place in London, but, should you wish it, he is not unwilling that they should be carried on at Madrid in accordance with the suggestion of M. Geoffray, as reported in Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram No. 21 of to-day, which he has repeated to me. I told M. Cruppi that I did not know what view you held in regard to this proposal, but I thought that as it would have the advantage of eliminating M. Perez Caballero from the negotiations it would also prevent him from hampering them by his personal feelings, which are pro-German and anti-French, and concerting constantly with his German colleague. I also suggested that Sir M. de Bunsen could afford great assistance to M. Geoffray, as he understands the Spaniards and is appreciated by them, and M. Cruppi would at the same time retain in his hands the direction of the negotiations.

I learnt from M. Cruppi that he had, in the course of his negotiations with the Spanish Ambassador, offered to put no difficulty in the way of the construction of a road from Ceuta to Tetuan, and to give the Spaniards a free hand in the Presidios. They appear, however, he said, to be bent on obtaining liberty to undertake various things, such as the policing of the Tangier district, which are incompatible with French and British interests. M. Cruppi has received reports that they are preparing to take action of some kind at Ifni. He said that the statement that there are 100 French officers at Alcazar is untrue. France has the right to act there, and there is one instructor in the town. He even went so far, he said, as to offer to the Spanish Ambassador to transfer that officer to the French side of the river at Alcazar if in return for this concession the Spanish Government would undertake to assist on their side in pushing forward the supplies, &c., necessary for the relief of those shut up in Fez. The attitude of opposition maintained by M. Perez Caballero is, however, in no way modified by anything that M. Cruppi proposes.

[17141] No. 247.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 55. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, May 7, 1911.*

WHEN I saw M. Cruppi yesterday I took the opportunity to inform him of the assurances given to you by the Spanish Ambassador in London, as mentioned in your

despatch No. 32 of the 2nd instant to Sir M. de Bunsen, that the Spanish Government have not communicated to the German Government their views and intentions in regard to Morocco, though they have not refused to hear what Germany has had to say on the subject of that country. M. Cruppi expressed his disbelief in the truth of these assurances. It has come to his knowledge that persistent intrigues have been going on between the Spanish and German Ambassadors here, and that Germany has been tendering pernicious advice to Spain; and he has been led to suspect that some secret understanding exists between the two countries under which Germany would in certain circumstances obtain, with the acquiescence of Spain, a port or a coaling-station either at Mogador or somewhere else on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. In support of this theory he points to the action of Spain at Ifni, the so-called horse buying mission to Marakesh, the concentration of reinforcements in the Canary Islands, the general restlessness and intractability exhibited by the Spanish Government, besides the general attitude of Germany and her continual endeavours to stir up strife. He does not suppose that such an arrangement would be agreeable to England any more than it would be to France, nor that England could permit the Spaniards to undertake the policing of the Tangier district—a task for which they are quite unfit—or establish their influence there backed up by Germany.

M. Cruppi said that he was very grateful for the advice which you have instructed Sir M. de Bunsen to give to the Spanish Government. The Russian Government, he says, have used language at Berlin which shows that they are prepared to support France in the Moroccan question, and he thinks that if you could find yourself able to convey an intimation to the German Government, either directly or let it become known to them in some other way, that England is in agreement with France and Russia in the matter, such action might have the effect of restraining the activities of Germany, and would, when such attitude of England reached the ears of the Spanish Government, make them realise the unwisdom of listening to the counsels of Germany, and bring them to adopt a more reasonable attitude in their negotiations with France on the subject of their grievances.

No. 248.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 56. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, May 2, 1911.*

DURING the conversation which I held with the Minister for Foreign Affairs at his weekly diplomatic reception on Friday, the 28th April, and which is reported in my despatch No. 55 of the following day, no allusion whatever was made by Señor Garcia Prieto to the memorandum which the Spanish Ambassador in Paris was the same afternoon presenting to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. From the repetition of Sir F. Bertie's telegram to you No. 48 of the 30th April, and from M. Cruppi's detailed despatch recording his interview with Señor Perez Caballero, which M. Geoffray had the goodness to read to me, I have since been made aware of the terms of the memorandum, and of the threatening language with which the Spanish Ambassador thought fit to support the demand which it contained, to the effect that, in view of the development which events had taken in Morocco, Spain should henceforward be allowed an absolutely free hand within her own sphere of influence. Señor Perez Caballero's menace that, failing French consent, Spain would denounce the secret convention of 1904, appeal to "another Power," and cause to be summoned an international conference, has since been disavowed by both the Spanish Prime Minister and by the Minister for Foreign Affairs; and it is only worthy of note as reflecting the tone of the more ardent Spanish Chauvinists and of their organs in the Madrid press. As regards the contents of the memorandum itself, which I understand has since been communicated to you, I may state that a semi-official letter to the same effect, dated the 28th April, was received by M. Geoffray from Señor Garcia Prieto on the following day. In it the Spanish Foreign Minister laid stress on the altered situation of affairs which had resulted, in his view, from the steps taken by France for the relief of Fez, and urged that the collapse of the Sultan's authority and the state of anarchy prevailing in Morocco had already produced the conditions contemplated by article 3 of the secret convention as justifying the demand that Spain should be allowed to exercise her full and unhampered influence in the recognised Spanish sphere.

M. Geoffray had already received from Paris the text of the reply which M. Cruppi desired him to return to the previous letter of the 20th April, in which Señor Garcia Prieto had called attention to the virtual collapse of the *status quo*, and pressed for a full discussion of the new situation. The draft reply gives in detail the reasons of the French Government for considering that the time had not yet come for modifying existing arrangements. Before sending it in M. Geoffray secured by telegraph M. Cruppi's permission to add to the reply as drafted in Paris a further clause which might be taken as the French reply to Señor Garcia Prieto's second letter of the 28th April. The additional clause was to the effect that, although the French Government were compelled to deprecate the independent action which Spain desired to exercise, they were quite willing to consider in a friendly spirit any reasonable demands which she might wish to put forward, and that he himself would be prepared at any time to receive such demands, and to discuss them, on behalf of M. Cruppi, with Señor Garcia Prieto—and, he added, with myself, as representing the other Power whose consent was indispensable to any alteration of the *status quo*.

In this amplified form the French reply to Señor Garcia Prieto's two letters of the 20th April and the 28th April was sent in by the French Ambassador on the 1st May.

Whether anything is likely to come of the French suggestion that the desires of Spain as regards action in the Spanish sphere should be amicably discussed at Madrid in the manner proposed I have no present means of judging, and any part that I might personally take in the discussions would be subject, of course, to the directions which you might see fit to send me. M. Geoffray has been good enough to explain to me that his object in proposing an addition to M. Cruppi's instruction was to remove the appearance of a positive objection on the part of France to the slightest sign of additional Spanish activity in Northern Morocco. His Excellency fears that, in the absence of any such safety valve as the one suggested by him, the Spanish Government are not unlikely, in the event of complications occurring in the Fez region, to take the law into their own hands within the Spanish sphere. The temptation to do so would be partly removed, in M. Geoffray's opinion, if the Spanish Government were allowed to feel that an agreement with France as regards the steps to be taken might be obtainable without much difficulty.

M. Geoffray was considerably ruffled by the full record which he received from Paris on the 1st May of the expressions used by Señor Perez Caballero in his conversation with M. Cruppi on the 28th April. Happening to meet Señor Garcia Prieto on the same day, he twitted him with having so carefully concealed at Friday's diplomatic reception the fact that the Spanish Ambassador in Paris was presenting that day an important memorandum to M. Cruppi and supporting it by ominous statements foreshadowing a change in the relations between the two countries as established by treaty. Señor Garcia Prieto said that the Spanish Ambassador had exceeded his instructions, and had already been directed by telegraph to be more careful in future. The Foreign Minister was evidently distressed at what had happened, and begged the French Ambassador not to attach any importance to it. Señor Canalejas, however, coming up during their conversation, chimed in with some rather unpleasant remarks on the persistent hostility of the French in Morocco towards everything Spanish and on their determination to treat the Spaniards as an inferior people.

M. Geoffray has often refuted these accusations, and it must be admitted that he has worked hard since his arrival in Madrid to remove the impression of French unfriendliness in Morocco which undoubtedly exists in Spain, and to secure a hearing for legitimate Spanish grievances. He is inclined to believe that Spanish complaints concerning the conduct of certain French agents in Morocco are sometimes not entirely without justification. He is also strongly of opinion that his country could only gain by adopting a more uniformly friendly attitude towards Spain which would thus be left with no excuse for indulging the inclination, already visible in some quarters, to break away from the Anglo-French combination and to seek support for her aspirations in another direction.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[17301] No. 249.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 57. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, May 3, 1911.*

IN continuation of my previous despatch No. 56, Confidential, of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to furnish the following account of a conversation which I held with the Spanish Prime Minister on the 1st instant.

I saw Señor Canalejas by appointment, and found his Excellency in the nervous and agitated frame of mind to which he has been brought by the increasing difficulty of his political position at home and by the serious embarrassment caused by the turn which events are taking in Morocco. After thanking me for my visit, and adding that, as the conversation was to be regarded as a confidential one, he would speak with entire frankness, he proceeded to declare that without doubt France was the implacable enemy of Spain. The fair words of M. Cruppi in Paris did not alter the fact that the attitude from day to day of the French agents in Morocco was of unconcealed hostility to everything Spanish. These gentlemen showed no regard whatever for the feelings of the Spanish community, and they persistently ignored the rights claimed by Spain under existing treaties. I asked his Excellency if he could give me instances to prove what he alleged. He said the French representative at Tangier—presumably M. de Billy, the chargé d'affaires, as M. Regnault has been absent for some time—had been slow to return the visit of the new Spanish Minister and had avoided anything like a frank exchange of views with him, such as would be useful under the present circumstances.

Señor Canalejas had that very day received the officer whom he had recently sent in the cruiser "Rio de la Plata" to report on the state of affairs in the region of Larache. One officer had found at Alcazar, a place within the Spanish sphere, a number of French military instructors, who were rapidly turning the town into a base of military operations. The Prime Minister said he was tired of the whole question. It would almost be better for Spain that the matter should now come to a point. She would then be compelled to strain every nerve to assert her rights. She would, of course, be defeated, as she had been defeated in Cuba. But she would have upheld her honour, and could retire behind the walls of her fortresses on the Morocco coast with her honour intact.

I begged his Excellency to look upon the facts in a calmer spirit. He had spoken as if France were already firmly established at Fez, with the Sultan under her wing, and the Government of Morocco in her sole grasp. In reality she was only at the beginning of an expedition, undertaken very unwillingly, and destined perhaps to produce its effect without Fez being even entered. At all events, it was obviously premature to proceed as if a French protectorate had been already proclaimed and the Algeciras arrangements suspended. The object of France I understood to be to make those arrangements more secure and permanent than they appeared at the present moment to be. It was early days to assume that she would fail. When she did so, it would be time enough to consider how Spain would be affected by the altered situation. Even then it was by a friendly understanding with the other countries most concerned, that is with France and England, that she was most likely to secure the objects she had in view.

At the present stage it would be supremely unwise for Spain to precipitate events, for I could assure his Excellency that, from all I had heard, there was now every readiness at Paris to make allowances for the natural aspirations of Spain in Morocco. It would be at all events the height of unwisdom to employ force to obtain privileges or positions which might be equally well secured for ought he knew by friendly negotiations. The local bickerings to which he had alluded probably reached his ears in an exaggerated form, and they would certainly not be diminished by Spain taking the law into her own hands. If only the Spanish Government would say frankly what it was that they wanted I believed there was a fair prospect of matters being arranged to the satisfaction of all concerned. It was at all events worth trying.

I spoke also of the treaties and conventions by which Spain continued to be bound, and I expressed regret that there should be a disposition to break away from them. Very different had been the spirit which presided over the meeting of our two sovereigns at Cartagena less than four years ago, when an exchange of notes

was negotiated showing the closest community of views between Spain, England, and France as regards the continuing of the *status quo* in the territories adjoining the Mediterranean and Atlantic.

Señor Canalejas said he was quite ready to admit the force of these considerations. They were, indeed, always present in his mind, and, as regarded the attitude of France, he was glad to hear that I was able to describe it as not unfavourable to an harmonious understanding with Spain. He promised to give full weight to all I had said, and terminated the interview with the most friendly acknowledgment of the assistance Spain had often derived from the counsels of the British Government.

Before doing so he had given me an indication of the kind of action which, if allowed, Spain would be likely to make in the early future.

Tetuan, he said, was of course in every patriotic Spaniard's thoughts. He had resolutely opposed, however, till then the course often pressed upon him of ordering a military occupation of that important town, which was already policed under Spanish instructors. What he felt it would not long be possible to resist was the very reasonable demand of the Ceuta authorities that Spain should take measures to put a stop to the frequent robberies by which the neighbourhood of Ceuta was being rendered daily a more dangerous region to traverse. It was with that object in view that the contemplated frontier police under a Moorish kaïd had been assigned, in the convention between Spain and Morocco of the 16th November, 1910, a sphere of operations extending some distance beyond the present limits of Spanish jurisdiction. But the frontier police force it seemed impossible to call into being while the Sultan continued a prisoner in Fez and the Makhzen paralysed. Spain would be fully justified under the circumstances, his Excellency thought, in sending herself a force to perform these very necessary police duties, and also to occupy, in a manner rendering them secure from attack, the heights from which Ceuta could be easily destroyed if they fell into the hands of the enemy.

I said I thought an arrangement to facilitate the policing of the country behind Ceuta might easily be come to.

Another object occupying the mind of the Prime Minister was the strengthening of the native police force under Spanish instructors which is stationed at Larache. He said his Government would much like to transfer thither from Casablanca which lay beyond their sphere, the Spanish instructed police of the latter port. Casablanca would thus be left entirely in French hands and much friction avoided.

On this point I merely remarked that the plan of a divided police force at Casablanca had been carefully devised at Algeciras, with the object, probably, of discountenancing the theory of a partition of Morocco into spheres of influence.

Any modification of it would therefore require the assent of the signatory Powers.

But on both the points his Excellency had mentioned, I said that it seemed to me that arrangements could be made without much difficulty to meet Spanish views consistently with the general Act of Algeciras, if Spain would only abstain from adopting hasty measures in disregard of treaty engagements.

Since my conversation with the Prime Minister I have had the honour to receive your telegram No. 33 of the 1st instant, directing me to inform the Spanish Government of the manner in which their present attitude is regarded by His Majesty's Government. I lost no time in communicating its purport to Señor Garcia Prieto, who must thus be convinced that you view the Spanish claim to exercise independent action in Morocco in precisely the same light as the French Government.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[17395] No. 250.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 56.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, May 8, 1911.*

THE Commissioner for Foreign Affairs is very much disturbed with regard to the present situation between Spain and Morocco. During the last two days he has received three notes from Spanish Minister on subject of creation of police at Melilla and Ceuta, and nomination of commissioners in Riff and at Ifni, and insisting on immediate effect being given to measures agreed upon in the recent Hispano-Moorish convention.

In his last note Spanish Minister states that Spanish Government, in view of

urgent situation, are taking certain measures which will assume a permanent character if their present demands are not complied with at once.

Cid Guebbas has telegraphed to Mokri to endeavour to arrange matters with Spanish Ambassador in Paris.

[17432] No. 251.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, May 8, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 56.

I learn from British vice-consul at Tetuan that Spanish captain of police force there, who had just returned from Ceuta, informed the Basha yesterday that 250 men of the Spanish Riffian force had been stationed by the Spanish Government at Fanideek, which is in Moorish territory, and that, until the Makhzen established the police force provided for in the recent convention, they would be maintained there.

The Spanish Minister informed Guebbas this afternoon verbally that if measures were taken at once by the Makhzen to fulfil agreement the force would be withdrawn; otherwise the occupation would assume permanent character.

I have repeated the foregoing to His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid.

[17140] No. 252.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May 8, 1911.*

MOROCCO. Your telegram No. 54.

I agree with your view that Madrid is the best place for the negotiations. It is important that the negotiations should be Franco-Spanish officially, and this would not be so if they took place in London; further, the injudicious action of the Spanish Ambassador in Paris will be eliminated. Negotiation at Madrid is the only way to secure these two points together. Moreover, other Powers might claim to come in if the negotiations have any official character other than Franco-Spanish.

[16350] No. 253.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 154.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 8, 1911.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 195 of the 29th ultimo, and I entirely approve the language which you held to your Austrian colleague in regard to the situation in Morocco.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[17439] No. 254.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 203.)
Sir, *Paris, May 8, 1911.*

M. HUBERT JACQUES, the special correspondent of the "Matin" with the French relief column now on its way to Fez, reported, in a communication dated the 2nd May and sent to the coast at Rabat, that the column was at that date encamped at El Kinitra and was awaiting the arrival of a portion of the column in the rear which was delayed by the question of bringing up supplies. Colonel Brulard had made a reconnaissance of 15 kilom. ahead of the column and found the country difficult, as the surface of the soil was cracked and broken up into large masses, and it was decided that a detachment was to precede the column in order to improve the route over which it had to pass. One of the objects of the reconnaissance was to open pourparlers with

No. 254*.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 23. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, May 9, 1911.*

THE French Ambassador informed the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday that French Government had no objection to the Spanish occupation of the heights overlooking Ceuta. M. Geoffray has, however, now been instructed to point out to the Spanish Government that any advance beyond the line defined in article 8 of the Spanish convention with Morocco of the 16th November, 1910, might lead to danger, and could not receive the assent of the French Government.

The latter, I understand, have requested that I should be instructed to make a similar representation, but I venture to hope that I may be allowed latitude in making this communication, so as not to offend unnecessarily. The danger is that unless Spain be given a little rope in the present crisis, she will be tempted to break away from her natural allies and seek help elsewhere. French Ambassador shares this view, and doubts the wisdom of using strong language, unless the French Government are prepared to resist by force any move on the part of Spain, such as the occupation of Tetuan. His Excellency is of opinion that the only way to keep Spain within the Anglo-French orbit is to treat her gently and not to oppose too strongly everything she may want to do in order to assert the position assigned to her under the secret convention. The above was in fact the object in view in inviting Spain to submit a statement of her demands respecting the Spanish sphere.

I would propose, if you think it sufficient, merely to tell Señor Garcia Prieto that His Majesty's Government consider Spain acted wisely in restricting her operations to the above-mentioned line. The French Ambassador intends to postpone making his communication to the Spanish Government until I have received instructions.

the Kaïd Si Larbi-ben-Ahmed, through whom it was hoped to obtain a large supply of barley. It was important to obtain this supply in order to obviate the transport of provisions for the cavalry all the way from Rabat or even from Casa Blanca. However, when, later in the day, a detachment was sent out to bring in the promised supplies, it found the village deserted, all the inhabitants having disappeared into the forest of Mamora.

M. Hubert Jacques remarks on the veiled hostility with which the column has everywhere been received since it left the Casa Blanca district. He alludes to an attack on a convoy at Salé, which was reported in the press two days ago, and to the arrest and liberation on ransom of various small parties of persons travelling between Salé and El Kinitra. Information, so he states, has reached the French as to the sentiments of the tribes and to their concentration in the forest of Mamora, which leads them to expect shortly a serious attack on the column.

The slow progress of the column is the subject of criticism in the press. The "Temps" continues to attack the Government in a vehement manner for not sending troops from the Algerian frontier. The maritime base provided by the Atlantic ports is, it says, extremely inadequate; only one ship a day can unload at Casa Blanca. The "Écho de Paris," the "Figaro," and other important papers criticise the Government for the want of decision and dispatch in sending relief to Fez. On the other hand, M. Jaurès publishes an article in the "Humanité" this morning in which the gloomiest view is taken of the development of the present difficulties. He declares that the column may possibly meet with much resistance from the tribes whose fanaticism is aroused; that its arrival at Fez will mean the moral ruin of the Sultan, whom his subjects will henceforth consider as the ignominious puppet of the foreigners. Insurrectionary movements will continue, especially in the south, and there will be a coalition of Germany and Spain against France. The latter will be placed in the dilemma either of retiring from the Moorish "Fashoda," or of buying off her adversaries by concessions of various kinds. She may have to abandon her position in the near East and open her market to German finance, and all for the right of sharing with Spain "un Maroc anarchique et haineux."

Criticisms of this nature were to be expected from M. Jaurès, as, for the last five years, he has devoted all his energies and eloquence to keeping French policy strictly within the limits laid down by the Algeciras Act, and to discouraging the French Government from any forward movement in Morocco.

The communiqués which the French Government have issued during the last three weeks respecting their military action in Morocco have all had the same fate, namely, to be immediately rendered null and void by the turn of events. It was first announced that a Moorish force only was to go to the assistance of the Sultan; then that a column of French troops would support it in the rear; then that the delay in forming the Moorish force had necessitated the immediate advance of the column without waiting for the Moorish force. The latest communiqué, dated the 5th instant, made known the intention of the French Government to order their forces to stop at Dar-Dzrari, about 85 kilom. from Fez, where the route enters upon a mountainous region which separates the former point from the plain round Fez. This communiqué was no sooner published than the highly disquieting reports of the situation at Fez obliged the French Government to reconsider their decision, and, at the request of the Sultan, to approve the advance of their troops to the capital.

There is no reason to suppose that the present Ministry contemplated any "policy of adventure" in Morocco, but the critical situation of the Sultan, involving the security of their officers as well as of the European communities at Fez, has forced their hands.

Until the Europeans at Fez are safe, public opinion, aroused by the strong line taken by the "Temps" and other papers, will demand vigorous measures on the part of the Government. But once they are safe, expression will be given in many quarters to a dislike of spending men and money in complications in the interior of Morocco which will weaken France in Europe.

I am informed by the military attaché that it is considered that France has not a soldier to spare from her home forces, and that it is frequently a subject of discussion whether the Algerian and Tunisian garrisons cannot be further reduced in order to augment the total of the French army at home.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[17616] No. 255.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, May 9, 1911.*

I HAVE received letter from Mulai Zin announcing his proclamation as Sultan. He says he desires to maintain friendship which has always existed between his ancestors and Great Britain, and as proof of this he has chosen as Minister for Foreign Affairs Mikwar, who has always exerted himself on behalf of British interests. Zin has also written to German Minister and to Abd-el-Aziz. I am communicating a copy of my letter to my colleagues. I do not propose to reply.

Reports which reach me from all sources, European and native alike, throughout the country all show depth of unpopularity of Hafid, and the French will have a most serious task before them if they intend to maintain him. French chargé d'affaires seems to have realised this.

I am assured that Fez would have surrendered before this had not leading Shereefs dreaded possibility of harm befalling Europeans. I believe that negotiations are in progress between them and Zin, and, provided safety of Europeans could be assured, situation might be simplified were they to succeed. Task of French would be undoubtedly facilitated were Hafid to be deposed before arrival of column. This cannot be expected for a fortnight, as great difficulties are being experienced in landing stores, &c. Two convoys have already been attacked and five French soldiers killed.

[17141] No. 256.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May 9, 1911.*

PARIS telegram No. 55 : Morocco.

I request that you will notify to the Spanish Government in the manner which you consider most appropriate and advisable that His Majesty's Government will fully maintain the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, and that their attitude will be shaped in accordance with that which they adopted in 1906 at Algeciras.

[17678] No. 257.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May 9, 1911.*

I TOLD M. Cambon of the instruction sent to Sir M. de Bunsen to-day.

While admitting that in view of the situation at Fez the French must relieve the place by the quickest possible route, I observed that the revolt of the tribes was apparently against the extortion and misrule of Mulai Hafid and Glawi. If so, it would be a pity for the French to make it their object to force these bad rulers upon the Moors; to do so would turn the revolt into an anti-French or anti-foreign channel, it would not recommend itself to public opinion, and it would make it impossible for the French to withdraw.

When the French officers got into touch with the tribes, if they found that a pacific settlement could be made and all difficulties dissipated by a change of Sultan or Grand Vizier or both, it would be well not to miss the opportunity.

M. Cambon thanked me cordially for what I had told him of the communication to Madrid, and said he would tell M. Cruppi my view of the situation in Morocco. Personally he thought it probably indispensable that Glawi should be dismissed, and Mulai Hafid might himself have to go if he would not concede that.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 79; Madrid, No. 55; and Tangier, No. 33.)

[17742] No. 258.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, May 10, 1911.*

HIS Majesty's consul Fez reports town quiet on 5th; insurgents attacked on previous day, but were repulsed with some loss.

[17734] No. 259.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, May 10, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 55, Secret.

I met the German Ambassador yesterday, and had a long conversation with him as to the present aspect of the Morocco question.

His Excellency was, he told me, at present engaged in a difficult dispute with the Spanish Government as to a boundary complication which had arisen between a mining company represented by a German named Natter and the Compañía de las Minas del Riff. Natter complains that having purchased a mining site in the neighbourhood of the Spanish mines, and having occupied this site for many months, he has now been forcibly ejected by the Spanish mining company, who claim that the site is included in the territory belonging to their company. My support has also been engaged in this question on the side of the Spanish company, whose principal shareholder, a Mr. Macpherson, claims to be a British subject.

Prince Ratibor then went on to discuss the Morocco question on its broader lines. He seems to mould his language on that held in Berlin. France, he said, should not establish her influence at Fez in a way to destroy the principles of the General Act of Algeciras. Should this be the result of French operations, the Morocco question will return to the *status quo ante*. I sounded his Excellency as to the rumoured occupation by Spain of Ifni. He seemed to think that this as well as the recent occupation of the Ceuta heights was justified by the failure of the Makhzen in assisting her in carrying out the stipulations of the convention of 16th November, 1911. He gathers from some remarks dropped by the King of Spain that the Government do not intend to take any further forcible action at present, but added that in his opinion it would be quite natural if Spain responded to the possible French occupation of Fez by a Spanish occupation of Tetuan. I pointed out that the circumstances in the two cases were in no way similar, and Prince Ratibor said that anyhow both occupations would be only theoretically justified by events, since in fact the French intervention at Fez (from where the news was now most hopeful, Major Brémond's column having returned in good condition) was just as unjustified by actual events as would be a Spanish intervention at Tetuan.

I discussed the German Ambassador's general attitude with my French colleague. M. Geoffray agrees with me in thinking that there is no reason to suppose that the German Ambassador is encouraging the Spanish Government to adopt a recalcitrant attitude. It is of course obvious that the Spanish Government look at developments in Morocco from much the same standpoint as the Germans do, and they think that Germany is not likely to object to their gradually taking up a position in Morocco such as will limit French influence there.

[17745] No. 260.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, May 10, 1911.*

IN discussing the Morocco question to-day, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs repeated his declaration that it was a matter in which the Austro-Hungarian Government took but little interest. The newspapers here have published statements to the effect that Austria-Hungary has a more considerable trade than Germany with Morocco, but the Marquis Pallavicini appeared to regard this announcement with

doubt. He told me that the Morocco question was viewed with calm by official circles in Berlin, and that France would meet with no serious trouble unless she took refuge in subterfuges in order to remain in Fez. His information as to the state of things in that town went rather to confirm the German view that there was no imminent danger there for the Europeans, and that the Sultan was in a fairly stable position.

[17745] No. 261.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 28.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 10, 1911.

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador asked me to-day whether I had any news from Morocco.

I said that the news from Fez was bad; the town was cut off from supplies; the people inside were getting short of ammunition, and food also was running short. With the revolted tribes outside and approaching starvation inside, it was obvious that the only thing for the French to do was to relieve Fez by the quickest possible route. When this had been done, I hoped that some settlement might be made by the French which would restore the normal order of things; but at present the first thing to do was to relieve Fez as soon as possible. In Parliament here we had been pressed as to the danger to British subjects in Fez. There were not many there, but they were people who deserved sympathy, and if the French had not been taking measures to relieve the place, we should have had to ask them to do so. As it was, the French subjects in danger in Fez were more numerous than the British subjects—they included French officers—and the French had therefore been bound to act promptly upon their own initiative.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[13935] No. 262.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 36.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 11, 1911.

I HAVE had under consideration your despatch No. 73 of the 6th ultimo, reporting the proceedings of the sub-commission charged with the examination of the draft regulations for a municipality for Tangier.

I agree generally with the views on the subject which you express, and as regards article 15, I should be disposed to recommend the alternative favoured by yourself and by Ali Zaky, viz., that the four technical delegates should be members of the Commission administrative, and that they should have a vote.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[17536] No. 263.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 38.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 11, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 6th instant, and informed Sir A. Nicolson that the French Ambassador at Madrid had received instructions to discuss with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in conjunction with your Excellency, those points in connection with Morocco on which Spain desires to obtain some satisfaction. M. de Villa Urrutia considered this news very satisfactory. He added that he had received no information as to whether the statement made by the German Ambassador in Paris—see my telegram No. 40 of the 4th May—had been confirmed by the German Government.

Sir A. Nicolson communicated to the Ambassador the substance of Mr. Lister's

[17622] No. 260*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 56.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May* 10, 1911.

MOROCCO. Your telegram No. 23.

I think that the French Ambassador's view of the situation is sound, and it is certainly desirable to avoid giving offence to Spain. If Spain is to be kept in the Anglo-French orbit it seems to be essential that some latitude of action should be allowed to her by France.

I quite agree with the language which you propose to hold to Señor Garcia Prieto.

[17915] No. 261*.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 25.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, May* 11, 1911.

(R.) MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has communicated to me copy of a memorandum sent yesterday to French Ambassador, containing the demands of Spain as regards her sphere of influence in Morocco.

Memorandum is accompanied by a draft declaration and protocol setting forth the manner in which the Spanish Government consider that they should be allowed to exercise their influence.

The draft declaration is drawn up in the name of Spain, France, and England, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs states that he sends me these papers "in order that from the beginning you may be in a position to take part, with the French Ambassador and myself, in the work of conciliation and good understanding upon which we are entering, and of the happy result of which I cannot doubt."

I have replied that I shall be happy to use my good offices and tender friendly advice, but that I have no authority to take part in a tripartite negotiation as apparently contemplated by the Spanish Government. I hope to be able to forward an abstract in a few days. (End of R.)

The Spanish proposals go far beyond anything that could be at present conceded, but M. Geoffray agrees with me in thinking that some of them may form a reasonable basis for discussion, and that the French offer to take the Spanish demands into consideration has already produced a good effect.

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telegram No. 53 depicting the serious situation at Fez, on which his Excellency remarked that he feared French news from Fez was sometimes coloured—an assertion which Sir A. Nicolson contested. The Ambassador also pointed out that the French were making progress from the east, and had occupied Debdu.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[17938] No. 264.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 12.)

(No. 60.)

Madrid, May 8, 1911.

Sir,

SINCE the commencement of the French advance on Fez, public expectation in Spain has fixed on Laraiche and Ceuta as the two points likely to form the scene of a Spanish counter-demonstration. There has been irritation against France for the use which she has made of Alcazar as a base, first for the relief of Major Brémond's mehalla, and later for military co-operation with the French and native columns now marching up the Wady Sebu towards the Moorish capital. In point of fact it seems natural enough that, in responding to the besieged Sultan's appeal for assistance, the French military authorities should have felt themselves at liberty to forward supplies and money through places lying within the Spanish sphere of influence, though to do so might involve the placing of a certain number of instructors and other French agents in the town of Alcazar. But the Spanish Government, in their present frame of mind, are disposed to resent any action whatever that France may take in the Spanish sphere without a previous understanding with them, or at least without the notification required under article 2 of the secret convention. I understand from the French Ambassador that he has now received full particulars of all that his countrymen are doing at Alcazar, and that he expects to be able, by communicating them to Señor Garcia Prieto, to relieve his apprehensions in respect of French interference in the Laraiche–Alcazar region.

As regards Ceuta, M. Geoffray has always told the Spanish Government that no objection was likely to be raised to their organising some sort of police force to keep the peace in the neighbourhood. At his last diplomatic reception on Friday, the 5th May, Señor Garcia Prieto told both his Excellency and myself that something was likely to be done on those lines. I was, therefore, not greatly surprised to hear that the Governor of Ceuta had been authorised to take the law into his own hands. It is, of course, much easier for the Spanish Government to occupy a few strategic points with their troops than to organise a new police force, and the step can equally be presented as a police operation.

Moreover, Señor Canalejas had spoken to me, as reported in my despatch No. 57, Confidential, of the 3rd May, in a sense foreshadowing the employment of forcible measures in the Ceuta region.

The points occupied at dawn yesterday morning are described in to-day's newspapers as Cudia Federico, commanding Wady Marsa, Cudia Fajana, commanding Wady Fenidak (or Castillejos), and the heights de la Condesa, commanding a considerable stretch of the road to Tetuan.

They are all three strategic positions along the line of heights overlooking Ceuta which, by article 7 of the convention between Spain and Morocco of the 16th November, 1910, the Makhzen engaged neither to fortify nor occupy with troops at any time.

Notwithstanding this undertaking, Spanish Ministers have repeatedly expressed to me since the date of the above convention their feeling that the safety of Ceuta would never be adequately secured till the chain of heights by which it is commanded should be in Spanish hands. Their seizure does not come, therefore, as a surprise, and M. Geoffray has been good enough to inform me that he has this morning assured the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the French Government have no objection to offer. The latter had, indeed, already intimated to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, in preparing him for a possible French move on Fez, that they would place no difficulties in the way of any steps which Spain might think it necessary to take to protect from disturbance the districts in which she was especially interested.

In the terms of the communication in which the Spanish Government inform me that they have brought to your knowledge the action taken yesterday by the garrison at Ceuta, the occupation of the heights in question is described as a police measure of

a temporary character, justified by the failure of the Makhzen to keep their engagements in respect of the maintenance of an efficient police force to keep free the communications between Ceuta and the surrounding country, and rendered necessary by the increasing frequency of the acts of violence perpetrated by the neighbouring tribes. It is added that the operation has no relation to the events which are taking place in other parts of Morocco.

It is difficult, however, to resist the reflection that, whether consciously or not, the Spanish Government are more concerned in making a move from Ceuta, to assert their liberty of action and to make a counter-demonstration as a set-off to what the French are doing elsewhere, than merely to restore order in a region which is probably not now in a more disturbed condition than it has frequently been in the past without in the least disturbing the equanimity of the authorities of Ceuta.

The occupation of the heights overlooking Ceuta is likely to be followed by further attempts on the part of Spain to extend her authority in the region which the French Government recognised in 1904 as falling within her sphere of influence. The press of all shades of opinion, except the Republican, continues to urge energetic action in response to what is described as the gratuitous advance of the French to relieve a city no longer in any danger of assault. Señor Maura, the ex-Prime Minister responsible for the Melilla war in 1900, gives out that, in his opinion, the only prospect of restoring Morocco to order lies in its immediate partition into avowed spheres of influence, French and Spanish.

Possibly, the Spanish pretensions will assume a concrete form in the note which is being prepared for submission to the French Ambassador, in response to his own suggestion.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[17939] No. 265.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 61.)
Sir, *Madrid, May 9, 1911.*

THE situation in Morocco formed the subject of interpellations in both chambers of the Cortes at yesterday's opening session.

In the Senate, Señor Garcia Prieto very briefly recounted the circumstances which had led to the Spanish action in the Ceuta district. The Government were ready to permit a general discussion of the Morocco problem, but were unable as yet to make a full statement of policy in view of the exchange of views now being carried on with the French Government.

In the lower chamber, Señor Canalejas stated that he had nothing to remark regarding the real or supposed projects of France. As regards the action taken by Spain at Ceuta it had been undertaken owing to the state of disorder outside the gates of that fortress. Under the Act of Algeciras, Spain had a perfect right to occupy the two points which she had lately occupied; this step was a mere measure of police, temporary in character, although its duration could not be definitely stated, until it could be seen when the Sultan would be in a position to ensure tranquillity in that district. He declared that the step thus undertaken had been necessary for the prestige of Spain and had been carried out with all prudence, adding that in cases where the national honour was at stake, such duties must be carried out.

Señor Pablo Iglesias, the Republican Socialist deputy, criticised the statement that the step undertaken at Ceuta was a mere police operation. The party which he represented were opposed to a policy of conquest and must renew their active protest against what practically amounted to an act of war, declaring that this so-called intervention in Africa was a source of the greatest danger to Spain. If the Spanish fortresses of Ceuta and Melilla could be held as hitherto all was well, but, if an extension of territory in the neighbourhood was necessary, then this meant that Spain was going to war and the Spanish nation was opposed to such a war.

Señor Canalejas replied that such language would not have been held by the Socialists in Germany. Spain would never consent to renounce her personality or to abandon her possessions. She had been compelled lately either to retire or to intervene. He himself would never be a party to a policy of retreat while, apart from a policy of adventure, there were engagements and duties which had to be carried out. The Socialist deputy repeated that to say that the fortresses could not continue to be

held without some territorial expansion was equivalent to talking of war and declared that the current of public opinion was entirely opposed to such a course.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[17745] No. 266.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May 12, 1911.*

MOROCCO. Your telegram No. 42 of the 10th instant.

Please inform the Austro-Hungarian Government that the reports which we have received from Consul McLeod entirely confirm the French view of the gravity of the situation at Fez.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador called here on the 10th May, and I told him that our news from Fez was bad. There were officers amongst the French citizens at Fez, and the French had therefore been bound to act at once on their own initiative. There were also British subjects there, and we should have had to ask France to take measures for their relief if she had not been doing so already.

[18114] No. 267.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 104. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, May 7, 1911.*

AS I had the honour to report by telegraph, I returned to Tangier on the 2nd instant and resumed charge of His Majesty's Legation.

I saw the French chargé d'affaires on the following morning. He appeared to me to take a very gloomy view of the situation. The arrival at Fez of Major Brémond's mehalla, he said, was not confirmed; the attitude of Raisuli was far from satisfactory; there seemed little hope of getting ammunition and money through to Fez, both of which were badly needed, and the tone of the Spanish Minister was far from pleasant. A minor official of the Spanish Legation, Villaalta by name—notorious, M. de Billy said, for his gallophobia and venality—was being sent down to Alcazar to replace the consular agent. The situation there was already sufficiently delicate, and he feared trouble.

He at the same time read me two letters which he had received from M. Regnault, saying that the French Government were anxious, if possible, to avoid sending the French column as far as Fez, and that their idea was to halt them at Dar Sorrira, at the junction of the roads to Fez and Mequinez; their presence there would exercise a salutary effect upon the tribes, and they would be within easy distance of Fez were they actually required in the capital. The decision of the Government in the matter would, of course, depend upon further news from Fez.

That afternoon a letter, copy of which is enclosed herein,* reached me from Mr. Macleod, sent by a special messenger bearing despatches to the Spanish Legation. I telegraphed to you a summary of the information which it contained, which certainly appeared to me satisfactory.

On the following morning I saw the German Minister, who had received despatches from his consul dated two days later than my letter from Mr. Macleod. As I reported in my telegram No. 51, Dr. Vassel took a most optimistic view of the situation. Major Brémond's mehalla was, he said, in splendid condition; the Sultan had 7,000 men at his disposal; there was no possibility of the town being captured by the rebels, and the Europeans were in no sort of danger. The only thing, he added, which might imperil their safety was the arrival of a French relief column. He could not, he said, answer for what might then occur, as the fanaticism of the lower orders of the population would certainly be aroused.

Baron Seckendorff told me that he had telegraphed this information to his Government, and had also communicated it to the French chargé d'affaires.

I subsequently saw M. de Billy, and said that, in view of the favourable informa-

* Not printed.

tion which had been received, I hoped that it might be possible to delay the advance of the French relief column, and thus to avoid giving any pretext to Germany to raise difficulties ; the native force, under El Amrani, whose presence at Fez would no doubt be of great value, would of course continue. M. de Billy said that personally he shared my hopes, but that he was inclined to fear that, since M. Regnault had written, other counsels had prevailed in Paris, and the Government were decided to send the French troops up to Fez in any case. He realised the gravity of such a step in view of what Dr. Vassel had written. If any outburst of fanaticism were to be occasioned by the arrival of the French column, Germany would of course lay the responsibility for any disaster that might ensue upon the French Government. He could not, however, do more than lay the facts before his Government, and they must decide. He begged me to consider his expression of opinion as purely personal, and, in reporting it, begged that he might not be quoted. I must say that, on receipt of Mr. Macleod's letter of the 26th, I was full of hope that the tide had turned, that the local situation would improve, and that the French would no longer be obliged to take action which might create international complications. It appeared almost certain that the moral impression produced by the safe arrival of the Sherarda mehalla would be very good, all the more so in view of the glowing accounts of their conduct during the recent operations, which would have been most trying, to say the least of it, to thoroughly disciplined troops. It was consequently a great disappointment when, on the following day, M. de Billy showed me letters, dated from the 27th to 30th April, which he had just received from the French consul at Fez and from Colonel Mangin, stating that the situation had changed very much for the worse. The spirit of the mehalla, they said. had completely altered since their arrival at Fez, and it appeared doubtful whether they could be made to take the field again with any chance of success, although the Sultan contemplated an attack upon the rebel camp at Ras-el-Ma. Moreover, the impression produced upon the tribes by their arrival at Fez had been the reverse of what we had hoped. During the whole of the march they had been incessantly attacked, and, after their passage, the hostile tribes had closed in behind them ; the blockade was closer than ever, and various tribes who had hitherto been wavering had joined the rebels. The Sultan, who had up till then been optimistic, had become desperate, and had begged the French consul to arrange at once for the dispatch of a French army, which, he said, was his only means of salvation. M. Gaillard and Colonel Mangin agreed with him in this, as the difficulties experienced by Brémond's mehalla, notwithstanding the fact that it was led by Europeans and supported by artillery, had proved conclusively that it would be impossible for any native force to cut its way through the enemy and reach Fez. Colonel Mangin expressed the opinion very strongly that a simultaneous advance should be made from the Shawia and from the Monlouya, and that no time should be lost. The situation at Fez was growing daily more serious, owing to the scarcity of food, of ammunition, and of money, and it was with great difficulty that the Makhzen could negotiate their bills.

M. de Billy said that he had reported the above by telegraph to his Government, and that he imagined that an immediate advance would be ordered. He laid great stress on the fact that the demand for French intervention was made by the Sultan entirely on his own initiative, and before the news of the dispatch of the French column could have reached the capital.

Yesterday morning M. de Billy came to see me again. He told me that he had communicated M. Gaillard's and Colonel Mangin's reports to Baron Seckendorff. The latter had expressed profound astonishment, having, he said, received a report from Dr. Vassel, dated the 30th, in which he stated that the situation was very much the same, but mentioned nothing that could give cause for alarm. M. de Billy is convinced that Dr. Vassel is acting under instructions, as, so far, his reports have always, more or less, tallied with those sent by his French and British colleagues. In the meantime I had received despatches from Mr. Macleod, copies of which are enclosed,* which, more or less, confirmed the French reports of the gravity of the situation. Dr. Verdon has also written a long private letter to Mr. Rattigan, in which he says :—

"The position of Mulai Hafid is becoming most critical, and that of the Europeans at Fez far from pleasant. If the insurrection spreads to the Gharb and down south, I do not see what Hafid can do ; he has a force of between 2,000 and 2,500 half-trained men, the Sherarda mehalla, and about 1,500 tribal levies of very little value. The Fez

* Not printed.

people are without work, trade is at a standstill, the Sultan is hated by all, rich and poor ; should the troops trained by the French meet with a reverse, I fear the Fez people would rise."

Dr. Verdon, writing of Mulai Zin, whom he has known intimately for many years, says :—

"I am convinced that he will do his utmost for British and other Europeans. Since his proclamation he has sent me greetings, and has requested me to look after a sick slave of his. He is a nice young fellow, of about 25, with pleasant manners, considerate, very good-natured, and not at all fanatical. He is, I am sure, a weak man, and in many ways he resembles his brother, Mulai Abd-el-Aziz. If he were to be proclaimed at Fez, and I could communicate with him, he would do his best for us. I fear he may be only a puppet in the hands of the Berber hordes who have proclaimed him at Mequinez."

Dr. Verdon sums up his long letter by saying that he fails to see how Mulai Hafid is going to pull through the present crisis without the assistance of a French army. There is no sign of dissensions among the insurgents at present, and things have gone too far for the factor of the proximity of the harvest to be of any real importance.

The ex-Sultan, Mulai Abd-el-Aziz, paid me a visit last Thursday on my return to Tangier. The conversation naturally turned upon politics, and I can see that he considers the situation excessively serious and most complicated. The tribes, he says, are clamouring for the dismissal of Glawi, yet the Sultan cannot afford to dismiss him, as he would at once lose the whole of the south ; moreover, if he had the courage to take such a step, the country would realise that he had some force behind him (*i.e.*, the French), and he would become, if possible, more unpopular than before.

Abd-el-Aziz said that he did not consider that his brother Mulai Jin would make a good Sultan ; but he was very guarded in his remarks, and I derived the impression that his views have considerably modified since last summer, when he told me that he had no desire to reascend the throne ; that a change of Sultan would necessitate a complete change of régime, and that it would be far better for any such new régime to be started by a new Sultan who had never reigned under the old conditions.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[18116] No. 268.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 13.)

(No. 106. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, May 7, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 30 of the 24th ultimo, enclosing copy of a note from the Spanish Ambassador in London, on the subject of the difficulties which have arisen between the Spanish Government and the international syndicate known as the Union des Mines marocaines.

As far as I know, Mr. Harris, when at Fez in the spring of 1909, made a statement to M. Merry del Val to the effect that no doubt a special arrangement had been or would be made with the Spanish group with regard to mines situated in the immediate vicinity of the Spanish fortresses in the Riff.

Apparently an arrangement of this nature had already been made in July 1908, and I understand that on the 29th March, 1909, M. de Allen de Salazar, at that time Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed the representative of the Union des Mines, in the presence of the French Ambassador, that the Spanish Government were absolutely satisfied with the measures taken to ensure proper regard being paid to Spanish political interests in the districts in question. It would appear to me difficult after this for the Spanish Government to maintain that they never acquiesced in the scheme.

As regards the statement that the agents of the syndicate who have lately been prospecting in the neighbourhood of Peñon and Alhucemas have done so in a manner which showed their desire to escape the notice of the military authorities, I was assured by Mr. Harris that he never despatched any agents to districts in which the

Spanish Government could lay claim to any special position without previously notifying the Spanish Minister here.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[18229] No. 269.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, May 13, 1911.*

FRENCH chargé d'affaires informs me that Spaniards have now occupied a position 10 miles from Tetuan. Their action is, in my opinion, quite unwarranted by state of country, and district bordering on Tangier may become seriously disturbed in consequence of it.

I learn that Anjera tribe has called a general meeting for to-day to discuss desirability of opposing Spanish advance by force.

Harris has written to Valiente, one of the chiefs of the Anjera, recommending extreme caution.

[18232] No. 270.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 43. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, May 13, 1911.*

SEE my telegram No. 39 of the 5th instant with regard to the Moroccan question.

The writer of the article referred to in the above-mentioned telegram has told me in strict confidence that, after Herr von Tschirschky had communicated to him verbally the general outline of the article, he, the writer, called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and enquired their views as to the advisability of its publication. He was informed that he was at liberty to publish the article, as in their opinion it might have the effect of checking German *intransigeance* as a result of the rousing of public opinion in Austria to a sense of the risks which the Dual Monarchy might incur through the policy of her ally.

My informant tells me that in the article he considerably modified Herr von Tschirschky's language. The latter said that the view taken by the Spanish Government of the Moroccan question was sound, but that the fear of France organising a revolution in Spain deterred them from giving effect to it. His Excellency also said that in the event of a French force entering Fez his Government would peremptorily demand that it should be withdrawn. He added that the action of the French Government was, in his opinion, calculated to produce a situation similar to that caused by the Fashoda incident. The writer of the article considers that Herr von Tschirschky was expressing the true opinion of the Imperial Government which has been communicated to their representatives, not with a view to publication, but for their personal information.

According to information which I have received confidentially, Herr von Tschirschky complained some days ago to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that certain Ambassadors had been intriguing to influence the Viennese press in a direction unfavourable to German interests. By certain Ambassadors, Herr von Tschirschky meant my French colleague and myself. He also denied that the above-mentioned article had been in any way inspired by him.

The difference in the attitudes towards the Moroccan question of the Austro-Hungarian and German Governments is explained to me by the editor of the Foreign Office organ here to be the following:—

The former accept in a friendly spirit the assurances given by the French Government, while the latter accept them officially in an unfriendly spirit. The editor informs me that he intends to publish at the beginning of next week in a paper, not his own, an inspired article adopting a most friendly tone towards France. It would not be thought expedient to publish an article so favourable to France in a semi-official paper.

[18321] No. 271.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 77. Confidential.)
Sir, *Vienna, May 11, 1911.*

IN my telegram No. 39, Confidential, of the 5th instant, I had the honour to inform you that a leading Vienna newspaper had, at the request of the German Ambassador here, published a violent anti-French article purporting to give the views of the German Government as to the action of France in Morocco. The following is a translation of the article in question, which appeared in the "Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung" of the 3rd May:—

"*Berlin, May 3.*

"The development of Moroccan affairs is considered here to be serious, and the situation is characterised as difficult.

"No hindrance will be placed in the way of the French advance on Fez, so long as the action of the French troops is confined to saving French citizens in Fez from the danger of being massacred, although according to present ideas the news from French sources of the danger of Europeans in Fez is very much exaggerated. On the other hand Germany will make a peremptory and strong protest if it turns out that the French expedition exceeds the character of a relief force. The German Government would regard a sojourn of French troops in Fez longer than is absolutely necessary for rest and for the preparations for the withdrawal of French residents as a breach of the Act of Algeciras, and would draw the resulting conclusions. Germany would no longer consider herself to be bound by that Act, and would reserve to herself full freedom of commerce.

"Germany would in all probability decline to assent to a proposal for a fresh conference for the revision of the Algeciras Act, because a breach of that Act by the French would clearly show the futility of such agreements, and it would therefore not seem worth while to give much labour only to reach a useless and aimless result. The fate of the first Algeciras Act would not encourage Germany to co-operate in the preparation of a second.

"Germany must, however, also insist on the maintenance, *de facto* and not only *de jure*, of the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan of Morocco. It must therefore be borne in mind that the measures adopted by France are to be examined from this point of view as well. A French display of force in Morocco, exceeding the object of a mere relief expedition, and combined with an occupation, even if only temporary, of Fez, would of necessity make such an impression in Morocco, that the Sultan would in reality sink to the level of a mere vassal of France. Such a state of affairs would be in direct opposition to the spirit of the Act of Algeciras. Germany would deem herself to be representing the general interests of Europe in protesting against the distortion of international agreements.

"Germany will also have to consider carefully before deciding to agree to the renewal of the mandate which was given by the Algeciras Act to France and Spain with regard to the policing of the Moroccan ports. This international mandate expires at the end of this year, and recent events are not altogether calculated to encourage Germany again to legalise the privileged position of France in this respect."

This article was reproduced by two papers in Berlin, where it appears to have caused some excitement, and even to have affected the Bourse. The "Koelnische Zeitung," however, immediately published a semi-official statement to the effect that the article did not emanate from official sources either in Berlin or Vienna.

The "Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung" published on the 5th May a further statement said to have been made to a representative of the paper by a diplomatist particularly well-informed with regard to the Moroccan question. A very moderate view of the situation was taken by the author of this statement, who expressed the opinion that it was scarcely probable, judging from the present state of affairs, that the Moroccan question would lead to serious complications. Various aspects of the question combined to support this view. In the first place there was the fact that several European Great Powers, some small European States, and finally the United States of America were interested in Morocco. The presence of these various interests produced on the one hand the result that the development of the question was on all sides watched with eager attention, but on the other hand it rendered improbable a one-sided solution of the affair in favour of one particular Power, as for instance France. It could not be

assumed that England, in spite of her friendly relations with France, would intervene in order that the latter might become the leading Power in Morocco. For that might be prejudicial to English interests in Morocco or limit their expansion, which would not be at all to English taste. In this connection it was worthy of note that the English press had so far not fanned the flame, but had rather made efforts to restrain France from too far-reaching measures. As it was with England so it was with Spain. The latter had not yet recovered from the loss of the large and rich colonies which she once possessed, and would therefore not willingly allow herself to be deprived of her influence in Morocco, where she considered herself one of the parties most interested. Certain limits were therefore set to France's action by the attitude of these two Powers. The same argument applied incidentally to Germany, whose attitude would be largely influenced by that of England and Spain. If, as suggested above, England did not desire French supremacy in Morocco, it was by reason of local interests. But if matters were to come to a conflict between France and Germany, England would find political questions of a more important and general nature called into question, behind which the care for her local interests in Morocco would take a back place. A consideration of the attitude of the group of Powers interested resulted in the conclusion that Germany's action with regard to Morocco also had certain limits, which could only be overstepped after very serious consideration of the general interests involved.

The "Neue Freie Presse" has not in any way modified its attitude as a result of the semi-official repudiation by Germany of Herr von Tschirschky's article. Its issue of the 7th May contains an article by Professor Schiemann in precisely the same strain as that communication, full of insinuations that France's assurances are not to be trusted, and that her real intentions are to tear up the Act of Algeciras and to occupy Morocco. Professor Schiemann quotes the "Wiener Allemeine Zeitung's" article with approval as corresponding entirely to the facts of the situation.

The many leading articles which this pan-German journal publishes on the subject of Morocco are naturally conceived in the same strain. It is represented that the Sultan will be completely under French influence, and that Morocco will gradually undergo a process of "tunification": a policy which it attributes entirely to M. Delcassé's return to office. It reports with satisfaction every indication of Spanish displeasure at France's policy, and endeavours to prove that the latter is not looked upon with favour even in England. "The antagonisms of Algeciras are reviving, and the turn of affairs in Morocco is serious" declares this paper, which characterises the Anglo-French Agreement regarding Egypt and Morocco as "the most solemn lies ever embodied in a treaty," and compares England's action in Egypt with France's action in Morocco. It affirms that the Franco-German Agreement gave France no right to take the action she has done, and that Germany now stands before important decisions.

On the 9th May the "Neue Freie Presse" somewhat moderated its tone. In a leading article of that date it analyses the dangers and losses to France and Germany which a serious difference between the two countries would entail, and recommends the latter to come to a clear realisation of the actual value of Morocco for Germany. No one, it declares, desires a disturbance of peace, and it would be to the best interests of both Germany and France to come to an amicable understanding on the Moroccan question. It also publishes an article from Paris pointing out the fact that Austria-Hungary's trade with Morocco is more considerable than that of Germany, and that "the Dual Monarchy has shown as little mistrust as Germany of French action in Morocco." This article also refers to the necessity of French influence preponderating in Morocco, while admitting that that influence must be wisely and moderately exercised.

The semi-official "Fremdenblatt" has so far remained completely silent, and has given no indication of the views of the "Ballplatz" on the Moroccan question.

The clerical "Vaterland" accuses England of stirring up France and Spain to active measures in Morocco in order that she may "fish in troubled waters."

The Christian-Socialist "Reichspost" in an article published on the 7th May, and entitled "the shy second," discusses Germany's action in what it entitles yielding on the Moroccan question. After explaining the reasons which Germany had for apprehending a permanent occupation of Morocco by the French, and referring to the violent and threatening article suddenly published as a warning to France in the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," the "Reichspost" goes on to state that the subsequent cooling of the atmosphere originated in England, where your speech, Sir, in the House of Commons on the 2nd May showed clearly that England would give France her full support in the Moroccan question now, as she did at the Algeciras Conference. Nor, says the "Reichspost," can anyone doubt that the attitude of Italy

would be the same now as then, or that Spain would be quite unprepared to attack France, who is well aware of all these factors in the situation.

Official Germany now gives credit to France's assurances of her correct intentions; but why, enquires the "Reichspost," was there so sudden a change? Because Germany had reckoned on Russia's indifference to the Moroccan question. When she found that in spite of the Potsdam interview Russia, who still needs French money, would give France her full support, she was compelled to moderate her tone and merely to take up the attitude that, like all the other Powers, Germany must regain her freedom of action in Morocco in the event of a violation by France of the Act of Algeciras. That is to say, the same situation prevails as before Algeciras, with the important difference that the futility of a second conference is generally recognized. Germany must admit the worthlessness of the Act of Algeciras and her own disappointment in finding Russia such a bad second.

The above article is remarkable as being the only one published in the Viennese press which in any way admits the fact of Germany's sudden withdrawal from her hostile attitude. It is also the only paper, so far as I have observed, which gives as a reason for this withdrawal the fact that Germany was mistaken in reckoning on Russia's indifference to the Moroccan question.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[18300] No. 272.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 15.)

(No. 128.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, May* 11, 1911.

I ASKED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday whether he had had any conversation with the French Ambassador prior to the latter's departure on leave on the subject of the situation in Morocco, and whether that situation was causing him any preoccupation.

M. Nératof replied that M. Louis had spoken to him about ten days ago, and had expressed the opinion that an occupation of Fez would not be necessary, and that, even if it did take place, it would be of very short duration. The assurances which the French Government had given with regard to their policy in Morocco were, M. Nératof remarked, entirely satisfactory, but, if they found themselves obliged to occupy Fez, circumstances might arise which would render it difficult for them to withdraw as quickly as they might wish to. The Russian Ambassador at Berlin had, his Excellency said, had a conversation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the subject, from which it appeared that M. Kiderlin Waechter had been favourably impressed by the assurances of the French Government, though he had expressed a doubt as to whether they would be able to keep within the limits which they had laid down.

M. Nératof, however, said nothing to me about the intimation which the Russian Ambassador, as reported in Sir F. Cartwright's telegram No. 39, Most Confidential, of the 5th instant, was instructed to make to the German Government, to the effect that Russia would stand by France, nor about the assurances which M. Nératof himself is said to have given to the French Ambassador.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[18296] No. 273.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 15.)

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, May* 15, 1911.

SPECIAL courier dispatched from Tetuan this morning to Menebhi reports that there has been fighting between Spaniards and tribesmen and that town is in panic.

This may or may not refer to previous report, which was sent by French vice-consul.

[18504] No. 274.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, May 15, 1911*

MY immediately preceding telegram: Fighting at Tetuan.
Reports of fighting now contradicted.

[18487] No. 275.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, May 15, 1911.*

THE decision of the French Government to send a relief force to Fez will to-day be communicated by the French Ambassador to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. Crozier will assure the Marquis Pallavicini that the French force will be withdrawn at the earliest possible opportunity, the only object of the expedition being to consolidate the Sultan's position and to protect Europeans from the danger of being massacred.

[18512] No. 276.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, May 15, 1911.*

THE decision of the French Government to send a relief force to Fez was to-day communicated by the French Ambassador to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. (see my telegram No. 44 of to-day's date). M. Crozier pointed out that the object of the expedition was to consolidate the position of the Sultan and to protect Europeans in Fez, and that as soon as that object was accomplished the force would be withdrawn. M. Crozier explained that there was no question of the principle of the open door being jeopardised; no one would, however, benefit by that principle so long as a state of anarchy prevailed in the country.

The above communication was received by the Marquis Pallavicini in a very amicable way. His Excellency remarked that the French Government were better qualified than any one else to decide as to the necessity of sending a relief force to Fez, and that it would be useless and premature at the present juncture to discuss the question, which might, indeed, never present itself, of the withdrawal of that force. M. Crozier gathered from his conversation with the Marquis Pallavicini that the Austro-Hungarian Government are anxious that the French Government should not commit any actual breach of the Algeciras Act, although they will allow them the utmost latitude in its interpretation, for a palpable breach of the Act might have as a result the convening of a conference to deal with fresh aspects of the Moroccan question. The Great European Powers would then be split into opposing factions, and Austria-Hungary might find herself mixed up in a question in which she has no real interests at stake.

[18296] No. 277.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May 15, 1911.*

REPORTED fighting at Tetuan. Tangier telegrams Nos. 65 and 68.

Please impress on the Spanish Government the necessity of the Spanish military authorities in Morocco behaving with great forbearance and prudence. A most serious situation might arise in neighbourhood of Tangier if the tribes and a Spanish force should come into collision, and in that event it would be difficult for the Powers to remain indifferent. We have received no information which would appear to call for any measures outside the limits of the Spanish possessions, and it is the earnest hope

of His Majesty's Government that the Spanish Government will refuse to sanction any measures likely to complicate the situation in Morocco, which is already sufficiently irritating and delicate.

[17301] No. 278.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 40.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 15, 1911.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 57 of the 3rd instant, reporting your conversation with the Spanish Prime Minister on the subject of the situation in Morocco.

I entirely approve the language held by your Excellency.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[18712] No. 279.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 63.)
Sir, *Madrid, May 14, 1911.*

IN my despatch No. 58, Confidential, of the 5th instant I gave some account of the correspondence which has recently passed between the French Ambassador and the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs in connection with events in Morocco. The correspondence closed with a letter dated the 2nd May, at the conclusion of which M. Geoffray suggested, with the approval of his Government, that the Spanish Government should state frankly the nature of their grievances so that a discussion might take place between the two Governments "with the object of arriving, in concert with the British Government, at the best way of applying, in the territory of Morocco, the principles set forth in the conventions of 1904 and in the Act of Algeciras."

The quotation in inverted commas is translated from the Spanish version of the text.

In the course of the conversations which M. Geoffray and myself held on Friday, the 5th May, with Señor Garcia Prieto the latter informed both of us that the Spanish Government proposed to act on the above suggestion, and that a memorandum would be drawn up accordingly.

The promised memorandum reached the French Ambassador on the night of the 10th instant.

Señor Garcia Prieto was good enough to send me a copy, under cover of a private letter, which concluded as follows:—

"I send you the accompanying documents so that, from the first, you may be in a position to take part, with M. Geoffray and myself, in the work of conciliation and good understanding upon which we are entering, and of whose happy result I cannot doubt."

In acknowledging this communication I was careful to make it clear that, as instructed in your telegram No. 49 of the 8th instant, my co-operation, which I said I should be happy to afford, must be limited to good offices and friendly advice, and that I was not at present authorised to enter into a formal negotiation or to sign new conventions.

I have the honour to forward herewith an abstract of the Spanish memorandum, together with a translation of a draft declaration and protocol by which it is accompanied.

The Spanish Government contend, in the memorandum, that the secret convention of 1904 has been unfairly applied.

Experience shows that—

1. France has concluded financial arrangements with Morocco affecting the Spanish sphere of influence, and exceeding the maximum period of fifteen years mentioned in article 2 of the convention, without consulting Spain. The resources of the Spanish sphere have been pledged as security for loans contracted in the general

interest or in the exclusive interest of France. The Spanish sphere is thus financially crippled.

2. The distribution of the police requires readjustment. The stipulated expansion of the Casa Blanca native extra-urban police under Spanish instructors has been rendered impracticable by the terms of the last Franco-Moorish convention. France monopolises military instruction of the native troops throughout Morocco.

3. In the Morocco Public Works Department the proper position and authority of the Spanish engineer has never been recognised. Spain has been thwarted over the draft mining regulations. She is insufficiently represented in the State Bank and other institutions.

4. It is not sufficiently recognised that Tangier, notwithstanding its "special character," forms part of the special sphere of influence.

5. The Spanish share in loans, &c., is insufficient.

6. The Spanish language has been improperly excluded from employment, equally with the French language, in proclamations, &c.

In conclusion, it is argued that an occupation even temporary of Fez by the French must inevitably affect the position of the Sultan and the existing régime, in a manner compelling Spain to secure her rights. The best way to meet the new situation would be to admit that circumstances have brought into action the provision contained in the secret convention allowing Spain under certain contingencies full liberty to do what she pleases in her own sphere; and, further, to publish the secret treaty. But, as France sees objections to publication, the Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests, as an alternative, a form of declaration for signature by the Spanish Government and the French and British representatives at Madrid, and also a protocol, which latter is drawn up in a form permitting it to be communicated to the Powers while the declaration remains secret.

The draft declaration contains six articles:—

1. The first period of the secret treaty being ended, Spain enjoys free action in her sphere of influence.

2. Franco-Moorish financial arrangements of March 1910 not to be secured on the resources of the Spanish sphere. France and Spain will come to an agreement concerning the construction of a Tangier-Fez Railway passing through Arzila, Larache, and Alcazar.

3. Annexed protocol, for communication to the Powers, sets forth measures jointly agreed to for restoring order and re-establishing the Sultan's authority.

4. The French and Spanish engineers at the head of the Moorish Office of Works shall each advise and assist the Makhzen in relation to the sphere of influence of his country.

5. Each Government shall support the action of the other in the respective spheres of influence.

6. Spanish language to be on a footing of equality with the French in proclamations, &c.

British Ambassador to take act of the foregoing, which remains secret as long as the secret convention remains so. If the Sultan loses his independence, Spain declares herself to be at liberty to determine by herself the legal status of her sphere of influence.

The protocol is divided into two parts. The first provides that French instructed troops shall not operate in the Spanish sphere; that if foreign officers be required to instruct the native forces in the Spanish sphere, they shall be taken from the Spanish instructors of native police; that it is expedient that the police mandate exercised by France and Spain in Morocco be renewed under specified new conditions as to distribution, &c.; and that Spain will introduce into the Riff country and the regions south of Wady Mesa, which form the frontier of the Ifni district, the régime contemplated in article 3 of the Hispano-Moorish Convention of the 16th November, 1910.

Part 2 of the protocol aims at the immediate repayment of the holders of the 1904 and 1910 loans of that portion of their contributions which is secured on certain Moorish revenues in the Spanish sphere. It further contemplates arrangements in virtue of which the ceded revenues in the French and Spanish spheres of influence shall be administered by agents of the French and Spanish Governments respectively.

M. Geoffray is sending M. Martin, councillor of the French Embassy, to-day to

Paris to lay these papers before the French Government and explain personally their full purport.

In the conversation which his Excellency has already held with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, since the receipt of the memorandum, he has confined himself to stating that, although the latter displays a profound divergence of view between the two Governments, he is glad to have before him a concrete statement of the full extent of the Spanish demands, and is not without hope that it will provide a basis for useful discussion, in view of the understanding which is so desirable in the interest of the peaceful development of affairs in Morocco.

M. Geoffray had confided to me that, in his opinion, such an understanding might be sought in an arrangement meeting to some extent the Spanish claims in respect of the non-penetration of French-instructed troops into the Spanish sphere. He thinks that some redistribution of the police of the open ports might be considered, if the other signatory Powers of the Algeciras Act saw no objection, but he holds that the demand for the elimination of the French-instructed police from Tangier, and the desired recognition of that port as constituting a portion of the Spanish sphere of influence, are outside the range of possible discussion.

His Excellency does not think it would be possible for France to recede from the financial arrangements concluded with Morocco in the convention of March 1910; nor, in his opinion, would any interference with the constitution of existing organisms, such as the State Bank, Public Works Department, &c., be at all admissible, in the manner suggested by Spain.

M. Martin is instructed to represent as forcibly as he can to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs M. Geoffray's view that something substantial must be yielded to Spain if she is to be prevented from breaking away from her present allies.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 279.

Abstract of Spanish Memorandum.—(*Communicated May* 10, 1911.)

(Confidential.)

MINISTRY OF STATE.

THE conventions of 1904, 1905, 1907, and others, between France and Spain, regarding Morocco do not seem to have been applied in harmony with their spirit or with Spanish interests. The convention of 1904 reserves to Spain, within a defined sphere of influence, the same action as, by article 2 (paragraph 2) of the Franco-British declaration of the 8th April, 1904, is recognised as belonging to France throughout the Empire. The only restriction is that, owing to difficulties then existing, Spain, within a maximum period of fifteen years, is not to take action within her sphere without the concurrence of France, whereas France can act with reference to the Spanish sphere on simple notification to Spain.

The result of six years' experience is the following:—

1. In the field of finance, France has concluded agreements with Morocco without even the previous knowledge of Spain, though such agreements affected the Spanish sphere of influence and covered periods exceeding fifteen years from 1904. The resources of the Spanish sphere of influence were pledged to secure loans contracted, some in the general interest; others to the exclusive advantage of the French sphere of influence; and some for the direct benefit of the French Government (as, for instance, the arrangement for the payment of a war indemnity). Indeed, if the financial scheme contemplated by the Franco-Moorish convention of March 1910 were put in force, the Spanish sphere of influence, except in the districts covered by the Hispano-Moorish convention of the 16th November, 1910, would be deprived of the resources indispensable for the institution of the necessary reforms, and even for the maintenance of order, France having gone so far as to reserve for her delegate the right to object to any new taxes being imposed in the ports.

2. Under the 1905 and 1907 agreements French and Spanish instructors were assigned respectively to the native police outside and inside the town of Tangier. But whereas the ex-urban zone is of unlimited extent, the urban zone, restricted by nature to the actual town, is to be still further circumscribed, if the French Legation has its way, by the creation of a body of municipal police.

The Franco-Spanish convention of 1905 had only contemplated the creation of a police force in five ports. At Algeciras eight ports were provided for. The French delegates at the conference being thus prevented from securing for Spain arrangements in strict conformity with the 1905 convention, Spain was compensated by a share in the instruction of the native police at Casa Blanca. In 1908 it was agreed that the radius of the Spanish extra-urban police at that port should be expanded over the territory to be eventually evacuated by the French troops on the gradual re-establishment of order. But the Franco-Moorish convention of the 4th March, 1910, runs directly counter to this agreement by providing in article 1 for the replacement of French troops, as they are withdrawn, by a native force under the French military mission.

Likewise, in the matter of the military instructors, Spain raised objections in Paris in 1908 to the continued exercise of their functions at Tangier by Major Fournié and Lieutenant Ben Sedira, holding this to be contrary to the spirit of the General Act of Algeciras which intended that the new police force at Tangier should take over from the military force the protection of the foreign colonies. In a note dated the 6th May, 1908, the Spanish ambassador reminded M. Pichon of his promise to remove the two officers in question as soon as the police force should be set on foot. But the officers still instruct the artillery at Tangier; they pay the garrisons of Arzila and Alcazar, and they are now organising the forces at Alcazar in a manner that has given rise to serious Spanish protests.

In the above-mentioned note of the Marquis del Muni of the 6th May, 1908, M. Pichon was further reminded that he had offered to support at Fez the Spanish demand for the establishment of a military mission. Yet every kind of objection has since been raised by the French Government to this idea, though the Spanish Government has explained that it only wishes to organise the Shereefian troops within the Spanish sphere of influence. The French claim to monopolise military instruction in Morocco is inconsistent with the convention of 1904. It would be so even if France only used the privilege in her own sphere (which is not the case) for then, by depriving the Spanish sphere of the presence of instructed troops, she would compel the Spanish Government, in the event of the insufficiency of the police of Larache and Tetuan, to call in the assistance of the land and sea forces of Spain to restore order at a given point, native uninstructed troops being notoriously inefficient for such a purpose.

3. Public Works. Article 66 of the Act of Algeciras mentions, not an "engineer-in-chief," but a "principal engineer" and an "assistant" engineer. At first these were always referred to by the Makhzen and diplomatic body as "the engineers," M. Porché and M. Llorens being thus associated together on an equal footing, without the latter being subordinated to the former. The idea of subordination arose later, and was met by objections on the part of Spain, in 1907, when a negotiation on the subject took place in Paris in connection with the Caisse spéciale programme of works. All that Spain could obtain was a promise that the French Government would do what it could to give practical effect to the wishes expressed by the Marquis del Muni by allowing the Spanish engineer to participate in the "execution and inspection" of the works carried out in the Spanish zone. Without stopping to enquire into the practical result of this promise, it suffices to call attention to the complete ignorance in which M. Llorens, the Spanish Legation at Tangier, and the Spanish Government were kept in regard to the project of a Tangier–Alcazar Railway which was negotiated in Paris, and to the attitude of M. Porché in the matter of the Ceuta–Tetuan Railway, in proof of the fact that M. Porché's Spanish associates may perhaps be admitted to give some technical assistance, but are held unqualified to exercise the slightest political influence by having a voice in the decisions of the Makhzen as regards public works in the Spanish sphere of influence.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the opposition raised to the natural desires of Spain in respect of the organisation of the service of mines in the scheme of mining regulations for Morocco drawn up in Paris. The draft regulations give very incomplete satisfaction to the Spanish Government, and the Spanish Ambassador in Paris has been awaiting for the last two months the French reply to a note in which he had again pressed the Spanish contention respecting the powers of the Spanish collectors of the mining tax—a contention which the French Government had rejected notwithstanding its equity and the circumstance that the tax in question was the security for the sums payable to Spain.

When agents are appointed to represent the State Bank, or the holders of the 1904 loan, or the Department of Public Works, this service is systematically confided

to French agents, who thus intervene frequently in the Spanish sphere of influence. Even when a Spaniard secures the appointment he is under French direction, and thus incapacitated for rendering useful service to his country. Señor Furundarena, of the Tetuan Urban Tax Commission, is in this situation.

In 1907 the two Governments agreed to establish at Tetuan and Laraiche agencies of the State Bank under Spanish directors. This has never been done. In the Tangier office the Spanish employés are also in an unsatisfactory position both numerically and as regards the work they are allowed to do.

4. According to article 9 of the 1904 secret convention Tangier retains its special character as being the seat of the diplomatic body and in view of its municipal and sanitary institutions. Evidently it was never intended that Tangier should be outside the Spanish sphere of influence, or that France and Spain should be on an equal footing there. Strictly speaking, France has no claim even to a half share in the work of reform at Tangier. But, in practice, Spain has even more difficulty in being admitted to take part in the work of reform at Tangier than at Tetuan and Laraiche.

5. The agreements of 1904 and 1905 contemplate the association of French and Spanish capital for certain objects in Morocco. But Spain has repeatedly had to complain that the share allowed to her in loans and institutions of credit enjoying Government support is not proportionate to the political interests of the country. These enterprises are formed with an undue proportion of French capital; they are under French law and domiciled in France.

6. The growing custom of promulgating Makhzen notices in Arabic and French, and the tendency to use the French language in the administrative business of Morocco, have compelled the Spanish Government to press for the similar employment of the Spanish language. Negotiations to that effect with the Makhzen were suspended so that an agreement might first be reached at Paris. The matter is still in suspense.

The prejudice which Spain has suffered from all that is set forth above would be even greater than it is but for the fact that most of the territory lying within her sphere of influence is Bled-es-Siba, to which the action of the Makhzen and the influence which France exercises over the latter do not extend. This is the case in the whole of the southern zone (south of the River Mesa) and in the Riff, in Gomara and among many of the Sebala tribes. Even the small extent of territory lying between Tetuan, Tangier, and Larache can hardly be described as Bled-el-Makhzen. Moreover, part of it constitutes the Ceuta frontier district. But for these very reasons Spain requires liberty of action if she is to maintain order and open up the country to civilisation and economic activity, and the restriction placed upon her by the conventions of 1904 and 1905 hampers her action without benefit to anybody.

Nor can Spain be indifferent to a possible French entry into Fez. The experience of both countries shows how difficult it is to retire from places occupied with every intention of early withdrawal, and even a temporary occupation of Fez could not fail to effect the position of the Sultan and the existing régime in a manner rendering it necessary for Spain to demand special guarantees.

Invited by the French Government to offer suggestions as to the best manner of applying in Morocco the principles contained in the Franco-Spanish conventions of 1904 and 1905, and in the Act of Algeciras, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, after setting forth the foregoing, desires to place on record that he had already anticipated the present enquiry by expressing his conviction that the solution most in conformity with the 1904 convention would be to recognise that the second of the eventualities comtemplated by article 3 of the convention has already come to pass. This eventuality is a question of fact not requiring to be admitted by the French Government. The expression "à constater d'un commun accord" refers in the text of that article to the words "pour toute autre cause," and not to the eventualities expressly mentioned.

Such recognition, and the publication of the secret convention, which El Mokri himself has recently stated that he desired, would supply the two Governments with a clear rule of conduct, capable of being submitted now or latter to the definite approval of third parties.

The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs still adheres to the above conviction. In view, however, of the objection entertained by the French Government to this course, and desiring to reach an understanding by any means, he submits the conciliatory formula contained in the annexed draft declaration and protocol. The

latter provides a means for securing the assent of third parties to the fundamental basis of our policy, without divulging the nature of our engagements or the limits of the respective spheres of influence. Though these documents speak for themselves, it may be as well to state that article 1 of the declaration is to be understood in the sense that, for the future, any reform submitted by France to the Makhzen or to the diplomatic body applies to her own sphere of influence, and not to the Spanish sphere except in so far as the Government of His Catholic Majesty shall have expressly intimated its consent. The Spanish Government is at liberty, therefore, to offer to the Makhzen such advice and assistance in respect of the Spanish sphere as it may consider expedient, and to provide for the tranquillity and order of that region in the form which, in its opinion, the circumstances demand.

As regards the above-mentioned proposal of the Spanish Government, respecting the intervention of Spanish agents in the collection of the mining tax, which is still awaiting the French reply, it is, of course, clear that it should now be modified in the sense that, within the Spanish sphere of influence, the Cabinet of Madrid can make whatever arrangements it pleases with the Makhzen, and that an understanding with France is only necessary as regards the French sphere of influence, as long as the regions to which the last sentence of the second article of the draft protocol refers are not defined.

Enclosure 2 in No. 279.

Draft Declaration.

(Translation.)

THE Governments of Spain, France, and Great Britain, animated equally by the desire to maintain and confirm this understanding between them concerning the Morocco question, and recognising that it would be useful to enquire jointly, in view of the events which are taking place in that Empire, what would be the most appropriate way of applying existing conventions, have conferred this task respectively on the Minister of State of His Catholic Majesty, and on the Ambassadors of the French Republic and of His Britannic Majesty at Madrid. As the result of this enquiry the two first-mentioned, duly authorised thereto, have agreed as follows :—

1. The first period of the application of the convention of the 3rd October, 1904, is declared to be at an end, Spain remaining therefore free to exercise her action within her sphere of influence as recognised in the said agreement.

2. The financial convention of the of March last between France and the Makhzen, having reached neither ratification by His Imperial Majesty, nor examination by the State Bank, the Paris Cabinet will cause it to be modified in such a manner as to place it in agreement with the principle stated in the foregoing paragraph, that is to say so that it may not be secured on the resources of the Spanish sphere of influence. The Governments of His Catholic Majesty and of the French Republic, will come to an understanding with a view to the construction of a Tangier–Arzila–Larache–Alcazar–Fez Railway, in conformity with the new situation.

3. Since it is expedient to bring into harmony with the stipulations of paragraph 1, the situation created by previous events, and to secure the concordance of the action respectively of Spain and France as between themselves and in relation to the Act of Algeciras, the arrangements concerning which the two countries are in agreement as regards the method of the gradual restoration of order, the re-establishment of the Sheerifian authority, and the financial measures required by these objects, have been set forth in the annexed special protocol, which may be communicated to the other signatory Powers of the said Act. It is understood that, though in the said protocol no allusion is made to spheres of influence, it is the intention of both countries that its stipulations should be applied within the limits fixed by the Franco-Spanish convention of 1904 and 1905, the said limits not being either directly or indirectly modified.

4. The Spanish and French Legations at Tangier shall inform Messrs. Porché and Llorens that the two Governments desire that, in matters falling within the competence of the Office of Public Works of the Makhzen, including mines, the advice and assistance to be given to the Sultan and to native agents, shall emanate from the Spanish official when the matter in hand concerns the Spanish sphere of influence. If, for the adequate application of this principle, the Madrid Cabinet

should consider an administrative division useful, a proposition to that effect shall be made forthwith to the Makhzen.

5. Independently of what is set forth in the annexed protocol, both Governments will instruct their agents in Morocco to the effect that, in all matters requiring the intervention of the diplomatic body or of special commissions or organisations, the representatives or delegates of either country shall extend their support to those of the other in all that refers to the respective spheres of influence. As far as their means permit, both Governments will contrive that the same course should be pursued in the Administrative Councils, &c., of the State Bank and of other societies in which capital belonging to different countries is invested. It is agreed that, if in future the two Governments should consider that it would be expedient to favour the constitution of these groups or societies in such a way as to avoid, in concrete cases, the inconvenience of competition in matters in which competition is legally admissible, Spanish capital shall enjoy, within the Spanish sphere of influence, the predominance which is due to it.

6. The Government of the republic will not oppose the use of the Spanish language, on a footing of equality with the French, in the promulgation of the notices issued by the Makhzen and by the administrative offices of Morocco and in dealings between the administration and private individuals.

For his part, the Ambassador of His Britannic Majesty, duly authorised, takes act of the foregoing in the letter and spirit of article 8 of the Franco-British Declaration of the 8th April, 1904.

The text of the present agreement shall not be published until the Franco-Spanish convention of the 3rd October, 1904, is published. Its application, which aims at securing the integrity of the Empire, shall cease if the authority of the Sultan ceases, as foreseen by article 3 of the convention of 1904, or if it should diminish to the point that it could no longer be regarded as independent, in which case Spain shall have full and absolute liberty to determine the legal status of her sphere of influence.

Protocol.

The Governments of Spain and France, being in accord since the 3rd October, 1904, concerning the extent of the rights and the guarantee of the interests of their respective countries in Morocco and having in mind the expediency of now defining, in view of the events which are now taking place in that Empire, the most efficacious manner of exercising those rights and securing those interests, in harmony with the principles and stipulations set forth at the International Conference of Algeciras, have agreed on the following provisions :—

1. The measures which the Government of the French Republic may consider it necessary to take in order to restore the authority of the Sultan, by putting an end to the violence and disorder which prevail in Moorish territory, shall not be applied in Laraiche nor in the neighbourhood of Alcazar, to the north of the River Lucus, which fall within the Spanish sphere. Spanish officers are charged with the duty of organising the police in the said port of Laraiche and at Tetuan, of taking part in the organisation of the Tangier police, and of adopting the precautions and taking the measures which they hold to be necessary in order that the peace may not be disturbed and that the authority of His Imperial Majesty may be strengthened in this part of the Empire. If to this end the intervention of foreign officers to pay, instruct or organise the forces of the Sultan should be necessary, it shall be undertaken by the Spanish instructors of police.

Both Governments shall forthwith propose to the other Signatory Powers of the Act of Algeciras and in due course to the Government of the Swiss Confederation and to the Makhzen, the renewal of the mandate of the instructors and inspector-general of the police of the Morocco posts, on the conditions laid down in that agreement, supplemented by the following :—

In view of the circumstances in which Casa Blanca is placed, the *cadre* of the police in that place shall not be mixed but French. Similarly the *cadre* of the instructors at Tangier shall not be mixed but Spanish. Provision shall be made to set on foot a police force of 100 men in each of the cities of Arzila, Alcazar, and Azemur, the *cadre* of the officers being Spanish in the first two places and French in the third. The Regulations Commission shall make the alterations which may seem

to be expedient in the numbers of the contingents of the different ports, always within the Act of Algeciras.

In the Riff (to be interpreted as including also the Gomara region) and in the southern portion of the Empire beyond the River Mesa, which will in fact be the frontier of Ifni owing to the establishment of Spain in that place, the Government of His Catholic Majesty intends to cause the Makhzen to apply a régime analogous to that which is set forth in article 3 of the Hispano-Moorish convention of the 16th November, 1910.

2. Since it is necessary that the Makhzen should have the means required to apply the measures contemplated by the preceding article, the Government of the French Republic will exert its influence over the holders of the 1904 and 1910 loans, notwithstanding any of the clauses of their contracts, with a view to their accepting immediate reimbursement of that portion of their contributions which is secured on the customs receipts and property of the Makhzen, on the Sultan's share of the Urban Tax, Mostafadet, and Sakat, &c., in the ports of Tetuan, Tangier, and Laraiche. The Government of His Catholic Majesty will come to an understanding with the Makhzen concerning the manner of providing it with funds for this reimbursement, either directly or by means of some loan to be guaranteed by the Spanish State, so that the annuities for interest and amortisation being less than they now are, something may remain over which could be applied to the above objects.

The Government of the French Republic, for its part, concede to the Government of His Catholic Majesty the security and the rights which have been conceded to it by the Makhzen over the said revenue, in the financial agreement of the 21st March, 1910. As compensation the Government of His Catholic Majesty concedes to the Government of the Republic the security and the rights belonging to the former over the mines revenue of the Makhzen in the regions to be determined by common agreement.

The Government of His Britannic Majesty takes act of the foregoing in the letter and spirit of article 8 of the Franco-British declaration of the 8th April, 1904.

And the undersigned, duly authorised, holding it to be expedient that the above protocol be communicated to the Cabinet of Berlin and to the other signatories of the Act of Algeciras, agree that this shall be done jointly by the representatives of the three countries accredited to each of the said Powers.

[18556] No. 280.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 16.)

(No. 139.)

Sir, *Berlin, May* 14, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of a communiqué which has appeared in the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," contradicting a statement made by the "Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung" that steps had been taken by the Russian Government at Berlin with a view to bringing about a *détente* between France and Germany in the Morocco question.

You will observe the acrimonious tone in which it has been thought necessary to deny that the Russian Government have taken any step of this kind on behalf of the French.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 280.

Extract from the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of May 13, 1911.

(Translation.)

THE press campaigns respecting the Morocco question which were lately sharply criticised are continued by a new incorrect announcement in the "Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung." The paper now announces that the Russian Government have taken a mediatory step in Berlin to bring about a *détente* in the Morocco question, basing their action on their treaty obligations towards France. To this statement the following answer has been sent to the "Kölnische Zeitung" from Berlin:—

"This statement constitutes a mischievous distortion of the simple fact that the Moroccan question has lately formed the subject of several friendly conversations both between other Cabinets and between the German and Russian Governments. There has been no question of a mediatory step on the part of the Russian Government, as there has been no cause for mediation on the Moroccan question between Berlin and Paris. Nor has there been any cause for attention to be drawn to Russian treaty obligations towards France in the Moroccan question, and this has in fact not been done. Both Governments have received communications as to the French intentions in Morocco, which, as far as we know, were in the main identic, and were accepted in both quarters with the same confidence in the loyalty and sincerity of the French Government. Clear expression has, as we have reason to believe, been given to this feeling of confidence in the conversations between German and Russian statesmen. Moreover, the point of view of the German Government was recently so clearly and openly expressed that it should be regarded as all the more satisfactory, in view of the fact that neither the general situation nor the attitude of the German Government towards it have in any way changed since then. It is regrettable that the 'Wiener Reichspost' has also joined these speculations, and in a Berlin letter has dealt with the Moroccan question in some rather strange observations from the point of view of the German-Austrian-Russian relations. Such discussions are, to say the least, pointless. Combined with the sensational rumours mentioned above, they make it difficult for the press to maintain a moderate tone in dealing with the Moroccan question, as should be done in dealing with so important a subject, no less by serious papers than in official quarters."

[18530] No. 281.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 16.)

(No. 215. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, May* 14, 1911.

I HAVE had the honour to report to you in another despatch of this date the anxiety which M. Cruppi feels in regard to the state of affairs in the Ottoman Empire and the predominance of German counsels and interests at Constantinople. His fears on the subject of German influence are not confined to the Ottoman Empire. He says that the German Government are egging on the Spanish Government to make unreasonable claims in regard to the position of Spain in Morocco, so as to create a situation giving an opportunity for Germany to hope to obtain something for herself out of the trouble which the German agents may succeed in bringing about, and Spain is foolishly playing into Germany's hands, and aspires to undertake matters for which Spaniards are quite unfit. His Excellency is quite ready, he says, to make reasonable concessions to Spain within the provisions of the Act of Algeciras and the secret agreements of 1904, but there seem to be no means of satisfying the Spaniards without imperilling French and British interests. He is very grateful for what you have done at Madrid in the way of restraining the Spanish Government from precipitate action; but if the German Government were convinced by some way or another of the determination of England to uphold the Act of Algeciras and the secret agreements regarding Morocco, they would probably abstain from encouraging Spain to advance unreasonable claims, and complications would be avoided. He is willing that Spain should have a freer hand in the neighbourhood of Ceuta, but he objects to a Spanish occupation of Tetuan for which there is no reason, and he cannot think that it would be consistent with British interests that Germany, who by favour of the Turks is to have a privileged position at the eastern end of the Mediterranean—viz., at Alexandretta—should gain a footing at the western end of that sea opposite to Gibraltar by a permanent Spanish occupation of Tetuan, for assuredly if the Spaniards remained there it would be with German acquiescence and for German purposes. These are the views which I gather from a conversation with M. Cruppi yesterday that he holds in regard to the position which may be created by the attitude of Spain if persisted in with Germany at her back.

With regard to some observations which you have made to the French Ambassador in London on the subject of the Sultan Mulai Hafid and the extent of the support which the French Government may be inclined to give to him in view of his unpopularity in Morocco, M. Cruppi stated to me that he does not fully share your views. He considers that Mulai Hafid and his brothers, pretenders to the throne of

Morocco, are all much alike when in power and when not. They are unreliable, and though generous in promises of reform when pretenders, neglect when in power to fulfil them. So also of the Grand Viziers. If the French Government did not support the authority of the recognised Sultan at the present moment they would be open to the charge of disregarding the *status quo*, and Germany would proclaim the fact. It had become the duty of France to go to Fez for the succour of the French and other Europeans there. When I remarked that the fear you had was that if the French troops entered Fez it would become difficult for them to come away unless they entirely subdued the revolted tribes, and such an undertaking might require a long stay and bring Germany out of her present expectant attitude, and I asked M. Cruppi whether, if after the relief of Fez it should be found that the greater part of the country would not accept Mulai Hafid, the French Government would continue to support him, his Excellency said, but rather hesitated in his reply, that in such case the French Government would reconsider the position. He evidently attached great importance to the Sultan having applied to the French Government for their aid, for he referred to the fact several times. Probably he feels that a successor or substitute to the present Sultan might not follow the same course. His Excellency ignores the fact that it is only the desperate situation of Mulai Hafid in regard to his own people which causes him to appeal to France. I have heard indirectly that it has been intimated to the Spanish Government on the part of the French Government that a Spanish occupation of Tetuan for no other reason than the French advance to Fez might be very inconvenient to Spain, for the Spanish troops would be expected to evacuate Tetuan as soon as the French troops withdraw from Fez.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

[18528] No. 282.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 16.)

(No. 213.)

Sir, *Paris, May* 15, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a report which I have received from Colonel W. E. Fairholme, military attaché to this embassy, relating to the military situation in Morocco and the progress of the French expedition.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 282.

Note by Colonel Fairholme on the Situation in Morocco and Progress of the French Expedition.

1. *On the Casa Blanca Side.*

PARTLY owing to the rough weather which has impeded the landing of stores, troops, and animals at Mahedieh, General Moinier's preparations for the dispatch of the relief column have taken a good deal longer than had been anticipated in France, and the column, under Colonel Brulard, only left El Knitra on the morning of the 11th May.

The latest news of it, unofficial from Tangiers, dated the 14th, states that it had passed the latitude of Lalla Ito, and that it had been caught up by Colonel Gouraud's supporting column on the 12th, the latter force being then 1,500 strong.

If all goes well the relief column is expected to reach Fez on the 20th or 21st. The exact route to be followed depends on the state of the roads and the attitude of the tribes, but that viâ Sidi Gueddar, Jebel Telfat, and Sidi Malek is spoken of as likely to be adopted.

A force of about 600 tribesmen, both mounted and on foot, was encountered a few miles from El Knitra, but was easily dispersed by artillery fire. Serious opposition was expected to be met with at Mechrat-er-Remla.

Colonel Brulard's column numbers about 3,000 men, and is reported to be composed as follows :—

1 battalion of colonial infantry.
1 battalion of Senegalese Rifles.
1 field battery, 2 sections mountain artillery.
½ squadron chasseurs, ½ squadron spahis.
A light field ambulance.

The Goum of the Shawia, consisting of 800 infantry and 200 horsemen, divided into six self-contained sections.

In support of Colonel Brulard's column is a detachment of all arms, commanded by Colonel Gouraud, which numbers about 1,800 men. Its mission is to secure the communications of the column with its base near Rabat. This body of troops had arrived at El Knitra by the 9th May; there were then encamped at that place some 8,000 French troops of all arms.

The total of French troops, white and black, in the Shawia and on their way to Fez now amounts to about 20,000, including the original garrison. Some 15,000 reinforcements have been dispatched to the Shawia and to Algeria since the 18th April, when the General Staff first got orders to prepare for an expedition; 2,000 mules were purchased in Algeria and shipped to the Shawia.

As might have been expected, the enforced delays and the consequent inactivity of the French troops at El Knitra have been taken as a sign of weakness by the tribesmen, who have become bold and enterprising, and have carried out a series of successful raids on convoys passing between Mahedieh, Rabat, and El Knitra, while on the 7th instant they even dared to attack the camp at the latter place. The attacks on the convoys were facilitated by the cover afforded by the forest of Mamora, close to which the road hitherto followed by the convoys passes. On the 6th and 7th the Moors captured 149 camels and 60 mules in this manner, and killed or wounded several French officers and men.

The escorts of the convoys are now being strengthened, and a safer road employed.

2. *On the Algerian Side.*

So early as the 30th April it was reported that some 12,000 men had been concentrated in the Taourirt region.

General Toutée, who commands the Oran division, was on the 8th May at Merada, a village on the eastern bank of the Mouloya, with a force of about 3,000 men and twenty-four field and two mountain guns.

His instructions apparently preclude him from crossing the river, but this did not prevent his shelling the village of Guersif on the western bank on the 9th May to punish the inhabitants for harbouring the murderers of a French subject, an innkeeper named Mul.

Next morning a strong contingent of tribesmen crossed the ford at Guersif and advanced with great determination to attack General Toutée's camp at Merada. A force of about 2,500 men of all arms was sent out to meet them, and after a sharp engagement, during which the Moors suffered heavily, drove them in disorder across the Mouloya. The tribesmen left thirty-four of their dead lying on the battle-field, and are reported to have received a severe lesson.

It is stated that General Toutée's instructions are to be ready to throw a bridge over the Mouloya, but not actually to construct it without further orders.

The French Government has been severely criticised in various quarters for not undertaking the relief of Fez from the Algerian frontier side, but we know that General Toutée's forces are not equipped with the necessary transport for operations at a long distance from railhead.

Spanish susceptibilities have also to be considered, as the Taza route would bring the French rather nearer to the Spanish sphere of influence than is considered desirable.

3. *Situation at Fez.*

Official news was received from the French consul at Fez, dated the 6th May. The situation is apparently becoming more critical. The town had been attacked on the 4th by forces estimated to number 10,000, which is 3,000 more than the figures spoken of in connection with previous attacks. The attack is said to have only been repulsed with difficulty.

The news of the dispatch of the relief expedition seems, however, to have raised the spirits of the defenders of Fez.

The Sultan has renewed his appeal to the French Government for help, and the latter has now confirmed General Moinier's previous instructions to expedite the dispatch of the relief expedition to raise the siege of Fez, which town it is only to occupy for as long a time as may be strictly necessary.

A message from the British consul at Fez, dated the night of the 7th to 8th, describes the situation as extremely precarious.

4. *The Gharb Region.*

The situation is becoming strained in the El Ksar district, where a small mehalla under a French officer, Captain Moreau, supported by the horsemen of the Kaïd Cherkawi, is having difficulty in keeping order.

The market of Souk-el-Arba was threatened on the 10th May with an attack by the Beni-Ahsen and Sherarda tribes.

5. *Spanish Activity near Ceuta.*

An official telegram from Melilla announces that a Spanish column commanded by General Larrea has arrived at the Quebdana tribe, near the Mouloya River.

W. E. FAIRHOLME, *Military Attaché.*

Paris, May 15, 1911.

[18711] No. 283.

M. Cambon to Sir A. Nicolson.—(Received May 16.)

Ambassade de France, Londres, le 16 *mai*, 1911.

Cher Sir Arthur,

JE vous répète, comme vous m'en avez prié, ce que je vous ai dit tout à l'heure sur les intentions de mon Gouvernement au Maroc.

Les dernières nouvelles du Maroc montrent la situation à Fez comme compromise, et le Sultan réclame la prompte coopération de nos troupes. Le Gouvernement français a prescrit au Général Moinier de presser la marche de la colonne de secours pour débloquer Fez et même pour l'occuper le temps strictement nécessaire.

En me chargeant de porter cette décision à la connaissance de Sir Edward Grey, M. Cruppi me prie de lui déclarer que le but de notre action est toujours d'assurer la souveraineté du Sultan, l'intégralité du territoire et la liberté des transactions commerciales, intimement liées au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

PAUL CAMBON.

[18714] No. 284.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 26.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, May* 16, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 59.

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day and communicated to him your messages as instructed. His Excellency said he would take note of your friendly counsels as to the danger to which Spain would be exposed were this already delicate situation to be further complicated. He said that with regard to the occupation of Tetuan the pressure from all parties and the highest quarter was very strong. The Republican leaders themselves, whose press was the only organ which had raised a voice against the prevailing call for an advance on Tetuan, had, in their private conversations with Spanish Ministers, themselves advocated such a policy. The Spanish Government had no desire to precipitate matters, and Señor Garcia Prieto took credit for having resisted these powerful influences until the impending friendly discussions with France should have taken place. He repeated, however, that a French occupation of Fez would place the Spanish Government in a position of extraordinary difficulty, and that

a French entry into Taza would immediately entail a corresponding Spanish advance on Tetuan.

I urged as strongly as I could that Spain as an important Power should feel it her duty, at a time of such international difficulty, to abstain from rash action, and all the more in view of the fact that those Powers with which she was most closely connected were showing themselves so willing to consider Spanish demands in a friendly spirit.

I left with his Excellency at the same time a memorandum in Spanish giving him the exact purport of your instructions. As to the reported occupation by Spanish troops of places within 10 miles of Tetuan, his Excellency denied that anything of the kind had been done. There had been no advance beyond the heights behind Ceuta, which were occupied on the 7th May. It was true there was some agitation among the Angera tribes in the vicinity of Tetuan, but not among those adjoining Tangier. Spanish Government had heard that the Basha of Tetuan, though a notorious enemy of Spain, was thinking of using the Spanish instructed police to restore order if necessary. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that if this measure proved ineffective, and further action became necessary, Spain would be compelled herself to intervene. Spanish Government also heard that the tribes round Alcazar were preparing to attack the military establishments, which are said to have been set up in that place by the French. Should this be confirmed, Spain would have to assume the duty of dispersing them.

[18052] No. 285.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 41.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 16, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 9th instant to convey the grateful thanks of the Spanish Government for the assistance which His Majesty's Government were giving them in facilitating arrangements between France and Spain in Morocco.

His Excellency said that the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin had not been able to ascertain positively whether the proposal made by the German Ambassador in Paris had emanated from the German Government, but he considered that the latter did not desire at present to make difficulties with France, though, in order to satisfy public opinion in Germany, they would probably put a price on their abstention. What that price might be, the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin could not say. M. Kiderlen-Waechter had told the latter that he was going away now to Kissingen as he felt that he could do so with safety at this moment, but that "he (M. Kiderlen) was sure that very serious events would occur in six weeks' time," when he would have to be in Berlin.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[18734] No. 286.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Vienna, May* 15, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 43 of the 13th May, I have the honour to inform you that the newspaper article alluded to in it appeared this morning in the weekly "Sonn- und Montags-Blatt." It may be taken as a warning to Germany not to drive her intransigeance against France too far in the Morocco question, as Austria-Hungary might find that her own interests were jeopardised thereby. The substance of this inspired article runs as follows :—

The French advance into Morocco is no longer a mere "Kulturfrage," it has become a serious political problem—it has reopened the question of the balance of power. It is true that the view taken in journalistic, political, and financial circles as to the dangers of the Morocco question fluctuates continually; the attitude of the Bourses shows that during this crisis public opinion has repeatedly run through the whole gamut of political excitement, from absolute indifference to grave anxiety; but no settled conviction has as yet been reached. This uncertainty of opinion is one of the peculiarities of the situation produced by the French advance into Morocco—a

situation which has been to a certain degree rendered more acute by France's internal politics, in that the entry of Delcassé into the Ministry awoke into actuality all those painful possibilities which once led to Algeciras.

The manifest vacillation in the conduct of Germany's foreign policy has, however, exposed that country also to the accusation of materially contributing to and increasing the uncertainty of the situation.

The rôle hitherto played by Austria-Hungary in the development of the Morocco question at the settlement of the Algeciras Act has been a prominent one. For the first time after a long interval, Austria-Hungary thereby caused her voice to be heard in a very decisive manner in the workings of international politics; and it was owing to the support of Austria-Hungary that Germany found an honourable retreat from a difficult position—a position brought about chiefly by serious mistakes in the latter's own policy. Any one who follows the subsequent development of things since the conclusion of the Algeciras Act cannot avoid reproaching Germany's statesman with having learnt nothing from the events which preceded Algeciras. For however considerable and bewildering the vacillations of Germany's Moroccan policy may have been since then, so far as may be judged from the official and unofficial utterances of diplomatists, politicians, and journalists, one thing is entirely clear, namely, that Germany seems continually to be attempting trials of strength with France, and that she estimates too highly the probable effects (for the event of a serious conflict with France) of the improvement of her relations with England since King Edward's death and of the Potsdam agreement with Russia? An unbiassed examination of the possibilities which would arise in such a case shows that in spite of any rapprochement between Germany, England, and Russia, the force of the earlier alliance and *entente* would, in the event of a serious conflict, be bound to emerge in all its pristine strength, and throw Germany back into the isolation which she only surmounted with difficulty, and with the successful support of Austria-Hungary.

In these circumstances the statesmen of our Monarchy and, indeed, the members of all political and economic circles in Austria-Hungary are obliged to consider to what extent the fate of our State might be affected by an extension of this German policy, the dangers of which we have indicated, and also in what way those dangers may be averted. Outwardly, Austria-Hungary owes a deep political debt to Germany. The intervention of the latter in the annexation crisis contributed not a little to the satisfactory and peaceful regulation of the political and military action which was then necessary. The effect produced abroad by that intervention was enhanced by the part played in person by the German Emperor by his visit to the Vienna Rathaus and his famous speech about the "shining armour." These outward events have produced a strong effect on public feeling, and caused people to forget that in the annexation crisis Germany was paying the debt she owed for Algeciras, and was, moreover, driven to intervene by most powerful political interests of her own.

Personal advantage is as a rule the deciding factor in politics as in all human affairs. States and people must, of course, even in the pursuit of their own advantages, comply with the moral duties imposed by friendship and reciprocity, but with States the impulse for self-preservation excludes a policy like that of the two conspirators in Schiller's "Bürgschaft." Political friendships and alliances are the outcome of historical necessities if they are to be lasting. The history of the Austro-German Alliance is of course a glowing example of this principle. Still one must not forget that Bismarck, when it appeared advantageous to Germany, sought the support of Russia, although such a policy came very near to a possible betrayal of the interests of Germany's ally, Austria. In indicating this example, we do not for a moment contemplate that Austria-Hungary should under certain circumstances adopt an attitude of reserve towards Germany. The strength of the international politics of our Monarchy lies in its absolute reliability. Moreover, Austria-Hungary has no opportunity or cause for interference in this affair. What, therefore, is to be desired in the interest of our Monarchy, and still more in the interest of our alliance with Germany and Italy, is that Germany, mindful of her duties as an ally, should so control her political actions as to avoid a fresh state of isolation.

Austria-Hungary has no share in any competition which has been fomented by the great colonial Powers. She can gain nothing, and has no desire to gain anything, but she will not be responsible for the losses of others. Austria-Hungary therefore expects from German diplomacy and German statesmen that they should not again create a situation, in which lies hidden the danger of war, without having reckoned with the possibility of war. Austria-Hungary is ready to employ all her power for

the maintenance of peace, as she needs peace, and she demands that this standpoint should be realised and respected in Germany.

If a thought is given in Germany to the services rendered by Austria-Hungary at Algeciras, our anxiety over the contradictory policy which is being pursued with regard to Morocco will be understood, and our wish not to be involved in the consequences of political nervousness will be respected. It will also be intelligible that Austria-Hungary, at the moment when necessary decisions have to be taken, will be compelled in the first place to consider her own State interests. If Germany realises this necessity, perhaps she will then resume a calmer view of the situation in Morocco.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[18911] No. 287.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May* 17, 1911.

I HAVE urged on Spanish Ambassador the danger of Spain occupying Tetuan, representing to him that we desire two objects: (1) That French, when they get to Fez, should restore peace by a settlement with the tribes, and come away as soon as possible without altering the political status of Morocco. This is French intention, and we have expressed to them the hope that they will adopt line of least resistance to effect it. (2) That certain concessions should be made by France to Spain guaranteeing Spain against prejudice in her sphere, and meeting her complaint of inferiority of her position under secret Franco-Spanish agreement.

If these objects are attained diplomatic difficulties as regards Morocco will disappear, and position of Spain will be better off than it has been before.

Occupation of Tetuan or unnecessary action by Spain in Spanish sphere will create new trouble, especially with Anjera tribes, will widen area of disturbance in Morocco, and make attainment of these objects difficult if not impossible.

If these objects are made impossible, partition of Morocco will be forced, European complications will ensue, and it is uncertain how anyone will come out of it.

Ambassador said he would report my views to his Government. Latter might wait for the present, but if French stayed at Fez no Government could live in Spain unless it occupied Tetuan.

I said if French stayed in Fez a new situation would arise, which could be considered then; this did not make it necessary for Spain to move to Tetuan when French reached Fez.

Ambassador asked that you should be authorised to take part in discussion *à trois;* it was not a new treaty or convention that was under discussion, and we were in a sense a party to existing agreements between France and Spain.

I promised to authorise this, and you can do it. This will, I understand, also be agreeable to French.

(Repeated to Paris and Tangier.)

[18988] No. 288.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 18.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, May* 18, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 61 of to-day.

I have just seen Minister for Foreign Affairs. His Excellency expressed himself as very grateful for the messages which you desired me to convey to him, and for the explanation of the British Government's attitude to the Morocco question therein contained.

As regards your warning against precipitate action, his Excellency said that great pressure was being brought to bear upon him in the Cabinet, not only by the Ministers of War and Marine, but by the Prime Minister himself. He had been so far able to

resist this pressure on the plea that he is engaged in a friendly discussion with France. But he urges an early settlement of the Spanish demands, since he does not feel confident that these daily struggles in the Cabinet will be always decided in his favour.

[19139] No. 289.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 115.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 18, 1911.

THE German Ambassador asked me to-day whether I had any news from Morocco.

I said that the information we had had was that the state of things in Fez gave rise to great anxiety, as must necessarily be the case with all communications cut, the price of food rising, and the revolted tribes all round the town. I had been pressed in the House of Commons as to the possible danger to British subjects. I could not give a reassuring account of the state of things; but, of course, the situation was worse for the French, who had more subjects in Fez, including French officers. The French clearly had no choice but to do what they were doing. I asked Count Metternich what the view of his Government was.

He replied that the French had given loyal assurances of their intention, and his Government quite believed that they did not desire to stay in Fez, or do more than they had said. If they were forced by circumstances to go further and make the Sultan a mere puppet in their hands, a new situation would have arisen, inconsistent with the Algeciras Act. In that case, the hands of the other Powers would, of course, be freed; but this situation might never arise.

I said that I hoped it would not arise; but, if it did, I hoped it would not stir up political difficulties. We did not wish to have the state of things of the Algeciras Conference over again, and I had hoped that the agreement between Germany and France as to Morocco had removed any possibility of this recurring. The question of Morocco was one in regard to which some of us were bound by treaty engagements, which would, of course, come into operation if difficulties arose. It was not like a general question in which there were no special engagements.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[19009] No. 290.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 64.)

Sir, *Madrid, May* 15, 1911.

IN addition to the occupation by the Spanish troops of certain positions in the neighbourhood of Ceuta, an advance has now been made into the country beyond Melilla.

It is reported that a column composed of three companies of Spanish troops, together with a native contingent, have reached the wells of El Zayo, some 30 miles south-east of the fortress, and overlooking the lower valley of the Muluya River. This move appears to have been effected without any opposition, and the surrounding Quebdana tribes are reported to be quiet. The advance may be regarded as a counter-demonstration to the French occupation of Taurirt and Debdu.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[19047] No. 291.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

[By Post.]

(No. 59. Most Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, May* 18, 1911.

FRANCO-SPANISH negotiations in regard to Morocco.

M. Cruppi has made two offers to the Spanish Ambassador with a view to placating the Spanish Government, and his Excellency told me to-day that M. Perez Caballero seemed to consider them satisfactory. One of these offers is, that the present French consul at Tetuan, whom the Spaniards dislike, should be promoted to another post. The other is that the French and Spanish consuls at Alcazar should make such arrangements in concert with one another to spare Spanish susceptibilities as may be feasible, and, at the same time, will not impede the forwarding of supplies for the French troops in the field or endanger the maintenance of their communications. In making these offers M. Cruppi warned M. Perez Caballero that he would not be able to carry them out if any mention of them appeared in the newspapers.

[19177] No. 292.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 29.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, May* 19, 1911.

SIR F. BERTIE'S telegram No. 59 of the 18th instant: Morocco.

Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me with satisfaction of the first of the two French offers which M. Geoffray had just communicated to him. He was, he told me, uneasy as to the position of affairs at Alcazar. He hears that the tribes there are becoming threatening in view of the passage of El Amrani's column through the Gharb country. Should the protection of Alcazar be thus rendered necessary, Señor Garcia Prieto claims that it should be entrusted not to a French force but to the Larache police. I confine myself to the statement that this would be an excellent opportunity of bringing into practice the first of the French offers, namely, the co-operation of the French and Spanish consuls at Alcazar with a view to concerting measures.

Your telegram No. 61 of the 18th.

His Excellency was much pleased with the report he has received from the Spanish Ambassador of your conversation with him, showing the efforts you are making to bring about an understanding between France and Spain. Your warning about Tetuan has been noted, and his Excellency told me to-day that he will do his best to prevent a rash move being made in that direction.

[19179] No. 293.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 113. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, May* 13, 1911.

DURING the end of last week rumours kept reaching us of Spanish activity in the vicinity of Ceuta, on the Tetuan side, and, as I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 56 of the 8th instant, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs has been considerably agitated at the attitude of the Spanish Minister. On the 6th and 7th he had received no less than three notes from M. de Villa Sinda, insisting on the immediate application of the arrangement made in the Hispano-Moorish convention of last November, for the nomination of commissioners in the Riff and at Ifni, and for the creation of a police force at Melilla and Ceuta. The tone of the last note was very threatening; it stated that the Spanish Government were taking certain measures to meet the urgency of the situation, and added that if their demands were not complied with at once these measures would assume a permanent character. Cid Guebbas, feeling that he was powerless to do anything at Tangier, telegraphed to Cid Mokri, in Paris, and begged him to communicate at once with the Spanish authorities and try and arrange matters.

On the 8th May I received a letter from His Majesty's vice-consul at Tetuan, by special courier, telling me that the Spanish police captain had returned on the previous day from Ceuta, and had informed the Basha that the Spanish Government had stationed 250 of their Riffian forces at Fanideck, a spot in Moorish territory. These men, he said, would remain on duty there until the Moorish Government established the police force provided for in the recent convention between Spain and Morocco.

On the afternoon of the same day the Spanish Minister saw the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, and, after notifying to him the steps taken by the Spanish Government, informed him that the force would be removed if the Moorish Govern-

ment took steps at once to give effect to the recent agreement, but that otherwise it would remain there permanently.

The French chargé d'affaires informs me that the Spanish troops have now pushed on far beyond the zone of Ceuta, and have occupied a post within about 10 miles of Tetuan. Menebhi has also heard from Erzani, a very level-headed man, and one of the most influential citizens of Tetuan, that no less than seven points in Moorish territory are now held by Spanish troops. The Spanish Government have, I understand, justified their action to the Powers on the ground of the insecurity which they say prevails in the country, but the stories which they tell are much exaggerated, and such agitation as does exist has been to a very large extent provoked by the doings of the Spanish military and police officers. Now, of course, the situation has become very much more serious—a large meeting of the Anjera tribe has been called to-day to discuss the question of opposing or attacking the Spaniards. The neighbouring tribes have also, I believe, been invited to attend. Mr. Harris tells me that he has written to Valiente to impress upon him the necessity of acting with the greatest caution, and of doing all in his power to avoid the encounter which of course is what the Spaniards hope for, as it would furnish them with a pretext for an advance upon Tetuan. Mr. Bewicke, in a private letter, writes: "Of course this town (Tetuan) has nothing to do with the Anjera, but I fear the Spaniards will make it responsible." He adds that some of the Ceuta Jews have written to their relations in Tetuan telling them to join them at Ceuta at once for safety.

I consider the action of the Spanish Government to be quite unjustified and most reprehensible; they are determined to take advantage of the existing complications to further their territorial ambitions, and they are perfectly indifferent to the fact that by so doing they risk setting the whole country up to within a few miles of Tangier in a blaze.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[19182] No. 294.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 116. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, May* 14, 1911.

I HAVE now received letters from Fez, dated up to the 7th instant. Both Mr. McLeod and Dr. Verdon confirm the statements made by the French consul (see my telegrams Nos. 53 and 54) to the effect that the news of the dispatch of a relief column supported by a French expeditionary force has been well received in the town, and has so far provoked no anti-European sentiments. They express the hope that it may arrive as soon as possible, as although up to the time of writing the behaviour of the townspeople has been excellent, there undoubtedly exists a certain amount of discontent which could only increase with the increasing scarcity of provisions and the steady rise in prices. They state that the ranks of the insurgents are being continually swelled, and that disquieting reports have reached the capital that several of the eastern tribes, who had not hitherto proved actively disloyal, have joined the rebels. The results of this would be serious, as small quantities of grain and cattle still continue to come into Fez from that side; were these to be stopped the town would be entirely dependent on its own resources.

Dr. Verdon concludes his letter by a remark that in his opinion trouble from the people within the walls is more to be feared than attacks from the outside.

There is no doubt that many of the more intelligent Moors hold the view that trouble may be expected on the arrival of the French force, and that the Europeans may then be exposed to considerable danger. The ex-Sultan, as reported in my telegram No. 60, is certainly of this opinion, and spoke very strongly on the subject. The whole movement, he said, was directed against the Sultan and the Grand Vizier; the people realised perfectly well that they were only being maintained in power by French arms and French money, and for this reason the French were daily growing more unpopular. Were a hostile movement to be made against them at Fez, or were there to be an outburst of fanaticism, these distinctions of nationality would inevitably be forgotten, and all Christians would fare alike.

The time, however, has passed for the consideration of such eventualities. As stated in my telegram No. 53 the Sultan has formally requested the military intervention of France, and has addressed the enclosed letter, which was communicated to me by M. de Billy to M. Regnault, explaining to him the circumstances which have led him to take this step, and asking him to come up to Fez with El Mokri as soon as the expeditionary force arrives. Should this be impossible, His Majesty begs that M. Gaillard may be authorised to act as intermediary between him and the officer in command of the column.

Orders were dispatched from Paris to General Moinier to arrange for the departure of the relief column for Fez with the least possible delay, the date and the choice of the route by which it was to advance being left to his discretion. Considerable delay was caused by the difficulty of unloading the transports at Mehedia owing to a heavy sea, and to an insufficiency of the necessary plant, and it was not until the morning of the 11th that the column actually started from Kenitra. On account of the impracticability for guns and ammunition of the so-called summer road, it has been obliged to take the road by Lalla Itto, which skirts the forest of Marmora, and is infested with bands of Zemmour and other hostile tribes. Already before the general advance began two convoys were looted and five French soldiers killed.

The column appears to have been attacked during the greater part of the first day's march, but succeeded in reaching a point some 20 to 25 miles beyond Kenitra; it continued its march on the following day, and camped at Lalla Itto, where it was joined by Colonel Gouraud, the hero of many Mauritanian campaigns, with a body of colonial infantry. The total force, M. de Billy tells me, now amounts to some 7,000 men.

The country which they have now to traverse is particularly difficult, and the tribes by whom it is inhabited particularly warlike. They will, however, no doubt succeed in cutting their way through, but it appears to me that with their arrival at Fez their difficulties are only beginning. It is, I think, indubitable that the whole revolutionary movement is directed against the Sultan and his Grand Vizier; this is clearly shown by the message sent by Kaïd Akka, the chief of the Beni M'tir, to Mr. Harris, and published in the "Times" of the 9th instant; and it is, moreover, further confirmed by another and almost identical protest sent from an independent Berber source to M. Michaux Bellaire, who was for many years French vice-consul at Alcazar, and who has kept up close relations with natives all over the country. If the French decide to keep Moulai Hafid on the throne and to maintain his present Government, they not improbably may find themselves obliged to practically reconquer the whole country. It has been frequently said that it would be impossible for the Sultan to dismiss Glawi, as he would then lose the whole of the south, but I am inclined to doubt the truth of this assertion. Hadj Thami and the other brothers have little love for the Grand Vizier, and would view his disappearance with the greatest equanimity; moreover, as a matter of fact, the family, though no doubt feared in the south, are cordially detested; the whole country has groaned under their exactions, and it is quite possible that the disgrace of the Grand Vizier might be the signal for a general rising against them.

As I informed you in my telegram No. 59, I received a letter on the 8th May, dated the 28th April (copy enclosed), from Moulai Zin, announcing his proclamation as Sultan. He said that he desired to maintain the friendship which had always existed between his ancestors and Great Britain, and that as a proof of this he had chosen as his Minister for Foreign Affairs Hadj Mohammed Mikwar, because "he had had proofs of his sincere friendship and of his exertions on behalf of Moorish and British subjects." Moulai Zin at the same time wrote to the German Minister and also to the ex-Sultan. In the latter letter he assured his brother that it was quite against his will that he had been proclaimed Sultan, and that he had only yielded when the Berbers threatened to sack the town of Mequinez if he maintained his refusal. M. de Billy informed me very confidentially that Moulai Abdel Aziz had come to see him at the legation and had asked whether he should reply to the letter, and if so, in what sense. I understood that it was finally decided that he should reply in vague terms, but that he should impress upon his brother the necessity for him to take every precaution possible to prevent any harm befalling the Europeans at Fez.

I have since received a second letter from Moulai Zin, dated the 6th May, and also one from Hadj Mohammed Mikwar, copies of which are enclosed. I have communicated them both to the French chargé d'affaires. Moulai Zin has also written to Raisuli inviting him to join his cause, as being that of all true patriots and of Islam. This letter has also, I understand, been communicated by Raisuli to the French Legation, and his action has, I hope, somewhat dissipated the suspicions which they had undoubtedly harboured with regard to his loyalty to them during the

last fortnight. I cannot help thinking that their interests would be better served if they were more prepared to trust the persons whom they employ, and to whom they turn for assistance the moment they require it. In the case of Raisuli, they entrust him one day with some particularly confidential mission, and on the following day accuse him of treachery on the strength of some vague reports from their vice-consul at Alcazar, M. Boisset, a courageous young man no doubt, but at the same time an ambitious adventurer, who has his money to make, and who is known to have thrown in his lot with the notorious Remiki and Sherkawi, the bitter enemies of Raisuli. They have always been inclined to act in the same way towards Menebhi. Both men, I think, have realised this, and now show less alacrity to fall in with their wishes.

I hear that the situation at Alcazar is not very satisfactory, and there is a fear that some of the hill tribes on the confines of the Gharb intend to attack the city with a view to looting the fondak, where the French rifles and ammunition have been stored. The latest telegrams announce that El Amrani has crossed the Sebou and entered the Gharb, and it is to be hoped that the mere presence of his harka may exercise a restraining effect, but M. de Billy tells me confidentially that General Moinier has a very poor opinion of the men of whom it is composed, and says that no reliance can be placed upon them.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER

Enclosure 1 in No. 294.

Mulai Zin to Mr. Lister.

(Translation.) 28 *Rabia* II, 1329 (*April* 28, 1911).

Praise to God. And there is no power or strength save in God!

FROM the slave of his God, the Commander of the Faithful, Zin-el-Abdeen-ben-Mulai Hassan (the blessed)—may God direct him rightly!—to his Excellency the intelligent, friendly Minister of the honoured English Government, after due compliments, and hopes that you may always remain in good health.

As God has united the voices of the Mahommedans in proclaiming our Majesty—exalted in Allah—seeking thereby kindly treatment for themselves and compassion and clemency for the weak amongst them, and protection for their lives [also means the honour of their wives and daughters] and property, safety of the roads for their commerce, peace with all nations—especially with your glorious, respected nation—between which and our sanctified ancestors in the past there existed bonds of amity and friendship, which it is confidently expected it will maintain and continue to observe.

We have elected to write to your most honoured, respected Excellency to inform you of this, in order that you may observe towards us the dues of alliance and friendship, and should your Excellency have any wishes they will be given effect to, from the friendship and amity of which you are well aware.

(As a proof) amongst others of the friendship which unites us and you we have chosen for the Foreign Ministry our servant Hadj Mohammed Mikwar, because we have had proofs of his sincere friendship and of his exertions on behalf of Moorish and British subjects. We have commanded him to convey to your Excellency due notification of this, with compliments, for your information.

Peace.

(Seal of Zin-el-Abdeen-ben-Hassan.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 294.

Moulai Zin to Mr. Lister.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) *May* 6, 1911.

FROM the slave of his God, the Commander of the Faithful, who seeks the protection of Allah and who confides in Him—may He be exalted!—Zin-el-Abdin, son of our lord Hassan, blessed by God, to his Excellency, the wise, the diplomat, the cavalier, the Minister of the respected English Government We trust that you may always continue well.

A detailed notification has already been sent to you, but since then we have heard that the glorious French Government have sent out a large force of soldiers which has crossed the Sallee River, and is now encamped at the bridges of Ali and Addi (Knitra), notwithstanding that that nation has the reputation of acting legitimately—which would not render desirable the going out of this force while there is war between the Moors. We therefore impart to you the task of discussing with the French Minister about the withdrawal of the said troops to their place, or their remaining within their boundary until the matter is settled between the Moors, and missions be sent to all (the Powers).

We are confident you will do this, as the friendship and amity of your Government towards our blessed ancestors is solidly established since ages, unchanged and unaltered, as is well known to all the nations, as a measure of precaution and expectancy until it is shown who is rightly directed and who is in error.

May your health continue, &c.

(Seal of Mulai Zin.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 294.

Hadj Mohammed Mikwar to Mr. Lister.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) *April* 28, 1911.

WE have sent you information in detail through Consul Macleod and in general by way of Rabat. We informed you of the robberies, losses, and killings which have occurred and also that God had united the hearts of his servants in proclaiming our Lord and Master, the Father of Good Works, Moulai Zin-ben-el-Abdeen, son of Moulai Hassan (the blessed), who has commanded me to write to your Excellency so that you may have the utmost certainty that the Moors, great and small, are most deeply attached to your glorious nation, desirous of its friendship and its alliance, and to join with it, because all the Moors are assured of your good dealings and of your following the right course in all your affairs.

His Shereefian Majesty's letter accompanies this (N.B.—There was no letter received with this), and it is hoped you will notify the Government in London and assure them of His Shereefian Majesty's solicitude for your nation. His Majesty (compliments) has given instructions for letters to be written for the three roads to Mequinez to be kept safe and open for camel drivers, muleteers, and postal couriers, of which I inform you.

May you, &c.

HADJ MOHAMMED MIKWAR.

Enclosure 4 in No. 294.

Moulai Hafid to M. Regnault.

(Traduction.)

EN présence de la situation créée autour de Fez par la rébellion des tribus, qui porte atteinte à la sécurité et à la paix générale et peut faire craindre pour la vie des résidents étrangers et pour tout ce que renferme la ville, j'ai appelé auprès de moi le consul et ami M. Gaillard et le secrétaire le Taleb Si Kaddour Benghabrit, et leur ai exposé la situation actuelle et les moyens qu'il convient de prendre pour ramener la paix et la tranquillité et faire disparaître les sujets de crainte.

Parmi les moyens utiles que nous avions envisagés se trouve celui de faire venir de la région de Houz une mehalla importante sous le commandement de notre cousin Si Mohammed-el-Amrani, afin de dégager la ville, de donner la sécurité aux résidents étrangers et de rétablir la paix et la tranquillité. D'autre part, conformément au promesses de votre Gouvernement ami de nous prêter son appui, en cas de nécessité, nous avons demandé que la mehalla en question soit appuyée par une force française destinée à la seconder et à lui prêter son concours pour atteindre le but poursuivi, c'est-à-dire de rétablir la paix dans ces régions et de faire disparaître les causes de trouble et d'agitation, tout en réservant notre autorité chérifienne et l'indépendance de notre Empire fortuné.

M'appuyant, ô ami, sur l'entière confiance que j'ai en vous, sur nos bonnes relations et le succès que vous avez toujours obtenu dans vos démarches auprès de

votre Gouvernement respecté, je vous confirme par la présente ce que j'ai exposé à vos agents.

La situation actuelle en réclame la prompte réalisation. Je vous demande de faire d'urgence les démarches en vue de l'envoi de la force en question afin de parer en temps utile au danger de la situation actuelle, d'assurer d'une façon complète la sécurité des résidents étrangers et de mettre fin, dans un bref délai, au désordre.

Je vous prie aussi de vous faire donner par votre Gouvernement l'autorisation de venir vous-même me voir en compagnie de notre serviteur, notre Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Sid Elhadk Mohammed-el-Mokri, aussitôt après l'arrivée ici de la force française.

Dans le cas où votre arrivée se trouverait retardée je vous prie de faire donner à l'ami le Consul Gaillard les pouvoirs nécessaires pour être l'intermédiaire entre moi et le chef de la colonne expéditionnaire en ce qui concerne les affaires politiques que les circonstances exigent de traiter, car il est nécessaire d'avoir pour cela une personne au courant des choses marocaines et des relations politiques spéciales existant entre les deux Gouvernements.

J'ai la conviction que vous emploierez tous vos efforts pour obtenir les résultats espérés, et j'attends avec confiance la décision bienveillante et amicale du Gouvernement de la République.

[19193] No. 295.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 80. Secret.)

Sir, *Rome, May 16, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I endeavoured this afternoon to sound the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of Morocco, and to ascertain whether he had any suspicion of the intentions with which Germany has been credited, by observing to him that there seemed to be a great discrepancy between the reports as to the actual condition of things at Fez emanating from German and French sources respectively, which suggested that the reports in question were rather inspired by political motives than the actual facts of the case. The Marquis di San Giuliano said that having no agent on the spot he had no first-hand information; he gathered, however, from the reports he had received from Berlin that the French Ambassador had been quite satisfied with the attitude of the German Minister for Foreign Affairs. Italy is, however, as has on more than one occasion been admitted to me here, not consistently taken into the confidence of her partners in the Triple Alliance.

On the other hand, it has come to my knowledge that the King of Italy, who is generally the best informed man in the country, has expressed considerably anxiety as to the probable attitude of Germany on the Moroccan question, and has confessed to an apprehension that France may receive a sudden warning to halt, which, if it did not lead to the gravest issues, might create a feeling of bitter resentment and disturb the international situation for a considerable period to come.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[19344] No. 296.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 30.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, May 20, 1911.*

PRIME MINISTER declared to representatives of the press yesterday that there was no truth in story of an impending occupation of Tetuan.

The King of Spain said the same to me this morning, but spoke as if he hoped that occupation would take place a few months hence.

(Repeated to Paris and Tangier.)

[19272] No. 297.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, May 20, 1911.*

I SPOKE to M. Cruppi last night in regard to the Franco-Spanish negotiations relative to Morocco which form the subject of Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram No. 28 of the 18th instant. His Excellency said he was not prepared to concede the Spanish demand that the first period of fifteen years, provided by the secret convention of 1904, should be reduced, and that they should be given forthwith a free hand in the Spanish sphere, nor to concur in an alteration of the police arrangements at Tangier. He is ready to make concessions to the Spanish Government in other matters, and he hopes that you will impress on them that compliance with the demands above mentioned would involve a derogation from the *status quo*, and would consequently bring the Algeciras Act into question and discussion. He begs that you will do what you can to persuade the Spanish Government to relinquish such demands.

[19060] No. 298.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 45. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 20, 1911.*

THE Spanish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 13th instant, and told Sir A. Nicolson that the tribes immediately round Ceuta were at present quite tranquil, but that it was feared that more distant tribes were advancing to attack them. The peaceable tribes were desirous of protection, and it was possible that the Spanish Governor-General, to ensure peace in the immediate neighbourhood of Ceuta, might be compelled to occupy Sierra Bullones. He had not done so as yet, and the Ambassador had not been instructed to mention the matter officially here; but as he knew that such a step was in contemplation he did not like to withhold the information from His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[19409] No. 299.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 31.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, May 21, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

French Ambassador has been authorised by telegraph to make certain counter-proposals to the Spanish Government, conceding some of the points demanded by them. M. Geoffray is of opinion that they must be further amplified before they will become acceptable to Spain, and he hopes to be authorised to amend them accordingly.

Unfortunately, the Spanish Government are not likely to remain satisfied with any French proposals which do not include the recognition of the expiration of the first period contemplated by the secret convention and the commencement of the second. The French Government seem in no way disposed to grant this, as they fear that recognition of the right of Spain to occupy Tetuan and Laraiche would be implied by this admission. It appears to me, however, that this would not be the case, as we could still contend that the Act of Algeciras, which Spain professes to desire to uphold, would be violated by such occupation. It might be well to await the Spanish reply to the French counter-proposals before raising this point.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[19357] No. 300.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 135.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, May 17, 1911.*

THE semi-official "Rossia" recently published an evidently inspired article on the Moroccan question.

After stating that recent events in Morocco have more than once led to an exchange of views between the signatories of the Algeciras Act, owing to the necessity in which the French Government finds itself of taking measures to protect the lives of the Europeans who are shut up in Fez, the article proceeds to state that in some quarters the motives by which the French are actuated have been wrongly interpreted, while the press has unduly exaggerated the matter and put it in quite a false light. In its communications to the signatories of the Algeciras Act the French Government has explained the measures which it is taking for the re-establishment of order in Morocco, and the Russian Government has always received these explanations with entire sympathy.

A frank and sincere exchange of views has, the article continues, always formed the basis of Russia's traditional friendship with Germany, so that in the present instance the declarations of her ally have formed the subject of friendly discussion between the two Governments, with the result that a complete unanimity of views has been revealed with regard to the sincerity of France's intentions and the irreproachable manner in which she is fulfilling her obligations under international treaties. The article concludes by stating that this complete accord of views is especially welcome at the present time, when pourparlers are taking place between Russia and Germany on the question of railway construction in North Persia.

The "Novoe Vremya," in commenting on a statement telegraphed from London to the effect that Russia and Great Britain have made friendly representations to the Berlin Cabinet, states that these explanations, made simultaneously at Berlin by the ally and by the friend of France, have had a most beneficial effect on the international aspects of the Moroccan question. First of all their effect is noticeable in the altered tone of the German press, while in the second place they afford evidence of the fact that Russia is acting in accord with her treaty obligations to France and her friendship with Germany. Finally, the "Novoe Vremya" considers that such a statement of Russia's views on the Moroccan question was necessary owing to the illusions cherished and openly expressed by certain organs of the German press that, in assuming a vigorous attitude towards France, Germany would bring about the collapse of the Triple *Entente*.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

[19499] No. 301.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 222.)

Sir, *Paris, May 20, 1911.*

THE news of various attempts made by the Moors to harass the French troops concentrated near Moulouya River, and especially of a surprise attack made on the 17th instant under cover of a fog on a detachment of the 1st battalion of the Foreign Legion, during which Captain Labordette and ten men were killed, has diverted the attention of the papers from the progress of Colonel Brulard's column towards Fez.

The orders issued by the Government that the French troops are not to cross the Moulouya River are the subject of indignant criticisms on the part of the "Temps" and the other organs of the press, which are conducting a campaign against the manner in which the military operations in Morocco have been organised. The scene of the desultory hostilities between the French and the Moors is roughly 90 miles from the Algerian frontier as the crow flies, and it is probable that the Ministry has purposely prohibited the crossing of the Moulouya River as a means of keeping within bounds the military officers on the spot who might otherwise advance, under plea of tactical exigencies, further towards Taza than from reasons of international policy is desired by the Government.

The "Radical," an organ of the Radical party which supports the present

Government, publishes an article on the situation in Morocco, in which stress is laid on the abuses committed by the Makhzen and its general misgovernment, and the necessity for securing better conditions of administration in the future. It observes that the French Government are resolved to carry out their mission in a disinterested fashion, but France cannot be exposed to the risk of having to repeat continually expeditions of the kind now on its way. Fez should not be evacuated without guarantees being obtained for financial and political control. Unless this be done, the paper adds, nothing will have been accomplished.

As there is no indication that the French Government will bring away from Fez the French military instructors, a course of action which would lay them open to the charge of destroying French influence at Fez and betraying the Sultan, who would thus be left at the mercy of the revolting tribes, the question will arise, as soon as the relief column reaches Fez, as to how the French Government are to find a means of insuring themselves against the necessity of having to repeat the present relief operation.

The Government have declared that their intention is not to continue the occupation of Fez for a longer time than is strictly necessary, and the international situation which would arise were that occupation prolonged, as well as the expenditure necessary for keeping a large force in the interior of Morocco to maintain the line of communications with the base, will doubtless make them endeavour to carry out this intention. But they have still to find a solution of the question as to how Morocco is to be governed by its present ruler without French military assistance, which would render him dependent on France and thereby impugn the Algeciras Act and other treaties concerning Morocco.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[20058] No. 302.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, May 22, 1911.

LE Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne, considérant qu'il serait utile de renouveler, pour une nouvelle période d'un an, le mandat qui leur a été conféré par Sa Majesté le Sultan du Maroc, pour empêcher la contrebande des armes sur les côtes de l'Empire chérifien, l'Ambassadeur de la France serait heureux de savoir si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique ne verrait pas d'objection au renouvellement de ce mandat, dans les mêmes conditions générales.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 22 mai, 1911.

[20049] No. 303.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 177.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 22, 1911.*

IN speaking to M. Cambon to-day of his conversation with Sir Arthur Nicolson in which he stated that the French Government proposed that an offer should be made to Spain to discuss at some future date her position under the secret agreement, while negativing her request that the period during which her liberty of action was restricted should be regarded as having now come to an end, I said that I thought this would not be an offer satisfactory to Spain. Spain would be sure to urge that, after France had sent troops to Fez and restored order, and after the possibility of complications with Germany had passed away and things had reverted to their normal condition in Morocco, she would then be met with the reply that, as everything in Morocco had reverted to its normal condition, it was unnecessary to alter the secret treaty. It would be difficult to reassure her on this point, and she must get something out of the present situation if she was to be kept with us. I had therefore suggested that Spain should be promised that she should get her corresponding liberty of action on the 1st January next. If this were done, I should be prepared to tell

her that the secret agreement must not be altered while the crisis in Morocco continued, and that she ought to be content with the near and certain prospect of obtaining the advantage which she desired.

M. Cambon personally raised no objection to this proposal. He would communicate it to M. Cruppi. He asked me whether I thought Spain ought to be promised her liberty of action from the 1st January, or only that on the 1st January France would negotiate with her to arrange this.

I said that if it could be done it would be better to promise liberty of action upon that date.

As regards Tangier, I said that I should be prepared to urge upon Spain that to alter the situation there would be to alter the situation created by the Act of Algeciras, and that Tangier was in an exceptional position and must remain so.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[19794] No. 304.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, May 23, 1911.*

SPANISH Ambassador has probably informed you of the action taken this morning by the Governor of Ceuta in establishing a post of Spanish "police" at a point on the road to Tetuan called Ponte Negron, well beyond police boundary fixed in convention with Morocco of 16th November, 1910.

The pretext is an alleged assault on a Spanish fishing-boat in that neighbourhood, for which reparation could not be obtained from the Governor of Tetuan. It was no doubt more accurately described to-day to French Ambassador by Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as "a little sop to public opinion." Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that the Spanish Government were trying to avoid occupying Tetuan.

(Repeated to Tangier and Paris.)

[19802] No. 305.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, May 23, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 31 of the 22nd May.

French Ambassador has received authority to offer better terms to Spain on one or two points relating to employment of Spanish engineers and limitation of field without which native troops may operate when accompanied by French instructors. His Excellency proposes to send in a written statement of French counter-proposals as they now stand, and to suggest that after studying them the Minister for Foreign Affairs should arrange another meeting with his Excellency and myself.

Do you agree to this course?

(Repeated to Paris.)

[19930] No. 306.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May 23, 1911.*

SPANISH Ambassador has asked my opinion of project to send police from Laraiche to Alcazar and to send war-ship to Laraiche to land temporary force to take the place of police at Laraiche. I have urged strongly that Spain should do nothing beyond what is described in your telegram No. 32 of the 23rd May, which is already done.

His Excellency observed that the Spanish Government understood that it was impossible to anticipate the date on which Spain would obtain liberty of action in her sphere, and that the outlook in regard to the negotiations with France was not hopeful. I answered that although any change of the Tangier police arrangements

was out of the question, some anticipation of the above-mentioned date was open to discussion. The best policy for the Spanish Government was to keep quiet in Morocco and to concentrate her attention on negotiating with France. It was quite possible that some of the Spanish grievances might be adjusted in favour of Spain, and this would be clear gain to her, since once the present crisis was over her position in Morocco would be improved, without her having risked money, men, or anything in that country.

[19929] No. 307.

Señor de Villa Urrutia to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(Confidential.)
Dear Sir Edward, *Spanish Embassy, London, May 22, 1911.*

I HAVE received since I left you two telegrams from Madrid, of which I enclose herewith a copy.

I will see you to-morrow at your convenience.

Yours sincerely
W. R. DE VILLA URRUTIA.

Enclosure in No. 307.

Telegrams received at the Spanish Embassy in London.

(Translation.)

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London:—

"As a consequence of the barbarous outrage on Wednesday last against Spanish fishermen on the coast by Monte Negron, and as the Basha of Tetuan took no immediate and effective measures for the punishment of the guilty parties, in spite of the Spanish consul having declared to him that this act could not be allowed to swell the large list of insults to our nationals which have been systematically left unpunished, and in spite of the fact that—into the bargain—Guebbas wrote pressing him to do so, the military Governor of Ceuta informs me that he established a police post this morning in the above-mentioned spot, so as to avoid the repetition of such acts and still greater wrongs.

"He hopes not to meet with such opposition as would oblige us to take further action, since the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages have come to him begging that he will establish a police post, and offering their aid."

A later telegram announces that a police post has been established without further disturbance.

[19812] No. 308.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, May 23, 1911.*

SIR M. DE BUNSEN'S telegram No. 32.

Spanish Minister assured French chargé d'affaires to-day that occupation of post was provisional and necessitated by the insecurity of the region.

French chargé d'affaires tells me that special incident on which this latter assertion is based is frivolous. One Moor threatened six Spanish fishermen and demanded money. They offered 2 dollars, then took courage and overpowered him. One Spaniard received a knife wound and the Moor was badly bitten in the nose. French chargé d'affaires tells me that he has suggested to his Government to propose that Tetuan police furnish pickets to occupy points within their district where Spanish authorities maintain that danger exists. Otherwise Spanish posts will gradually be established all over country.

(Sent to Madrid.)

[19802] No. 309.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May* 24, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 33 of 23rd May: Morocco.
I agree.
(Repeated to Paris, No. 126.)

[19997] No. 310.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 25.)

(No. 68.)
Sir, *Madrid, May* 21, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 53, Confidential, of the 24th April, 1910, forwarding a copy of an agreement made between the Spanish Compañía de Minas del Riff and the Compañía del Norte Africano, a Spanish concern in which French capital is largely interested, for settling their rival claims in the neighbourhood of Melilla, I have the honour to report that the affairs of the former company have again been brought to my notice by Mr. Macpherson, one of the company's largest shareholders, who, though his family have been established for two or three generations in Spain, professes to be still entitled to British nationality, in the question of a dispute between his company and the Navarrette company, formerly a Spanish but now a German concern, represented by a Herr Natter.

The facts of the case appear to be briefly as follows:—

It will be remembered that a Spanish company of the Riff mines was formed in 1908 to work a concession obtained from the Roghi, at that time *de facto* ruler of the district. The original concession covered the whole of the Guelaya region. In order to improve the security of this concession the company subsequently negotiated with the minor local chiefs and proprietors, with whose consent and concurrence the limits of the company's concession were more exactly defined and a kind of title-deed drawn up and deposited in the Department for Native Affairs in Melilla. This is the document on which the company mainly rely for proof of the territorial extent of their claim.

The question that has now arisen relates to a stretch of ground lying outside the boundary marked in the above-mentioned document, but claimed nevertheless by the company as belonging *de facto* to them, inasmuch as they state that they had been for some time engaged in working there when the circumstances arose which gave rise to the present dispute. The position of this piece of land, in relation to what may be loosely called the *de jure* and *de facto* boundaries claimed by the company, is shown in the enclosed map.*

Notwithstanding the fact that until lately the Spanish company had to a certain extent, as stated above, worked the disputed land, certain documents, of which the genuineness is contested by the Spanish company, have been produced by Messrs. Natter in support of their claim, Herr Natter representing that the land in question belongs legally to him by right of purchase. The question came before the Melilla authorities, who denied the validity of the supposed sale of land to the Germans and ordered the latter to withdraw to their undisputed possessions beyond the Wady Bokoya.

It was at this juncture that Mr. Macpherson appealed to me in a letter written from Melilla to support the British interests involved. He founded his request on the fact that he, the principal shareholder in the Spanish company, is a British subject, and as such has been influential in placing orders for plant, &c., with British firms, which I know to be true. On the 17th instant his representative at Madrid called upon me and explained at considerable length the latest developments of the question.

It appears that the case of the Navarrette, or Natter, Company has been strongly taken up by the German Ambassador, who used violent and even threatening language at the Department of State, insisting on the claim of the German company up to what he asserted to be the true boundary of the Spanish concession receiving immediate recognition. Alarmed at this intervention, the Spanish Minister for

* Not reproduced.

Foreign Affairs has proposed to the German Ambassador a compromise to the effect that the titles of the rival companies should be referred to the arbitration of the High Court at Lausanne, when the Morocco mining regulations come into force. In the meanwhile the German company is to be allowed to continue its work provisionally in one portion of the disputed ground, the remainder being left fallow and unoccupied by either party. This arrangement is to continue until the true ownership has been determined by the Lausanne court.

The question of the rights of the English shareholders in the Spanish company appears accordingly no longer to call for any intervention on the part of this embassy. When Mr. Macpherson's Madrid representative called to explain the case to me the matter had already been taken in hand by the Spanish Government in the manner described above. I am not aware whether the German Embassy have accepted the proposed compromise.

A further question, however, appears to have arisen subsequent to Mr. Macpherson's appeal to me. The Spanish Compañía de Minas del Riff lately conveyed down to the port of Melilla, and consigned to Bilbao, some 800 tons of iron ore. This was the first attempt of the Spanish company to export their produce since the date of their concession. As this action might be regarded by the company's rivals as not being in conformity with the General Act of Algeciras, inasmuch as the contemplated mining regulations are not yet in force, the Spanish Government are anxious lest the legality of the proceeding should be questioned by the German Government. Indeed, it has already formed the subject of a protest from the Spanish representative of Messrs. Mannesmann, whose comprehensive claims over all mining rights throughout the Empire have not yet been abandoned. Accordingly, I am told the Spanish Government propose to make the following suggestion to the German Ambassador, whom they know to be a supporter of Messrs. Mannesmann. They will propose to his Excellency that, pending the application of the mining regulations, no objection should be raised by him to the export of ore from the Riff district, in consideration of an undertaking to be given by the Spanish Government that a control shall be established at the port of Melilla in order that an accurate register may be kept of the precise quantity and quality of the exported ore. Any duties to which the company might subsequently be held liable in respect of these exports would thus be recoverable eventually from the company. Even if the Lausanne court decided against the entire Spanish claim to the possession and exploitation of the Riff mines, the value of the ore thus provisionally exported could be recovered, inasmuch as it is provided that the value of the total quantity of the exported ore is to be kept within the value of the company's plant.

It is not expected that the Norte Africano company (French) will raise any objection, since they profit to the extent of 15 per cent. on the value of all the ore exported by the Compañía del Riff.

Only German opposition was expected, and it is for this reason that the Spanish Government propose to address themselves only to the German Embassy.

The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has given me much the same account of this question as that which is here recorded. His Excellency did not ask in any way for my assistance, and I do not at present see that I could usefully further the interests of the Spanish company by supporting them against the German Embassy, where my right to have a say in the matter might with some reason be disputed. It has seemed to me, nevertheless, to be my duty to place you in possession of the above particulars, which show the determination with which Germany pursues her object of obtaining a footing in the Riff mining district. I have already alluded to the German Ambassador's controversy over this matter with the Spanish Government in my telegram No. 24 of the 10th instant.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[20522] No. 311.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.**

(No. 46. Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 25, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador complained to me to-day that the French answer to Spain made concessions only on trivial points, and was absolutely silent as to anticipating the date of putting Spain on an equality in her sphere.

* Also to Sir F. Bertie, No. 183, Secret.

I observed that this answer of the French had probably been drawn up before I last spoke to him. I had since impressed upon M. Cambon the importance which the Spanish Government attached to this point, and how impossible it would be to come to an arrangement at all if the secret agreement between Spain and France remained entirely unmodified respecting the terms of years. I was sure that the matter was still open for discussion, but the French might not yet have made up their minds as to what proposal they could make with regard to it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20725] No. 312.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 187.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 25, 1911.*

I CONGRATULATED M. Cambon to-day on the arrival of the French at Fez. To have arrived there, to have found everything safe, and to have relieved the place without any fighting was a great success. It would complete the success if the French found that they were able to make a peaceful settlement and leave soon. On the merits of the case, and from the point of view of public opinion, it was very desirable that one result of the settlement should be to redress the grievances and prevent the extortion and abuses from which the tribes had suffered. I hoped this would be achieved. It was a thing which I was sure would appeal to public opinion in France as well as elsewhere. In connection with this, I read to M. Cambon Mr. Lister's telegram No. 77.

M. Cambon said that he had no information, but he saw in the press that an amnesty was already a part of an arrangement. Of course, what the French had done would consolidate the power of the Sultan.

M. Cambon then observed to me that he was afraid Spain still had designs on Tetuan.

I told him in general terms the substance of my last conversation with the Spanish Ambassador, in which I had urged that the Spanish Government should do nothing beyond establishing the police post, which was already a *fait accompli*, and should concentrate their attention upon negotiations with the French Government. They would get some concessions, and they would get them for absolutely nothing.

I also told M. Cambon what the Spanish Ambassador had said about the importance of anticipating the date when Spain would be put upon an equality in her sphere.

M. Cambon said that he had not yet had an answer from M. Cruppi as to the suggestion which I had made about this. Spain, by her action with regard to the police post, had already violated the secret agreement.

I observed that, however soon the French left Fez and however well everything went, one result would, of course, be that French influence would be much strengthened at Fez, and Spain would expect some compensation out of the situation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20190] No. 313.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 70.)
Sir, *Madrid, May 23, 1911.*

TO-DAY'S newspapers contain a full account of the action taken by the Governor of Ceuta early yesterday morning to establish a post of police at Monte Negron (or Jebel Negro), an elevated position near the coast, lying about half-way between Ceuta and Tetuan, and some 8 kilom. beyond the outside limit of the zone of the Ceuta frontier police, as fixed in the convention of the 16th November, 1910, between Spain and Morocco. The post was occupied, without opposition, by a body of Riff rifles (Tiradores), supported by two companies of engineers. The latter subsequently withdrew.

The pretext for this advance in the direction of the coveted goal of Tetuan is an assault stated to have been made on the 17th instant on a Spanish fishing-boat by a group of natives from the shore near the mouth of Wady Negro. The Basha of

Tetuan is said to have neglected to take the necessary measures for the punishment of the guilty parties. The Governor of Ceuta is thus compelled, according to the official statement published this morning, to undertake the policing of this portion of the road to Tetuan. The Spanish consul has informed the Basha of Tetuan accordingly, requesting him to take effective measures to keep the peace along the remaining portion of the road.

The occupation of Monte Negron recalls the similar establishment of Spanish outposts at Restinga and Cap de l'Eau, on the coast between Melilla and the Algerian frontier, in February and March 1908. In all these cases Spain has professed to undertake a necessary duty which the Makhzen was unwilling or unable to perform. But neither in 1908 nor at the present time would any such action have been taken but for the supposed necessity, in the interests of Spain, to do something as a set-off to the advance of French forces in other parts of Morocco.

The present forward movement of the relief force towards Fez had already impelled the Spaniards to occupy the heights overlooking Ceuta. It has now caused them to take a second step in advance. The expectation is general that a third will shortly follow, and all eyes are eagerly turned towards Tetuan. There is reason, however, to hope that the Government will shrink, at least for the present, from incurring the responsibility of this more important operation, in the hope that their self-denial will contribute to the success of the pending negotiation with France.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[20344] No. 314.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, May 26, 1911.*

LAST night I received a message from Consul MacLeod, dated Fez, 21st May, reporting that the French column had arrived. He adds that in spite of the assurances given by M. Gaillard that a policy of pacification would be followed, the Sultan and Mangin in a spirit of vengeance needlessly caused about twelve villages of the Ulad Jama to be burnt and raided by troops from Fez this morning. The incident has caused great indignation among the foreigners with the exception of the French. Telegrams in the same sense have been sent by the "Times" war correspondent. To prevent repetition of destruction of property, of which a considerable amount belongs to foreigners and protégés, much pressure may be required. This morning, in conversation with the French chargé d'affaires, I drew his serious attention to the matter, pointing out that it must produce a very bad impression. M. de Billy, while agreeing with me, said no news of the incident had reached him; great leniency had, he knew, been shown by the column on the march to Fez, and M. Gaillard rather feared the Moors might wrongly attribute this to weakness.

French chargé d'affaires led me to believe that now that General Moinier had reached Fez, there would be no chance of a repetition of such acts. He read me the French consul's instructions, which had just reached him from Paris, but begged me to treat them as strictly confidential, as he had no authority to communicate them to me. M. Gaillard is given sole charge of the negotiations with the Sultan, but will of course consult with the general with a view to preventing a repetition of the abuses which have given rise to the present situation. M. Gaillard is to insist upon the introduction of reforms in the administration in return for services rendered by France in dispatching a French column to the Sultan's assistance. He will further demand that measures be taken for the keeping of strict accounts of all State revenue and expenditure, for the proper collection and assessment of taxes, also for the creation of a department for the prompt examination and settlement of the claims of foreigners, and for the reorganisation of the army. The question of the modifications to be made in the personnel of the Government to meet the exigencies of the situation were also to be discussed between the French consul and the Sultan. The necessity to "ménager la possibilité" of the prompt evacuation by the French troops of Fez and the surrounding districts is to be borne in mind by M. Gaillard throughout the negotiations.

[20332] No. 315.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, May 27, 1911.*

MOROCCO. My despatch No. 73 of the 26th May. Although the French Ambassador does not expect to receive his full instructions regarding the preliminary French counter-proposals till the 30th or 31st May, his Excellency agreed to hold an informal conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself this afternoon at the British Embassy.

The Spanish Foreign Minister being in a state of agitation which rendered serious argument impossible, the discussion which ensued was somewhat heated and inconclusive. Indeed, Señor Garcia Prieto's demeanour gave me at first the impression that he desired a rupture, and that it would be useless to continue the negotiation unless France was prepared to admit that circumstances have brought into operation the second period of the secret convention.

His Excellency, however, finally calmed down, and was persuaded to send us both his observations, in writing, on the counter-proposals which he declared to be insufficient and unsatisfactory in every way. Before Spain could think of accepting the French proposals, he said, the Franco-Moorish financial convention of March last must be entirely recast in all its provisions in the sense of the conventions of 1904. It was not sufficient to make arrangements for future eventualities.

M. Geoffray and I are both of opinion that the prospect of agreement is very slight.

[20340] No. 316.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 27.)

[By Post.]

(No. 69. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, May 27, 1911.*

FRANCO-SPANISH negotiations in regard to Morocco. M. Cruppi, in conversation with me this evening, said that he quite appreciated the force of the arguments employed by you and by M. Cambon (recorded in your despatch No. 177 to me of the 22nd instant) in favour of giving to the Spanish Government the free hand in their sphere which they desire on the 1st January next. He is unable, however, to take any decision in a question of such importance until the matter has been considered by the Cabinet, and it has not been possible to bring it before them during the past week in consequence of the Ministerial crisis resulting from the recent aeroplane accident. He will, however, consult his colleagues in the Ministry on the subject on the 30th instant, and has so informed the French Ambassador at Madrid. He is fully alive to the danger that if concessions be not made to Spain she may be thrown into the arms of Germany, but if Spain be given a free hand the fact would have to be recorded by a formal note, and he fears that in such case the German Government might come forward with the complaint that the *status quo* contemplated by the Algeciras Act has ceased to exist, and might demand a discussion of the situation, for he knows that the Spanish Government communicate all that passes between the French and Spanish Governments to the German Government.

M. Cruppi considers that there is a great difference between the informal consent of France and her abstinence from objection to various proceedings on the part of the Spanish Government and a formal recognition by the French Government of the anticipation by seven years of a date mentioned in the secret agreement of 1904. He thinks that the publication of the secret agreement would inevitably result from such formal recognition, and he fears that a serious European question might possibly be raised in consequence.

[20415] No. 317.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 119. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, May 19, 1911.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 34 of the 6th instant, transmitting for any observations which I might have to offer a copy of certain proposals which the Spanish Government have made to the French Government with regard to future arrangements respecting police, finance, and railways in Morocco.

I must say that the general impression which I derived from reading these proposals was that in the opinion of the Spanish Government the provisions of the secret agreement for the partition of Morocco between France and Spain had come into force, and that the so-called sphere of influence recognised by France as falling to Spain in the event of the break up of the Moorish Empire had already become Spanish territory. It has always been the tendency of the Spanish Government to accentuate the importance of the spheres of influence, and in their present proposals they appear to go a good deal further than they have done before.

I am of opinion that it would be disastrous for Tangier that the policing of the town should be handed over entirely to Spanish instructors, and I should be much surprised if the French Government ever agreed to this. The organisation of the French Tabor is very perfect, and all the arrangements for its accommodation and training have been made with the greatest care; the results obtained, moreover, have been excellent. There appears no objection to the extra 300 men for Arzila, Alcazar, and Azemmour respectively; but I am at a loss to see where they are to be taken from if the total number of the force provided for by the Act of Algeciras is to be maintained.

The second proposal appears to me preposterous. The Spanish Government agree to waive their right to supply military instructors to the Sultan, a right which they have never had, and which the French Government have told them clearly they can never admit, on condition that in the Spanish sphere the right is practically granted to them, for (A) and (B) taken together amount to little short of that.

I consider that proposal No. 3 is well-founded.

Proposal No. 4 will, as far as I can make out, entail a division of the administration (levying and application of proceeds) of the tertib, which, in my opinion, could only cause confusion and hamper the execution of necessary public works. In this particular instance the "spheres of influence" arrangement appears to me very pernicious. The same applies to proposal No. 5, and as I previously stated (see my despatch No. 75 of the 8th ultimo) it appears to me that it would be very difficult to begin making exchanges of guarantees.

Proposal No. 6. A railway from Ceuta to Tetuan would, I think, be an absurd waste of money, and I imagine that a part of it at all events would have to be borne by the Moorish Treasury, but it might be advisable not to raise objections, as no doubt Spanish national pride would be much gratified. I trust that M. Porché may be absolved of all responsibility if the *études* are to be entrusted to M. Llorens, whose incompetency is proverbial.

Perhaps the French Government might be inclined to agree to proposal No. 7.

The point raised in proposal No. 8 has already been discussed with regard to the application of the funds of the "Caisse spéciale"; and it was decided that to confine the application of resources to the ports from which they were derived would greatly retard public works. I expressed a similar opinion in my above-mentioned despatch in connection with the application of port and lighthouse dues.

Proposal No. 9 will, I suppose, depend on whether an agreement is come to for a rearrangement of guarantees.

With regard to proposal No. 10, as I stated in my despatch No. 75, M. de Billy assured me that the advance of the 2,350,000 fr. to which the Spaniards object was made at the special request of the Maghzen to prevent any interruption in the functions of the police during the discussion of the renewal of their commission by the representatives of the signatory Powers at the end of this year. If the Maghzen were assured that there was no danger of this occurring, perhaps the loan might be dropped.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[20416] No. 318.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 120. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, May 20, 1911.*

DURING the last week a fine crop of alarmist rumours have reached Tangier from the Tetuan district, and there is no doubt that great anxiety exists as to the intentions of Spain. Erzini has come over to Tangier to see Menebhi, and is very much perturbed as to what may occur. He would like to bring his wife and family away, but fears that that would be a signal for a general stampede. He considers the occupation of the town to be imminent. It is also persistently rumoured that everything is in readiness at Cadiz for the dispatch of a squadron with a body of troops to be landed at Rio Martin. I must say that Sir Maurice de Bunsen's latest telegrams give colour to these reports. At the same time, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs informed me on the 16th instant that the language held to him that morning by the Spanish Minister had been quite satisfactory, although he added "it remains to be proved whether their deeds will correspond with their words." Si Guebbas had insisted very strongly upon the desirability of avoiding a collision between the Spanish troops and the tribesmen, and had pointed out how necessary it was to do nothing which could affect the susceptibilities of the latter with regard to the privacy of their women. M. de Villa Sinda had replied that he fully shared this view, and that he had urged strongly on his Government the necessity of strict orders in that sense being given to the troops. As I stated in my despatch No. 118 of the 15th instant, the leading Moors on their side are doing all they can to restrain their compatriots, and I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a letter addressed by the Tetuan notables to the chiefs of the Anjera,* urging them to keep quiet, and not to provoke any collision.

Si Guebbas told me that the Spanish troops had not so far occupied any posts outside the line drawn in the recent convention.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[20418] No. 319.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 122. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, May 20, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 106, Confidential, of the 7th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note communicated to me by Mr. Harris, which has been addressed by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Marquis de Villa Mejor, one of the representatives of the Spanish group of the Union des Mines, with regard to the arrangement made to ensure proper regard being paid to the Spanish political interests in the districts in the immediate vicinity of the Spanish fortresses. This letter was at once communicated by the Marquis de Villa Mejor to the president of the board of the union.

Mr. Harris tells me that M. Garcia Prieto had already addressed a private letter to the Marquis de Villa Mejor, in which he stated that he believed that some sort of promise or acquiescence had been given by the Spanish Government to the proposals of the union, but that no trace of it could be found in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that he (the Marquis) must make the best possible arrangement he could. This letter was also communicated by M. de Villa Mejor to the board of the union.

Mr. Harris also tells me that the Union des Mines are in negotiation with the Mannesmanns, and that there is every chance of an agreement being arrived at. He promises to let me have full details when anything is absolutely settled.

He also informed me very confidentially that the engineers of the union had recently come upon an enormously rich tract of land on the Algerian frontier, in the district of Bou Anan, some 150 kilom. from the French railway. They had decided to practically abandon all the various areas previously denounced by them, and to

* Not printed.

concentrate all their energies on the recent find. A light railway will be built at once to connect the mines with the French system, and Mr. Harris said that the French military authorities had arranged to lend French engineers and facilitate in every way the building of the line on condition that they were allowed to use it. Bou Anan is one of the districts which the French have the right to occupy, and I believe that one small French post already exists there. With the assistance of the railway the whole region will no doubt soon be occupied.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 319.

Note communicated to Mr. Lister by Mr. Harris.

(Confidentielle.)

APRÈS examen du projet de la filiale espagnole de l'Union des Mines marocaines pour exploiter les mines de Beni 'Msala, près Ceuta, je ne trouve dans nos archives aucune trace de ce que notre Gouvernement ait donné son assentiment aux accords entre l'Union des Mines marocaines et la maison G. y A. Figueroa.

Le 20 pour cent est suffisant pour la représentation espagnole dans d'autres régions, mais il ne peut être accepté pour des affaires des mines situées dans le voisinage des places fortes espagnoles.

Quand le Gouvernement espagnol donna son consentement à la réunion de tous les intérêts miniers dans une seule main, il ne le fit sans qu'on lui donnât des sécurités relatives à ses intérêts politiques. Cette déclaration fut faite devant le représentant d'Espagne à Fez, par le délégué de l'Union des Mines marocaines, Mr. Harris, le 18 mars, 1909.

Malgré la bonne volonté de l'union, ses agents se sont présentés dans les places espagnoles dans une forme qui fait prévoir leur désir de ne pas reconnaître les autorités militaires.

Vous devez parler de tout ceci d'une manière confidentielle à vos collègues de l'union. Pour ma part, j'ai soumis le cas aux Cabinets de Londres et Paris, qui prêtent leur concours à l'Union des Mines marocaines.

Le 3 mai, 1911.

Les 23 et 24 janvier, 1911, l'union avait remis au Marquis de Villa Mejor deux notes de protestation contre l'interprétation officielle de ses accords avec la maison Figueroa.

Le Marquis de Villa Mejor les communiqua à son Ministre d'État, M. Garcia Prieto.

La communication qui précède est un extrait de sa réponse remise le 3 mai, 1911, à M. d'Arcy par le Marquis de Villa Mejor.

[20419] No. 320.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 123.)

Sir, *Tangier, May 21, 1911.*

I HAD some conversation to-day with the French chargé d'affaires on the situation. M. de Billy confirmed the information sent by Mr. Carleton, which I communicated to you in my telegram No. 74, with regard to the movements of the relief column. He also read me a letter from Captain Pettelat, the chief of the staff of Colonel Brulard, who was previously attached to the French Legation here, dated from Lala Ito on the 14th instant. The column has been attacked more or less incessantly, but not, as far as I can make out, very seriously, and the casualties do not seem to have amounted to more than a few men wounded and some horses and cattle killed. Captain Pettelat is very impatient at the slowness of the advance. General Moinier, he says, does not believe in the urgency of Colonel Mangin's need, and will not move forward until he is certain that his communications are assured in his rear. M. de Billy says that the French troops will not enter Fez; they will, further, not undertake any campaign on a big scale against the Berbers which would draw them into the mountains. They will clear the country round the capital, and

then probably march upon Mequinez, and from Mequinez through the Zemour and Zair country to Rabat. A good lesson will be given to the latter on the way. I asked him whether any arrangement had been made as to the policy to be followed with regard to the Grand Vizier and the reconstitution of the Makhzen, but could get little out of him on this point. If they miss the present opportunity of removing El Glawi it seems to me that it will be very difficult to find another as good!

M. de Billy tells me that he has received a letter from the Shereef of Wazzan, whom he had dispatched to Fez, stating that the tribes were beginning to get nervous, and that there were signs of some of them wishing to come to terms with the Makhzen. This bears out news which I have received from Mr. Carleton.

His Majesty's consul at Fez, in a message which was telegraphed to me from Rabat, writing on the 11th, states that the rebels were repulsed that day with severe loss, the Makhzen losses being small. The state of affairs at Mequinez, he says, sounds very bad; on the other hand, the general feeling at Fez is more loyal. The Makhzen, however, are powerless to do more than defend the town from capture. The reports from the eastern tribes are more reassuring.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[20464] No. 321.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 85.)
Sir, *Stockholm, May 23, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the French and Spanish Ministers in Stockholm periodically make communications on the subject of Morocco to the Swedish Government as one of the signatories of the Algeciras Treaty. These communications are made separately, and I understand from my French colleague that a conversation which he had with the Spanish Minister was of an unsatisfactory nature, as M. Carro commented with some freedom on "French aggression" in Morocco. Both Ministers have told me that the Swedish Government merely echoes the voice of the Government of Berlin. My Russian colleague, with some justice, describes the Swedish policy as "une politique phonographique," the discs being periodically supplied from Germany.

The attitude of the press is somewhat peculiar. The Moroccan question is severely boycotted, and among the miscellaneous telegraphic news which is generously supplied to the Swedish papers by the German Wolff Agency, there is practically nothing respecting the advance of the French relief force. On the other hand the newspapers are continuously publishing telegrams from the Far East of a highly sensational character relative to impending troubles between China and Russia or Russia and Japan. Lord Kilmarnock, in conversation with a member of the press department of the Foreign Office, was informed that the reason for this difference of treatment was that the Swedish public had no interest whatever in Morocco, while everything that related to Russian policy was of great importance to Sweden. My French colleague is of opinion that it is the desire of the German Government to keep the public in the dark as to the danger of the Europeans in Fez, and as to the true facts of the French advance in order when necessary to be able to represent French policy in the light of pure and unwarrantable aggression.

My Turkish colleague, who was for a long time employed in the Turkish Foreign Office, tells me that, in his opinion, there will soon be a change in the Turkish policy on the Moroccan question. The late Sultan for dynastic reasons refused to have any official dealings with a rival shereef; but now the tendency in the Young Turkish party was to sink all minor differences and to work for Mussulman solidarity, even between Sunnis and Shiahs. He was strongly of the opinion that if there was an aggressive movement, joint or isolated, by any European Power or Powers against the Moorish Mussulmans, and if the latter gained any sort of success, the effect in Turkey would be both wide and deep.

I have, &c.
CECIL SPRING-RICE.

20509] No. 322.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 73.)
Sir, *Madrid, May 26, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 67 of the 19th instant, I now have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a memorandum which the French Ambassador handed on the 24th instant to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs. It contains, under five headings, the concessions which the French Government are prepared to make to that of Spain in respect of the demands put forward by the latter in the confidential memorandum and draft declaration and protocol, as transmitted in my despatch No. 63 of the 14th instant.

The principal points are as follows:—

1. Satisfaction is given to Spain as regards the course of the proposed Tangier–Al Cazar Railway.
2. Moorish Department of Public Works to be recommended to employ preferentially Spanish engineers in connection with public works in and around Laraiche and Tetuan and especially on the Ceuta–Tetuan road.
3. French and Spanish Legations at Tangier will concert together with a view to settling questions that arise in the spirit of the convention of 1904.
4. Provision is made for the employment of the Spanish language in certain cases.
5. French military instructors will not lend their services to set up permanent native military organisation within the Spanish sphere of influence; native troops accompanied by French military instructors will not operate so as to conflict with troops or police employed by Spain in virtue of the Act of Algeciras and her conventions with the Makhzen. Definition of duties of French officers at Tangier.

M. Geoffray explained to Señor Garcia Prieto that the question of a redistribution of the police forces now stationed in the eight open ports of Morocco was largely a financial question, and that it was therefore being carefully considered in Paris in consultation with the French Minister of Finance. There was every desire to meet the wishes of Spain on this point, except in respect of Tangier, which must retain its special character as the seat of the diplomatic body and other international institutions.

M. Geoffray informs me that his Government will firmly resist the Spanish demand for an advancement of the period when, under article 2 of the Secret Convention, Spain would be invested in her sphere of influence with a greater degree of liberty than that which she at present enjoys. I agree with his Excellency in thinking that the present French offer, if supplemented by a satisfactory rearrangement of the port police, will afford evidence of a sincere desire on the part of the French Government to meet the legitimate grievances of Spain.

A second meeting will now no doubt shortly take place between the Spanish Foreign Minister, the French Ambassador, and myself, in order to discuss in detail the the new French proposals.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 322.

Memorandum.

LE Chemin de Fer Tanger–El Ksar passerait par Arzila et desservirait Larache, soit directement, soit au moyen d'un embranchement. M. Cruppi étudie le moyen d'y réserver une part de contrôle à l'Espagne.

2. Les deux Gouvernements recommanderaient au Service des Travaux publics de choisir de préférence des agents espagnols pour l'étude des projets, la surveillance des travaux publics à effectuer à Larache, Tétouan et dans un certain périmètre de ces deux villes; ces dispositions s'appliqueraient notamment aux travaux de la route Ceuta–Tétouan.

3. Dans les affaires où intervient le corps diplomatique ou les commissions qui en dépendent, les deux légations échangeraient leurs vues pour faire prévaloir les solutions en harmonie avec les principes de l'accord de 1904.

4. Les actes généraux concernant les adjudications, affiches bulletins de taxes et toute publicité foraine seraient rédigés en arabe, espagnol et français. Les soumissions aux adjudications et déclarations en douane pourraient être faites dans l'une des trois langues au choix de la partie intéressée. Seuls les cahiers des charges, plans et projets continueraient à être rédigés conformément aux règlements en vigueur.

5. Les instructeurs militaires français ne serviraient pas à créer des organisations militaires permanentes de troupes chérifiennes dans la région visée à l'article 2 de l'accord de 1904. Il est toutefois entendu que si, en vertu d'ordres du Sultan, ces officiers étaient appelés comme précédemment à accompagner les méhallas chérifiennes, ils ne pourraient pas participer à des opérations qui les mettraient en conflit avec des formations militaires ou de police conformes à l'Acte d'Algésiras ou aux accords passés entre l'Espagne et le Maghzen.

Le Gouvernement français déclarerait qu'il n'a pas l'intention de faire étendre les attributions ni le nombre des officiers étrangers établis à Tanger depuis le 25 juillet, 1904, qui resteraient uniquement chargés de l'instruction du détachement destiné à effectuer les saluts, garder les magasins, former et accompagner les convois de munitions chérifiens.

[19970] No. 323.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 47. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 29, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 19th instant and informed Sir A. Nicolson that the Spanish and French representatives at Tangier, and the Spanish and French consuls at Alcazar were about to discuss arrangements to be made at the latter place so as to avoid possibilities of friction; and that he had been instructed to suggest that His Majesty's Government might give a hint to the French Government that Spain, notwithstanding these discussions, considered that in case anything untoward happened at Alcazar, she was the Power who had the right of dealing with the matter.

Sir A. Nicolson replied that he did not at all see why, when friendly discussions were being opened, it should be necessary to utter a warning as to what Spain would do in certain possible eventualities which might never arise. It would be introducing a note of discord just when His Majesty's Government were desirous of seeing harmony established. In fact a hint such as the Ambassador suggested would be most inopportune.

His Excellency said he had been instructed to make the suggestion, and he had made it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20787] No. 324.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Madrid, May* 27, 1911.

I TAKE the liberty of forwarding a memorandum in which I have endeavoured to explain the grounds, as I understand them, of the present attitude of the Spanish Government as regards Morocco.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 324.

Memorandum by Sir M. de Bunsen.

THE main difficulty in adjusting the pretensions respectively of France and Spain in Morocco arises from the different conceptions which have been formed from

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[20643] No. 322A.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, May* 29, 1911.

M. GAILLARD states that Sultan wishes that an advance to Mequinez should be made at once, and that no pity should be shown to Mulai Zin or to his Government. General Moinier refuses to move until Colonel Gouraud's column has arrived. Both General Moinier and M. Gaillard favour a policy of leniency, but I have pointed out to French chargé d'affaires that there can be no option in the matter in view of the positive assurances which M. Gaillard gave to Consul MacLeod and which the latter transmitted to Mequinez in a letter submitted to, and approved by, M. Gaillard (see my despatch No. 127 of the 25th May). As these assurances were actually conveyed by His Majesty's consul, we should be placed in a very false position if they were disregarded.

[20643] No. 322B.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 131.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May* 29, 1911.

TANGIER telegram No. 81.

Proposed advance on Mequinez.

His Majesty's Government assume there is no danger of their being placed in false position indicated by Mr. Lister, but it would be well to get this view confirmed. If a policy of a vengeance is carried out at the instigation of the Sultan, it will destroy all the prestige of the French expedition, and may also entail an extension of military operations.

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time to time of the régime which it is desirable to set up in that country. Three distinct solutions of the problem have been successively devised, and consciously or unconsciously embodied in international conventions. The first was partition into French and Spanish spheres of influence; the second, internationalisation; and the third, a more or less disguised French protectorate. In all three cases it was provided that the independent authority of the Sultan and the integrity of the Empire should be maintained.

1. Partition, pure and simple, into spheres of influence was the basis of the Franco-Spanish draft treaty of 1902. Its terms were never published, and signature was prevented by the refusal of Señor Abarzuza, then Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, to be a party to an attempt to settle the Morocco question without the ascertained concurrence of England. There is reason to believe that the northern portion of Morocco, reserved under this stillborn arrangement to the influence of Spain, included both Fez and Taza.

Partition, with the door left open to commerce, was also the idea underlying the *entente* between England and France. By the declaration of the 8th April, 1904, England recognised that "it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require." But the existing Spanish establishments on the north coast were not to be interfered with, and England secured from France the engagement to come to an understanding with the Spanish Government with regard to the interests which Spain "derives from her geographical position and her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean."

On the strength of these provisos, Spain accepted, in the published Franco-Spanish Declaration of the 3rd October, 1904, the arrangements contemplated by the declaration quoted above. France carried out the bargain made with England in respect of Spain by concluding with the latter country on the same date the secret convention fixing "the extent of the rights and the guarantee of the interests" possessed by Spain in Morocco. By this instrument French and Spanish spheres of influence were established on the lines of the abortive 1902 convention. The line of separation was drawn, however, a good deal further to the north, excluding both Fez and Taza from the Spanish sphere. It was also stipulated that Tangier should retain its special position as the seat of the diplomatic body and various other mixed institutions.

France at this time seems to have accepted unreservedly the idea of partition, subject to the nominal maintenance of the Sultan's authority, and the integrity of his Empire. Spain was to exercise within her sphere precisely the same powers as those recognised by England in the declaration of the 8th April, 1904, as appertaining to France throughout the whole country. According to the Marquis de Muni, Spanish Ambassador in Paris, and one of the negotiators of the secret convention, there was at first no idea of assigning to Spain in her sphere a position inferior to that reserved to herself by France in the French sphere.

The restrictions finally embodied in article 2 of the secret convention, which place a limit on the exercise of Spanish rights during the first period of the existence of the convention, was inserted, as his Excellency asserts, in consequence of the unwillingness of the Spanish Government to accept entire responsibility for the maintenance of order within the Spanish sphere. France, in view of the Spanish hesitation on this point, reserved to herself the right of intervention in the Spanish sphere during a period which could not exceed fifteen years (*i.e.*, till 1919). Within the same period Spain was only to take action in her sphere after securing the assent of France. But notwithstanding these limitations the northern region of Morocco was to constitute from the date of the signature the sphere of influence of Spain (article 3). Morocco from the 3rd October, 1904, onwards, was to consist of two defined spheres of influence. The convention of that date was communicated to His Majesty's Government, who offered no objection, the convention thus becoming, as it were, part and parcel of the Anglo-French Declaration of the 8th April, 1904, which it rounded off and completed. In a further convention concluded in the following year, but not communicated to His Majesty's Government, arrangements were made between France and Spain concerning the policing of their respective spheres of influence.

2. The visit of the German Emperor to Tangier in 1905 struck a blow at the theory of the two spheres of influence, the effects of which continue to be felt. In 1906 the Conference of Algeciras, summoned under pressure from Germany, asserted the equal rights in Morocco of all the Powers. Thenceforward the theory of

internationalisation has held the field. A special position was assigned to France and Spain only as regards the frontier zones adjoining respectively the French Algerian possessions and the Spanish presidios. Within the frontier zones, the extent of which has remained undefined, matters relating to customs and contraband of arms were to be settled directly between the Makhzen and Spain or France as the case might be. A native police force was also formed in the eight open ports under French or Spanish instructors. In all other respects the position of the different Powers was held to be equal. Morocco was internationalised, and to a considerable extent remains so to the present day, as proved by the fact that Holland, one of the lesser signatory Powers of the Algeciras Act, was able recently to offer effective opposition to the adoption by the diplomatic body at Tangier of the draft Mining Regulations laboriously drawn up by the four Powers principally interested in Morocco.

The dramatic circumstances under which the Algeciras Conference assembled and the publicity given to its resolutions, have caused the General Act, which issued from its deliberations, to become the chief constitutional charter of the Empire. It was, however, provided in its concluding article that "all the treaties, conventions, and arrangements of the signatory Powers with Morocco remain in force," the provisions of the General Act prevailing in cases of conflict.

Under this stipulation Spain has continued to assert, as far as allowed, the prevailing rights which both France and England recognised in the 1904 conventions as belonging to her within the defined region. Her policy has been manifestly directed towards the rehabilitation of the theory of spheres of influence, subject only to the fundamental requirements of the General Act as regards the independence of the Sultan and the integrity of the Empire. The former requisite has assumed gradually a more and more shadowy character. The latter was not held by Spain to be infringed by her conquest and occupation of the Rif. Her presence in the occupied region was said to be only temporary and terminable on the day when the Sultan should be in a position to exercise his own authority there. Spain holds that her rights under the secret convention were openly disregarded by the French when they proceeded to send military instructors to Tangier; to increase largely the French military mission at Fez, thus getting into their hands, to the exclusion of Spain, the control of the entire military forces of the Sultan; and to allow Morocco to negotiate loans on easy terms at Paris, which loans are secured on Moorish revenues in the Spanish as well as in the French sphere of influence; an arrangement which, if carried out, will cause a swarm of French collectors of taxes to settle in the Spanish sphere, without provision being even made for their withdrawal after 1919, when the first period of the secret convention will expire. A great grievance was the provision made in the Paris loan arrangement of 1911 for a railway to cross the Spanish sphere, of which no notice whatever was given to Spain. The part played by M. Porché, the French chief engineer on the Board of Public Works, in thwarting the Spanish demands to be allowed to construct in concert with the Makhzen a road from Ceuta to Tetuan was also deeply resented at Madrid. Within the last two months Spanish complaints have been mainly directed against the employment of Alcazar as a basis of military operations for the relief of Fez. Alcazar being within the Spanish sphere it was contended that military assistance should have been drawn, if needed, from the neighbouring police force at Larache, or, if the latter were insufficient, from Spain, and not from France.

On all these points, and many others, Spain contends that her just claims have been flouted by France, which has thus continued to extend her own influence to an unjustifiable extent within the sphere which she agreed in 1904 should be reserved to Spain. In order to render French encroachments on the Spanish sphere less easy in the future, Spain is now pressing for recognition of her contention that the first period of the secret convention during which her action was restricted in the manner described above should be held to have elapsed, and that the régime henceforward applicable in the Spanish sphere is one of unrestricted Spanish action so far as France is concerned, and subject of course to the provisions of the Algeciras Act.

3. This aspiration conflicts, however, with the last of the three solutions of the Morocco question mentioned above, namely, that of a French protectorate. France, it is true, has repeatedly disavowed any intention of establishing a protectorate over Morocco, or, in other words, of applying to that country the system which she has so successfully set up in Tunis. Spain admits the sincerity of this disavowal, but doubts the ability of France to resist the natural tendency of events which, she contends, is impelling France to assume a control over the Sultan and Makhzen which amounts to a protectorate in all but the name. Even Germany, according to this argument, has

abandoned her championship of internationalisation. By her agreement with France of the 9th February, 1909, she disclaimed all but an economic interest in Morocco, and recognised that France has special political interests there which are closely bound up with the consolidation of internal tranquillity. Not a word is said of any concurrent Spanish interest, the inference being clear, as Spain further contends, that by this instrument Germany allows France to proceed unmolested to the consolidation of her political influence at Fez, so far as the Algeciras Act will allow; for liberty to take measures to keep the peace among insurgent tribes involves inevitably, in the hands of a strong Power, the consequence that the Sultan becomes a mere puppet in the hands of his preserver. That the Makhzen, indeed, has long been entirely subservient to French influence was clearly shown during the negotiations which El Mokri conducted at Madrid with the Spanish Government in the autumn of 1910. El Mokri, as was well known to the Spanish Government, was in constant touch with the French Embassy, which inspired from day to day, in concert it is true with the British Embassy, his replies to the demands of the Spanish Government. The Sultan's last struggle for independence was his refusal to accept at the beginning of the year 1910 the draft of the convention with France. The French ultimatum brought him to his knees, and the convention of the 4th March, 1910, confirmed triumphantly the ascendency of France. Since that date the Sultan has exercised no independent power. The first to repudiate his authority were the tribes surrounding Fez. He was only enabled by the skilled assistance of the French military mission to hold out against his rebellious subjects till the day of the entry of a French army into Fez. His future position, and that of his successors, must be equally dependent on French support. Nothing, in short, but a French protectorate, avowed or disavowed, will henceforward keep a Moorish Sultan on his throne. The above is the drift of the arguments employed by Spaniards to justify their fear that, if they fail now to secure recognition of their claims under the 1904 convention they will be deprived for ever of the field of expansion in Morocco, to which their eyes have been turned since the loss of the Spanish colonies. France, they do not doubt, will then gradually force them back into their presidios, and spread herself over the regions which had been formerly assigned to Spain. It would be too late then to appeal to the conventions of 1904 or to the German assurance, somewhat grudgingly given in June 1909, that Germany continued to recognise the special political interests which Spain possesses in Morocco, and that the agreement with France of the 9th February, 1909, was in no sense directed against Spain.

Great pressure has been brought to bear on the Government to settle the question off-hand by a forcible occupation of Tetuan and Larache. Under strong persuasion from London and Paris this course has been for the present rejected in favour of an effort to obtain satisfaction by means of a friendly discussion with France and England. If this fails, it may become a difficult task to restrain the Spanish Government from taking independent action.

The problem is how to reconcile the fundamental arrangements of 1904 with those which supervened at Algeciras in 1906, and especially with those which would seem to be the natural consequence of the all-important Franco-German Convention of 1909.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[21078] No. 325.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May* 30, 1911.

THE French Ambassador here tells me that the Spanish Government ask that the date fixed in the secret agreement of 1904 for the termination of the first period limiting freedom of Spanish action in the Spanish sphere should be anticipated in a protocol to be communicated to all the Powers signatory to the Algeciras Act.

I agree with the French Ambassador that this is impossible. The secret agreement does not form part of the Algeciras Act, and if it is to be modified this must be done by arrangement between the Governments concerned, and not as if it was an alteration of the Act.

I conclude that the Spanish Government will hardly insist on an impossible form, provided that they can get some satisfaction in substance.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 132.)

[21422] No. 326.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 196.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 30, 1911.

I ASKED M. Cambon to-day whether he had any news from Fez. It was reported that the Sultan was very anxious for a policy of vengeance.

M. Cambon said that the Sultan was already committed to an amnesty, which included even Mulai-Zin, who had been proclaimed Sultan at Mekinez.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[20058] No. 327.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 200.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 30, 1911.

IN telling M. Cambon to-day that we agreed to the renewal for a year, under the same general conditions, of the mandate to France and Spain to suppress the contraband trade in arms in Morocco, I asked him what answer I should give if I were pressed in Parliament as to why we gave this consent as regards Morocco, when the French did not consent to the suppression of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf.

M. Cambon observed that the question of Muscat was one to be settled by compensation.

I replied that it would appear to people in Parliament that the suppression of the contraband arms traffic in Morocco could fairly be set off against the suppression of that in the Persian Gulf, without raising the whole question of French rights in Muscat.

M. Cambon said that we had no real interest in the arms traffic in Morocco.

I observed that the question of arms traffic in the Persian Gulf might be raised, and not altogether unfairly, in connection with that on the coast of Morocco.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[20996] No. 328.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 127.)

Sir, *Tangier, May* 25, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of three despatches which reached me yesterday from His Majesty's consul at Fez.

I have approved the reply which Mr. MacLeod returned to the Acting Vizier for Foreign Affairs with regard to the complaints made by the Makhzen against British-protected persons (see his despatch No. 30), and I have instructed him to take the first opportunity of expressing to Sid Taib-el-Mokri my surprise that he should have written in such a sense, in view of the great services rendered to the Makhzen by British-protected persons during the recent crisis.

As regards Mohammad Mikwar. I have instructed Mr. MacLeod to tell Sid Taib that, in my opinion and that of the French chargé d'affaires, Mikwar rendered a great service by joining the Provisional Government established at Mequinez. It was thanks almost entirely to him that the pillaging of the town was stopped and that the lives of foreigners were saved. The Makhzen, we considered, owed him a very considerable debt of gratitude, as I imagined that they must realise what the consequences for them and for Morocco would have been if any Europeans had been killed.

I have at the same time congratulated Mr. MacLeod on his release from a

situation fraught with considerable anxiety and danger, and expressed to him my appreciation of his attitude throughout the crisis; he should, I have told him, continue to act in close concert with his French colleague.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 328.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 29.)

Sir, *Fez, May* 11, 1911.

AT dawn this morning the insurgents, numbering some 5,000 or so, attacked Fez from the west, north-west, north, and south sides. Except on the south side the attack was pressed with much obstinacy, and fighting lasted for about three hours. It was evidently a strenuous effort on the insurgents' part, and, as reports of spies and letters from Mequinez which have been read to me show, they had brought from Mequinez tools for breaking the city walls and gates when the troops should have been defeated.

In the end, however, the insurgents were severely defeated, losing, by general estimate, some 250 in killed and wounded, besides a few prisoners and a number of horses. They made no use of their guns.

The losses on the Makhzen's part were (so far as is known) some ten to twelve killed and wounded, none of whom except a brother (killed) of Kaïd Ben Jellali were men of note.

Altogether, this has been the severest engagement which has yet taken place in the rebellion, and is so striking a success for the Makhzen as cannot but be of much discouragement to the insurgents, the more so, that the defeat was inflicted by about a third of the troops only (the rest being in reserve) and the Hiayna contingent.

To-night the letters of which I enclose copies herewith have reached me from Mequinez. These and others which (dated 5th and 7th) the German consul has had from a private correspondent of his at Mequinez all seem to show considerable confusion there. In the German consul's letters it was stated that Mulai Zeen had written to the general of the French troops, invoking the latter's help towards removing the present administration at Fez, on the ground of the Sultan Mulai Hafid's oppressions and so forth!

There is still no sure news regarding any of the relief forces, but they are supposed to be now in Beni Hassen and Sherarda.

The latest communication I have received is your private letter of the 25th April.

Since the Sherarda revolted, the difficulties of passing on letters have still further increased. The other day the German consul had two mails, sent in goods taken by a Shereef friend of his, seized in Ulad Jama, and the mules and their loads were confiscated. So far as I can make out, these mails were discovered by an insurgent spy at the Fez lines, where the mules were kept waiting for several hours, owing to not having been provided with a pass-out, and being under suspicions of taking out cartridges. There has been some friction between the German consul, the Moorish authorities, and the French authorities on the matter, the German consul suspecting (I think without good reason) the affair was an attempt to interfere with his correspondence.

The Makhzen still appear to have considerable difficulty in cashing drafts enough to ensure the regular payment of troops. I am still assisting the French consul in this matter.

Prices of food-stuffs continue high, but do not seem inclined to rise, which is due to small but increasing supplies coming in from Hiayna.

The town remains quiet, and shows generally a better disposition to the Makhzen, which, of course, to-day's success will encourage.

All Europeans here continue in good health.

I infer that the Americans at Mequinez are well, but (as I hear from other sources) many threats were made against them, presumably before the proclamation of Mulai Zeen.

The present letters from Mequinez were brought in by a courier from the insur-

gents' camp, who says he came in yesterday, and so has no news of to-day's results there.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 328.

M. Enyart to Consul MacLeod.

Dear Sir, *Mequinez, May* 2, 1911.

EL HADJ MOHAMMAD MIKWAR asks me to write you as follows :—

That your letter to him in English was received, and the list of houses of British subjects is also in his hands, and that the Sultan is to-day instructing his khalifa and the tribes to see that they are guarded and protected.

That the courier to Rabat went to-day and will be passing in safety through the tribes, and that whenever you desire to send letters to Rabat put them into a large envelope and address them to him, Hadj Mohammad Mikwar, and instruct the courier to go direct to the khalifa, who will have instructions to pass him through to Mequinez.

That a "Christian," said to be a German subject, was brought here by the tribes, having been captured near Fez; that the Sultan entrusted him to his care, and that he fed him and clothed him properly, and sees that he is comfortable in a room in the Sultan's Palace.

That this Sultan is a man of good sense, and that he is particularly a friend of the English, and feels that Morocco has lost much in recent years by not keeping to their old friendship for that nation.

That the viziers are men of intelligence and from the best of families, and influential and good.

Enclosure 3 in No. 328.

M. Enyart to Consul MacLeod.

Dear Mr. MacLeod, *Mequinez, May* 2, 1911.

I WAS glad to receive your letter* yesterday by the hand of El Hadj Mohammad Mikwar. It created considerable stir here, as it was soon noised abroad that I had information from Fez and the Vizier sent his officer to bring it to me. However, from it I could not be sure that matters in Fez had really come to a head, though I surmised that you considered that they probably would do so soon.

I translated the list of houses of British and American and Portuguese subjects and forwarded it at once to the Vizier, El Hadj Mohammad. He then sent for me, and I went down to his house about 9·30 in the evening, where I explained to him further, and he asked me to write you as herewith.

I also wrote a line to the British consul at Rabat as you directed and forwarded your messages and letter to him and some letters of Hadj Mohammad's and some of ours. I paid the courier 1 dollar, and asked the consul at Rabat to pay him further, though the courier said you had arranged with him to return also. I then sent him with my man to Hadj Mohammad to be sent on his way this morning by Sherarda and Zimmur to Rabat.

I would say, further, about the "Christian"† who was brought in here by the tribes a few days ago, that I was informed that he was found alone near the Fez River, that he was not mistreated by the Berbers, except that when he came here they had a rope about his neck and came on foot, but those who saw him when he washed that evening said he was well and sound and had no marks of any ill-treatment, that the Sultan provided him good clothing, and allows him some freedom about the Palace.

I was glad to hear of Mr. Swanson's safety, and enclose a letter for him with this courier.

I spoke to El Hadj Mohammad Mikwar about the reported cruelties to couriers, and asked him to seek to prevent their recurrence. He said he understood the

* Enclosure 3 in my despatch No. 26 of April 25, 1911.
† The Austrian renegade, Czerny.

feeling of Christian nations about such things, and would do what he could to prevent them.

I am sending this to El Hadj Mohammad Mikwar to be sent with the word he asked me to write you.

Your courier practically informed those who asked him that Muiai Zeen was proclaimed at Fez, and so that word went abroad here. It has had a tendency to make this town quiet, and to relieve some Jews of further trouble; however, until I hear more certain word from you I cannot think that Mulai Hafid is entirely done for.

We have prayed that God would give the victory to whom He pleased, for we cannot know what is for the best.

In case you desire to send word again by way of Rabat, I will probably not send a courier thither until time enough elapses for you to send to us again. In this matter I am at your service.

With kind regards, I am, &c.

F. C. ENYART.

Enclosure 4 in No. 328.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Rattigan.

(No. 30.)

Sir, *Fez, May* 17, 1911.

THERE has been no renewal of fighting between the insurgents and the Makhzen since the former's attack on Fez on the 11th instant.

To the east, however, there have been fights occasionally between the escorts of caravans arriving from Taza and marauders who try to intercept them.

The quantities of agricultural produce and sugar which came in from the east, though, of course, far from sufficient, are of great value to the town.

The day before yesterday considerable alarm was caused in the city by parties of Hiayna "friendlies," who, being left unpaid for several days, began to snatch bread and other articles from shops, and levelled their rifles at the shopkeepers who objected.

The leading offenders were imprisoned and the Hiayna contingent was paid its arrears, and no further trouble has ensued.

The news of the coming of a large force from Mehedia is generally known. The masses of the people have, however, heard so often these two months of great forces coming from the south that there is much incredulity and even apathy.

The line taken by all foreigners is to describe the force as Sidi Mohammad Amrani's mehalla.

The French consul to-day told me that the French here had had a note from the officer commanding the advance guard of the relief column, to the effect that it had arrived some 5 miles east of Meshra Remla on Saturday, the 13th instant, and the courier who brought the note reported that he had heard much firing between the column and the tribes on Sunday, the 14th instant.

I beg to enclose herewith copies of correspondence with M. F. C. Enyart for your information. His letter (long delayed in transmission) of the 19th April gives an account of the disorders at Mequinez antecedent to the proclamation of Mulai Zeen, and describes how, but for the protection afforded to him by native friends, M. Enyart himself would have been killed by the insurgents.

I would call special attention to the questions he asks in his letter of the 9th May and to the answers I have made to them. The replies to be made were, obviously, of particular importance, as, owing to M. Enyart being intimate with Hadj Mohammad Mikwar, and the latter also being furnished with these replies, and being Mulai Zeen's Vizier of Foreign Affairs, it is possible that they may have a serious influence on the course of events there.

The French consul and I entirely agreed that the best course would be for the present holders of power at Mequinez to go on maintaining order until the relief forces should reach them, and that an authoritative statement of the policy which is to be followed would best promote this end by relieving the minds of all concerned of fears of vengeance upon them by the Sultan, and encouraging the strong loyalist element which must still remain in Mequinez. It will be observed that the French consul gave me to understand clearly that, although his instructions were dated the 24th April and the proclamation of Mulai Zeen was heard of at Tangier on the 27th only, the instructions had been confirmed to him on the 29th April, the proclamation

having, therefore, caused no change in the policy decided upon by the Sultan and the French Government.

Having to give such information to M. Enyart as might be of great importance to him, I was careful to ascertain all this clearly from M. Gaillard, and we read over my letter to M. Enyart together, and M. Gaillard entirely approved of it, before it was dispatched.

I am sending duplicates of all this, by two routes, to Hadj Mohammad Mikwar as well as to M. Enyart, and have communicated it to Mr. Swanson (American) at Sefroo for his own guidance and that of his friend, the kaïd of that town.

I enclose also copies of letters exchanged with the Acting Vizier of Foreign Affairs regarding complaints by the Makhzen of British-protected persons acting and speaking disloyally just now, and particular reference is made to Hadj Mohammad Mikwar.

The charge, as far as our protégés here are concerned, is not only quite unfounded, but the truth is entirely the opposite. Only a few days ago the Makhzen, having difficulty in changing cheques and raising coin to pay the troops, appealed to the consuls to invoke the help of their respective protégés.

The British protégés, most cheerfully, at my suggestion complied at once, and already have supplied 15,500 dollars of coin, the want of which would have meant long delay in paying the troops and Hiayna contingents, and probably further disorders. No other protégés found any such sum, and the French officials here have been warm in their gratitude for their assistance,

This is the meaning of my remark to the Acting Vizier of Foreign Affairs referring him to the Minister of Finance (*i.e.*, to himself) for the facts of our protégés' attitude.

As regards Hadj Mohammad Mikwar, I should be glad to know what reply you would wish to be made. In the opinion of all foreigners here, it is most fortunate that Hadj Mohammad Mikwar and other men of the same kind took the functions pressed upon them, and thus ended the pillaging, &c., which had been going on for some days, and I suggest for consideration whether M. Enyart's letters do not prove clearly that but for such persons' action, M. Enyart, and perhaps the rest of his household also, would have been murdered by the Berbers. Had such a calamity occurred the Makhzen, presumably, would have been the first to blame Hadj Mohammad Mikwar and other such men for not appeasing the Berbers temporarily in any practicable way that offered.

At Mequinez there was no competent governor (the post having been awaiting a sufficiently high bidder for nearly a year), nor any troops, nor sufficient means of defence.

I do not, however, propose to show any active resentment of what the Makhzen have said, and will go on trying to assist them in getting money for payment of troops or like necessities, as, of course, allowance must be made for the strain to which their feelings are put at present.

The greatest difficulty continues to be experienced in both getting and sending news, particularly since the Hiayna road also has become unsafe even for natives of that district; hence I have been unable to send on any mails these eleven days.

I send this despatch to Alcazar by a party of mounted Hiayna tribesmen engaged to bring back any despatches or letters which may be stopped there or in Sheraga.

This morning there was some skirmishing to the west and a few casualties. Desertions are, unfortunately, becoming more common amongst even the reorganised troops, and Sergeant Balding reports that in his regiment of cavalry alone some 5 per cent. (say, about ten or twelve in all) have deserted during the last few days, several of whom joined the enemy at Ras-al-ma.

To-night there are rumours of another attack (signalling going on upon the hilltops) on the town to-morrow, and the insurgents are reported to have placed one of their guns on the top of Jebel Taghats in the hope of being able to use it against the mehalla outposts.

All foreigners continue well and in good spirits.

I have, &c.

J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 5 in No. 328.

M. Enyart to Consul MacLeod.

Dear Mr. MacLeod, *Mequinez, April* 19, 1911.

I WRITE you a line to let you know that we have so far passed safely through a crisis. This city did not want to join the Berbers against the Sultan, but finally the Berbers began last Sunday afternoon to make it come to terms. They had filled the city and so began looting. First they drove off the 300 or 400 and horses of the Government, and then all night Sunday night looting went on. A large Jewish fundak that sells sugar and tea, &c., both wholesale and retail, was entirely stripped not far from our house, and all the retail shops that were not emptied by their owners were eaten up, both Jewish and Moorish. On Monday the Jews defended their quarter from the walls, and sometimes the rifle fire sounded like a small battle. Tuesday the gates of the city were shut, and shereefs and prominent men houghed an ox outside of the city and besought the Berbers not to attack the Mullah, and the Jews fought from the walls with the help of Moslems whom they had hired. They killed some ten or twelve Berbers, and I hear that three or four Jews were killed.

Yesterday afternoon a new Government was set up and the city became quiet, and this morning the cannons on the walls proclaimed the new Sultan. His name is Mulai Zeen, a brother of Mulai Hafid. It is said that he will start to-morrow for Fez.

We were in considerable fear during the past two days, but our neighbours told the people that we had left, and we kept our doors tightly closed except when our friends brought us milk and other supplies at night. A good many times Berbers asked for us during the two days, and declared that they would kill us, but so far our neighbours have faithfully withstood them and insisted that we had left.

We have had no posts for a good while, and hope the couriers may soon be able to travel. I cannot judge what may be the conditions at Fez, but reports here are very bad. I hope no harm has come to the city or to foreigners or Jews.

What will yet be the end of peaceful penetration in Morocco? I suppose some of us will not see the end of it.

Hoping that this may find you and all the foreign colony in safety, I am, &c.

F. C. ENYART.

Enclosure 6 in No. 328.

M. Enyart to Consul MacLeod.

Dear Mr. MacLeod, *Mequinez, May* 9, 1911.

YOUR second courier arrived yesterday with duplicates of your letters of the 25th April. These were dated the 5th May. Sid Mohammad Mikwar sent the courier on to Rabat with the letters and despatches for the Minister. I also wrote the consul at Rabat fully of conditions here, and sent the additional names of houses of British subjects to Hadj Mohammad.

We continue on quietly indoors, and the city is orderly under the government of Mulai Zeen. A ruler has been appointed for the city, and the old "mhatsib" is again in office; and people go about business on a small scale, everyone fearing to show much goods in his shop. Prices are cheap as usual.

Much talk, however, is occasioned by the constant report that a French army has landed at Rabat, and is advancing slowly in this direction; however, it is said to have only advanced a short day's journey, and seems to be at a standstill. It is said that Zimmour and Beni Hsin have proclaimed a "jehad" in their markets, and will fight the French. This report was confirmed yesterday by some letters brought in here in French written by the French consul, in which he was giving information of the position and strength of the tribal contingents before Fez, said to be written to the commandant of the French army. As I did not read French I could not interpret them, but some Jew read them for El Hadj Mohammad.

I hope you will inform me of any new developments in this matter, for should the French enter as far as Fez we might be placed in considerable danger, and may need to go into hiding.

The French army is still reported to be at a place called El Kounitera, near Mahdia.

I am told that the Berbers took a number of boxes of kerosene oil from here yesterday to burn down the gates of Fez, and that an earnest effort will be made to-morrow against that city. I hope in any case no harm may come to Europeans nor any great loss to the city if it should be entered.

In case Mulai Hafid should be victorious, I would like to have your advice as to my attitude toward any members of this Government who might take refuge in me. My next-door neighbour, a shereef, has done much toward preserving our lives during these days, and he is an "ameen" in the new Government. I think he has a French Mokhalat paper. I should also say that Hadj-el-Arabi Geusus and his sons did much to help us, and his sons with the shereefs guarded our "derb" night and day during the worst times, and turned Berbers back at some risk to their lives; they also spoke to others and warned them of the consequences if harm should come to us. They are still living in our (house) downstairs, though for a week during the worst days they stayed in the shereef's house next door.

I wrote you a week ago acknowledging your first courier; that must not have reached you before you sent the duplicate.

Sincerely at your service,

F. C. ENYART.

Enclosure 7 in No. 328.

Consul MacLeod to M. Enyart.

Dear M. Enyart, *Fez, May* 15, 1911.

THIS afternoon I received your letters of the 19th April and 9th May. I need hardly say how distressed I am to learn of the extremely trying time through which you all have come, and which I earnestly hope may end soon and happily.

The attack on Fez on the 11th to which you refer came off, but, though only about a third of the forces here were engaged, it was repulsed with severe losses to the assailants and trifling casualties amongst the defenders.

In regard to the questions in your letter of the 9th instant, I called upon the French consul and read to him what you say. He desired me to assure you in the most formal manner, and for the information of whomsoever it may concern:—

1. That there is no question of any foreign occupation.

2. That the Sultan Mulai Hafid's khalifa, Sidi Mohammad Amrani, is at the head of a force empowered to restore order, to secure the lives and property of foreigners in the interior, and reopen the usual communications.

3. That Sidi Amrani will make public proclamation that no individual or tribe will, either now or in the future, be touched for anything done by them so far, provided such person or tribe makes no resistance to Sidi Amrani, and that the Sultan Mulai Hafid and the French Government, to whom His Shereefian Majesty has given guarantees that there will be nothing but amnesty and oblivion as regards the past, will see that these are carried out both in letter and spirit.

4. Further, that the French Government entirely recognise and abhor the injustice and oppression which have caused these hostilities, and that no person or tribe need fear any repetition of them when the Sultan's authority is restored in the revolted districts.

5. That if the tribes become orderly, no recourse will be had to the French troops which Sidi Mohammad Amrani can call upon should his own forces be insufficient, and that, in any case, such troops will go away as soon as order is restored, and that no person or tribe maintaining order will be touched. Indeed, were the insurgents to cease pillaging, &c., there would be nothing to do but ensure that no injustice be suffered by them in future. The continuance or cessation of hostilities and the ending of the oppression of which they complained are therefore in the insurgents' own hands, and they have everything to gain and nothing to lose by reverting to good order.

What has been said as to amnesty and oblivion applies to everybody concerned, no matter how highly placed.

Then, in regard to your attitude towards any members of the present Government at Mequinez, the French consul assures me that they have nothing to fear, even should the Sultan Mulal Hafid be victorious. They have only to go on maintaining order. As regards any of them, or any other persons who have befriended you, or any

other foreigners just now, they will be held in honour and gratitude for what they have done.

The French consul read to me the respective instructions he had received from the French Government on those points, so that I should be able to satisfy you fully. These instructions were dated Paris, 24th April, and were repeated on the 29th April, after the French Government had heard of the proclamation of Mulai Zeen at Mequinez.

As regards the best steps to take for your own safety, one cannot judge well at this distance. You will doubtless be guided by the course of public feeling, but I hope that the foregoing information may be of use towards enabling you to judge in advance what course events may now be likely to take.

About services rendered to yourselves in particular: if you let me know the names in full of such persons I will be very happy to recommend them to the American Minister towards getting them American protection, or such other recognition of their valued assistance as he may think fitting.

I have to thank Hadj Mohammad Mikwar and you warmly for your kindness in sending on my messages, &c., to Rabat for the British Minister.

Please give my own warm thanks to all who have been of assistance to you.

With kind regards and every good wish to you all, believe me, &c.

J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 8 in No. 328.

Sid Taib Mokri to Consul MacLeod.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) 16 *Jumadi I*, 1329 (*May* 15, 1911).

YOU cannot be unaware of the present state of affairs and what kind of precautions are necessary for the well-being of the citizens and foreigners, and that the Makhzen, being responsible for the same, are doing all in their power to those ends.

The Makhzen, however, hear from time to time of some foreign protégés speaking loosely against the Makhzen in a manner which may be harmful to the public interest. Hadj Mohammad Mikwar, who is one of your protégés in Mequinez, has done, both by acts and speech, things which are harmful to the Makhzen, and for which compulsion cannot be accepted as an excuse, there being a limit to the compulsion in as much as his so doing was contrary to the policy of your friendly Government in connection with Morocco. Therefore, the Makhzen think it well to send you this notice to inform you thereby of what some of your protégés do against the public good, so that you can warn them to be of good behaviour, and to do nothing in future to compel the Makhzen to treat them in the manner they deserve.

There is no doubt that you will do all you can in this matter, as it is a public service; it is necessary in a situation like the present one to assist the Makhzen in preserving public order.

May you continue in peace and prosperity.

TAIB MOKRI.

Enclosure 9 in No. 328.

Consul MacLeod to Sid Taib Mokri.

(After compliments.) *Fez, May* 17, 1911.

I HAVE received your letter of the 16th Jumadi I, in which you complain of seditious words and acts of British protégés, and you mention the instance of Hadj Mohammad Mikwar of Mequinez, and so forth.

As regards British protégés in general, you mention no names and adduce no proofs, so I can answer only that, to the best of my knowledge, they have acted with loyalty and public spirit. If, however, you have any doubt thereon, enquiries of the Minister of Finance will, I feel sure, satisfy you, in respect of our protégés at Fez, that to convey your present message to them would be not only unjust to those persons, but a positive disservice to the Makhzen, so serious as, perhaps, to render me liable to blame from my Government, so contrary would it be to their friendly policy to Morocco.

I beg to protest against the threat contained in your letter.

As regards Hadj Mohammad Mikwar, I am convinced the Makhzen—God honour it—must have been imperfectly informed as to what has taken place at Mequinez, both as to his action and that of others there, and I propose to report on the subject fully to His Majesty's Minister, and obtain his Excellency's directions as to what reply to make.

With reference to your request to me to assist the Makhzen in preserving public order, I have, after careful discussion with the French consul, sent such information and advice to Hadj Mohammad Mikwar as I hope will conduce to public tranquillity and prevent any recurrence of such disorders as have occurred at Mequinez of late.

May you always be in prosperity.

Enclosure 10 in No. 328.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Rattigan.

(No. 31.)

Fez, May 19, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copies of three letters, dated the 15th instant, which I have received from Hadj Mohammad Mikwar, and of my reply thereto.

I am unaware whether Hadj Mohammad Mikwar, when he wrote, knew of the severe defeat of Mulai Zeen's partisans at Fez on the 11th instant, and of a further defeat of them which occurred in Beni Hassen on or about the 12th instant. Moreover, I am still unaware whether the proclamation of Mulai Zeen has caused any change in the policy of His Majesty's Government, or of the other Powers, in regard to events hereabout.

I have further no means to judge when such information may be likely to reach Fez, and at the same time it might be of much importance that Hadj Mohammad Mikwar, and others (including Europeans) dependent on him for guidance, get some sort of course indicated to them.

The all-important point seems to be to prevent any recurrence of such disorders as ensued at Mequinez previous to the proclamation of Mulai Zeen.

Should his administration hold its own troubles will not be likely to occur, but it would seem essential that, in the opposite event, the interval between its collapse and the restoration of the Sultan Mulai Hafid's authority be as brief as possible.

This end should, I hope, be attained in the latter event, should Hadj Mohammad Mikwar and his friends follow the suggestions in my letters of the 16th instant and to-day to M. Enyart.

I have, &c.

J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 11 in No. 328.

Hadj Mohammad Mikwar to Consul MacLeod.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) 16 *Jumadi I*, 1329 (*May* 15, 1911).

AS you know, letters were sent to the tribes ordering them to respect houses and property of foreigners and protégés. This order is repeated every day to the same effect. Hadj Mehdi Menebhi also wrote to the same effect, as likewise did I. Please find a letter enclosed herein. If you think it would do good, see our Master's brother and warn him of the disastrous end, and that he should fear God in the destruction of property and lives, and assure him that no harm will be done to him, and that he will be employed in a high post. Please rest assured that our Master intends to maintain close relations with the British Government, and that they will be his best friends, as he firmly believes in their impartial policy; so please do all in your power to that end. I can assure my Master was only compelled to accept the Throne when he saw it might go to another family, as some of the Drisi family sought it, to which I can bear witness. Then he yielded in order to avert a more serious disaster. All the tribes are determined to die rather than again submit to Mulai Hafid's authority. As soon as one detachment leaves another comes to replace it, and, as you know, the situation is a bad one. This loathing of the tribes for Mulai Hafid cannot be wondered at, and there have been many similar cases before. The mehalla has captured a courier who said he was for you. Our Master has ordered the letters

to be translated, and, if found to be for you, to be sent to you through the khalifa. The best thing to do is to give orders for your letters to be sent to me, and I shall send letters to you by a special courier with an open letter to ensure there reaching you.

HADJ MOHAMMAD MIKWAR.

Enclosure 12 in No. 328.

Hadj Mohammad Mikwar to Consul MacLeod.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) 16 *Jumadi I*, 1329 (*May* 15, 1911).

PLEASE find herewith some letters, which please deliver to their owners. We want you to do a great favour to Moslems, namely, to see Mulai Hafid and speak to him, in order to calm these troubles, as the tribes are very earnest with regard to the close investment of Fez, and they are still coming in great numbers, morning and evening, in order to besiege its gates. And as you know humanity demands peace and not the destruction of lives and property, and that if the tribes entered Fez they would no doubt pillage houses, fondaks, and shops: please speak to Commandant Mangin to this effect, so that perhaps they will withhold their hand and follow the way of peace and quiet, so as to save women, property, and the property of foreign protégés from destruction. Do not think that anybody thinks the tribes will withdraw till they gain their end, as the number of the besieging tribes exceeds 15,000 strong. I spoke to our Master in regard to his intentions towards his brother, and I found him very generously intending to do him no harm, but to employ him in a post suitable to his position; he will not disgrace him or humble him, in respect for the right of brotherhood. So please do all you can to prevent destruction to Moslems, foreigners, and protégés. Do your best to secure that end.

HADJ MOHAMMAD MIKWAR.

Enclosure 13 in No. 328.

Hadj Mohammad Mikwar to Consul MacLeod.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) 16 *Jumadi I*, 1329 (*May* 15, 1911).

I CONFIRM my last, and now I beg to tell you that some of the tribes to-day captured a courier with letters; he said they were for you from Rabat, which turned out to be the case. The tribes were ordered to let him pass in safety, so you can write to the consul at Rabat to send your letters through me. I informed you that the tribes were ordered not to menace the couriers bearing letters in my name, so you can inform him (vice-consul at Rabat) of this, and relieve your mind about your letters.

HADJ MUHAMMAD MIKWAR.

Enclosure 14 in No. 328.

Consul MacLeod to M. Enyart.

Dear M. Enyart, *Fez, May* 19, 1911.

I WOULD be very much obliged if you could communicate the following to Hadj Mohammad Mikwar, asking him to take it down in Arabic so that it be clearly understood and remembered by him and his friends.

I have received his three letters in Arabic, dated the 16th Jumadi I (15th May, 1911), and have earnestly considered all he says. He and all who know me can feel no doubt that nobody can deplore recent events more than I do, and will believe me when I say that whenever I can do aught to stop the lamentable loss of life, sufferings, and dangers of these days and hasten the return of peace it will be not only a thing which my Government will applaud highly, but will afford me supreme happiness. Unfortunately, however, by the senseless action of the tribes in stopping couriers, I am still without the views of the British Government upon the situation created

by the proclamation of Mulai Zeen, and without these to guide or support me I could only make an appeal from your side and myself and this; from what I know of the parties you name and in view of the situation here it would, just now, I am certain, only further infuriate those concerned were I to give them your messages.

Meanwhile, however, I would entreat all your side to act on the lines of my letter of the 16th May to M. Enyart. Go on maintaining order and put down all interference with traffic and communications, and stop hostilities wherever you can as speedily as possible, and rest assured that, if you all do so, you have nothing to fear, whether Mulai Hafid or Mulai Zeen be victorious, should no resistance be made to Sidi Mohammad Amrani and the forces supporting him, and that in any case the oppressions complained of will not again be permitted. It must be manifest to so intelligent and far-travelled a man as yourself that neither Mulai Hafid nor Mulai Zeen have themselves power to at once stop the present bloodshed, dangers, and disorders, and that this—under God—can only be attained by both Mulai Hafid and Mulai Zeen co-operating with the forces upon whom Sidi Mohammad can call, and that the more numerous the resisting tribes may be the greater will be the loss of life on their side.

People may ask you, "But why this interference at all." To this one can but point to the mad action of the tribes in stopping communications. For many days at a time not a word of news could be had at Tangier of Europeans in the interior until the wildest alarm must quite naturally have arisen (and still continues) that they were in danger, and Europe would insist upon steps being taken to ensure their safety. The tribes themselves took no such steps, no consul ever having been approached nor warned to withdraw his compatriots, nor did the tribes or their leaders ever give anybody, native or foreign, an authoritative statement of their grievances!

You must not suppose from all this that I am insensible to the misgovernment and the acts which have provoked the present movement. Far from this, nobody can realise them more fully nor desire more deeply to see them removed peaceably.

I am very much obliged for the facilities offered towards passing on our letters to and from Rabat and Fez, and I send some herewith for kind transmission by special courier as fast and direct as possible, open, so that you may see there is nothing intelligible, except to the Minister.

I duly delivered all the various letters Hadj Mohammad Mikwar forwarded.

Mulai Ali-el-Wazzani, of Tangier, is, I hear, in Sherarda trying to pacify that district and to ensure that foreigners may travel safely through it, in which objects I hope Hadj Mohammad Mikwar and his friends will co-operate actively.

With kind regards to you all and trusting you are having a quieter time, believe me, &c.

J. M. MacLEOD.

P.S.—Letter enclosed, open, for kind transmission to British vice-consul, Rabat, per special courier, as direct and fast as possible.

J. M. MacL.

[20987] No. 329.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 31.)

(No. 245.)

Sir, *Paris, May* 30, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 242 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith an extract from the "Figaro," reporting a denial on the part of El Mokri that the Sultan of Morocco had ever asked for a French protectorate over his country.

The Quai d'Orsay has published a communiqué to the effect that that department was not concerned in any way with the publication of El Mokri's denial, nor with the information in a contrary sense which preceded it.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 329.

Extract from the "Figaro" of May 30, 1911.

DÉCLARATIONS D'EL MOKRI.

LE Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Maroc, El Mokri, qui est toujours à Paris, dément catégoriquement la nouvelle que le Sultan aurait demandé à la France, soit récemment par l'intermédiaire d'El Mokri, soit hier au Général Moinier, d'établir son protectorat sur le Maroc. Tant dans les circonstances antérieures, à Fez ou à Paris, que dans son entretien avec le Général Moinier, Moulay Hafid a fait ressortir que, ayant fait appel aux troupes françaises pour rétablir l'ordre à Fez et l'aider à sauvegarder la vie des colonies européennes, il se félicitait du concours loyal que lui avait prêté la France et à l'aide qu'elle lui avait accordée dans les circonstances difficiles. Mais il entendait rester sur le terrain de l'Acte d'Algésiras, ainsi, d'ailleurs, que la France, dont le Gouvernement a toujours déclaré vouloir rester fidèle à ce traité. Aujourd'hui comme hier, ajoute El Mokri, le Sultan veut s'en tenir et s'en tient à l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Questionné au sujet de l'éventualité d'une marche de troupes sur Méquinez, El Mokri a déclaré que le Sultan, dans le cas où les rebelles Beni M'Tir n'auraient pas encore fait leur soumission, espère que les troupes chérifiennes, encadrées seulement de troupes françaises, suffiront à rétablir dans cette ville une situation normale.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Sultan, qui connaît personnellement Raisouli et sa véritable situation, ne croit pas que celui-ci veuille prêcher la guerre sainte. Une pareille prédication n'aurait pas l'effet que son auteur en attendrait.

[L'Agence Havas, qui nous avait communiqué cette déclaration, a publié dans la soirée une note disant que le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères est étranger à cette publication ainsi qu'à celle des informations en sens contraire déjà parues.]

[20988] No. 330.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 31.)

(No. 247.)

Sir, *Paris, May* 30, 1911.

ON receipt this morning of your telegraphic instruction No. 131 of last night, I applied for an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and he received me this evening. I said to his Excellency that I hoped that the French authorities would not allow the Sultan to wreak vengeance on the revolted tribes in Moorish fashion as I was informed he desired to do. You felt that if he so acted it might entail the danger of extended operations by the French troops, and would injure French prestige. I gave to M. Cruppi the memorandum in French, of which I have the honour to transmit to you a copy herewith, and also the further memorandum of which a copy is also enclosed herein.

M. Cruppi, after reading the memoranda, said that the reports referred to were newspaper tales, and that you need not have any fear of being placed in a false position by any action of the French military or civil authorities. He sent for his "chef de cabinet" and directed him to draft a telegram to M. Gaillard and General Moinier, repeating the reports which had reached you, and instructing them to concert together in order not to allow the assurances which had been given on the authority of the French consul to be falsified.

M. Cruppi received to-day a telegram from General Moinier, stating that he has established his camp at a distance of 5 kilom. from Fez; that the French troops have not entered the city, and that he is in negotiation with the Sultan for the carrying out of the instructions of the French Government.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 330.

Memorandum communicated by Sir F. Bertie to M. Cruppi.

LE Ministre d'Angleterre à Tanger a informé Sir E. Grey, le 25 mai, que le consul de France à Fez avait donné à son collègue britannique les assurances suivantes en lui laissant la liberté de les communiquer à tous ceux qui s'y trouveraient intéressés :—

1. Qu'il n'y avait aucune question d'une occupation étrangère.
2. Qu'Omrani n'approuvait pas un recours à la force pour ramener l'ordre, et qu'il ne ferait appel aux troupes françaises qu'en cas de nécessité absolue.
3. Qu'une amnistie serait accordée à toutes les tribus et à tout individu, sans exception, pourvu qu'aucune résistance ne fût offerte à Omrani.
4. Que le Gouvernement français reconnaissait et avait en horreur l'injustice et l'oppression qui avaient occasionné la révolte, et que personne n'avait à craindre de les voir renouveler quand l'autorité du Sultan serait rétablie.
5. Que le Gouvernement provisoire de Méknès n'avait rien à craindre ; qu'il n'avait qu'à continuer à maintenir l'ordre et se montrer conciliant envers les étrangers ; et que de tels procédés ne manqueraient pas de faire naître à son égard la reconnaissance et l'estime.

Le consul britannique à Fez a, d'accord avec le consul de France, ensuite fait parvenir ces assurances à Mikwar par l'intermédiaire du missionnaire américain à Méknès.

Selon une dépêche en date du 21 mai reçue de Fez par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, douze villages des Ulad Yama furent attaqués et brûles ce jour-là par les troupes de Fez, malgré les assurances préalablement données par le consul de France, et par des motifs de vengeance. Une partie de la propriété ainsi détruite appartenait à des étrangers ou à des protégés étrangers.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a appris ensuite que le Sultan a fait connaître son désir que des troupes se dirigeassent immédiatement sur Meknès, et qu'il demandait qu'aucune pitié ne fût montrée à l'égard de Mulai Zin et de son Gouvernement.

Ambassade d'Angleterre, Paris,
le 30 mai, 1911.

Enclosure 2 in No. 330.

Memorandum communicated by Sir F. Bertie to M. Cruppi.

LE Gouvernement de Sa Majesté est persuadé que le Gouvernement français évitera de le mettre dans une situation fausse en ce qui concerne les faits exposés dans le précédent mémorandum en date d'aujourd'hui.

Sir Edward Grey est d'avis qu'une politique de vengeance mise en exécution à la demande du Sultan enlèverait tout prestige à l'expédition française à Fez et pourrait entraîner des opérations étendues.

Ambassade d'Angleterre, Paris,
le 30 mai, 1911.

[21101] No. 331.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, May 31, 1911.*

DETAILED reports from His Majesty's consul at Fez received to-day show that action of Moorish troops in raid of 21st was even more brutal than at first appeared. Some fourteen villages were burnt and pillaged. Real culprits had all fled ; remainder, consisting principally of old men, were killed or taken prisoners. About eighty women and girls were brought into Fez and publicly sold into slavery by soldiers.

No respect was paid to the aman granted by Moorish Government and by French military authorities. I protested very strongly to French chargé d'affaires, and pointed

out to him that result of such proceedings would be to range British public opinion with that of Germany against France.

He fully admitted justice of what I said, and seemed much upset at news, but hopes that instructions have now reached Fez giving full powers to French consul. This seems probable, as His Majesty's consul at Fez reports that raiding was to have recommenced on following day, but order was cancelled by general, and a three days' grace, extended to eight, was proclaimed for insurgents to come in.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[21105] No. 332.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, May 31, 1911.*

MOROCCO negotiations.

Subsequently to the second meeting held at the British Embassy (as reported in my despatch No. 80 which should reach you to-day) Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent in a set of counter-proposals.

These do little more than repeat the original proposals put forward by Spain (see my despatch No. 63 of the 14th instant), and completely ignore the reservations which were made in our two conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs by French Ambassador and myself.

From this it is plain that settlement is as distant as ever, and, in fact, M. Geoffray and myself were inclined to gather from Minister for Foreign Affairs' attitude at our last meeting that it was doubtful whether he himself desired a settlement.

French Ambassador may to-morrow be in a position to present the French proposals in a more attractive form, since by then he hopes to receive his instructions as to the termination of the first period of the secret agreement.

[21122] No. 333.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 80.)
Sir, *Madrid, May 27, 1911.*

I PROCEED to give as connected and intelligible an account as I am able of the conversation which took place at His Majesty's Embassy this afternoon between the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the French Ambassador, and myself. It had been agreed between us that we should meet once more before the receipt by M. Geoffray of his definite instructions which are expected in a few days, in order to talk over the preliminary counter-proposals which his Excellency had been authorised by telegraph to submit to the Spanish Government a few days ago, as reported in my despatch No. 73 of the 26th May.

I knew from what Señor Garcia Prieto had let fall in conversation at his usual diplomatic reception yesterday afternoon, that his Excellency was far from satisfied with the French offer. It had produced, he told me, a deplorable effect not only on himself, but, in a marked degree, on the King and Señor Canalejas, the Prime Minister. I expressed surprise, and said I had myself regarded the French proposals as indicating much good-will on the part of the French Government, which would no doubt continue to discuss the further suggestions which Spain might have to offer in the same friendly spirit. But Señor Garcia Prieto harped on the point of the advancement of the second period mentioned in the secret convention, and repeated what he had said so emphatically at our first meeting *à trois*, namely, that failing compliance with this demand, it would be mere waste of time to continue the discussion.

Our conversation to-day was opened by Señor Garcia Prieto, who read us a telegram he had just received from the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, giving an abstract of to-day's article in the "Temps" on the Morocco question. M. Geoffray said the "Temps" was now the organ of the Colonial party, and therefore an opposition newspaper. The Foreign Minister replied that he saw little opposition between the words of the "Temps" and the actions of the French Government. France was now installed at Fez, and Morocco was at her feet. M. Geoffray protested against the implied rejection of all the assurances which France had given to the world as regards

her intention to withdraw her troops from Fez the moment peace was restored and the Sultan's authority re-established. I said His Majesty's Government had frankly accepted those assurances, and I read to Señor Garcia Prieto the categorical statements made on these points by the French consul at Fez to His Majesty's consul, as forwarded to you by Mr. Lister in his telegram No. 78 of the 25th May. Señor Garcia Prieto replied that Spain had also accepted the French assurances, but that the entry of the French troops into Fez was, nevertheless, an event of a very disturbing character.

Turning to the French counter-proposals, his Excellency began by remarking that no notice was to be found in them of the all-important point of the advancement of the date when the second period of the 1904 convention will begin to take effect. M. Geoffray said that his Government had already stated its objections to any departure on this point from the terms of article 2 of the convention in question. He proceeded to argue that the desired anticipation of the date of 1919 would in practice be less advantageous to the Spanish Government than the proposals now made by France. His point was that the present proposals go beyond anything that France would be compelled to concede, even if the second period were in full operation. There was nothing, for instance, in the General Act of Algeciras to compel the Sultan to restrict the action of his mehallas within the Spanish sphere, or to select Spanish engineers to design and execute public works at Tetuan and Larache. Yet France now freely offered her influence to secure these concessions for Spain. The same might be said of the other French concessions. They related to matters which would not be affected by the greater or less liberty of action enjoyed by Spain in her sphere, for her liberty of action, whether in the first or second period, would continue to be restricted by the exercise of the Sultan's authority within the four corners of the Algeciras Act. Spain would lose and not gain by endeavouring to force on the second period. She would obtain much better terms by friendly agreement with the French Government, which was naturally in a better position than ever before to influence the decisions of the Sultan. To concede the second period would be to open the door to endless misunderstandings.

Señor Garcia Prieto replied, in excited language, that Spain took precisely the contrary view. Only by France acknowledging that circumstances had changed would she be able to obtain the elbow room which had so long been denied to her in her own sphere. France should yield on the point of the second period, and, having done so, should use her influence with the Sultan to bring about the settlement desired by Spain, namely, the acceptance of the general principle that in the sphere subject to Spanish influence administrative and military acts should be performed through the agency of Spaniards. There would be nothing in this contrary to the Act of Algeciras, and it was extremely unlikely that Germany or any other country would protest. In angry tones his Excellency went on to say that, if the second period was refused, Spain would declare that the third period of the 1904 convention had arrived, the period, namely, which was contemplated in article 3 of the Secret Convention. Who, in truth, could now honestly contend that the political *status quo* of Morocco still subsisted, or that the Sultan had not amply demonstrated his impotence to preserve the peace within his dominions? The conditions which article 3 had in view were now manifestly fulfilled, and in the Spanish reading of the article there was nothing to require that Spain should abstain from proclaiming this patent fact until she could secure the concurrence of France. Señor Garcia Prieto repeated the argument on this point contained in the concluding portion of the memorandum of Spanish demands. The French Ambassador said his Government interpreted the article differently, holding that the words "d'un commun accord" referred to all the conditions mentioned in the article.

I here remarked that the French must be assumed to be the best interpreters of their own language, but that the point was not of great importance since it was obviously to the advantage of all concerned that no important decisions affecting the *status quo* in Morocco should be taken without a previous understanding between the three Powers chiefly interested. This observation provoked an extraordinary outburst on the part of the Foreign Minister. I am quite disposed, he said, to admit that what you say is true. We should be better off in the end if we took your good advice. But Spain lives largely on sentiment, and when impelled by sentiment she acts recklessly, without counting the cost. Call us, if you like, a nation of madmen. We are mad sometimes. We were mad to go to war with America. We are quite capable of committing a similar act of madness now. Very likely we should suffer for it. We should not mind, if we felt we were striking a blow to uphold our rights.

I appealed to his Excellency to discuss dispassionately the French proposals, and the remainder of the conversation passed off more peacefully.

His Excellency commented adversely on the several French suggestions for a settlement. In his opinion the share offered to Spain, both in the matter of the Tangier–Alcazar Railway and in that of the employment of Spanish engineers in certain places was entirely inadequate. Some discussion followed between his Excellency and the French Ambassador on the subject of the duration of the Algeciras arrangements concerning the police of the ports. As Señor Garcia Prieto promised to recast his observations in the form of a written counter project, it seems unnecessary to trouble you with further details at present.

M. Geoffray and myself remain under the impression that little progress has yet been made in these conversations towards a practical issue. The points of view are too widely divergent. Spain considers that the artificial fabric raised at Algeciras has broken down, and that the arrangements made in 1904 revive in their integrity. France has more in mind what she has accomplished since the Berlin Agreement of the 9th February, 1909, and she is endeavouring to prove that the present *de facto* situation is not inconsistent with the Algeciras Act. It is difficult at present to see how these opposing contentions can be harmonised.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[21259] No. 334.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, June 1, 1911.*

MOROCCO negotiations.

I hear that French Minister for Foreign Affairs informed Spanish Ambassador in Paris that the French Government cannot consent to any alteration in the secret convention of 1904, nor to the advancement of the second period mentioned therein. M. Cruppi stated that his Government is determined to carry out the convention as it stands and in such a way as to allow Spain at once to exercise the full economic influence to which she is entitled in her own sphere of influence. He promises that the French Government will be ready to enter upon a friendly discussion with Spain as to the political influence also claimed by her in this sphere, but adds that such negotiations cannot be begun until the crisis caused by the relief of Fez has subsided.

Spanish Ambassador, who arrives in Madrid to-day, was, as my French colleague informs me, apparently satisfied with these declarations.

As regards the Casa Blanca police, M. Geoffray will to-day inform Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government agree to the rearrangement of the police in question. The French Government propose that the Spanish contingent be distributed. between Larache and Tetuan, and the French contingent between Mazagan and Rabat The two Governments would come to an agreement as to the duration and financial basis of the new arrangements which would then be submitted to the signatory Powers of the Algeciras General Act.

[21101] No. 335.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 133.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June 1, 1911.*

TANGIER telegram No. 84.

Please inform El Mokri that, in view of facts reported in the above telegram, His Majesty's Government are unable to receive a Moorish special mission on the occasion of His Majesty's Coronation.

[21625] No. 336.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 202.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 1, 1911.

I SPOKE to M. Cambon to-day about the accounts which had appeared in the press of the barbarities committed by the Sultan's troops near Fez. They were sure to make a great stir in this country, and a telegram from Mr. Lister received to-day confirmed them generally. It was impossible for me, after having defended in Parliament the necessity of the French expedition, to refuse to give any information; and I hoped that the French Government would make the facts known as soon as possible. If, as I supposed, their information was the same as that supplied by our consul, I should then be able to say that what we had heard confirmed their account.

I added that it was clear that the Sultan wished to commit the French to very disagreeable things. I assumed that the responsibility for these barbarities was solely upon the Sultan and his troops; and we were telegraphing to say that a Moorish mission could not be received at the Coronation.

M. Cambon said that he was going to Paris, and that he would get the fullest information for me from M. Cruppi.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21432] No. 337.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 87.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, June* 2, 1911.

ROUHAN, of the Oulad Haddoo, of Koof, the notorious bandit who captured Clarke Kennedy, has been appointed chief of the police which is being raised in the Anjera. The Spaniards have insisted on this appointment. The Moorish Government have always insisted strongly against the fact that the Spanish authorities have had dealings with this man, and have granted him Spanish protection. He is the same man whose arrest was demanded by the British vice-consul, and who, owing to the intervention of the Spanish consul, was enabled to escape, as reported in my despatch No. 62 of the 3rd April, 1909. As you will recollect, the incident formed the subject of a subsequent correspondence between the British and Spanish Governments.

In my opinion, we ought certainly to protest against the appointment, but I shall do nothing without instructions from you in view of the negotiations which are now in progress at Madrid.

The Governor of Tetuan has informed the Spanish consul once more that the claim made by His Majesty's Government for the arrest of Rouhan is maintained.

[21499] No. 338.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 128.)

Sir, *Tangier, May* 26, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translations of two letters which have been addressed to me by Hadj Mohammed Mikwar, protesting against the action of the French in sending troops to the assistance of Mulai Hafid.

I also beg to transmit copies of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez reporting that Hadj Mohammed Mikwar had written to him stating that Mulai Zin had only accepted the Throne in order to prevent the destruction of natives and foreigners, and to keep the sovereignty in the family, and that he had sent orders to the tribes to protect foreigners and their property. Mikwar requests Mr. Macleod to warn the Sultan and Colonel Mangin that the tribes are in great numbers, and are determined to die rather than to submit to Mulai Hafid, whom he urges to surrender, in which case he would be honourably treated and appointed to a high post. His Majesty's consul sent a verbal and unofficial reply to the effect that any actions on his part in the sense desired would have the opposite effect to that desired, and that he must await information as to the views of His Majesty's

Government. He added that in the meantime Mulai Zin should make every effort to maintain order and protect life and property, and he repeated the assurances of amnesty given by the French consul. I have approved Mr. MacLeod's action as reported, and have told him that no further reply should, for the present, be given to Hadj Mikwar.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 338.

Hadj Mohammed Mikwar to Mr. Lister.

(Translation.)

(After compliments)

THERE is nothing to add to the Shereefian letter sent to you earlier, save that His Shereefian Majesty has heard that the French and Spaniards have the intention to go out into the Gharb and act contrary to what has been unanimously decided by the Moorish people, and by those of them who decide and determine matters. Notwithstanding that, the foreign neighbours of Morocco who sat at the conference agreed upon the integrity (freedom) of Morocco, peace with its people and upon the safeguarding of its inhabitants and its wealth, and not to encroach upon it.

His Majesty has instructed me to write to your Excellency, the respected (to request you) to protest against either of them who intends to go beyond their boundary, until this matter is settled, when discussions will take place with each (or all) properly by rule, &c. You know what is the fixed intention of all the tribes and (what they mean) by closely investing Fez and besieging it, and if (these) are the resolutions of the people, it is not desirable that any nation should go beyond its boundaries and assist one side, until the disturbances cease and the tribes return to their districts, then no one will lose, and all having objects will be attended to as is requisite.

This is a form of protest against whoever may intend to do this thing in order that you may assist in it and do your utmost to restrain whoever may desire to act contrary to it.

7 *Jumad I*, 1329 (*May* 8, 1911).

Enclosure 2 in No. 338.

Hadj Mohammed Mikwar to Mr. Lister.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

THERE is nothing to add to the letter sent to you on the 7th instant, save that the tribes have discovered a courier on the road bearing letters from the French consul at Fez to the general asking him to hasten with the soldiers to the assistance of Fez. Those letters are now in my hands, and from strong evidence our lord the Sultan protests against the French that they remain on their boundaries until the matter between the Gharb tribes and Fez shall be settled and the tribes return to their districts.

Then the desires of those who have them will be attended to, and each will receive a proper reply to his demands.

In any case, the Gharb people individually protest against the French, and demand that they remain within their boundaries, especially as the French are the cause of the disturbances by killing the soldiers at the gate of Fez.

The responsibility for losses, monetary and otherwise, will consequently be on them. The protest (as regards) the rest, I send to your Excellency the respected.

9 *Jumad I*, 1329 (*May* 10, 1911).

Enclosure 3 in No. 338.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Rattigan.

Sir, *Fez, May* 18, 1911.

THE expected general attack on Fez troops took place to-day, lasting from 6 A.M. till 4 P.M., but was never pressed and was easily repulsed.

There was much useless expenditure of ammunition on both sides. The Maghzen killed and wounded were under twelve in number, and the insurgents' losses also are supposed to have been small. The insurgents employed one gun ineffectively against Dar Dabibagh.

I have received and communicated to French consul your telegram of the 28th April.

Mikwar writes on 15th instant to me assuring transmission of our communications if addressed to him by British vice-consul, Rabat. Mikwar also states that letters have been sent by Mulai Zin and Cid Menebhi to tribes to respect foreigners and protected persons and their property.

Mikwar invokes me to warn the Sultan Mulai Hafid and Colonel Mangin that tribes are in great numbers, and determined to die rather than submit to Mulai Hafid, and urges Mulai Hafid to surrender, under the promise of honourable treatment, even to the extent of the grant of a high post to him.

Mulai Zin states he only accepted the Throne in order to prevent destruction of natives and foreigners, and to keep the sovereignty in the family, as he knew the Drisi family sought it.

I have communicated verbally and unofficially a reply that at present such intercession would certainly have an opposite effect, and that I await information as to the views of His Britannic Majesty's Government regarding the action of Mulai Zin, and that the latter should make every effort to continue maintenance of order and protection of life and property, and that French consul solemnly assures me, meanwhile, by order of his Government, that no person whatever connected with the rebellion, however highly placed, will be touched in respect thereof, should Mulai Hafid be victorious, provided that no resistance be made to his khalifa, Sidi Mohammed-el-Amrani, or the latter's representative, when they reach Mequinez, and that I have called the attention of the British and American Ministers to the valuable protection afforded to foreigners at Mequinez during disorders.

Dispatched the 19th May, afternoon.

All well.

I have, &c.

J. M. MACLEOD.

[21501] No. 339.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 130.)

Sir, *Tangier, May* 28, 1911.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 75, the French relief column arrived at Fez on the afternoon of the 21st instant.

General Moinier had anticipated resistance from the tribes at the bridge at Mekkes (a day's march from Fez), but he appears to have succeeded in creating dissension amongst them, and they had been so busy fighting amongst themselves all the previous day that they were not in a condition to oppose the French advance. The French troops camped at Dardebibagh, the Sultan's farm, about a mile from the walls of Fez.

On the following morning General Moinier, in the centre of a square formed by Moorish troops and escorted by Spahis and Chasseurs d'Afrique, entered the capital, and was received by the Sultan in the great square of the Palace. After an interchange of complimentary phrases the general proceeded to a pavilion in the Palace gardens, where a grand luncheon was prepared.

After luncheon the Sultan came round to see the general, and a long conference took place on the situation. Moulay Hafid appears to have insisted on prompt and energetic measures being taken against the insurgent tribes, who, he said, had submitted only in appearance, and would recommence hostilities immediately after they had gathered in their crops. The French chargé d'affaires read me this morning

most confidentially the latest report which he had received from M. Gaillard, in which he stated that the Sultan, at the inspiration of Colonel Mangin, had demanded that a strong force should be at once dispatched to Mequinez, and that no pity should be shown to Moulay Zin or to the men who had consented to form his Government. General Moinier had replied that there could be no question of dispatching any troops until the arrival of Colonel Gouraud's column. M. Gaillard went on to say that both he and General Moinier were of opinion that a policy of leniency should be followed with regard to Moulay Zin and his Government, who, by accepting the honours thrust upon them by the Berbers, had prevented the pillaging of the town and saved the lives of the foreigners. M. de Billy said that he shared this view. I told him that, even if he did not, I did not see how it was possible to follow any other course after the solemn assurances given by M. Gaillard on the instructions of the French Government (see Enclosure No. 2 in my despatch of the 25th instant). The effect would be disastrous if, after sending assurances to Mikwar that the amnesty would be general and no exemptions would be made, the Sultan were to be allowed to wreak his vengeance on his brother and his Ministers. M. de Billy said he thought we need have no anxiety on this score, as the instructions to M. Gaillard would arrive in plenty of time, but he was not quite as definite on the point as I should have liked.

He also read me what M. Gaillard had written with regard to the burning of the Uladjama villages, to which Mr. MacLeod took such exception (see my telegram No. 80). It appears that these villages were occupied by Riffians who had been settled amongst the Uladjamas since generations, and who had, on every possible occasion during the last few months, grossly maltreated the rekkas (postal couriers). They had killed one and put out the eyes of another; they richly deserved that their villages should be burnt. Unfortunately in the fighting the harmless son of Hadj Mohammed-ben-Shacroon, a rich proprietor near Lemta, and an intimate friend of the British and German consuls, had been killed by accident. I said that it was very regrettable; I remembered the man myself, having spent a very pleasant day in his country house in the hills when I was at Fez two years ago.

M. de Billy told me that on the following day a great Franco-Moorish dinner had been given, at which all the important personages had assisted with the exception of the Grand Vizier, who had excused himself on the ground of ill-health. M. de Billy said that he believed that the excuse was genuine, and that Glawi was in the last stages of consumption; if so, the situation would be greatly simplified, as he could be made to retire for that reason. He certainly was suffering from bronchitis during a considerable part of the winter.

I am assured that the reception given to the French troops was excellent; that the town was hung with flags, and that there was no sign of animosity towards the foreigners, rather the reverse. There is no doubt that times have changed in Morocco, and that the difference wrought in the last two years is enormous. I remember the scribe of this legation, an elderly and reverend gentleman, telling Mr. Irwin, when we were at Fez, that, notwithstanding the respect and affection he had for the members of the legation, it would be his duty, even if a painful one, to kill any one of us, were the Jehad to be proclaimed. He now expresses the greatest relief at the intervention of the French, and at the thought that an end would be put to an intolerable situation: intolerable in his opinion mainly, I think, because in the stagnation of business which has resulted, he is unable to add to his income by performing all sorts of small notarial and clerical jobs as he did before.

The British vice-consul at Marrakesh, who has a long experience of this country, writes: "I never imagined that a French advance upon Fez would have been received as quietly—almost with joy—by the people here. Times are greatly changed. I have not seen the slightest sign of any ill-feeling towards Europeans, even these days when there are wild rumours of severe fighting and great forces rallying to oppose the French or to plunder Fez. The abundant harvest has done much to keep the country people quiet, but this is not all; a change has come over the people!"

The news from the districts around Fez is distinctly reassuring. Mr. MacLeod reports that on the 19th instant the Sherarda and Gerwan tribes sent a deputation to the capital to make their submission, and were dismissed peacefully. All the Berbers decamped from Ras-el-Ma on the morning of the 21st, and Ali Zaky Bey informs me to-day that the Uladjama and Sheraga have also made their peace with the Sultan. He believes that the whole movement will very soon collapse.

Colonel Gouraud's column appears to have had another sharp engagement with the insurgents in the Tselfats mountains and to have punished them severely. It was expected to reach Fez yesterday or to-day.

In the meantime, I have seen a telegram from the correspondent of the "Daily Mirror," who is with Amrani's mehalla, to the effect that they are in a position of considerable difficulty, and are now hemmed in by mountaineers. A disaster would be serious, as the force is in charge of the money and ammunition which was sent up to Fez some weeks ago, and was unable to get through. It always appeared to me rash to detach this mehalla from the French column, all the more so, as I knew that General Moinier had a very poor opinion of it as a fighting force.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[21503] No. 340.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 3.)

(No. 132.)

Sir, *Tangier May* 29, 1911.

THERE seems to have been a lull during the last few days in Spanish activity in the Ceuta-Tetuan district.

The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs came to see me on the 24th, and talked a great deal on the subject. He promised to communicate to me copy of a long note which he had addressed to the Spanish Minister reviewing the whole question, and protesting against the unwarranted action of the Spanish authorities, but I have not as yet received it.

He gave me a somewhat different version of the "fishermen" incident, which led to the occupation of Monte Negro, to that given by the French chargé d'affaires. It appears that it has always been the custom for Spaniards wishing to fish there to give previous notice, and to pay a small toll. In the case of these fishermen (four, Sid Guebbas said, not six) no notice was given. One of the Moors of the district seeing them, reproached them for coming without having given notice, and said that at all events they would have to pay. An altercation ensued which ended in a fight, in which the Moor was naturally overpowered. He was gagged and bound, and the Spaniards were carrying him off to the boat when some more Moors appeared on the scene. The Spaniards thought that they had come to help their compatriot, so they dropped their victim and made off in their boat as quick as they could. The incident appears hardly sufficient to warrant the establishment of a Spanish military post!

I see in the section which reached me by special bag yesterday* that the French would be prepared to remove their present vice-consul at Tetuan by giving him promotion. Personally, I hope that this proposal may be carried into effect, as I consider that M. Lucciardi is rather a fomenter of trouble, and I have on more than one occasion found that his reports are very much exaggerated to say the least of it.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[21522] No. 341.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 3.)

(No. 84.)

Sir, *Madrid, May* 31, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 80 of the 27th instant, I have now the honour to transmit, as received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a translation of the French counter-proposals for a settlement with Spain in Morocco, in the amended form in which his Excellency has returned them to the French Ambassador. They may be termed the Spanish counter-proposals.

It will be seen that Señor Garcia Prieto reverts, on almost every point, to the original Spanish proposals:—

1. As regards the railway from Tangier, he insists that it shall pass through

* No. 291.

Arzila, Laraiche, and Alcazar; that it shall be prolonged to Fez; and that the sections falling respectively within the Spanish and French spheres of influence shall be managed and financed respectively by Spain and France.

2. Similarly, within the entire Spanish sphere, including Tangier, and not only within the ports and neighbourhood of Laraiche and Tetuan as proposed by France, Señor Garcia Prieto demands that the Moorish Department of Public Works be recommended to select preferentially Spanish agents to superintend Public Works and other matters.

3. Mutual co-operation of France and Spain within their respective spheres to be understood in the sense of article 5 of the Spanish draft declaration.

4. Provisions for use of the Spanish language on an equality with French.

5. French military instructors to be excluded from taking any part in the payment, organisation, or military operations of the Sultan's troops within the Spanish sphere of influence.

On all other points the proposals of the draft Spanish declaration and protocol are maintained in their integrity.

The French Ambassador and myself are not encouraged by this communication to hope for a satisfactory conclusion of these negotiations. On no single point has Señor Garcia Prieto taken the slightest notice of the reservations which my French colleague thought it necessary to make during our first two conversations, and in which I acquiesced. Those reservations related, amongst other points, to the impossibility of consenting either to a change in the mixed status of Tangier as defined by article 9 of the secret treaty, or to a revocation of the arrangements made between France and Morocco in regard to the security for the loans of 1904 and 1910. It will be observed, however, that in article 2 of the enclosed counter-proposals, Señor Garcia Prieto seeks to extend to Tangier, without a word of explanation, the functions to be confided by the Moorish Department of Public Works, within the Spanish sphere of influence, to Spanish agents proposed by Señor Llorens, the Spanish assistant engineer. His Excellency revives also, in all their crudeness, the complicated arrangements set forth in No. 2 of the draft Spanish protocol, with a view to leaving exclusively in Spanish hands the collection of the revenues assigned to be the security within the Spanish sphere of influence for certain loans brought out in Paris.

A further instance of the Foreign Minister's deafness to our representations is afforded by his insistence on the passage of the proposed railway through Laraiche. In the French counter-proposals Laraiche was to be served by the railway either directly or by means of a branch line. M. Geoffray explained to Señor Garcia Prieto at our last meeting that the French Government understood that there were technical difficulties which stood in the way of the main line passing round by Laraiche, and that this was the only reason for suggesting the alternative of a branch line. He added, that if it should appear that the French Government were misinformed on this point, there would be no objection to the main line touching at Laraiche.

Señor Garcia Prieto, in article 1 of the counter-proposals, again requires that the main line shall pass through Laraiche, without making any reference whatever to the possible difficulty which had been so clearly explained to him.

M. Geoffray has forwarded the Spanish counter-proposals to his Government, with the request that he may receive as soon as possible precise instructions embodying the whole of the offers which the French Government are prepared to make to that of Spain. He proposes then to send them in to the Spanish Government, with an intimation that if the latter are not disposed to accept them as the basis of a reasonable settlement, it will be useless to continue the negotiation.

His Excellency received this morning a telegram informing him that M. Cruppi was considering the form in which it might be possible to give satisfaction to Spain in respect of the question of anticipating the date fixed in the secret agreement for the commencement of the second period of its operation.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 341.

Spanish Counter-proposals communicated on May 30, 1911.

(Translation.)

(1.)

A RAILWAY is to be constructed starting from Tangier and running direct to Fez viâ Arzila, Laraiche, and Alcazar. The funds for this construction to be obtained by a loan guaranteed—

(*a.*) On the actual proceeds of the working of the proposed railway.

(*b.*) On the subsidiary guarantee of a part of the sources pledged to the military and naval debts of France and Spain against the Makhzen, with the provision that paragraph 2 of article 2 of the draft declaration and protocol be complied with. In this connection, it is to be understood that the guarantee of France or Spain shall serve to supply the deficit in the railway returns only for the section enclosed in their respective spheres of influence. The same principles shall be applied to the question of financial and technical supervision. The terms of this arrangement and the form in which it is to be presented to the Makhzen and the State Bank will be determined by a commission of specialists of both countries.

(2.)

Both Governments shall recommend the Director of Public Works that in the questions of survey, management, supervision and inspection, and in the general execution of all matters in the Spanish sphere of influence, as also in the ports of Tangier, Tetuan, and Laraiche preference be granted to Spanish subjects. These officials shall continue to be under the orders of the Spanish assistant engineer. MM. Porché and Llorens shall be informed that it is the desire of the two Governments that the Spanish engineer should have the initiative in all matters which fall within the province of the directing engineers, including mines and such advice and assistance of which the Sultan and his native agents may at any time stand in need, when these matters affect the Spanish sphere of influence. Should the Madrid Cabinet feel that a more efficient application of this principle would be ensured by a division into administrative districts, immediate proposals to this effect shall be laid before the Makhzen.

(3.)

(Same as paragraph 5 of the draft declaration.)

(4.)

The Spanish language shall be employed on a footing of equality with the French language in the promulgation of the Makhzen's edicts and of those of the various branches of the Moorish administration, and in all documents passing between the latter and private individuals. Notices of conditions of tender shall, however, continue to be drawn up in accordance with the established method.

(5.)

In the Spanish sphere of influence the French military instructors shall not interfere in the payment, instruction, organisation or operations of any garrisons, brigades or military body of the Sultan, but shall abide by the conditions laid down in article 1 of the draft declaration.

In all other respects the propositions contained in the draft declaration and protocol shall be maintained.

[21655] No. 342.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 3.)

[By Post.]

(No. 75. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, June 3, 1911.*

FRANCO-SPANISH negotiations in regard to Morocco.

I saw M. Cruppi this afternoon, and I again suggested to his Excellency that Spain might be led to make use of Germany to gain her ends unless the French Government made large concessions to her. To this M. Cruppi replied that the German Government could have no valid cause to raise objections to French proceedings, of which proper notice had been communicated to them, so long as the French Government continued to observe their treaty engagements, as they fully intended to do. The French troops were not in Fez itself, and they would be withdrawn as soon as possible from the neighbourhood. General Moinier had been instructed to that effect, and he had been directed to take no action which would be in contravention to the Act of Algeciras or would affect the independence of the Sultan. He was to arrange with His Majesty for the institution of reforms and the re-establishment and maintenance of public order, and he was further to organise posts destined to secure a line of communications between Fez and the coast. These posts were to be held by Moorish soldiers under the direction of French instructors.

[20058] No. 343.

*Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.**

Foreign Office, June 3, 1911.

Your Excellency,

WITH reference to the communication which your Excellency was good enough to make to the Foreign Office on the 22nd ultimo, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Government agree to the proposal that the mandate given to the French and Spanish Governments to exercise the right of search off the Moorish coast for contraband arms and ammunition should be renewed for another year down to the end of 1911 under the same general conditions as before.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[21653] No. 344.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 4.)

[By Post.]

(No. 73.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, June 3, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

Your telegram No. 133 of 1st instant, my private telegram to Sir A. Nicolson of the 2nd, and his reply of that date.

I read to M. Cruppi this afternoon Tangier telegram No. 84 of 31st May down to "military authorities," and I said that in the circumstances described His Majesty's Government could not receive a Moorish special mission for the Coronation. Would he therefore so inform El Mokri, who, he had requested me to inform you, had been appointed to represent the Sultan Mulai Hafid?

M. Cruppi, who has seen M. Cambon this morning on the subject, earnestly begs you to suspend your final decision in the matter until he has had time to receive replies to telegrams which he dispatched to the French consul at Fez and to General Moinier on 1st June, calling for reports as to the real facts. He is informed that there were no sales of women and girls, and he is led to believe that the raiding and burning of villages and ill-treatment of their inhabitants, which he greatly deplores, were reprisals for their torturing and killing of the Sultan's messengers on their way from

* Also to Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, *mutatis mutandis.*

Fez to Tangier, some having had their eyes put out, others having been crucified or having been hung up by their feet, and others killed.

M. Cruppi has given instructions that the Sultan is to be warned that such acts as are attributed to him cannot be permitted by the French Government. He says that the refusal to receive a Moorish mission at the Coronation will be a great blow ("une atteinte sérieuse") to the position of the Sultan, whose sovereignty it is the policy of the French Government to support as the ruler of Morocco. He admits that Mulai Hafid is a barbarian, but he does not think that he is worse than his predecessors, and to diminish his position at the present moment may have serious consequences to French policy as showing a divergence between the French and British Governments, and giving an opportunity to the German Government for mischief.

[21662] No. 345.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, June 4, 1911.*

M. DE BILLY informed me that he had an interview with the Spanish Minister last night, in the course of which the latter complained with considerable emphasis of the state of affairs in the Gharb. The new pretender, he said, threatened to overrun the whole district, and even to attack Alcazar. He had already robbed certain Spanish protégés. M. de Villasinda had sent a full report of what was happening to his Government, and it remained for them to take such steps as they considered necessary. I have received a report from the British consular agent at Alcazar, stating that considerable anxiety was felt there, as the pretender had been raiding some villages about five hours away, and an attack on the town was not impossible.

M. de Billy informs me that the last portion of the French convoy for Fez started on the 2nd instant, and that about 500 Sherkowi men have been sent to oppose the pretender under Lieutenant Moreaux. Raisuli has about the same number at his disposal in and around Alcazar. For some months past there have been scares of an attack upon the town, and yet order in the district has been maintained. Mr. Carleton and Raisuli suspect that these disorders are being more or less engineered by the Spaniards, and Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram No. 40 shows that the Spanish Government have wasted no time in making use of them.

[21849] No. 346.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 138.)
Sir, *Tangier, May 31, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 84, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, giving full details of the raid committed by the Fez troops in the Jebel Zalagh and Gergeb districts. At the same time Mr. MacLeod and Dr. Verdon have also written to me privately on the subject, expressing the greatest indignation at what had occurred. The former was specially upset at the line taken in the matter by M. Gaillard, and at the vehemence with which he avowed and even defended the action of the troops. I at once went round to the French chargè d'affaires and read him extracts from Mr. MacLeod's despatch. I said that I considered the matter very serious; full reports had, I knew, been sent to the "Times" by their war correspondent, and the result would be that English public opinion would be ranged on the same side as that of Germany against France, a situation which I felt sure he must agree with me in thinking should be avoided at all costs. Colonel Mangin was I knew a most able and courageous soldier, but he appeared to me terribly wanting in judgment, and I feared that he would lead his Government into difficulties if he went on in his present manner. By his headstrong action some months ago, taken without consultation with the French consul, in having two soldiers publicly shot he had furnished the Berbers with a cry for rallying the tribes, and had endangered the lives of all the Europeans at Fez, for whatever anti-Christian feeling there had been in the movement was entirely due to him; by his present action he will have succeeded in arraying all civilised nations against France. Dr. Vassel, I had heard privately from Mr. MacLeod,

was perfectly furious, and the Germans were not likely to let such an opportunity pass of making themselves unpleasant.

M. de Billy fully admitted the justice of my remark, and went on repeating that he was much *embêté* at what had occurred. He could hardly believe that the outrages reported by Mr. MacLeod had been committed by troops under French officers, and could only suppose that the operations had been carried on over a considerable tract of country, and that some of the soldiers had got out of hand and started pillaging the villas and farms of the rich Fez merchants. He said that he felt convinced that the latest instructions from Paris had now reached M. Gaillard (see my telegram No. 80), and the recurrence of such regrettable incidents in the future was impossible. I only hope this may be the case, and the fact that the orders for a recommencement of the raiding on the following day were cancelled by General Moinier gives ground for the hope. Mr. MacLeod states that three days' grace have been given for the insurgents to come in, and in a later letter received by Mr. Harris these three days have been extended to eight.

I have just received your telegram No. 42. It is ridiculous for the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to say that these reports were mere newspaper tales, considering they were brought to my knowledge in the first instance by His Majesty's consul at Fez.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 346.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 32.)
Sir, *Fez, May 23, 1911.*

VERY early in the morning of the 21st instant, as soon as the relief column was known to be near at hand, and it being known that the bulk of the insurgents at Gergeb had dispersed, the Fez troops were sent out to Jebel Zalagh and Gergeb districts. The former is a high hill covered with farms, olive groves, and fruit gardens, nearly all belonging to Fez citizens, and all within an hour or two of the city.

Many of the inhabitants, gardeners, and labourers are Riffs. These were the last to join the insurgents, and notoriously did so because of the Makhzen's failure to protect them from the raids of the Beni M'tir. Once joined, however, they were peculiarly annoying as enemies because of their being in the area where couriers were oftenest intercepted, and of their being hard fighters, and much given to looting close to the town. They were particularly annoying to the Makhzen and French military mission, but, on the other hand, had faithfully guarded the very great amount of Fez citizens' property in their charge.

Stories of their having cruelly illtreated couriers (especially Makhzen and French ones) were circulated, but, so far as I have been able to learn, these gross cruelties were done at the Beni M'tir camp. In one case a man with letters from the Ambassador Mokri exhorting the Makhzen "to hold out till the Christians arrived" is alleged by the Makhzen to have been blinded, but, according to other accounts, was merely ducked in the Fez River.

That severe punishment should be meted out to individuals proved to have done such things is of course unquestionable, but instead of this the Makhzen let loose the Fez troops under the French military officers on the whole district. The real offenders had nearly all fled, and there remained only a few old men, women, children, and Fez people, or mountain people taking care of their own or their masters' properties.

Some fourteen villages were burnt and raided of their contents. The remaining men (already referred to) were killed or brought in as prisoners, and some eighty women and children were brought in and sold as slaves by the soldiers.

No respect was paid to the "aman" granted by the Makhzen to loyal people, and these were shot without mercy whenever they attempted to defend their places from destruction. Several of the raided places belonged to foreign protégés, some British ones in particular (Mimi Hlou and the Lazaracs) were the very merchants who had lately found for the Makhzen (at my appeal) important sums of coin, which were urgently needed to pay troops.

One particularly cruel case is that of Hadj Mohammad Benshokron, owner of a

pleasant country house, with farm, olive groves, and large fruit gardens attached, at Lemta, and who has been the constant friend of all Europeans here. The latter always have the use of his place to camp at (often for weeks at a time when in need of change of air) and almost every foreign mission visiting Fez has been given the use of his place for excursions.

He had obtained "aman" from the Makhzen and French military officers, but nevertheless his place was raided and burnt, his youngest son and an old manservant shot dead, his second son wounded, and five of his menservants carried off as prisoners.

At the earliest moment after learning of what had happened, I called on the French consul, pointing out that all this was an absolute contravention of the assurances he gave me as embodied in my letter of the 16th May to Mr. Enyart, and begging him to have these raids at once stopped.

To my great surprise M. Gaillard not only refused to do so, but avowed and vehemently defended them, and refused absolutely to move in the matter. He deprecated what had happened to Cid Benshokron with sincerity, but as an "incident de guerre" merely; and, in fairness, I would remark that, at that moment, neither he nor I knew of the stealing and selling of women and children.

Next day the raids were not renewed, and three days' grace was proclaimed for insurgents to come in, from which I infer that M. Gaillard (notwithstanding his refusal) must have referred the matter to General Moinier, and that the latter has had them stopped.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

[21850] No. 347.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 139.)

Sir, *Tangier May* 31, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting a conversation between himself and General Moinier on the subject of the raid by Government troops upon the villages of the Ulad Jama.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 347.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 33.)

Sir, *Fez, May* 26, 1911.

ON the 22nd instant General Moinier was received in state by the Sultan. The ceremony was the same, essentially, as on the reception of a foreign Minister, except that the General was accompanied by a guard of his own troops. The Sultan was wearing the Insignia of the Legion of Honour, and at the end of the reception presented General Moinier with the 1st Class of the Hafidian Decoration.

Thereafter General Moinier and his staff were entertained to an official banquet at the Betta Gardens.

On the 23rd instant General Moinier received the French colony here at the French consulate, was entertained to lunch, and thereafter paid a number of official visits, on the consuls amongst others.

When he called here I took the opportunity to thank him cordially for the relief his arrival had afforded to us all. I should, perhaps, explain that his visiting the consuls before they had called upon him was in response to a request from him that this would be more convenient for his arrangements.

I availed of the opportunity to describe what had happened at Mequinez, and to recommend the British subjects and American citizens to his good offices, should occasion arise, and he was kind enough to promise that their interests would be carefully kept in view.

On the 24th instant I returned his call, at his headquarters, Dar Dabibagh. He remarked that the situation immediately around Fez seemed to be improving, various

small tribes on the Fez–Mequinez plain having made their submission to the Sultan. With this I agreed, but (this just for his information in case he should not be in the way of hearing this side of passing events) I was sorry to say all the town and the foreign residents here had been much moved by what had happened in Ulad Jama, about which indeed I had spoken to the French consul, but which the latter, I was sorry to say, had strongly defended.

I described what had happened (as already detailed in my despatch No. 32), and pointed out that during these three months the Makhzen had been so completely dependent upon Colonel Mangin and M. Gaillard, and that they could have exercised a controlling influence on the violent impulses to which the Sultan was but too disposed. In the Ulad Jama affair, however, they had unfortunately rather worked in the opposite direction. The action taken was quite contrary, it seemed to me, to the wise and moderate policy of immediate pacification which had been agreed upon. Such methods only further exasperated the tribes, deepened their distrust of the Makhzen, and made them more intractable. The injustice of punishing a great number of innocent persons on the chance that a few guilty ones were amongst them was surely obvious, and I could not but think that the impression produced in Europe would be very bad indeed when it was known that so happy an event as the arrival of the relief column had been associated with such deeds as those in Ulad Jama, and, further, that in such reprisals European military officers had been employed.

It was a positive fact that the women and children captured in Ulad Jama were being auctioned in the Fez streets while the relief column was marching into its quarters. Now being free of their recent fears, and, with so much force at hand, the Makhzen were full of merely revengeful projects, and I was convinced the chief danger now was the Makhzen's further exasperating the tribes.

General Moinier answered in kindly, but very guarded terms, that of course he had known nothing of what was intended in Ulad Jama; that the Makhzen were indeed savages; that, however, it was a difficult and delicate matter to impose any course upon them. To do so was so apt to look like a conquest of them, but he would keep in view what I had said.

M. Gaillard to-day told me that General Moinier had mentioned to him what I had said, and from the rest of M. Gaillard's remarks it was clear that he now sees the situation in a more reasonable light.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

[21851] No. 348.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 140.)

Sir, *Tangier, May* 31, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting the arrival of Colonel Gouraud's column at Fez.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 348.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 34.)

Sir, *Fez, May* 26, 1911.

COLONEL GOURAUD'S column arrived here this afternoon after five days' almost continuous fighting between Al Kunitra and Mikkes, where it was joined by General Dalbiez's column sent out from Fez to its assistance.

The fighting was severest on the 21st at Wad Beht, where, alone, the enemy left about 106 dead. The French losses throughout were one officer and ten men killed and forty-one men wounded.

Although the Ulad Jama and Sheraga have sacrificed to the Sultan, the latter has refused to accept their submission unless a number of soldier deserters in that district are given up. Still, a settlement of those two districts, with the Basha Abdelkrim Eshirgui as governor, seems likely to be completed within a week or so.

Some lootings, burnings, &c., by Hiayna are still in progress in Ulad Jama, but it is hoped that yesterday's and to-day's posts will be able to pass with an escort of tribesmen, which has been furnished.

A new pretender, claiming to be Buhamara, has appeared in Beni Messara. He gathered a following of several hundred ill-armed hill-people and burnt several villages in the Gharb, but was defeated by Sidi Mohammad Amrani's force and fled to Sidi Mimun, in Beni Messara, where he now is. My informant is a courier whom I dispatched from here on the 7th, and who was stopped, robbed, and imprisoned by this man's following, and was released by Sidi Mohammad Amrani's force.

There is no news from Mequinez itself, but according to native reports the insurgents have gathered in large numbers at Ain Toto, some 10 miles west of Mequinez. Fairly reliable reports from Sefroo are to the effect that the Ait Yusi have surrounded the town and mean to hold it against the Makhzen.

From all that has occurred to Colonel Gouraud's column it seems clear that no proper submission of the Sherarda and other tribes between Mikkes and Kunitra has yet taken place.

The courier who reached you from Fez on or about the 18th instant, and who states he was given a letter for me, was robbed of his letter in Sheraga on the 22nd instant, and very badly beaten on the head and shoulders. From the mauled state in which he arrived I can quite believe his story that his assailants* left him for dead.

I have, &c.

J. M. MacLEOD.

[21734] No. 349.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 152. Secret.)
(Extract.)

Berlin, June 1, 1911.

SHORTLY after my arrival from England on the 25th ultimo I called upon the Imperial Chancellor, and had some conversation with him both on the visit of the Emperor and Empress to London and other subjects.

By a very natural train of thought the Chancellor asked me what I had heard of the Morocco question when I was in London. I said that I had had the advantage of some conversation with you on this subject, and that it was your view that, in the face of the reports received from Fez, the French Government could not have acted otherwise than they had done, and that full confidence could be placed in their assurances that after they had restored order the French force would leave Fez as soon as possible. You were, moreover, strongly of the opinion that every allowance should be made for the difficulties of the situation, and that, in view of their avowed intention to do nothing which could be regarded as contravening the Act of Algeciras, no pressure of any sort should be brought to bear upon them from any quarter which might result in their leaving their difficult task unfinished. I added that you hoped, above all, that no political discussions of an international character would arise out of the situation, as in that case England would have to abide by her treaty engagements, and the grouping of the Powers would, you presumed, be the same as at the time of the Algeciras Conference. The Chancellor replied that the Imperial Government, while not encouraging the French expedition—as, from the reports they had received from Fez, they had failed to see that there was any very special or urgent necessity for it—had raised no objections whatever, and, as I could not have failed to perceive, had observed the calmest and most correct attitude possible. This attitude they would continue to maintain, and it was far from their thoughts to object to the French troops remaining at Fez for a reasonable time for the purpose of restoring order. They had, however, always thought, and still thought, that circumstances would be too strong for the French, and that they would be unable to carry out their assurances, which he was convinced had been given in perfect good faith.

I asked his Excellency what he considered to be a "reasonable time"; but to that question I neither obtained, nor did I expect to obtain, any answer.

My Italian colleague tells me that he has put the above question to nearly everybody in the Imperial Foreign Office from the Chancellor downwards, and has never obtained the slightest inkling of what the Imperial Government considers to be

* Fugitives from the Makhzen's attack on Ulad Jama on the 21st.—J. M. MacL.

a reasonable time for the French to remain in Fez. Herr von Kiderlen had indeed given him an answer, though not a direct one. He had said:—

"When France contented herself with peaceful penetration, time was on her side and the game was in her hands. By precipitating matters she has lost her advantage, and the game now bids fair to be in our hands."

The Chancellor concluded the conversation with these words:—

"There is one thing I can tell you, which is that the situation in Morocco does not cause me the very slightest feeling of anxiety."

[21741] No. 350.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 159.)
Sir,

Berlin, June 2, 1911.

IN the course of a short conversation which I had with Herr Zimmermann to-day the subject of Morocco came up, and I repeated to him more or less what I had said to the Chancellor a few days previously, namely, that you hoped that the situation would lead to no discussions of a political nature. Herr Zimmermann said that he hoped so too, and that he did not anticipate there would be anything of the sort, provided, of course, that France did what she had to do "within a reasonable time," and did not change the whole political situation by remaining at Fez indefinitely. He added that the German Government were as anxious as anybody that no political discussions should take place, as in that case he presumed that Germany and England would again find themselves, so to speak, in opposite camps. This would, particularly under present circumstances, be highly disagreeable to Germany, and her Government was anxious to do everything possible to avoid such an eventuality. I said that such a situation would be also disagreeable to His Majesty's Government, therefore I hoped that when he spoke of a reasonable time he meant time sufficient for France to have a chance of restoring order and effecting some good after the great trouble and expense to which she had been put by her necessary expedition. He said that whether the expedition had been actually necessary or not was a matter of opinion, but the German Government certainly did not wish to add to her difficulties by pressing her to retire prematurely. I then asked Herr Zimmerman what he considered to be a reasonable time for the French to remain at Fez, taking into consideration the difficulties with which he had admitted they had to cope. He replied that he thought a month or six weeks would give them ample time to do all that they had to do. He added that that was only a personal opinion, and that he could not say what the views of the Imperial Government were upon the matter.

The greater part of the German press is exercising quite as much reticence as the Government on the subject of Morocco, and contents itself for the most part with reporting the movements of the French troops and the more salient features of the situation as they occur day by day. The pan-German press, on the other hand, is extremely violent, and calls loudly for the Government to take some action and change their "sphinx-like" attitude. It is not necessary that I should trouble you with long translations of these diatribes; it is sufficient to say that in papers like the "Post" and the "Hamburger Nachrichten" all the stories about French barbarity, the selling of women and children in the Fez bazaars, the burning of villages belonging to inoffensive tribes, and particularly the reports as to the request of the Sultan that France should at once assume the protectorate of Morocco, are raked together and put forward as reasons why Germany should take action at once. They say that one of the consequences of the apathy of the German Government is that the public is beginning to lose confidence in the hitherto much-belauded Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and that another consequence is that people abroad are gradually coming to the conclusion that Germany has made a bargain of some sort with France.

The "Post" states at some length that it is not at all sure that this latter idea is not correct, and affects to have heard that France has offered, in return for a free hand in Morocco, either to give Germany all she wants in the matter of the Bagdad Railway or to hand over to her French Congo. As regards the Bagdad Railway, the "Post" says that it is a commercial undertaking, for which a German company holds the concession, and for the successful carrying out of which Germany has ample funds at

her disposal, adding that Germany is not the least disposed to make the slightest concession for the admission of German securities to the Paris Bourse.

As regards the handing over to Germany of French Congo, the "Post" observes that Germany has already as much as she can stand of unhealthy tropical colonies. What Germany wanted and had not got was subtropical territory where Germans could live and work; Morocco was just such a country. "What Algeria is for France to-day," it adds, "Morocco can in forty years be for Germany. A hundred thousand Germans could well settle there and prosper. Morocco produces everything we want, and offers enormous possibilities for our manufactures, our merchants, and our artisans. Moreover, it lies only three or four days' journey from Hamburg. Such countries are not to be found in dozens on the face of the globe, and it is ridiculous to offer us as compensation for our share in such a country an unhealthy bit of tropical country like French Congo."

In conclusion, the article from which I am quoting says that all such sort of compensation must be summarily rejected; that for Germany the partition of Morocco into spheres of influence was the only thing.

"We have, in the meanwhile, confidence that our Foreign Office really takes the same view, and will look to it that Germany's sphere of interest when such a partition takes place will correspond in extent to her effective strength, her need for fresh territory, and the stake in Morocco which her force represents."

These quotations will, I think, be sufficient to show you the line taken by the pan-German press on the Morocco question.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[21880] No. 351.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 86.)
Sir, *Madrid, June 2, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 73 of the 26th May, I have the honour to forward herewith, as kindly communicated to me by the French Ambassador, the text of the proposition which the French Government have made to that of Spain with regard to the question of the redistribution of the Casa Blanca police.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 351.

French Proposition respecting Casa Blanca Police.

LE Gouvernement de la République est prêt à se joindre au Gouvernement Royal pour demander au Makhzen le renouvellement de l'institution actuelle de la police pour une durée qui sera établie d'après la combinaison financière à rechercher entre les deux Cabinets. Le Gouvernement français ne verrait pas d'inconvénient à la suppression des deux tabors de police de Casa Blanca, dont les cadres et les effectifs pourraient être respectivement répartis à Tetouan et Laraiche, Rabat et Mazagan. Ainsi que le propose la note espagnole, la répartition en serait faite par la Commission du Règlement.

Si d'autres ports venaient à être ouverts au commerce, les deux Gouvernements recommanderaient au Sultan d'y instituer des tabors de police d'après le régime appliqué dans les autres ports. Les cadres et les effectifs de ces nouveaux tabors seraient empruntés aux tabors existants dans les autres ports.

Dans les régions situées au nord de Laraiche, ces nouveaux tabors seraient espagnols.

[21703] No. 352.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 260.)
Sir, *Paris, June 4, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 247 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of M. Cruppi's reply to the memoranda which I handed to him on that day in regard to French operations in Morocco and the reported desire of the Sultan for an immediate advance of the French troops on Mequinez and for vengeance on Mulai Zin.

His Excellency, after justifying the action of the Shereefian forces in the Lemta region, proceeds to express his regret that certain British-protected persons, and especially Menebbhi, should have acted in a hostile manner towards the Moorish Government and the policy pursued by France. M. Cruppi concludes by stating that the French Government will not carry out a policy of vengeance at the instigation of the Sultan, and that they continue to be deeply desirous not to compromise the prestige of their army and not to allow themselves to be drawn into extended military operations.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 352.

Memorandum communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Cruppi.

PAR un mémorandum et une note en date du 30 mai, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a bien voulu faire part au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères des préoccupations de son Gouvernement au sujet des mesures prises ou projetées par le Makhzen, pour la répression et la soumission des révoltés. Il rappelait à ce propos les déclarations faites par le consul de France à Fez à son collègue britannique sur le caractère de l'intervention militaire français.

En réponse, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie que le langage tenu par M. Gaillard à M. MacLeod répond pleinement aux intentions constantes de la politique française et aux conseils que les agents du Gouvernement de la république ont déjà donnés à Moulay Hafid. Il est notamment exact que les révoltés devaient recevoir l'"aman" du Makhzen à la condition de se soumettre dans un bref délai. Les tribus qui ont profité jusqu'ici de cette faculté n'ont été l'objet, à notre connaissance, d'aucune punition abusive. Les faits signalés à la Légation d'Angleterre et mentionnés dans le mémorandum de l'ambassade sont d'un autre ordre. Ils se rapportent à la journée du 21 mai, c'est-à-dire au dernier jour où la capitale chérifienne était investie. Ce jour-là et avant l'arrivée des troupes françaises, qui ne parvinrent à Fez que dans l'après-midi, la méhalla chérifienne se porta vers le camp des rebelles établi au nord de la ville, à Sidi Ahmed-el-Bernoussi; elle y rencontra une vive résistance de la part des Oulad-el-Hadj, Oulad Djama et Riffains concentrés sur ce point, et c'est seulement avec l'aide des tabors réguliers instruits par la Mission française qu'elle put enlever le camp et achever la défaite de l'ennemi dans la région du Lemta, occupée par une fraction riffaine. Le combat fut très vif, un grand nombre de Riffains furent faits prisonniers et la plupart des villages incendiés.

Il y a lieu d'ajouter que la population de ce district insurgé avait eu jusque-là une attitude nettement hostile au Makhzen: elle avait mis un véritable acharnement à arrêter et torturer les courriers envoyés par le consul de France; l'un de ces courriers avait été tué, un autre avait eu les yeux crevés.

L'action militaire dirigée contre le Lemta et qui a été le dernier événement de la défense de Fez paraît donc entièrement justifiée. On ne saurait l'assimiler à un châtiment infligé de sang-froid et "par des motives de vengeance" à des sujets n'offrant aucune résistance à l'autorité chérifienne.

Le mémorandum britannique fait observer qu'une partie des propriétés détruites au cours du combat appartenaient à des étrangers ou des protégés étrangers. Il eût été difficile, semble-t-il, que ces propriétés fussent respectées par les soldats marocains alors que les indigènes de toute la région, et vraisemblablement parmi eux ceux qui occupaient les fermes en question, étaient aux prises avec la méhalla.

Le consul de France a fait connaître à ce propos que le fils d'un notable de Fez, propriétaire d'un domaine dans le Lemta, avait été tué pendant l'opération. Cet indigène était en relations amicales avec plusieurs consuls, dont Mr. MacLeod et M. Gaillard ; sa mort a donc produit une vive impression ; mais si regrettable que soit un pareil accident, on y doit voir le fait de la guerre et de la difficulté de modérer l'action d'une troupe marocaine sous le feu de l'ennemi.

Le Gouvernement britannique, mieux renseigné sur les circonstances de cette journée, reconnaîtra sans doute qu'elles ne permettent pas d'incriminer la conduite des agents français, et qu'elles n'impliquent aucun désaveu des intentions exprimées par le consul de France à son collègue anglais. Il n'entre certainement dans l'esprit d'aucun des Gouvernements représentés à Fez que les instructeurs militaires français aient pu encourager ou tolérer des traitements barbares de la part des soldats placés sous leur autorité effective. Si le combat du 21 mai a été réellement suivi des actes inhumains rapportés par un journal étranger—et le département sera renseigné avec précision sur ce point dans un bref délai—ces conséquences trop habituelles de la guerre marocaine n'auraient pu se produire qu'en dehors de l'action des officiers français ou au mépris de leurs ordres. L'attitude qu'ils ont pris dès le début de la campagne des Cherarda et les résultats qu'ils avaient obtenus déjà montrent suffisamment dans quel sens s'exerce leur influence auprès du Makhzen et des troupes.

Le mémorandum de l'ambassade expose d'autre part que Moulay Hafid, en demandant l'envoi d'une colonne sur Méquinez, voulait qu'on traitât sans pitié Moulay Zin et son entourage ; on rappelle à ce sujet les assurances contraires données au consul d'Angleterre à Fez par son collègue français.

Les mêmes déclarations avaient été faites au Ministre de Grande-Bretagne à Tanger par le chargé d'affaires de France. Les vues du Gouvernement français sur le meilleur règlement de cette question n'ont aucunement changé. Il continuera de préconiser auprès de Moulay Hafid une solution indulgente. Cette solution eût été sans doute facilitée si Moulay Zin, interprétant mieux les avis qui lui avaient été transmis par l'agent anglais à Fez et ne se croyant pas à l'abri des risques de sa conduite, n'avait pas persisté jusqu'au dernières nouvelles dans ses appels aux tribus contre le Makhzen et augmenté ainsi le ressentiment de son frère.

La complète entente des deux Cabinets de Paris et de Londres dans les affaires marocaines, heureusement servie par la confiance mutuelle des deux légations à Tanger, autorise le département à exprimer le regret que l'action de certains protégés anglais au Maroc, et notamment celle de Menebbhi, se soient exercées parfois, au cours de la dernière crise, dans un sens ouvertement défavorable au Gouvernement chérifien et à la politique française. Quelles que puissent être les sympathies personnelles que l'ancien Ministre d'Abd-el-Aziz et de Moulay Hafid éprouve aujourd'hui pour Moulay Zin, il est fâcheux que son influence et ses agissements aient rendu plus difficile la tâche assumée par les instructeurs et agents français en vue de prévenir le développement des troubles.

Le Gouvernement anglais voudra certainement juger la politique française au Maroc sur les déclarations répétées du Gouvernement de la république et sur les faits vérifiés qui manifesteront la conformité de nos actes à nos engagements. Le Gouvernement français ne compte point exécuter une politique de vengeance à la demande du Sultan ; il reste profondément soucieux de ne point compromettre le prestige de son armée et de ne pas se laisser entraîner à des opérations étendues.

Paris, le 3 juin, 1911.

[22043] No. 353.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 6.)

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, June* 6, 1911.

COMMISSIONER for Foreign Affairs confirms news of total defeat and flight of pretender.

[22044] No. 354.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 6.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, June* 6, 1911.

I HAVE just received a visit from Sid Guebbas, who begged that His Majesty's Government might reconsider their decision not to receive Coronation Mission. He said that he asked this as a suppliant in the name of the Makhzen and of the Moorish nation. Was forgiveness impossible ? The refusal to receive the mission brought so great a disgrace upon the nation. He begged me to telegraph, saying that the Moorish Government was ready to provide any guarantees demanded by His Majesty's Government. In consenting to comply with Sid Guebbas' request to telegraph I gave his Excellency little or no hope of a favourable reply, being fully aware of the obstacles in the way of granting his request. It seems to me, however, that since French officers were clearly involved in the Lumta incident, it would be a source of relief to French Government were request acceded to.

[22045] No. 355.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 6.)

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, June* 6, 1911.

AMRANI'S mehalla reached Fez 1st instant.

[21653] No. 356.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 141.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, June* 6, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 73 of 3rd June : Moorish mission to Coronation.

Pray explain to M. Cruppi that, as knowledge of acts perpetrated by Sultan has become publicly known here and has caused questions in the House of Commons, there would be a strong protest from public opinion were a special mission to be received so shortly afterwards, and a feeling would arise against the Sultan which would be embarrassing in many ways.

You can assure M. Cruppi of my earnest desire to cause French Government no difficulties whatsoever, and of firm intention of His Majesty's Government to abide closely by 1904 agreement, and it is with those objects in view that I do not desire to give any cause for public opinion here to be unfavourably aroused in connection with present situation in Morocco.

(Repeated to Tangier, Confidential.)

[21432] No. 357.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, June* 6, 1911.

MR. LISTER'S telegram No. 87 of 2nd June : Appointment of Ruham as head of Anjera police force.

You should make a strong protest, and say that the selection of this individual is not only certain to produce a deplorable effect in Morocco, but would be regarded by His Majesty's Government as showing a most unfriendly disregard of the interests of Great Britain.

(Repeated to Tangier, No. 44.)

[22050] No. 358.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, June 6, 1911.*

MOROCCO negotiations.

Our meeting to-day was more satisfactory. Minister for Foreign Affairs showed a desire to continue conversations.

French Ambassador had sent in last night a new version of French proposals, differing very slightly from the first version. His Excellency promised to refer to French Government several points which were strongly pressed by Minister for Foreign Affairs relating to employment of Spanish engineers and other agents in the Spanish sphere of influence and to redistribution of the police of the ports. French Ambassador said that, though French Government could not consent to consider during the present crisis advance to second period of secret convention, they would not refuse to discuss at a more favourable time question as to political status of Spain in her sphere of influence. He added that he did not think that the ratification of the financial convention of March 1911 was immaterial [*sic*].

On taking leave Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to do his best to promote an agreement, but the pressure of public opinion clamouring for some overt act was difficult to resist.

Prime Minister will reply to-morrow to an interpellation in the Chamber of Deputies.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[22163] No. 359.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.) [1163]

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, June 7, 1911.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 71 and 72 of 6th June.

Minister for Foreign Affairs knows nothing of appointment of Ruham, but is making enquiries of general in command at Ceuta. He adds that if such an appointment is in contemplation it is in ignorance of the fact that it is injurious to British interests.

(Repeated to Tangier.)

[22164] No. 360.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, June 7, 1911.*

CORONATION.

I have communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs contents of your telegram No. 141 of yesterday. He regrets decision not to receive El Mokri, but he appreciates your reasons, and thanks you for your assurances.

[22170] No. 361.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 265.)
Sir, *Paris, June 7, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, extracted from this evening's "Temps," copy of a leading article on Spanish policy in Morocco and the press campaign at present being waged on that subject in Madrid.

The "Temps" points out that the occupation of Alcazar—so hotly advocated by certain organs of the Spanish press—would constitute a flagrant violation of the Act of Algeciras and of the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1904.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 361.

Extract from the "Temps" of June 8, 1911.

LA FRANCE ET L'ESPAGNE AU MAROC.

LE "Temps" a fait, depuis trois jours, la part large à l'expression de la mauvaise humeur espagnole et n'a rien dissimulé des propos inexacts et blessants qui remplissent à son égard les journaux de Madrid. Dans un ton différent, nous croyons devoir aujourd'hui mettre les points sur les *i*.

Tout d'abord il conviendrait que la presse espagnole fixât une bonne fois la thèse à laquelle elle entend se tenir, et qu'après l'avoir fixée elle s'abstînt de la contredire. Tantôt elle insiste sur la modestie de l'action espagnole: ce que l'Espagne a fait à Ceuta, à Tétouan, ce qu'elle fera sans doute à Larache est bien peu de chose, nous dit-on, et nous avons mauvaise grâce à nous alarmer. Tantôt elle justifie nos protestations par la franchise même de ses aveux. C'est ainsi que la revue "España en Africa," dans un supplément spécial, écrit:—

"Les circonstances de temps et de lieu ont radicalement changé la position de nos possessions d'Afrique. Auparavant elles offraient quelque valeur stratégique. Si elles restaient dans l'état actuel, cette valeur serait aujourd'hui annulée par la puissance et la portée des armes modernes: d'où la nécessité d'étendre notre souveraineté sans hésitation en regardant loin, très loin dans l'avenir, afin de faire de nos modestes possessions africaines de riches colonies modernes, base sûre d'expansion commerciale et de domination du détroit le plus important du monde."

Avant de s'indigner du vœu qu'exprime le "Temps" de voir l'Espagne revenir à une plus équitable interprétation de l'Acte d'Algésiras, les journaux de Madrid, "Heraldo," "Imparcial," "Diario Universal," feraient sagement de prodiguer leurs conseils à leurs propres compatriotes. Nous avons écrit samedi: "L'Espagne élargit ses possessions non par une obligation provisoire de préservation, mais par un dessein d'occupation définitive. Elle estime que l'heure est venue de se servir sa part de Maroc." La revue "España en Africa" dit la même chose avec plus de précision. Ce qu'elle préconise, c'est une "extension de souveraineté." Ce qu'elle réprouve, c'est "la modestie" actuelle des présides. Ce qu'elle vise, c'est "la domination du détroit de Gibraltar. En vérité cette citation pourrait nous dispenser de prolonger le débat. Nous y ajouterons pourtant, par déférence pour nos lecteurs et par égard aussi pour des contradicteurs que nous souhaiterions plus courtois, quelques précisions nécessaires.

Ces précisions, au surplus, tiennent dans une affirmation que le "Temps" a déjà formulée et dont la presse espagnole esquive, et pour cause, l'examen: c'est qu'il est, à l'heure présente incorrect et contraire à l'Acte d'Algésiras de parler des "zones" marocaines dans les termes et surtout dans l'esprit où on le fait à Madrid. Les Espagnols conçoivent leur zone comme une zone d'occupation militaire. Cela s'explique peut-être par ce fait qu'ils se savent peu capables affirmer leurs aspirations autrement que par la présence de leurs troupes, leurs ressources financières, économiques, commerciales et morales au Maroc étant très inférieures aux nôtres. Mais expliquer n'est pas justifier, et nous maintenons que ni l'Acte d'Algésiras ni même les accords franco-espagnols de 1904 et 1905 n'autorisent l'Espagne à occuper actuellement les points qu'elle juge, comme en convient "España en Africa," nécessaires à la valeur stratégique de ses présides.

Cela dit, qu'il nous soit permis de noter encore que la situation à El Ksar est essentiellement différente de ce qu'elle était à Fez quand la France a décide d'y envoyer le Général Moinier. La capitale investie, sans vivres, sans ressources, sans communications avec l'extérieur, notre mission militaire (créée et confirmée par traités) en péril certain, exigeaient cette intervention. A El Ksar et dans la région environnante la sécurité au contraire était si grande que M. Boisset, notre agent consulaire, y circulait librement, dans des "marches et contre-marches" qui n'avaient d'autre objet que de sauver pacifiquement des vies humaines et qui ne méritent pas l'ironie dont les accable aujourd'hui la presse espagnole. L'agitation à El Ksar "provoquée par la campagne française" est une plaisanterie. Les communications de cette ville avec Tanger sont assurées. Si les Espagnols occupent El Ksar, ce sera pour "augmenter la valeur de leurs possessions africaines," comme le reconnaissent leurs

journaux, et non point du tout dans l'accomplissement du devoir de "surveillance" dont parle l' "Imparcial."

Or, cette occupation, nullement provisoire—les articles que nous avons cités le prouvent—violera de façon caractérisée, par sa cause d'abord, par sa date ensuite, le traité franco-espagnol de 1904, qui n'a prévu de possibilités de ce genre que pour un terme ultérieur et sous réserve de l'anéantissement du pouvoir chérifien. Elle violera non moins gravement l'Acte d'Algésiras, qui n'a prévu ni l'hypothèse d'un partage, ni l'exercice d'une surveillance de zones. L'article 123 de cet Acte, nous répond-on, ne vise pas les traités conclus entre les Puissances au sujet du Maroc, mais seulement ceux des Puissances avec le Maroc. Que le rédacteur du "Diario" questionne le distingué Ambassadeur d'Espagne à Paris; M. Pérez Caballero, qui fut plénipotentiaire à Algésiras, lui dira que les négociations de mars 1906 (celles notamment sur la répartition des ports et la rédaction de l'Acte général) ne laissent aucun doute sur la volonté de la conférence de faire prévaloir ses décisions sur tous autres arrangements soit avec le Maroc, soit—et *à fortiori*—au sujet du Maroc, contraires auxdites décisions. S'il fallait, à l'appui de cette affirmation, des textes officiels contemporains de la conférence, le "Temps," pour éclairer le public, les publierait.

Ce n'était point offenser l'Espagne de dire que, selon nous, elle se méprend sur les conséquences à tirer des accords franco-espagnols tels que les font non seulement leur texte, mais l'Acte d'Algésiras signé après leur conclusion. Le "Temps," qui, pendant la campagne du Rif, a constamment soutenu de son approbation l'effort valeureux des armes espagnoles, qui ensuite—nous n'en prétendons point tirer de mérite, puisque telle était notre opinion—a constamment défendu, au cours des négociations hispano-marocaines, la thèse du Cabinet de Madrid combattue à Paris par certains journaux importants, le "Temps" avait le droit d'exprimer sa pensée sur la situation actuelle sans être exposé aux attaques incorrectes que dirige contre lui la presse madrilène; d'autant que ces attaques, injustifiables dans la forme, sont imprudentes au fond par la nervosité qu'elles révèlent à l'Europe.

L'Espagne, nous le disons en toute franchise, veut aller trop vite et elle s'apercevra tôt ou tard de son erreur. Si elle persiste à concevoir des opérations stratégiques de nature à lui assurer "la domination du plus important des détroits," la France n'aura pas besoin de l'en détourner par une amicale et ferme résistance: cette résistance viendra d'ailleurs et le Cabinet de Madrid sait d'où. L'Europe ne veut pas d'une nouvelle conférence et elle persiste à croire que la meilleure des solutions consiste à fortifier le pouvoir chérifien. Elle en avait confié le soin conjointement à la France et à l'Espagne. Il lui appartiendra d'apprécier laquelle des deux Puissances remplit le plus sincèrement et le plus efficacement cette tâche solidaire.

[22291] No. 362.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, June 8, 1911.*

APPOINTMENT of Rouhan (see your telegram No. 45 of the 6th instant), I have protested to M. de Villasinda, in accordance with the terms of your telegram to Sir M. de Bunsen, against the above appointment. He replied that he had no knowledge whatever of the nomination, nor of the correspondence which took place between the Spanish and British Governments on the subject two years ago. He recollected shortly afterwards, however, that a complaint had been made by the Moorish Government against the Oulad Haddoo, one of whom, he believed, had been intimidating the tribes, representing himself as an agent of the Governor of Ceuta. The reports we had heard were probably the consequences of his actions, which were, however, taken without any authorisation. He assured me that he would immediately cause enquiries to be made at Madrid and Ceuta.

21354] No. 363.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 52.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 8, 1911.*

THE Spanish chargé d'affaires called at the Foreign Office on the 30th ultimo to say that the Ambassador had left hurriedly for Madrid to assist, it was understood, at some important sitting of the Senate.

At the same time the chargé d'affaires communicated verbally to Sir A. Nicolson a telegram stating that there was much agitation round Alcazar, and he also enquired whether His Majesty's Government had heard that the Sultan had asked the French to reorganise his forces on a more extended scale than at present with additional French instructors. Sir A. Nicolson replied that His Majesty's Government had no official news as to this, although he had seen it mentioned in the "Temps."

The chargé d'affaires asked whether His Majesty's Government had heard that the French proposed to advance to Mequinez, and whether they had specified a date for their withdrawal from Fez. Sir A. Nicolson replied in the negative, adding that the French had only just arrived at Fez, and that he was sure they did not wish to stay there a day longer than was necessary.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[22564] No. 364.

Señor Prieto to Señor de Villa Urrutia.—(Communicated to Foreign Office by Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, June 9.)

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, June 8, 1911.*

ON disembarking Spanish forces at Laraiche the authority of the basha will naturally be maintained, and the Moorish flag will be the only one flown on buildings in the town.

[22442] No. 365.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, June 9, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

French Ambassador, under instructions, has addressed to Minister for Foreign Affairs letter calling attention to presence at Tetuan of General Zuila, accompanied by escort of native troops belonging to Ceuta garrison, and also to danger of complications arising out of landing of Spanish forces at Laraiche. Letter, which is couched in friendly terms, states that French Government cannot assent to Spanish military movement outside Ceuta mixed police sphere, and reminds Spanish Government of responsibility it will incur by such action. Letter concludes with reminder to Minister for Foreign Affairs of French promises to withdraw troops at as early a date as possible, and deplores any action which is not inspired by same principles.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[22443] No. 366.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, June 9, 1911.*

MOROCCO. My telegram No. 45 of to-day.

Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has to-day communicated to French Ambassador instructions sent to Spanish chargé d'affaires at Paris to inform French Government that troops will be landed at Laraiche in consequence of murder of Spanish protected subjects at Alcazar.

I understand that disembarkation actually took place yesterday morning.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[22438] No. 367.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, June 9, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 93 of 5th June.

Spanish consul at Laraiche informed consular body yesterday that, in order to avoid disturbances at Alcazar, Spanish troops would land that evening, and 500 soldiers under Captain Ovilo, of the local police, would start at midnight for Alcazar. He also notified governor.

British vice-consul reports that town is quite quiet. Consular agent at Alcazar reports that at 11·30 on night of 7th June some thirty horsemen fired a volley, about forty shots, at town, and then rode off. Impression is that they were men of Rmiki's, who is Spanish protégé, and that incident was engineered by Spaniards to furnish pretext for landing. British consular agent states that otherwise district is perfectly quiet.

French chargé d'affaires tells me that this view is shared by Ben Ghabrit, who arrived last night from Fez, having passed near Alcazar at time of incident, and received a message from native commander of the troops in that town. Commissioner of Foreign Affairs is addressing a strong protest to Spanish Minister against this unwarrantable act of aggression.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[22591] No. 368.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 90.)
Sir, *Madrid, June 7, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith translation of a private letter which I addressed to the Minister of State last night on receipt of your telegram No. 72, in which you instruct me to protest, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, against the selection of the brigand, Rouhan, as head of the Spanish police in the Angera.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 368.

Sir M. de Bunsen to the Marquis de Alhucemas.

(Translation.)
(Private.)
My dear Minister, *Madrid, June 6, 1911.*

I HAVE just received from Sir Edward Grey the repetition of a telegram from Tangier informing him that the Spanish authorities proposed—according to the reports received—to appoint as chief of the police of Angera, one Rouhan, of the Ulad Habdo of Kuf. It is well known that this individual is none other than the notorious brigand, guilty of the capture of Mr. Kennedy, whose arrest was demanded by the British vice-consul at Tetuan in 1909. He was allowed to escape in the manner described in my note No. 39 of the 29th April of that year. The Makhzen have always protested against the protection granted by the Spanish authorities to this man, and the Governor of Tetuan has just notified those authorities that the British Government still demands his arrest.

It is clear that these facts could not have been present in the mind of the official who recommended Rouhan for the responsible post of chief of police—an appointment against which His Majesty's Government would be compelled to protest energetically if it were persisted in; and which the Spanish Government will certainly not permit, once they have been informed of the precedents of the case and convinced of the deplorable effect which it would not fail to produce in Morocco, besides being considered by His Majesty's Government as an affront to British interests in that country and incompatible with the friendly relations existing between the two Governments.

I do not doubt that the Spanish Government will take the necessary steps to prevent the fulfilment of this plan, if indeed they seriously entertained it.

Excuse my troubling you with this matter, and believe me, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[22592] No. 369.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 91.)
Sir, *Madrid, June 6, 1911.*

M. WILLIAM MARTIN, Councillor of the French Embassy, brought with him yesterday from Paris a set of instructions which have enabled M. Geoffray to cast in a new form the proposals which he is submitting, on behalf of his Government, to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have the honour to forward a copy of the French proposals as they now stand. It will be seen that article 1, relating to the proposed railway from Tangier, is omitted. M. Geoffray explains that he is awaiting his final instructions on this point. In article 2 an important addition has been made. As it originally stood, Spanish engineers were only to be employed on public works in the regions of Larache and Tetuan. The region at present occupied by Spanish troops is now thrown in. In articles 3, 4, and 5 no material alteration is made. The proposal regarding the redistribution of the police of the ports (see my despatch No. 86 of the 2nd June), is not reproduced in this version of the French proposals, as it is intended to stand in its original form.

This document formed the principal subject of the conversation held to-day at the British Embassy, as reported in my telegram No. 42, between the Foreign Minister, the French Ambassador, and myself.

Señor Garcia Prieto began by remarking on the omission of any reference to the repeated Spanish demand for an advancement of the second period mentioned in the secret convention.

M. Geoffray said he thought he had sufficiently explained at our last meeting the reasons why the French Government felt unable during the present crisis in the affairs of Morocco to consent to an alteration of the date fixed in that agreement. The written proposals represented practical suggestions capable of immediate application. It had seemed to his Government useless to insert an article containing a mere negation. From the report, however, which M. Cruppi had sent him of a conversation which he had recently held with Señor Pérez Caballero, Spanish Ambassador in Paris, M. Geoffray said he was able to give the assurance that, when matters settled down, the French Government would not refuse to talk over fully with the Spanish Government the question of the political status of the Spanish sphere of influence. Meanwhile, they desired to allow full scope to the aspirations of Spain in the economic field covered by the proposals now put forward.

Señor Garcia Prieto expressing anxiety lest the financial convention between France and Morocco of March 1911 should be ratified before it had been adjusted to the demands of Spain, M. Geoffray said that from information he had received from his Government, he did not think ratification was likely to take place for some time.

A discussion followed on the several articles of the French proposals in their new form:—

Article 2.—Señor Garcia Prieto could not understand why France should seek to limit the employment of Spanish engineers to specified towns and districts within the Spanish sphere. Spain must demand that they be employed throughout the whole extent of her sphere.

Article 3. Señor Garcia Prieto expressed a preference for the version of this article contained in the Spanish draft declaration, but he did not greatly press the point.

Article 4.—It was agreed that there was little difference between the French and Spanish versions.

Article 5.—The Foreign Minister thought a new wording should be found making it quite plain that, except at Tangier, which might be left out of the question for the moment, there would be no French instructors at all within the Spanish

sphere, except when they accompanied the Sultan, on which occasions they would not take part in any operations bringing them into conflict with existing Spanish troops or police.

His Excellency proceeded to comment on the French proposal that, in deference to the wishes of Spain, the Casa Blanca police tabors should be removed from that port, the French tabor to Mazagan and Rabat, and the Spanish tabor to Larache and Tetuan. A redistribution on these lines would not suit the Spanish Government. They must demand that the Spanish tabor, if taken away from Casa Blanca, should be transferred to Alcazar in the Spanish sphere. Simultaneously they were obliged to press for an exchange between the positions now respectively held by the native police under French and Spanish instructors at Tangier, the extra urban police becoming Spanish and the urban French.

The above gives, I think, in brief, the purport of the Spanish demands put forward at to-day's meeting.

M. Geoffray, after pointing out that there would be difficulty in meeting them to their entire extent, promised, nevertheless, to submit them to his Government, and to urge that they may be favourably considered as far as possible.

The meeting passed off very amicably, the Minister for Foreign Affairs appearing to be really desirous of reaching a practical conclusion. At the same time, it is clear that the development of events in the French sphere is causing Spain to realise with increasing clearness that she must in her own interest insist, to the utmost of her power and resources, on arrangements being made which will prevent the Makhzen from operating in future, within the Spanish sphere, through the agency of officers and agents, both civil and military, who would be acting in reality in the interest and under the directions of the French Government.

It remains to be seen how far France will be disposed to adopt such a complete reversal of the present order of things.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 369.

French Proposals.

2. LES Gouvernements français et espagnol recommenderont au Service marocain des Travaux publics de choisir de préférence des agents espagnols pour l'étude des projets et la surveillance des travaux publics à effectuer à Larache, à Tétouan et aux environs de ces villes, ainsi que dans la région actuellement occupée par les troupes espagnoles. Ces dispositions s'appliqueraient notamment aux travaux de la route Ceuta-Tétouan.

3. Les Gouvernements français et espagnol donneront à leurs légations respectives les instructions voulues pour que, dans les affaires qui demandent l'intervention du corps diplomatique ou des commissions qui en dépendent, elles échangent leurs vues pour faire prévaloir des solutions en harmonie avec les principes de l'accord du 3 octobre, 1904.

4. En ce qui concerne l'emploi des langues étrangères, les deux légations interviendront pour que les avis généraux concernant les adjudications, des affiches, placards, bulletins de taxes et tout ce qui touche à la publicité foraine soient rédigés en langues arabe, française et espagnole. De même pour les soumissions aux adjudications et les déclarations en douane, les deux Gouvernements s'emploieront pour qu'elles puissent être rédigés dans l'une des trois langues au choix de la partie intéressée.

Il reste entendu que les cahiers des charges,, devis, plans projets et autres pièces de détail continueront à être rédigés conformément aux règlements établis.

5. Le Gouvernement français déclare que les instructeurs mis par lui à la disposition du Maghzen ne contribueront pas à créer de nouvelles organisations militaires de troupes chérifiennes dans la région visée à l'article 2 de l'accord du 3 octobre, 1904.

Il est toutefois entendu que si, en vertu d'ordres du Sultan, les instructeurs français étaient appelés comme précédemment à accompagner Sa Majesté chérifienne dans ses déplacements, ils ne pourraient pas participer à des opérations qui les mettraient en conflit aves les formations militaires ou de police organisées con-

formément à l'Acte d'Algéciras ou aux accords passés entre le Gouvernement espagnol et le Maghzen.

Il est entendu également qu'il n'est porté aucune atteinte aux droits conférés à la mission militaire française par la lettre chérifienne du 25 juillet, 1904. Le Gouvernement français déclare à ce propos, qu'il n'entre pas dans ses intentions de faire étendre par le Maghzen les attributions et le nombre des officiers établis à Tanger qui resteront uniquement chargés de l'instruction du détachement d'artillerie destiné à effectuer les tirs de saluts de la place, à garer les magasins et munitions et à former et accompagner les convois de munitions et approvisionnements de l'armée chérifienne.

[22563] No. 370.

Señor Prieto to Señor de Villa Urrutia.—(Communicated to Foreign Office by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, June 10.)

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, June 8, 1911.*

THE Council of Ministers to-day discussed reports from Laraiche and Alcazar which confirm the news of the assassination of a Spanish protégé named Beumalec and two of his sons by people belonging to the Pretender Fayza, who, having captured our protégé and his sons in the Mesunda country some days ago and demanded from them a ransom of 20,000 douros, put them to death and treated their corpses with indignity, having their heads carried among the tribes as a trophy, so as to excite the natives against foreigners. This affair has caused a very grave impression in the colony and among our protégés, and the passive attitude of the Government in face of such an outrage, especially at a time when two Spanish war-ships are lying off Laraiche, would be interpreted as neglect by the Madrid Cabinet of their duty of giving protection.

Anxious to fulfil its duties, and at the same time filled with the most scrupulous respect for the Algeciras Act, His Majesty's Government will limit itself for the moment to landing a part of the ships' complements, giving to this step rather the character of a demonstration. If the measures adopted by the Shereefian authorities for making reparation for the murder and for punishing the guilty parties prove sufficient, as His Majesty's Government sincerely trust, they will not feel constrained to proceed with the action (alreday taken). Moreover, the above-mentioned dispositions will contribute —should the weather and the poorness of the anchorage off Laraiche make it necessary for the ships to take to the open sea—to the increased freedom of action of the Tabor, which is much reduced in numbers, and also to raise the spirits of the settlements, especially in Alcazar and the unprotected cities, where the panic is daily increasing. This panic is due to the probability that the pretender will rally his forces in the mountains, and that the chieftain Uldelfa will carry out his threat of taking part in the struggle with the contingents which he is raising in the Jemás, and to the fact that the unrest which has already been the cause of rapine and other excesses in the neighbourhood will probably increase.

[22485] No. 371.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, June 9, 1911.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 9th June.

Spanish Minister has just informed me of Spanish landing. He only knew bare fact, but had sent torpedo-boat back for precise details. He appeared to think that force sent to Alcazar was composed of police, possibly strengthened by soldiers.

He gave me definite assurance that measure was one of police and precaution, and purely provisional in character. Panic had reigned in Alcazar for several days, and appeals for help were being daily received from Spaniards there, of which he said there were thirty with wives and children. Spanish Government had been obliged to take some action, but were determined that that action should be on smallest possible scale; [?] great respect would be shown for Moorish authorities—nothing was further from wishes of Spanish Government than to do anything which could violate Algeciras Act.

He was very nervous and official at first, and then in a burst of confidence asked me what I thought of the whole thing. I replied that I certainly thought that [group omitted] [?] situation had been seriously complicated by Spanish action, but I that was glad of his assurances, which I would at once communicate to you.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[22485] No. 372.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Lister.

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, June* 10, 1911.

PLEASE ascertain and telegraph the strength and composition of the Spanish force which has advanced to Alcazar, and whether there is foundation for alarming reports which the Spanish authorities say they received from Alcazar.

[22607] No. 373.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, June* 11, 1911.

MOROCCO. My French colleague saw the Imperial Chancellor to-day, and communicated to him the French statement on the affairs of Morocco.

The statement was received by the Chancellor in a very friendly manner, and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said that in view of the action taken by the Spanish Government the statement of the French Government's intentions was very opportune. The Chancellor, however, did not give any indication of his own opinion of the Spanish Government's action. M. Cambon then declared that he hoped that the impulsive step taken by Spain would not be regarded in too serious a light by the German Government, especially since the communication that he had just delivered would show the Imperial Government that France had no inclination to allow their intention to do their work with the least possible delay and then retire to be interfered with by Spain's action. The French Ambassador did not miss the opportunity of emphasising the difference between the course followed by Spain and that followed by France. He pointed out to the Chancellor that France had given previous information to the Powers of the Algeciras conference of her intention and had acted in accordance with the wishes of the Sultan of Morocco, while Spain had done exactly the opposite.

[22620] No. 374.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, June* 11, 1911.

SPANISH troops sent to Alcazar.

With reference to your telegram No. 50, I am informed that the composition of the force is as follows :—

Laraiche police, 125 men, with 2 mitrailleuses and 1 gun.
Marine infantry, 264 men and 5 officers.
Sailors, 52, with 2 naval guns.

This force encountered no opposition of any kind on its march to Alcazar, where it arrived at dawn on the 10th instant. The khalifa of the town paid a visit to the Spanish commander and informed him that the town was at his disposal. Absolute tranquillity reigns in those districts.

In his circular sent to the foreign representatives M. de Villasinda justifies Spanish action on the following grounds :—

Firstly, that a Spanish semsar was brutally murdered together with his two sons. On this point I must observe that the man in question was a notoriously bad character from whom German protection had been withdrawn for that reason ; he was, I believe, a member of a mountain tribe in which British protection has always been refused,

as district is regarded as unsafe and the Moorish Government exercise no practical authority there.

Pretender sold this man to the tribes who revenged themselves upon him in a barbarous manner.

Although Spanish Minister assured me on the 9th instant that the murder took place about one and a-half hours' journey from Alcazar, he now states he is unable to say where the place is.

French are informed that the murder was committed at a spot a considerable distance from Alcazar.

Second reason given is the attack made on Alcazar on the night of the 7th instant.

The facts of the case, however, appear to be that a party of mounted men rode up to the town and discharged their guns into the air, and then proceeded to neighbouring villages where they acted in a similar manner.

It is generally considered here that the whole affair was an engineered one.

The third reason given is the alleged appearance of a new pretender.

Previous to the defeat of the pretender Tazia by Captain Moreau, there was undoubtedly a certain amount of uneasiness at Alcazar, but since then reports received at this legation have been to the effect that the district is quite quiet.

None of us here have ever heard of the new pretender, and Bed Ghabrit, who has just returned from Fez, states that when passing through the districts in question on the 7th and 8th instant, he saw travellers and caravans going along unmolested.

It is possible that mountainous regions to which pretender has retreated may still be in a state of unrest, but they are outside sphere of Spanish influence and disorders there are continual.

The above has been sent to Madrid.

[22751] No. 375.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 92.) *Madrid, June* 8, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of a letter which I have received from the Minister of State in answer to my protest regarding the selection of the brigand Ruan as head of the Angera police.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 375.

Señor Prieto to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(Translation.) *Madrid, June* 7, 1911.

My dear Ambassador,

ON receiving your letter marked private and urgent regarding the alleged intention to appoint as chief of the police of the neighbourhood of Ceuta the native Ruan, of the family of Ulad Hadu, I went through the correspondence with General Alfau without finding any mention of the name of that individual. I therefore consider that the rumour which reached your Excellency is devoid of foundation, but in any case I have telegraphed to General Alfau for a report on the matter, informing him of your observations.

I can, however, at once assert that if General Alfau had thought of this native in connection with a post of that nature, it would have been in ignorance of his antecedents and without suspecting that he was doing thereby anything which Great Britain considered damaging to her interests or contrary to the friendly sentiments which so happily unite our two countries.

Your affectionate friend,
M. GARCIA PRIETO.

[22882] No. 376.

Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

51, *Denison House, Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, June* 10, 1911.

Sir,

MR. DONALD MACKENZIE, a member of the committee of this society, having recently returned from Morocco, has forwarded to the committee a report on the Slave Trade in that country dealing especially with the open slave market in Morocco City, which he visited, as well as with the private sale of slaves in the coast towns.

The committee feels the matter to be one of such importance that I am instructed to enclose a copy of this report for your consideration, and to express the hope that it may be possible to obtain consular reports upon the subjects raised.

My committee begs to call your attention to the fact that the Moorish authorities, by agreement with the British Government in 1884, prohibited open slave markets in the coast towns; I am to submit that now that British consular agents have been appointed in the towns of the interior, a similar prohibition should be applied to the public slave markets for every inland town where there is such an agent.

The committee would be glad if British consular agents in Morocco could be instructed to lend their assistance to any slave requiring a manumission paper releasing him from slavery, as is the case in other Mahommedan countries. It would appear to be contrary to British tradition for British officials not to act on behalf of slaves when such assistance is needed to obtain their freedom.

I am to ask your special attention to the case mentioned by Mr. Donald Mackenzie of a female slave whom he saw on board a British steamer, and my committee would urge that steps may be taken to prevent a repetition of such an illegal proceeding.

I have, &c.
TRAVERS BUXTON.

Enclosure in No. 376.

Report on the Slave Trade and Slavery in Morocco.

I LEFT England on the 24th March last and arrived in Tangier on the 30th. The object of my visit was to make enquiries into the slave question, the condition of the prisons and prisoners, and also the protégé question, and other matters regarding the general condition of Morocco. I am glad to say at the outset of this report that I have received during my enquiry every assistance from the British Government officials and from missionaries, especially in Southern Morocco, and also from merchants who take an interest in the future of Morocco. I may here remark that one of the old missionaries, Mr. Badger, of Saffi, informed me that when I presented the memorial from your society for the abolition of slavery in 1887, it caused quite a commotion amongst the Moors. They thought that the abolition of slavery had come. When Sir William Kirby Green died so suddenly afterwards, they considered it a judgment of God on him for interfering with an institution which they considered belongs to the Mahommedan faith. Sir William had actually succeeded in obtaining a verbal promise from the Sultan for the abolition of all open slave markets in the interior, which was a step towards abolition of slavery.

In this report I shall only deal with the slave question, which especially interests your society. I made careful enquiry regarding the slave trade and slavery at every point, and I find that no effectual check has been placed on this unholy traffic. Slaves are continually required for domestic and other purposes; even Europeans are said to hire them as servants, and while the demand continues the supply will come. Many people are engaged in this trade; there is even evidence that European protégés are engaged in this business. I do not mean by that, that English protégés are concerned in this, I found so far no evidence of it. There is no open sale of slaves in the port towns, thanks to the efforts of the anti-slavery society, but the private sale of slaves is going on continually in all the port towns. The British vice-consul at Mogador informed me that he saw, not long ago, a woman being hawked about for sale in the open streets of Mogador.

While I was staying in Morocco city I visited the slave market with Mr. Nairn, the head of the South Morocco Mission. We found a large number of buyers. The stock of human flesh for sale consisted of twenty-four quite young black girls. One was about 18 years old, but the others were about 13 years. There was one man for sale. They all came from the Soudan, as we made particular enquiries as to their origin; 220 dollars were offered for the oldest girl, and I think she was sold for that sum or a little more; 120 dollars were offered for each of the other girls, but I did not stay to see the result. We went round and counted the number of slaves present, and asked questions of the dealers. It was a sickening sight to see those poor young things with their sad faces being marched up and down the market place offered for sale like animals, and that within a few yards of a British vice-consul, who represents an anti-slavery nation. I thought, as I looked at the poor defenceless slaves, what harrowing scenes they must have witnessed when they were being captured in the slave-hunting ground of the interior of Africa for the purpose of supplying the demand of the slave dealers of Morocco. There is a considerable trade in Morocco city and other towns in Morocco in white slave girls. In some cases, I understand, the supply comes from Sous and other parts where white slave girls can be found. It often happens that when the Sultan subdues a tribe the men are killed or taken prisoners, and the women are sold as slaves. A French protégé was recently engaged in this traffic in Morocco city, selling them privately, contrary, so I understand, to the Moorish custom in that city. He was sent to prison by the Moorish governor. The French consul asked his release, which the governor declined, and pointed out to him at the same time that the Christians asked them to abolish slavery in Morocco, and here, said the governor, one of your own protégés is concerned in it. This was unanswerable, so the French protégé slave dealer still remains in prison.

When on my way from Mogador to Tangier, I met a scene on board the steamship "Penshurst," belonging to the Power Company of London, which astonished me. The captain, whose name is Campbell, drew my attention to a young dark slave girl. She was being taken to Tangier, evidently for a customer. She might have been 18 years old, not more. She was in good condition, but she was crying all the time, and looked very sad. I told the captain he ought to take some action in the matter, but he could not tell his powers. The poor girl was accompanied by a man who was clearly a slave dealer. As we looked at the poor weeping slave girl several times, the slave dealer became somewhat nervous, and was most anxious to reach Tangier. She was a very pleasant girl. My heart grieved for her and her fate, and only wished that it was in my power to set her free, but from what I could gather, this is by no means an isolated case. Indeed, Captain Campbell and others told me that slaves have been on board British ships with their chains on, but Captain Campbell said that in such cases he would order, and has ordered, their chains to be taken off while on board. This system of carrying slaves from port to port in Morocco looks like slave running, which ought to cease as far as British ships are concerned. I have no doubt that the vessels of other nations are made use of in the same way by the Moorish slave dealers.

In order to put an end to this abominable system, I would suggest that an order should be issued to all British captains who sail to Morocco (in case some are ignorant as to the state of the law on the subject), that on no account should a black woman be taken on board any steamer as passenger, unless accompanied by a certificate from the British consular agent stating that she is not a slave, but a free women. This could with advantage be extended to certain native white women. I have made a careful calculation of the slave trade in Morocco, which I discussed with Mr. Johnston, British vice-consul at Mogador. Taking the slave trade of Morocco city as a basis, when Mr. Nairn and myself went to the slave market of that city, there were twenty-five black slaves for sale, and there were certainly plenty of buyers. The market is held twice a week. So it may be taken that forty slaves a week are dealt with, without counting the private sales, which cannot be less than ten a week. This makes fifty slaves a week, or 2,600 a year changing hands in Morocco city, and I am of opinion that not less than 10,000 slaves are bought and sold in the whole country in the course of a year. Add to that number 30 per 100 to cover the mortality of capture and the march across the desert, say altogether 13,000 slaves. This trade will unfortunately continue until a treaty is made with Morocco for its total abolition, but I think as a beginning that your society should insist that the slave markets should be closed wherever a British consular officer is present, as is the case in Fez and Morocco city. It seems to me very improper that slaves should be publicly sold before

the shadow of a British consulate. It looks as if we tolerated this traffic. I hope your society will do all in its power to remove this dark spot of slavery and slave trading from Moorish dominions.

DONALD MACKENZIE.

May 24, 1911.

[22743] No. 377.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 270.)

Paris, June 11, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 260 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a further communication from M. Cruppi respecting French operations in Morocco, and especially against the Lemta and the clandestine selling of certain children of the revolted tribes at Fez.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 377.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Cruppi.

LE Département des Affaires Étrangères a reçu les nouveaux renseignements qu'il avait demandés sur les faits qui ont motivé la note de l'Ambassade britannique du 30 mai dernier et la réponse à cette communication en date du 3 de ce mois.

Il en ressort que les instructeurs français avaient dirigé la méhalla chérifienne dans les opérations engagées contre le Lemta pendant la matinée du 21 mai, mais quittèrent le combat à midi avec leurs troupes pour se diriger vers l'avant-garde du Général Moinier, dont l'approche leur avait fait croire à un retour offensif des Beni-M'tir. La poursuite et la razzia qui suivirent furent donc l'œuvre des contingents du Glaoui et du Mouggui.

D'autre part, il est avéré que les fils de Ben Chekroun, dont la mort a produit une vive impression, avaient pris une part active au combat, tirant eux-mêmes contre les troupes chérifiennes. Ils ont donc subi le sort de la guerre.

Les insurgés pris les armes à la main n'ont pas été fusillés, mais conduits à Fez, où ils sont emprisonnés. Quelques enfants abandonnés dans les douars ont été vendus clandestinement à Fez, comme il arrive malheureusement après tous les combats au Maroc. Dès que le consul de France en a été informé, il a signalé le fait au Maghzen, qui avait déjà pris des mesures pour faire restituer ces enfants à leurs familles.

L'opération conduite contre le Lemta ne saurait être présentée comme contraire aux déclarations faites par le consul de France à son collègue britannique. M. Gaillard avait dit à Mr. MacLeod que le Gouvernement français préconisait une politique d'apaisement, mais jamais il ne s'est engagé à employer son crédit pour empêcher une action militaire contre les Riffains du Lemta, qui ont été jusqu'au dernier jour les ennemis les plus passionnés du Maghzen et qui se sont signalés par leurs cruautés à l'égard des "rakkas."

Le consul de France confirme que Moulay Zin et son entourage seront traités avec indulgence, bien que le vizir du prétendant, Mekouar, protégé anglais, se soit livré à une propagande anti-française acharnée.

Les indications précédentes permettront au Gouvernement britannique d'apprécier le caractère des rapports indigènes qui avaient été faits à certains de ses agents au Maroc et dont la tendance s'explique par les espérances qu'avait fait naître dans certains milieux la tentative de Moulay Zin.

Paris, le 10 *juin*, 1911.

[23182] No. 378.

Note communicated by M. Daeschner, June 12, 1911.

COPIE d'une communication lue à Sir Arthur Nicolson le 12 juin, 1911 :—

"Les opérations des troupes françaises pour rompre l'investissement de Fez se sont effectuées conformément aux indications qui ont été précédemment données au Gouvernement britannique.

"Aujourd'hui, grâce à la coopération de nos troupes avec les contingents chérifiens, la ville de Fez est débloquée, les communications sont rétablies entre la capitale et la côte et rien ne menace plus la sécurité des résidents étrangers. Nos troupes n'ont pourtant pas encore achevé l'œuvre de pacification entreprise à la demande du Sultan. Il reste à obtenir la soumission des quelques tribus, qui, récemment encore, ont attaqué le camp français de Dar Debibagh ; mais les opérations engagées dans ce but seront réduites au strict nécessaire et ne s'étendront pas au territoire berbère de l'Atlas.

"Des négociations se poursuivent en même temps avec les tribus qui sont disposées à abandonner la lutte, et l'intervention des autorités françaises s'exerce pour faciliter la pacification sans sévices ni représailles.

"Le Sultan a demandé notre concours en vue d'organiser une troupe chérifienne suffisante pour faire respecter son autorité et maintenir l'ordre. Le Gouvernement de la république a prescrit dès le début au Général Moinier de s'appliquer à réaliser cette organisation dans le plus court délai de façon à nous permettre de ramener nos troupes et de laisser au Gouvernement marocain le soin et les moyens de procéder aux réformes prévues par l'Acte d'Algésiras. Notre action continue à s'inspirer des principes de cet Acte, et loin de rien tenter contre l'intégrité du territoire marocain, nous nous attachons à relever le prestige de la souveraineté du Sultan et à permettre la reprise des libres transactions commerciales entravées par la rébellion."

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 12 *juin*, 1911.

[21703] No. 379.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 214. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, June 12, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE with great satisfaction taken note of the renewed assurances conveyed in M. Cruppi's memorandum which accompanied your Excellency's despatch No. 260 of the 4th instant, to the effect that the French Government have no intention of carrying out in Morocco a policy of revenge at the behest of the Sultan, and that they remain anxious not to let themselves be drawn into extensive military operations.

M. Cruppi's memorandum, which appears to have been prepared before he had received the detailed reports of the incidents connected with the raid of the Makhzen's Fez troops north of the capital on the 21st ultimo, gives a general account of the circumstances of that raid which tends to produce an impression not altogether in harmony with the more circumstantial narrative furnished by His Majesty's consul at Fez and forwarded to me in the despatches from His Majesty's Minister at Tangier, Nos. 138 and 139, of which I transmit copies herewith.*

Your Excellency will observe that Mr. Consul MacLeod brought the facts which he has reported to the notice of his French colleague, M. Gaillard, and of General Moinier, neither of whom made any attempt to contradict them.

Mr. MacLeod's despatches leave no possible doubt as to the unfortunate character of the measures which were carried out by the Sultan's troops at the very time when General Moinier's relieving force was approaching the city of Fez.

Having these reports before them, His Majesty's Government feel unable to share M. Cruppi's impression that the measures taken were entirely justified by military necessity and in accordance with the ordinary rules of warfare. It appears to them, on the contrary, that they not only involved a deplorable breach of faith on the part of the Sultan, but that they were accompanied and followed by acts of savagery such as is impossible to condone.

* Nos. 346 and 347.

His Majesty's Government do not for a moment believe that for the excesses of the Moorish soldiery any French officers were in any way responsible, and they have been glad to notice the promptitude with which General Moinier appears to have intervened to stop any renewal of the raids and to proclaim a period of grace.

I request your Excellency to make a verbal communication to M. Cruppi in the above sense, and to hand to him at the same time, privately and unofficially, a copy of Mr. MacLeod's despatch No. 32 of the 23rd May, omitting, however, the penultimate paragraph, as well as the words "notwithstanding his refusal" in the last paragraph. This will more fully explain to M. Cruppi the grounds on which His Majesty's Government have felt bound to criticise the Sultan's action and to mark their disapproval by advising the King to refuse to receive a Moorish mission at His Majesty's coronation.

His Majesty's Government have read with much surprise that the French Government should consider themselves justified in complaining against the overt opposition to the Makhzen and to French policy in Morocco of Menebhi, and other persons not named, who enjoy British protection. M. Cruppi's memorandum states this complaint in general terms, but in order that these charges, which His Majesty's Government confidently believe to be founded upon erroneous information, may be properly investigated and refuted, they beg that the precise facts laid to the charge of the incriminated persons, besides their names, may at once be communicated.

Meanwhile, your Excellency should call M. Cruppi's attention to the facts reported in Mr. Rattigan's despatches Nos. 85 and 87, from which it is clear that the French Legation at Tangier have repeatedly and quite recently solicited and received the friendly advice, assistance, and cordial co-operation in dealing with the revolted tribes of this very Menebhis against whom these grave charges are now brought. The reports received by His Majesty's Government show that Menebhi's repeated intervention on behalf and at the request of the French Legation has materially eased the tribal situation at a critical time, and so far from meriting their reproaches, he appears to deserve the warmest acknowledgments of the French Government for the assistance which he has rendered to them in somewhat difficult circumstances.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23618] No. 380.

Minute by Sir A. Nicolson.

Sir Edward Grey,

THE Spanish Ambassador called to-day. As you will see him to-morrow I need not go into detail as to what he said to me nor what I said to him, as the remarks to be made are pretty obvious.

There were, however, one or two points which came out in conversation which I should like to record. In the first place he said that in the early days of French intervention, France let it be understood that she would not seriously object to Spain going to Tetuan. Another point was—and this is more important—that France was offering Germany to come to terms with her, and was intimating that France had much to offer in many quarters. Germany ostensibly and officially announced that no discussions were proceeding with France, and that she (Germany) thoroughly relied on France's word that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as possible: but she let Spain know that France was knocking at her door and trying to placate her. "A highly-placed German" said to Spain: "La France commence à vouloir se ficher de nous: depuis longtemps elle s'est fichée de vous; mais l'Allemagne est assez forte de ne pas se laisser prendre." What troubles Spain is that France and Germany should come to an agreement and leave her out in the cold. This and much more the Ambassador will doubtless repeat to-morrow to you.

A. N.

Foreign Office, June 12, 1911.

[23183] No. 381.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, June 13, 1911.

D'APRÈS les renseignements fournis à M. Cruppi, les officiers français qui accompagnaient la méhalla chérifienne le 21 mai lors de l'affaire de Lemta, ont quitté le combat à midi en vue de parer à un retour offensif des Beni M'Tir qu'ils craignaient. C'est en l'absence de ces officiers que les irréguliers Glaoui et Mtouggui poursuivirent leurs adversaires et razzièrent leurs villages.

Les fils de Ben Chekrouh, dont le meurtre a vivement ému les autorités anglaises, avaient pris une part active au combat et on les avait vus tirer contre les troupes chérifiennes; ils ont donc subi le sort de la guerre. Les insurgés pris les armes à la main n'ont pas été fusillés: ils ont été conduits à Fez, où ils sont actuellement en prison.

Quelques enfants abandonnés dans les douars du Lemta, suivant un usage trop fréquemment observé au Maroc, ont été vendus clandestinement à Fez. Ces abus ont été signalés au Maghzen par le consul de France aussitôt qu'il en a eu connaissance, et des mesures ont été prises afin de faire restituer ces enfants à leurs familles.

Il semble donc que la presse britannique et même les agents anglais aient accueilli avec trop de précipitation et sans les vérifier des nouvelles tendancieuses défavorables au Maghzen et aux officiers français et dont l'origine doit être attribuée aux partisans des prétendants Moulay Zin et Mekonar.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 13 *juin*, 1911.

[23593] No. 382.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rennie.

(No. 60.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 13, 1911.

I SAW the Spanish Ambassador to-day, and told him that orders had been sent to General Toutée to withdraw to the Algerian frontier from Melilla. I expressed great apprehension as to the consequences of the Spanish action at Alcazar, which was not justified by any local circumstances, and I urged that the Spanish troops should at least be withdrawn from Alcazar to Laraiche.

The Spanish Ambassador said that this was absolutely impossible. Satisfaction must be given for the murder of the Spanish protégé.

I observed that this protégé was a man of bad character, who had been rejected by the Germans, and who had been killed, I understood, in the French sphere. Was it really the case that, if compensation was paid, the Spanish troops would be withdrawn from Alcazar?

The Spanish Ambassador admitted eventually that the troops could not be withdrawn while French activity in Morocco continued. Spain must obtain some improvement in the situation in her sphere. France had refused to anticipate the date of the second period of Spanish liberty of action in the Spanish sphere. She had promised to discuss the matter later on, but Spain felt that she would have no chance of getting later on, when things in Morocco were quiet, what France was unwilling to give at the present moment. Spain was sure that France had already entered into communications with Germany to make a settlement as to Morocco, and if Spain had done nothing she would have been left out altogether. As for the protest of the Moorish Government against the Spanish action, this was purely formal (Guebbas had in conversation admitted as much); it was done at the dictation of France, and was merely another instance of the subordination of the Moorish Government to France.

I said that Spain was running two dangers. In the first place, she might throw into unrest the north of Morocco, which was now quiet, and she would then have imposed upon herself a very difficult task, such as she had in the case of Melilla, that would be very inconvenient to her. In the second place, she might precipitate a European crisis which would lead to the partition of Morocco; a price would have to be paid, and no one could say what the result might be for Spain.

The Ambassador said that, if there was a partition of Morocco, he thought Germany would be quite willing that Spain should occupy her sphere as an enclave in French influence.

I observed that no one could say what price would have to be paid, or what the outcome would be. Spain was playing with fire. I regarded the future with anxiety, and I would strongly urge his Government to be very careful what they did.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23592] No. 383.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 227.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 13, 1911.

M. CAMBON spoke to me to-day of the grave consequences of the action which Spain had taken in occupying Alcazar and Laraiche. He said that if France took a severe line with Spain it would lead to a rupture, but we were in a stronger position, and in effect he said that it depended upon us to save the situation.

I told him what had passed with the Spanish Ambassador this afternoon, and said that the conclusion to which I had come was that it would be impossible to get Spain out of Alcazar until she obtained some satisfaction out of the situation. It might be possible to prevent her doing more than she had already done, and occupying other places, but if I pressed her too hard it would only throw her into the arms of Germany. It seemed to me, from what the Spanish Ambassador had said, that the view of Spain with regard to a partition of Morocco was that France, who would get the larger share, would have to pay some price, but that Germany would not be unwilling to see Spain have her sphere, and would not ask for a price from her.

M. Cambon then said that, if Spain looked to an agreement with Germany, France would naturally ask why she herself should not make an agreement with Germany without considering Spanish interests. Spain had practically torn up the secret agreement with France, and France need no longer recognise at all any Spanish zone in Morocco.

M. Cambon added that the friendship of Germany could not really be worth as much to Spain as the friendship of France and England, for England held the sea, and France held the Spanish frontier, and if she did not guard the frontier insurrection might be fomented in Spain. The Spaniards had no real economic or financial interests in Morocco, and they were like children in this matter.

I said that the sentiment in Spain as to Morocco was undoubtedly strong. The Spaniards had lost all their colonies, and they looked upon their sphere in Morocco as all that was left to them. As for their being children, children were never inclined to sit still, and when the result of their sitting still might be insurrection in their own house, they were still less inclined to do so. The only argument which I could think of using with the Spanish Ambassador was that, if Spain precipitated a political crisis, a settlement as to Morocco would be come to that would, in fact, be arranged by France and Germany with the cognisance of England, and it might be that Spain would be left out of account.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23237] No. 384.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 14.)

No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, June* 14, 1911.

MOROCCO. Spanish action at Laraiche.

The landing of Spanish troops has excited far greater attention in Europe than the Spanish Government at first anticipated, and there are indications that they are beginning to feel uneasy about the steps they have taken.

(R.) French Ambassador, who is still confined to his room, sent in last night written representation against occupation of Laraiche and Alcazar.

It points out in a friendly way that latest information does not indicate that there was any necessity for action taken, and that there are no signs of trouble in the region in question. Consequently military measures do not seem to have been justified

by events, and, having been taken without previous agreement with France, they cannot have their consent.

Letter goes on to say that French Minister for Foreign Affairs is surprised at statement issued by Prime Minister to Madrid press the day before yesterday regarding conversation he held on 10th June with Spanish Ambassador at Paris, which represents him only as asking for further information, and omitting his having called attention of Ambassador to responsibility Spain was incurring by her unjustifiable action. French Minister for Foreign Affairs had added that French Government could not acquiesce in steps taken, which were contrary to 1904 agreement and to Algeciras Act.

He had also told the Spanish Ambassador that until the return of Sir M. de Bunsen to Madrid, and until situation at Laraiche became clear, conversations between the two Governments had better be suspended.

In conclusion, French Ambassador says that Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs will understand that the object of this communication is solely to prevent any misunderstanding which might prejudice friendly understanding and community of views which have so far directed the policy of the two countries. (End of R.)

(Repeated to Paris.)

[22565] No. 385.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 54.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 14, 1911.

THE Spanish chargé d'affaires called at the Foreign Office on the 8th instant, and enquired, by instructions from his Government, whether it was true that His Majesty's Government and the German Government had exchanged views on the question of Morocco, and that a document embodying these views had been transmitted to Paris.

The chargé d'affaires was informed by Sir A. Nicolson that the report was pure fiction. It was quite possible that, in regard to a question playing for the moment so prominent a part, allusions were made to the subject at Berlin and here, but there had been no exchange of views, and the only Powers with whom His Majesty's Government were exchanging views were France and Spain.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23533] No. 386.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rennie.

(No. 57.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 14, 1911.

I TOLD the Spanish Ambassador to-day the substance of Mr. White's telegram No. 107, giving an account of the Moorish protest to the doyen of the diplomatic corps at Tangier respecting the action of the Spanish Government in occupying Alcazar. I pointed out that this protest brought the question one step nearer to becoming a European question and to a conference, and, perhaps, the partition of Morocco. I again urged the risk to which Spain was exposed by her action.

The Ambassador reiterated that Spain could not possibly withdraw from Alcazar now. All the concessions offered to Spain by France were of no importance as long as France refused to anticipate the date of the second period of the secret convention; but he informed me, quoting from a telegram from his Government, that she would not go an inch beyond Alcazar. She had done her best to smooth over the incident of the protest of the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs at Tangier to the Spanish Minister there, and she was anxious not to make things more difficult. On the other hand, she heard that some of the extra police from Tangier, with French officers and artillery, were moving towards Alcazar; and that a Moorish mehalla, presumably with French officers, was advancing to the Lucas.

I said that my reason for urging that it was a risk for Spain to precipitate a conference or a partition of Morocco was that she had now put France in a position to say that Spain had directly violated the secret convention, and that it therefore no longer existed. Then, if a partition took place, France and Germany might come to terms without any reference to the convention which had previously existed between Spain and France.

The Ambassador contended that France had indirectly violated the spirit of the

convention, though she had been more clever than Spain in the manner she had done so. In any case, as the desire of France was, not a partition, but a protectorate over the whole of Morocco, the secret convention would be of no use to Spain. He asked me whether, if the French had ignored the convention and come to an arrangement with Germany, we should have stood by Spain.

I replied that, as long as the secret convention continued, we could not be a party to any arrangement which ignored it; and as long as it remained in full force it was a guarantee that, if partition took place, Spain would have her sphere. But if she put France in a position to say that the convention no longer existed, there was no certainty as to what the result might be. That was why I wished to reinforce the point which I made yesterday, and to urge that it was not in the interest of Spain to take action in Morocco in direct contravention of the secret convention, and so to precipitate partition.

The Ambassador referred to the assurance which he had already given me, that Spain would not move an inch beyond Alcazar. He made it plain that, in the event of a partition, Spain relied upon our preferring in our own interest to see her, rather than a stronger Power in possession of the Mediterranean coast of Morocco.

I replied that, if the secret convention disappeared, there was no saying what the outcome of negotiations about Morocco might be.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23397] No. 387.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 109.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, June 15, 1911.*

APPOINTMENT of Rouhan as head of the police (see your telegram No. 53).

The Governor of Tetuan stated to Mr. Vice-Consul Bewicke that the Spanish authorities had insisted on the appointment. This was reported by Mr. Bewicke on the 22nd May, but before reporting to you His Majesty's Minister, desiring to be certain as to the facts, wrote to the vice-consul at Tetuan to enquire whether there was any doubt as to this man's identity. Mr. Bewicke replied on the 1st June that he had a further interview with the Governor of Tetuan, and that that official had renewed his statement to the following effect: The man whom the Spanish authorities insisted should be appointed head of the police in Anjera was Rouhan of the Oulad Haddoo, the same man whom he had arrested two years ago, and who had been released by the Spanish consul, who had claimed him as a protégé. It is possible that the Spanish consul at Tetuan acted on his own responsibility in insisting on Rouhan's appointment, but it seems impossible that the governor could have made his statement had there been no foundation for it.

I will communicate to you Mr. Bewicke's reply to the Spanish Minister's statement which I reported to him.

[23534] No. 388.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 228.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 15, 1911.*

I INFORMED M. Cambon to-day of the substance of my conversation of yesterday with the Spanish Ambassador respecting Morocco (see my despatch No. 57 of the 14th instant to Mr. Rennie.)

M. Cambon urged that Spain, if she would not withdraw from Alcazar now, should at least make a declaration that she would withdraw when order was secured. There should be no difficulty about this; she would be the judge of the time, and it would correspond to what the French had themselves said about Fez.

I said there could be no objection to this, and I would urge it on Spain. I had not done so before, because it meant the abandonment of my request to withdraw from Alcazar immediately.

You will see from my telegram No. 76 of the 15th June to Mr. Rennie that I have acted as suggested by M. Cambon.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23533] No. 389.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rennie.

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June 15, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

I have seen Spanish Ambassador to-day, and I urged strongly upon him that the occupation of Alcazar without even previous notification to France is a violation of the Franco-Spanish secret agreement. If Spain forces the partition of Morocco by tearing up the agreement, there is no certainty that her sphere will be recognised. Ambassador maintains that in present circumstances Spain cannot withdraw from Alcazar, but he assures me she will not go a step beyond it.

In my opinion, Spain ought at least to make a declaration to the Powers respecting her occupation of Alcazar on the same lines as the communication made by France respecting Fez, and say that the occupation will not be continued longer than is necessary to restore order.

[23418] No. 390.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 141.)
Sir, *Tangier, June 1, 1911.*

A STRAIN of great sadness pervades all the letters I have received from Fez now that the excitement of the arrival of the French troops has subsided.

Mr. MacLeod writes that it is painful to note the stricken appearance of nearly all classes of the people. He tells me that he actually saw tears on the faces of many of the well-to-do "thinking" Moors who witnessed the entry of the French regiments and realised the significance of what had occurred. It appears that up to the very last the population believed that El Amrani was arriving with a powerful mehalla from the south, and only two hours before the town criers had been proclaiming throughout the city, "The mehalla of our Lord is entering! decorate your shops!" They all crowded out as they thought to meet their victorious compatriots, who, under the command of one of their greatest and most respected shereefs, had overcome all difficulties and marched to their relief, and instead they beheld the "accursed" foreign general at the head of 6,000 of his troops.

I must say that I think that the French were very ill-advised in not arranging that El Amrani should arrive at the same time as General Moinier. In all the proclamations the relief force had been described as the mehalla under Amrani's command, supported, if necessary, by French troops, and the impression would have been far less painful had the shereef and the general made their entry together. The feelings of the inhabitants would have been spared, and the Sultan would have been saved all the fresh odium which he has incurred by this last cruel deception, or, as many natives term it, betrayal of his people. He is unpopular enough already, and any fresh grounds for unpopularity can only add to the difficulty of the task which the French have before them.

The Italian Minister told me yesterday that he had received letters from Major Campini, the head of the Italian military mission at Fez, stating that the effect produced by the non-arrival of El Amrani had been deplorable, and that the feeling against the Sultan and the French had grown very much more bitter in consequence. On the top of this came the outrageous raid on the harmless inhabitants of the Lemta villages, and the cynical disregard of the "aman" granted by the Makhzen and the French military officers. Many of the wealthy Fez merchants, two of them British protégés, who came forward so generously with specie to assist the Makhzen in their recent straits, have been made to suffer cruelly, some by the plundering and burning of their properties, others by the brutal murder of their sons and their servants. There is no longer any sense of security, and I fear little belief is placed in the vaunted assurances of the French. I can only hope that by their subsequent action they will succeed in restoring confidence in their word; but their début appears to me to have been distinguished by a series of clumsy blunders, the effect of which they will have considerable difficulty in dissipating.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[23419] No. 391.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 142. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, June 2, 1911.*

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 88, the Spanish Minister paid me a long visit this morning. He had come straight from an interview with the French chargé d'affaires, and appeared in a very nervous and depressed condition. He told me that the news he received from Madrid of the progress of negotiations between his Government and the French Ambassador filled him with apprehension, and that M. Geoffray's attitude was growing more and more unconciliatory. I said I was very sorry to hear this—that I had hoped that the negotiations would end in some arrangement which might render the relations easier between the two countries in Morocco, and that I had always understood that M. Geoffray was most conciliatory. He said that he too hoped and prayed that an arrangement might be come to—if only for selfish reasons—for I could not imagine what an unpleasant and painful position he was placed in here. He personally had always had the greatest admiration for France and the French. He had been partly educated in their country, and had made a special study of their literature and language. His one desire would be to work pleasantly with them, and yet, instead of that, he was obliged almost every day to go to the French Legation and lodge some fresh complaint or make some fresh protest. He did not for a moment believe that the French were working for a protectorate over Morocco, but there was no doubt that the presence of their armies in the country produced a very great moral effect, and that their position had been enormously strengthened by the recent events. The Government was practically in their hands; it was they who were making all the modifications in the administration. Moreover, they held the purse-strings, and nothing gave such power as this—the real master was the man who paid. In the meantime Spain was getting nothing, and her influence was daily dwindling by comparison. The Spanish Government had drawn up a memorandum of the things which they considered that Spain was entitled to both with regard to the military organisation of the country and in the domain of finance, yet there seemed no disposition on the part of France to agree to them: in fact, he gathered now that the French were trying to ignore the agreement of 1904 and fall back in everything upon the Act of Algeciras.

I said that I had seen a copy of the Spanish memorandum, and that I hoped very much that it would serve as a basis for negotiation. I had heard nothing quite recently of the progress of negotiations, but it appeared to me unreasonable to start with the idea that France was to make all the concessions in every arrangement; there must be concessions on both sides. M. de Villa Sinda seemed inclined to disregard this somewhat banal truth, and said that he did not consider that the question was one of concessions, but of the recognition by France of the clear and undoubted rights of Spain.

I confined myself to generalities, and did my best to calm M. de Villa Sinda down. I hope I succeeded to some extent. He told me that I must look upon all he said as the expression of a private person speaking as a friend to a friend. Sometimes he felt as if he could hardly bear the situation any longer, and must come and pour out his woes to somebody. He was most anxious to keep on good personal terms with M. de Billy, but there were moments when it seemed impossible. I told him that I knew that M. de Billy appreciated in the highest degree the spirit of courtesy and conciliation which he had always brought to bear upon all questions under discussion, many of which were undoubtedly thorny, and I trusted that nothing would bring about a change in this happy state of affairs. It was, I knew, the ardent desire of my Government that an arrangement should be come to between France and Spain in regard to affairs in this country, and that their relations should be placed upon a more satisfactory basis.

The impression I derived from our conversation was that M. de Villa Sinda's nerves, and probably those of his Government, were strained almost to breaking point, and that it was more than likely we should very shortly hear of some reckless move on their part.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[23420] No. 392.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 143. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, June 3, 1911.*

IN accordance with his promise, as reported in my despatch No. 132 of the 29th ultimo, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs has communicated to me a copy of the note which he addressed to the Spanish Minister with regard to the situation in the Ceuta–Tetuan district, and I have the honour to transmit to you a translation herewith. You will observe that Sid Guebbas, in the latter part of his note, protests against the action of the Spanish authorities in entering into relations with the Oulad Haddo of the Kûf. These were the men who were implicated in the capture of Mr. Clarke Kennedy and whose arrests we demanded. As you will recollect, their ringleader, Rouham-ben-Haddo by name, a notorious brigand, was actually arrested by the Basha of Tetuan in the month of April 1909, but was claimed by the Spanish consul as being under Spanish protection and released by him. The incident was reported at length in my despatch No. 62 of the 3rd April, 1909, and formed the subject of correspondence between the Spanish Government and His Majesty's Government. The explanation given by the former always appeared to me quite inadequate, but the matter was allowed to drop. On hearing from Tetuan that the Spaniards had insisted on one Roham, of the Oulad Haddo, being appointed chief of the police to be levied in the Anjera, I wrote to His Majesty's vice-consul to enquire whether he was the same man for whose arrest we had applied. Mr. Bewicke has now answered in the affirmative, and adds: "If you are reopening this question you should bear in mind that the Spanish consul distinctly lied to his Government when he wrote that he did not know that we had any question against this man; he knew it well, as he asked me at the time of the change of Governors why I had not had two of the Hadoos caught when they were in town." It appears to me that in employing this man the Spanish authorities have shown an extraordinary want of consideration for us, and under ordinary circumstances I think we ought most certainly to protest; I have, however, refrained from mentioning it to the Spanish Minister, as I thought you might think it unadvisable to raise the question at this moment when negotiations are proceeding between the French and Spaniards at Madrid, to the success of which His Majesty's Government attach great importance.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 392.

Sid Guebbas to the Spanish Minister.

(Translation.)

(After usual compliments.) 23 *Jumad I*, 1328 (*May* 23, 1911).

I RECEIVED your letter of the 18th May relative to the incident between the Houz man and the boat containing four men, and I note all you state. I would inform your Excellency that, on hearing of the incident, I at once wrote to the Governor of Tetuan, instructing him to hold an enquiry to verify the facts and to do the necessary. He replied thereto as follows, and as he heard it from the police guard charged to watch over the road from Tetuan to Negro: that when the boat was between Negro and the Fonidik the man Hadj Sherkawi-el-Houzi demanded from the men in it a sum of money which it is customary for fishermen (fishing there) to pay to the guard of that district. They attacked, seized him, and took away his gun (a five-shot rifle), and bound him, with the intention of taking him away in the boat. He defended himself with a knife, and they, seeing some people going along the road to market, let him go. The Governor informs me, nevertheless, that he has written to the sheikhs of the Houz to arrest the man Sherkawi, in order that the necessary punishment be inflicted upon him, and all this is confirmed from other sources. Therefore, if the affair is as stated, it is a small matter, and your Excellency will recognise that there is no necessity to place a guard in that place, as you said in conversation with me yesterday (had been done), as, in fact, no hostile attack meriting an occupation of the place has occurred there, but merely that the man imagined in his ignorance that the said custom still held good. But, even conceding that this offence was committed by him, he is a single individual, and should alone be punished as the case merits, especially as the Governor

has reported that the guard of police instituted recently to watch over the security of that port constantly reaches that place, and consequently the placing of guards there (by Spain) will only increase trouble. Your Excellency is not unaware of the trouble and fright caused to the people of Tetuan and of that district, nay, in the whole of the Shereefian Empire, by the going out of your soldiers beyond the boundaries of Ceuta and their occupation of the three posts which they still hold, as I have stated to your Excellency many times, and to which your Excellency has replied that it is only a temporary measure and one taken upon behalf of the Makhzen until such time as it can organise the Makhzen police on the frontier, in accordance with the agreement recently arrived at between the Shereefian Government and your respected Government. I prevailed upon the people with this (explanation), relying upon your repeated promises; in this I experienced great difficulties. Then, immediately afterwards, they heard that the troops of occupation had gone to Negro, which has added to their trouble, as is proved in many letters which have reached me to-day.

What adds to the difficulty of the situation is that the Oulad Haddo of the Kûf in the Houz (to whom we called the attention of your Government a long time ago through the intermediary of your predecessor, the respected Señor Merry del Val, and through yourself, also warning them of their rascality and of their mixing in disorders, and that it was advisable that they should not be given Spanish protection because they are known highway robbers and creators of disorder) have, nevertheless, I hear, been to the Governor of Ceuta and requested him to place a guard of police at the place known as Santa Torre, which is in the Houz tribe, and that the Governor promised to do so and went out himself with them to Negro. This has caused the Tetuan people and the tribesmen in that district great inquietude and fear. In view of all this, I would request your Excellency most urgently to request your respected Government to send orders to the Governor of Ceuta to withdraw those troops to Ceuta in order to tranquillise the minds of the people, as is expected from your sense of right, and that he have nothing to do with the Oulad Haddo mentioned above or with others of those who strive to disturb the good relations existing between the two nations, which friendship, it is hoped, may be enduring and increase, and the bonds thereof grow stronger, as could be wished. I thank you.

May you, &c.

[23422] No. 393.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 16.)

(No. 145.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 4, 1911.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 85, Sid Madani Glawi was dismissed from his post as Grand Vizier on the 26th May. He retains his liberty and all his personal property, but he is to restore the various properties of the Makhzen which he held. On the following day I heard that his brother Hadj Thami had also been dismissed from his post of Basha of Marrakesh, and was to be replaced by Ould Mennon, the man who put to torture the wife of Hadj-ben-Aissa at Mequinez last year, but there appeared to be some doubt as to the truth of this report. I have, however, received to-day a note from the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs submitting to me a list of persons who had appropriated Makhzen funds and properties, and to whom no sort of protection should be granted. This list is headed by Hadj Thami, and is composed almost entirely of members of the Glawi family. The French have evidently determined upon a root and branch destruction of the principal members of the clan. I only hope that they may be well advised in this. It has always appeared to me that Hadj Thami would be so relieved at the disappearance of his "big brother" that he would become the faithful and grateful adherent of any Government which got rid of him. It remains to be seen whether the South will rise against the Glawis or whether the Glawis will be able to raise the South against the Sultan.

I hear that the ex-Grand Vizier remarked to one of the Mokris who saw him after his downfall, "The rulers have come to govern their country, so there is no place for me."

Sid Aissa-ben-Omar has also been removed from the purely honorary post which he held lately, but I understand that he is going south almost immediately to resume the government of the Abda, Dukalla, and neighbouring tribes; he has thus finally triumphed over his old enemy Glawi.

M'toogi is also going south to deal with the Shillah tribes.

It is to be hoped that the removal of Sid Madani-el-Glawi may do much to restore the confidence of the tribes and bring them back to their allegiance, but the hatred for the Sultan is very deep-seated, and, as I said before, I fear that the French have a difficult task before them in reimposing him upon the people. Moreover, the experience of the Oulad Jamah at Lemta is not encouraging for those who are inclined to submit.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[23425] No. 391.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 16.)

(No. 148.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 4, 1911.

THE refusal of His Majesty's Government to receive the Moorish mission to the Coronation has no doubt come as a severe shock to the members of the Government, and will, I expect, considerably upset the Sultan. At the same time, I believe that it will be well received by the large and influential class to which Benshokroon, the Lazracs, and others of the principal sufferers from the Lemta raid belong. Hadj Dris Benjelum, an enlightened Moor from Fez, who holds a high official appointment at Tangier, told Mr. Harris very confidentially that he was not sorry that a lesson should have been given to the Sultan, and added that many Moors like himself were at heart gratified to think that a great Government sympathised with them in the brutal treatment to which they were at times subjected. The main body of the people, if they knew anything about the proposed mission at all, will be quite glad that a good slap in the face should have been administered to the Government, whom they merely look upon as a machine for extorting money.

I also think that it is not at all a bad thing from the point of view of our prestige with the Moors, and also our position *vis-à-vis* to the French. From Mr. MacLeod's recent letters I gather that Sid Taib Mokri had permitted himself since the arrival of the French troops to adopt a haughty and arrogant tone towards him, and spoke as if the support of the British Government could always be counted upon. The same applies, too, to some extent, to the French.

It is very disappointing that Colonel Mangin should have abetted the Sultan in his blood-thirsty desire for vengeance, and I begin to wonder whether the very extensive powers which he has latterly exercised over His Majesty's barbarous soldiers may not to some extent have affected him as it has other French officers in other parts of Africa. I am informed privately that there was a strong feeling at the time of the execution of the two soldiers that he ought to have been removed from Fez with high promotion, and I believe that M. René Leclerc, the head of the Société du Maroc, has written to M. Étienne, with whom he is on very intimate terms, saying that he should certainly not be allowed to remain in his present post.

Captain Brémond, the second in command, on the other hand, appears to have developed no such blood-thirsty instincts, and is always spoken of by Mr. MacLeod and Dr. Verdon in terms of the highest praise.

I communicated the decision of His Majesty's Government to the French chargé d'affaires. He did not reply, but when I next saw him he observed that he understood the attitude of His Majesty's Government, as having been in England he knew the strength of public opinion.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[23426] No. 395.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 16.)

(No. 149. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 5, 1911.

THE impression which I derived from my recent conversation with the Spanish Minister, as reported in my despatch No. 142 of the 2nd instant, was apparently correct, as the Government were no doubt already meditating the dispatch of the cruiser and transport to Laraiche; it is possible that the "calmer frame of mind"

in which Sir M. de Bunsen found the Minister for Foreign Affairs is to be attributed to the fact that this important decision had been taken.

There is no doubt that a considerable amount of agitation exists in the Gharb district, owing to the presence of this new pretender, Tazzia, who, as I telegraphed in my telegram No. 92, has marched north, and is in the Ahl Serif tribe; he is consequently now in the jurisdiction of Raisuli, and within the spanish sphere. Raisuli is collecting a force of 1,000 mountaineers, with whom he will proceed to Alcazar, where contingents from the Khlot are to meet him. He evidently considers that energetic action is necessary; at the same time he declares that he has sufficient forces at his disposal to cope with the situation, and I trust that a Spanish landing may be avoided. It would only further the cause of the pretender and swell the number of his adherents.

The British consular agent at Alcazar, who was at Tangier for a few hours at the end of last week, informed Mr. Irwin that both he and Raisuli were of opinion that the Spaniards were purposely fomenting the disturbances, and that they were suspiciously well informed of the movements and intentions of the pretender. It appears that two of the richest proprietors in the villages looted by him were Spanish semsars, and that both removed their families and valuables to Alcazar, for no apparent reason, a few days before the arrival of his horde.

This may not perhaps appear sufficient reason for entertaining such a suspicion, but I see that M. de Billy shares Mr. Carleton's view, and the ways of the Spanish officials in this country are so tortuous that at last one can believe anything. Moreover, I have always expected that intrigues would result from the presence of M. Villalta at Alcazar (seemy despatch No. 104 of the 7th ultimo).

The pretender is a shereef of the Raisuli branch and a distant cousin of the governor, but there is little love lost between them. Raisuli imprisoned him some time ago, and was much annoyed when the Sultan had him released without ever consulting him.

It is to be feared that the conspicuous failure of this rare act of clemency is not calculated to encourage His Shereefian Majesty to further efforts in that direction.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[23428] No. 396.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 151.)

Sir, *Tangier, June 9, 1911.*

ON receipt of your telegrams Nos. 44 and 45 I called upon the Spanish Minister and told him of the reports that had reached me, that the Spanish authorities at Ceuta had insisted upon the appointment of Rouhan ben Haddoo of the Oulad Haddoo of Kuf as head of the police which was being recruited amongst the Anjera and Houz tribes. I said that I had been astonished at the news, not only because the man was a notorious brigand and highway robber, but also because the Spanish consul at Tetuan was perfectly aware of the fact that his arrest had been demanded by the British Government, as being the head of the band who had captured Mr. Clarke Kennedy in 1908. I also gave him an account of the unfortunate incident which took place on the 15th March in the following year, when, owing to the intervention of the Spanish consul, Rouhan, who had been actually arrested by the Governor of Tetuan, on the demand of the British vice-consul, had been allowed to escape. M. Lopez Ferrer, I said, had then justified his action by saying that he was not aware that the man was wanted by his British colleague, but after the long correspondence which ensued between our two Governments it was impossible to plead ignorance again. I had reported the appointment of Rouhan to my Government, and I had received instructions from them to protest most strongly against the selection, which would not only produce a deplorable effect in Morocco, but would also show a most unfriendly disregard for the interests of the British Government.

M. de Villa Sinda replied that he had heard nothing of the appointment, and said he knew nothing of all I had told him with regard to Rouhan and his past history, having only lately arrived at Tangier; he promised, however, to write at once to the Governor of Ceuta and to the Government at Madrid to make enquiries. I told him that His Majesty's Ambassador had already been instructed to protest very strongly against the appointment to M. Garcia Prieto.

M. de Villa Sinda subsequently said that he had an idea that the Makhzen had written to him complaining of the Oulad Haddoo family, and that he believed that one of them bore the name of Rouhan. I said that I thought this was more than probable, as I knew the whole family stank in the nostrils of the Moorish Government. M de Villa Sinda said that, as far as he could remember, the man had been reported to be travelling about with a forged letter purporting to come from the governor, giving him power to enrol men in the new police and to exercise pressure and threats if they refused. M. de Villa Sinda said that, of course, no such letter had ever been given by the governor, and that the man was merely extorting a species of blackmail. It was this, he thought, that must have given rise to the report that he had been appointed native chief of the Anjera police. He would, however, let me know the moment he received an answer from Ceuta.

It is practically certain that the Spanish authorities will, as usual, have recourse to a flat denial, but there appears little doubt that they have had considerable dealings with Rouhan, and the Basha of Tetuan told Mr. Bewicke twice that they had insisted on his appointment. In any case our representations will oblige the Spaniards to disavow Rouhan, and may make them more careful in the future.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[23429] No. 397.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 152.)

Sir, *Tangier, June 10, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the despatch which I have received from the British vice-consul at Laraiche reporting the landing of Spanish troops at that port on the 8th instant, the substance of which I reported to you in my telegram No. 100.

Almost immediately after the arrival of Mr. Forde's despatch I received a letter from the consular agent at Alcazar reporting that at 11·30 on the night of the 7th a party of some thirty horsemen had ridden into the market-place and fired about forty shots. They had then retired and nobody was able to identify them. Mr. Carleton added that the impression was that they were men of Remiki's, who, as you will remember, enjoys Spanish protection, notwithstanding his disgraceful record in the past (see my despatch No. 99 of the 11th June, 1910), and that the attack was engineered by the Spaniards to furnish a pretext for landing troops.

I subsequently saw the French chargé d'affaires, who told me that Si Kadour Ben Ghabrit had arrived with M. Boisset the night before from Fez; they had passed the night of the 7th quite close to Alcazar, and the Kaïd R'ha, or native officer commanding the troops in the town, had sent a message to Ben Ghabrit informing him of this mysterious attack, if attack it can be called.

According to later reports received at the French Legation the men rode into the market-place, fired their guns into the air several times and then rode off and repeated the same performance in the neighbouring villages. They were pursued by the troops but were not identified, but at a distant village they were seen and recognised as being men of Remiki's with some men of the Laraiche police!

M. de Billy is quite convinced that it was a got-up thing, but is making further enquiries to make certain of the men's identity.

He appeared in a much agitated condition. He had, he said, at once told Guebbas to give instructions to the Commandant Toulat to proceed with a body of his police to a point (well within the French zone) where the Tangier–Alcazar and Laraiche–Tetuan roads cross, and thus prevent the Spaniards from connecting up with Tetuan.

He then said that he was in doubt as to whether he should advise the Makhzen to offer active resistance. I said that I thought that it would be the most fatal mistake; they should, I thought, protest most energetically against the Spanish aggression, but at the same time to do all in their power to avoid a collision which would only play into the hands of Spain. M. de Billy said he thought I was right. Guebbas, he told me, had already addressed a strong protest to the Spanish Minister, and had added a statement to the effect that in view of this aggression by Spain the Makhzen considered themselves no longer bound to give effect to the clauses of the recent Hispano-Moorish convention with regard to a payment of an indemnity for the Spanish campaign in the Riff. M. de Billy seemed very much pleased with this; but it appears to me that it

has but little value, as the Moors will eventually have to do what they are told, and all will depend upon the attitude taken up by the Great Powers in the matter.

M. de Billy said he was instructing Captain Moreaux, who is now at Souk-el-Arba, to advance to the River Lukkos, remaining of course within the French zone. I said that I hoped that he too would be careful not to come into collision with the Spaniards.

M. de Billy spoke very bitterly of Raisuli, and said that he considered that he was responsible for all that had occurred. I must say that I think this exaggerated. He has after all succeeded in maintaining order in his district, and by doing so has prevented the Spaniards from landing long before. I shall be anxious to see what attitude he adopts. He has written to Mr. Harris to say that if the Spanish land he will apply for a French semsarship on the strength of the paper given to him by the Union des Mines, and throw up his governorship.

About 6 in the afternoon the Spanish Minister came to see me. He announced to me that the Spanish consul, considering the situation at Alcazar to be most critical, had decided upon landing a body of Spanish troops, and that a force would be dispatched at once to Alcazar under the command of Captain Ovilo, the head of the police. He believed that this force would consist of police soldiers. I said that this appeared to me difficult, as I had been informed by my vice-consul that 500 soldiers were to be sent up, and the total police force at Laraiche amounted to less than 300. M. de Villa Sinda replied that possibly they might be supported by Spanish soldiers, but that he could give me no details. He had merely been informed of the bare fact of the landing, and had sent the Spanish torpedo-boat back to Laraiche for more precise information. As soon as he received it he proposed to address a circular to the representatives of the Powers. He expatiated at some length on the situation at Alcazar, which, he said, absolutely necessitated intervention. Panic had reigned in the town during the last few days, and letters were being daily received from the Spanish subjects, of whom there were thirty with wives and children, imploring assistance; it was impossible for the Government to turn a deaf ear to these appeals. Now, he said, news had just reached him of the attack upon the town made on the night of the 7th. I said that I, too, had received a report on this from my consular agent, but that it all appeared rather mysterious. The assailants were said to have fired off their guns aimlessly, and then ridden away without anybody having the slightest idea who they were or what they wanted. He replied that they were probably men sent by the Pretender or some other disturber of the peace; this seemed a foolish remark, but I thought better to let the matter drop. M. de Villa Sinda said he could assure me that the measure taken was solely one of police and precaution, and that its character was purely provisional. Nothing was further from the wishes of his Government than to violate the Act of Algeciras; they had been compelled to take action owing to the position of danger in which Spanish subjects were placed, but they were determined that that action should be on the smallest possible scale, and the most absolute respect would be paid to the Moorish officials. M. de Villa Sinda appeared to me very nervous, and was at first rather stiff and awkward; then suddenly his manner changed to one of great confidence, and, laying his hand on my arm, he said: "Now, do tell me what you think of all this, as a friend to a friend." I replied that I could not conceal from him that I considered it most regrettable that that the Spanish authorities had considered themselves compelled to land troops, and that their action could only complicate the situation, which was sufficiently difficult already; at the same time I was very glad of the assurances which he had given me, and which I should lose no time in communicating to you.

M. de Villa Sinda went on from this legation to see the French chargé d'affairs, and I understand from the latter, whom I met at dinner, that the interview was a stormy one. M. de Billy appears to have ridiculed the story of the night attack, and to have dropped a hint as to his suspicions. This, not unnaturally, incensed our Spanish colleague, who said that his Government was "au-dessus de pareilles insinuations."

I was careful in my conversation with M. de Villa Sinda to confine myself to generalities until I knew what line His Majesty's Government intended to take in the matter.

M. de Billy has just communicated to me a further letter which he has received from his vice-consul at Laraiche, in which it is stated that the force for Alcazar did not start until yesterday morning. It was composed of about 125 men of the police and some 375 Spanish soldiers. A reinforcement of 500 men is expected to arrive shortly at Laraiche from Cadiz on board the "Carlos V."

At the French Legation they apprehend a further advance towards Tetuan; great

activity in that district is reported, the road has been constructed as far as Cape Negro, and officers are continually motoring along it. His Majesty's vice-consul reports that Spanish officers come daily to Tetuan with escorts of the Riffian Regiment. On the 6th instant the general second in command was there, and went up the Gibel Dersa, the hill just behind the town.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 397.

Vice-Consul Forde to Mr. Lister.

(No. 13.)
Sir, *Laraiche, June* 8, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the Spanish consul has informed the consular officers that, in order to avoid disturbances at Alcazar, Spanish troops will land to-day at 7 P.M., and 500 soldiers under the command of Captain Ovilo will leave to-night at midnight for Alcazar.

The Spanish consul has notified the governor of this port of the landing of the troops.

I have, &c.
LEWIS FORDE.

[23431] No. 398.

Mr. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 154.)
Sir, *Tangier, June* 10, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting the progress of events there during the past week.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 398.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 39.)
Sir, *Fez, June* 5, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copies of Hadj Mohammed Mikwar's and M. F. C. Enyart's letters of the 2nd and 3rd instant describing the state of affairs at Mequinez, and of my replies thereto.

It will be seen from my replies that I have communicated to the French consul, Sidi Mohammed Amrani, and Sid Taib Mokri those passages only of Hadj Mohammed Mikwar's letter which seemed likely to conduce towards a good understanding and prompt restoration of lawful authority when the relief forces reach Mequinez.

Sidi Mohammed Amrani being now here and about to accompany the troops to Mequinez I called on him last evening, explained fully what had occurred at Mequinez, and mentioned that your Excellency and the French chargé d'affaires considered that Hadj Mohammed Mikwar had done a good service to the public in the action he took of joining the Provisional Government established at Mequinez.

I have called the special attention of Sidi Mohammed Amrani, Sid Taib Mokri, and the French consul to the efforts made by the Provisional Government at Mequinez to give effect to the advice sent to them, and very particularly to the promptness and energy with which they suppressed the anti-foreign disorders which began to recur on the 1st June, when upwards of a hundred arrests were made.

The remaining parts of Hadj Mohammed Mikwar's letter are merely animadversions on the Sultan and on the action of the French, and accounts of the extraordinary reports current in Mequinez about the attitude of Fez and most of the tribes, not unnatural after all that the Mequinez people have endured and the intense strain in which they still are, or may have been written by Mikwar merely to enable him for the time being to quieten malcontents by telling them how he is pleading their case.

He also states that the Berbers are still determined to besiege Fez, and have sent contingents for that purpose. The reports of couriers from the Fez–Mequinez Plain give no confirmation of this statement, but during last night the French mehalla here was attacked by Berbers, supposed to be Ait Yusi. Sidi Mohammed Amrani and his mehalla have been, therefore, directed to wait at Fez, in readiness to march, and meantime General Moinier has marched to Sefroo. I infer, therefore, that General Moinier will relieve Sefroo and then march westwards along the south side of the Fez–Mequinez Plain against the Beni Mtir themselves, and simultaneously Sidi Mohammed Amrani's mehalla will go to Mequinez by the usual road.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 398.

Hadj Mohammed Mikwar to Consul MacLeod.

Mequinez, June 2, 1911.

(Extract.)

YOUR letter of the 29th ultimo was duly received, and I thank you for your advice, and we have sought to follow it.

Accordingly, when we received a letter from the general of the French army asking us to send him some one with whom he might agree in matters fitting for us and for him, we at once gathered the chief men together and the Sultan appointed a man to represent him, and the city also appointed a few men to accompany him. It seems, however, that some one from our midst sent a courier to the Berbers and informed them of our intentions, and when Thursday morning arrived and our party wanted to go out to meet the general we found a small camp of Berbers before our gates, and the city had to remain closed and no one ventured to go out. When we saw that we were in danger of being eaten up by the Berbers, Beni Mtir, we called on two or three of their chiefs and invited them in, and told them that we wanted them to advise us what to do, and to send a man to speak for them and to hear all that was said to the general. To this they agreed. However, about that time, our courier with whom we had sent a letter to the general (saying that the Berbers had shut us in and that we could not come out to him) returned, and he said that the (French) mehalla had returned to Fez, and we heard that it had to fight all the way back till it reached Duyats.

Mequinez is now shut up and people are in much fear, and the poor are without food.

Yesterday wicked persons gathered together and wanted to begin eating up the houses of protected persons, and I and the rest of the viziers and the basha spent the night arresting them and putting them in prison to the number of about eighty, and others were arrested to-day, but we still fear that something further may occur that we may be unable to handle.

Enclosure 3 in No. 398.

Consul MacLeod to M. Enyart.

Fez, June 4, 1911.

Dear M. Envart,

PLEASE tell Hadj Mohammed Mikwar that I am much obliged for his letter of the 2nd instant, and that I have communicated in all proper quarters the passages given overleaf hereof, the action of himself and his friends in so energetically repressing these attempts at disorders is highly applauded by every person here who has come to know of it. They cannot do better than continue in that course. I have mentioned to the Makhzen and Sidi Mohammed Amrani all that has passed, and I feel sure you will find that he appreciates the course which Hadj Mohammed Mikwar and his friends have taken. I trust that by the time this reaches you the crisis at Mequinez will be happily over. We are all quite well and quiet here. Postal and caravan traffic with the coast has been resumed peacefully. Some European visitors have arrived pursuing their callings, and some others have left for the summer months, in the usual way. I expect the Berbers have spread these alarming rumours about Fez in order to cause panic at Mequinez. Please do not think me inattentive to the rest of your letter, but the situation is that the Morocco house is a-fire, in parts, and common sense demands that

the fire be put out before one can discuss who is the rightful owner! and be assured that in any event the misgovernment of the past will not be allowed to recur.

With all good wishes to Hadj Mohammed Mikwar and each of you, yours, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

Enclosure 4 in No. 398.

M. Enyart to Consul MacLeod.

Mequinez, June 2, 1911.

(Extract)

THIS leaves us, so far, safe within our house, but the conditions here are worse, since bad reports come that Fez has risen up against the French régime. If a mehalla comes here of some strength the city will not fear from the Berbers, but anti-foreign feeling is quite strong. Yesterday crowds of men went up and down the markets crying "Down with protégés!" and I feared trouble, but arrests were made and the matter stopped.

I hope this will find you safe and well, and that conditions in Fez may not be as bad as reported. A small Berber camp sits right up against our gates.

Enclosure 5 in No. 398.

Consul MacLeod to M. Enyart.

Fez, June 4, 1911.

Dear M. Enyart,

I HAVE communicated your letter as above to Sidi Mohammed Amrani, to the French consul, and to the Makhzen here for their information. I called on Sidi Mohammed Amrani and handed to him the letters to himself and for the French general (General Moinier) in your favour, and he (Sidi Amrani) assured me he would do everything in his power to assist you all, including Hadj-el-Arbi and Mrs. Guessus and their family.

About the copy letter of your society to the American Minister, *i.e.*,the 100 dollars credited to you, I cannot send you a copy of it as I forwarded it, as directed, to Mr. Swanson.

Please send me word by a sure and speedy messenger how all passes off at Mequinez.

With every good wish, always yours sincerely,
J. M. MacLEOD.

Enclosure 6 in No. 398.

M. Enyart to Consul MacLeod.

Mequinez, June 3. 1911.

(Extract.)

MEQUINEZ was expecting the French army to enter on Thursday, but when it failed to come and word came that trouble had occurred at Fez this city went wild with excitement, and I feared trouble would arise, as crowds of men went up and down crying out against the French and the protected persons. However, I am told that about a hundred men have been thrown into prison, and the Sultan called up the protected men and spoke with them in a friendly way, and assured them that he desired none of this wickedness with the nations.

We are quiet and fairly well, but concerned about Fez, and I fear the coming of the army will bring large numbers to fight these. The spirit of the Moslem will not change, and only fear will retard them from seeking to destroy every trace of the Christian.

I hope to send a courier to-night towards Rabat.

Enclosure 7 in No. 398.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 40.)

Fez, June 6, 1911.

Sir,

ON the night of the 4th–5th instant the Ain Smar body of insurgents (Beni Saden, Beni Warain, Aits Tsaroshen, and Aits Yusi) in large numbers attacked General

Moinier's camp at Fez, the French having five men wounded, while the enemy left twelve dead.

At dawn on the 5th General Moinier with the whole of his troops marched southwards and engaged and scattered the enemy along a front of some 5 kilom. near Ain Smar. The enemy left many dead, but their casualties are not exactly stated. The French lost four men killed and one officer and sixteen men wounded.

The French troops then bombarded and burnt Bahalil and encamped close thereto.

It is expected that General Moinier will now march to Mequinez through Beni Mtir and reach Mequinez about the 9th instant, where he will be joined by Sidi Mohammed Amrani and the latter's forces, who will have taken the ordinary road from Fez to Mequinez.

I have not been able, up to time of going to post, to ascertain what has happened at Sefroo, nor about the safety of Mr. Swanson, American missionary there.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[23439] No. 399.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 16.)

(No. 279. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, June* 15, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I carried out this morning the instructions contained in your Confidential despatch [21703] of the 12th instant.

With regard to the verbal communication which, as directed by you, I made to M. Cruppi, his Excellency said that nobody could regret more than he did the brutalities which in Moorish fashion had been committed on the afternoon of the 21st ultimo by the Sultan's troops, in the absence of their French instructors. He believed that the accounts of the occurrences were exaggerated, but there could be no doubt that the conduct of the Moorish soldiers in retaliation for acts of the revolted tribes had been deplorable. His information as to the alleged sales of women and children was that a few children only had actually been sold, and they had been recovered. A report on the occurrence of the 21st ultimo had just been received in his Excellency's department, and he would furnish me with the substance of it in reply to the written communications which I had handed to him, viz., Consul MacLeod's despatch and the memorandum, copy of which I have the honour to transmit to you herewith.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 399.

Memorandum communicated to M. Cruppi by Sir F. Bertie.

THE French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his memorandum of the 3rd instant, complained of the overt opposition to the Makhzen, and to French policy in Morocco of Menebhi and other persons not named, who enjoy British protection. His Majesty's Government have read these complaints with much surprise. The memorandum in question states the complaint in general terms, but, in order that the charges which His Majesty's Government confidently believe to be founded upon erroneous information may be properly investigated, they beg that the precise facts laid to the charge of the incriminated persons, besides their names, may be communicated to them.

Meanwhile, His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to point out to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the French Legation of Tangier has repeatedly and quite recently solicited the friendly advice, assistance, and cordial co-operation in dealing with the revolted tribes of Menebhi, against whom grave charges are now brought.

The French chargé d'affaires at Tangier requested his British colleague on the 15th April last to induce Menebhi to write at once to Raisuli, and urge him most strongly to show his loyalty to the Makhzen by advancing with a part of his forces to

Alcazar, where he would be in a position to prevent any irruption into the Gharb by the Beni Hasson. Menebhi thereupon called on Mr. Rattigan, promised to do all he could with Raisuli, and wrote at once urging him to do as requested. On the 18th April M. de Billy again requested Mr. Rattigan to obtain the intercession of Menebhi, and to induce him to write to his influential friends amongst the hostile tribes, begging them to return to their allegiance. On the 26th April Menebhi reported to Mr. Rattigan that Raisuli had agreed to advance to Alcazar, but had asked for further supplies of ammunition, &c. M. de Billy, on learning this, said that the ammunition would be immediately placed at Raisuli's disposal, and he added that Raisuli's attitude had completely changed since the last representations by Menebhi. Mr. Rattigan expressed the hope that M. de Billy would now be convinced of Menebhi's sincere desire to co-operate with the French and the Makhzen.

The reports received by His Majesty's Government show that Menebhi's repeated intervention on behalf and at the request of the French Legation has materially eased the tribal situation at a critical time, and that he appears to deserve the acknowledgments of the French Government for the assistance which he has rendered to them in difficult circumstances, and not to merit the reproaches brought against him in the memorandum under reply.

British Embassy, Paris, June 13, 1911.

[23442] No. 400.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 16.)

(No. 282.)

Sir, *Paris, June* 15, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that an interpellation was put in the Senate yesterday by M. Jénouvrier on the policy pursued by the Government in Morocco. M. Jénouvrier, who is a member of the Right, was never violent in his criticisms of the Government policy. What he chiefly objected to was the state of immobility in which General Toutée's column had been placed by orders from Paris not to cross the Moulouya, and the recent withdrawal of the column to Taourirt. France should, the orator declared, push on to Taza and open up a secure road, free to all nations, from Casa Blanca to the Algerian frontier viâ Fez.

M. Cruppi prefaced his reply, the text of which I enclose herein,* by stating that no military intervention of France had ever been more generous, more humane, or more calculated to further the interests of civilisation than General Moinier's expedition to Fez. France had gone to Fez with the approval of the civilized world and with the clearly shown sympathy of Russia and of England—her ally and her friend. The Government had decided that the relief force should start from the Shawia region, where it had been able to co-operate with tribes and harkas loyal to the Sultan, whereas if it had started from Algeria it would have conveyed the impression of undertaking a work of conquest contrary to the spirit of the Act of Algeciras, for in that case the Berber tribes round Taza—the most warlike in Morocco—would have to have been subjugated, as they had never recognised the authority of the Sultan. His Excellency went on to praise General Moinier for the firmness and prudence which he had displayed throughout, and then touched on "certain regrettable reprisals" taken on the 21st May by the irregulars against rebels who had murdered and tortured the Sultan's couriers. The French instructors were not on that occasion with those troops, and the French officers had in all circumstances given proof of the highest feeling of humanity. When order had been restored, when the Shereefian army had been reorganised, and when the necessary reforms had been carried out, General Moinier would proceed with prudence to the withdrawal of his troops, perhaps by another route, in order to punish the Zaer tribe.

M. Cruppi's remarks were well received by the majority of the Senate, and the discussion of the Foreign Office estimates was proceeded with, no vote being taken on the question of the Government policy in Morocco.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

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* Not printed.

[23595] No. 401.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, June 16, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

My telegram No. 48 of 14th June.

Reply of Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to French representations has now been received. It repeats intention of Spanish Government to act in close accord with France, and expresses regret that circumstances which occasioned Spanish action at Alcazar and Laraiche are not clearly understood. In order that French Minister for Foreign Affairs may fully appreciate reasons, Spanish Ambassador at Paris has been instructed to communicate detailed report of events at Alcazar. In any case, the Spanish Government consider that no French interests have suffered, and that Spanish Government have acted within their rights and within agreements as interpreted by seven years' experience.

As regards omissions in account of interview between French Minister for Foreign Affairs and Spanish Ambassador, communicated to Madrid press, conversation had been fully reported by Spanish Ambassador, but, French Minister for Foreign Affairs having asked for supplementary information regarding landing of troops, it was thought that account of conversation, as communicated, was for the moment sufficient. Moreover, it seemed inexpedient to publish anything that might allow it to be supposed that there were even a temporary divergence of opinion between the two Governments.

As regards conversations between the two Governments at Madrid, in the opinion of the Spanish Government it was in the present circumstances more than ever necessary that the two Governments, in concert with His Majesty's Government, should endeavour to come to an understanding regarding application of existing agreements.

Communication of Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs ends by calling attention to the presence of MM. Boisset and Moreau with the forces of the Makhzen within the Spanish zone of influence near Alcazar. Reasons for their presence are difficult to explain, and French Minister for Foreign Affairs is requested to issue instructions to prevent such excessive display of zeal on the part of French agents.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[23892] No. 402.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 158.)
Sir, *Tangier, June 13, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter addressed to the doyen of the diplomatic body by the Spanish Minister, stating that on hearing of the assassination of the Spanish protégé, Ben Malek, and his two sons, his Government had given orders for the disembarkation of troops at Laraiche, that the landing of the troops was to be merely in the nature of a demonstration, and that Spanish action would not have been carried further had the Moorish authorities adopted proper measures for giving reparation and punishing the guilty. The presence of Spanish troops at Laraiche would have the advantage of giving greater freedom of action to the Moorish police at that place and would reassure the Spanish colonies, especially at Alcazar, where disorders were increasing, and where it was feared that the pretender would reorganise his forces and that another person named Uld-el-Far would cause trouble. Before receipt, however, of the orders of the Spanish Government the Spanish consul, in concert with the captain of the Spanish cruiser, called a meeting of the consular body and informed them that, owing to the alarm caused at Alcazar by the attack on the town guard on the night of the 7th June, troops would be landed and a mixed force of Spanish troops and Moorish police would proceed to Alcazar. No objection was made by the consuls, and the troops were landed without any incident. Precise instructions had been given to the Spanish consul that the Moorish flag was to remain flying on public buildings and that the basha was to continue to exercise his functions.

This letter was communicated by the doyen to the foreign representatives, who all merely annotated the circular with the word "Vu," except the French chargé

d'affaires, who wrote: "J'ai transmis ces informations à mon Gouvernement et j'attends ses instructions." I confined myself to saying that I was forwarding a copy of the Spanish Minister's letter to His Majesty's Government.

Sid Guebbas has now also addressed to the doyen of the diplomatic body a letter, translation of which is enclosed herewith. The substance of this letter is as follows:—

Upon the arrival of the two ships of war at Laraiche, his Excellency made a protest to the Spanish Minister. On hearing of the landing of the troops, he addressed a further letter to him protesting against the landing as being contrary to all the treaties and conventions, especially the Act of Algeciras. The Spanish Minister had informed him that it was in consequence of the attack on Alcazar of the 7th instant that it had been considered necessary to send the Laraiche police to Alcazar and to replace them by 250 men from the Spanish ships of war. Sid Guebbas had replied that tranquillity reigned at Alcazar and in the neighbourhood, where caravans journeyed along the roads undisturbed, and that the incident of the 7th instant had been a got-up affair.

On the 11th instant the Spanish Minister had addressed a letter to Sid Guebbas, stating that the grounds upon which the troops had been landed were: (1) the assassination of the Spanish protégé, Ben Malek; and (2) the night attack on the guard at Alcazar.

To the second point Sid Guebbas had replied as before: as regards the first, his Excellency pointed out that the Makhzen had not accepted the grant of Spanish protection to Ben Malek, as it was contrary to treaty; the Spaniard, whose semsar he was said to be, was not engaged in trade, and was therefore not entitled to appoint a semsar; that Ben Malek and his sons were notorious intriguers who had created trouble in the district, and had on that account been deprived of the protection of another Power; he had, moreover, taken a leading part in the revolt of the pretender. His Excellency added that even had there been extenuating circumstances the Spanish Government could have obtained satisfaction by diplomatic means, and there was no call for the occupation of two important towns.

After recapitulating as above the communications that had passed between himself and the Marquis de Villasinda, Sid Guebbas informed the doyen that he had received letters from Makhzen officials in the occupied districts complaining of the action taken by Spain, which tended to give rise to disturbances and to ruin the country, but that he had replied exhorting them to maintain order and tranquillity, and assuring them that the Makhzen was doing all in his power to obtain the withdrawal of the Spanish troops. His Excellency requests the foreign representatives to bring the matter to the notice of their respective Governments, so that they may make representations on the subject to the Spanish Government, as the occupation of these places constitutes a serious blow at the integrity of Morocco and endangers the general peace and public interests. He begs that the Powers who were signatory to the Act of Algeciras should compel Spain to withdraw her troops and respect that Act, the fundamental principles of which are the independence of the country, the sovereignty of the Sultan, and liberty of commerce. In conclusion, Sid Guebbas declares that so long as the occupation by the Spanish troops continues the Makhzen assumes no responsibility, and will not fulfil any of its financial or other obligations, whether ancient or recent.

This letter has been put in circulation by the doyen, but has at present only reached the German and Belgian Ministers, who annotated it "Vu," and the Spanish Minister, who wrote on it as follows:—

"Au cours de ma conversation avec son Excellence Sid Guebbas, le délégué du Sultan m'a déclaré, à propos de certaines inadmissibles insinuations, qu'il reproduit dans sa lettre du 12 à notre honorable doyen, qu'il n'entrait pas dans son esprit de mettre en doute la sincérité du Gouvernement Royal ni de son représentant à Tanger. Les termes de la lettre susdite, même en les interprétant dans ce sens, m'empêchent de prendre acte de ce document. Je crois, avec cette attitude, donner une preuve de plus du désir du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté catholique de réduire les proportions de tout incident dans les délicates circonstances actuelles."

I have made no observations on the circular, and have confined myself to marking it "Vu."

All reports from Alcazar and Laraiche agree that no disturbances have occurred in consequence of Spanish action, and that the country is quiet, travellers passing safely through the district without any escort. I am informed that many of the natives who

have regarded French action with distrust are rather pleased than otherwise with the presence of Spanish troops at Alcazar.

The Spanish Minister, who has just called with reference to another matter, spoke to me of Sid Guebbas's letter. He told me that Ben Malek was granted protection at least eight months ago as semsar of one of the most well-to-do Spaniards at Laraiche, and no word of protest was received from the Makhzen; also that the two sons who were killed, and who were described by Guebbas as intriguers, were boys aged respectively 12 and 14 years.

I enquired what it was proposed to do with the reinforcements which had arrived at Laraiche. M. de Villasinda said he did not know what the military authorities would decide to do with them, but thought it probable they would be utilised for keeping open the road between Laraiche and Alcazar. I further enquired whether it was proposed to maintain the occupation if the country remained quite quiet. He replied that the occupation was purely temporary, but that he could not tell how long it would last.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 402.

Spanish Minister to Doyen of Diplomatic Body.

M. le Doyen et cher Collègue, [*Non datée.*]

LE Gouvernement Royal a reçu ces jours derniers des nouvelles de Larache et d'Alcazar-el-Kébir qui confirment l'assassinat du protégé espagnol Ahmed-ben-Malek et de ses deux fils par des gens de l'agitateur Tayza, qui les avait fait prisonniers, et, après avoir exigé une forte rançon pour leur rendre la liberté, les ont mis à mort, mutilant leurs cadavres et promenant leurs têtes coupées en guise de trophée par les tribus environantes. Ces faits ont produit une très grande impression dans les colonies étrangères et parmi nos protégés.

Le Conseil des Ministres de Sa Majesté catholique, prenant en compte que sa passiveté au moment même où deux vaisseaux de guerre espagnols se trouvaient à Larache pourrait être interprétée comme un abandon des devoirs de protection qu'il a à sa charge, prit l'accord de les remplir dans les limites du respect le plus scrupuleux aux principes de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Les instructions nécessaires avaient été envoyées en conséquence à M. le commandant du croiseur "Cataluña," pour qu'il fît débarquer à Larache un nombre d'hommes appartenant à la dotation des vaisseaux à ses ordres. Ce débarquement devait avoir le caractère d'une simple démonstration. Si les mesures qu'adopteraient les autorités chérifiennes pour réparer l'attentat et en châtier les auteurs eussent été suffisantes, l'action de l'Espagne n'aurait pas été portée plus loin.

Ces mesures offraient, en plus, l'avantage, si le mauvais état de la mer obligeait les vaisseaux à se retirer, de laisser une plus ample liberté de mouvement au tabor de la police marocaine et de relever l'esprit des colonies, spécialement à Alcazar, où la crainte de désordres augmente chaque jour à cause de la probabilité de ce que l'agitateur Tayza refasse ses forces dans les montagnes et qu'un autre, nommé Uld-el-Far, réalise ses menaces de venir aussi porter des troubles. En plus, des vols et d'autres excès ont été commis récemment dans les alentours d'Alcazar.

Avant, toutefois, que les instructions, ci-dessus énoncées eussent pu parvenir à M. Zugasti les événements s'étaient précipités. M. le consul d'Espagne, d'accord avec le commandant du "Cataluña," a convoqué en conséquence le corps consulaire de Larache et lui a fait part dans l'après-midi du 8, sans qu'aucune objection fût soulevée, que le débarquement allait s'opérer pour que le Capitaine Ovile pût partir pour Alcazar avec une partie des forces débarquées et une autre partie des forces du tabor de la police de Larache, étant données l'agitation et l'alarme causées à Alcazar par l'attaque à la garde de cette ville la nuit du 7 par un grand nombre des cavaliers des alentours.

Le débarquement s'est opéré sans contretemps. Des instructions précises ont été données à M. Zugasti pour que le pacha soit respecté dans l'exercice de ses fonctions et pour que le pavillon chérifien soit l'unique qui ondoie sur les édifices publics.

En portant ce qui précède à votre connaissance, veuillez, &c.

VILLASINDA.

Enclosure 2 in No. 402.

Sid Guebbas to Doyen of Diplomatic Body.

(Traduction.) *Tanger, le 12 juin*, 1911 (13 *jumada ethani*, 1329).
(Après les salutations d'usage.)

NOUS avons l'honneur de vous informer que nous avons reçu officiellement confirmation qu'une force militaire espagnole a débarqué à Larache pour l'occuper et qu'une partie de cette force s'est dirigée sur Alcazar pour procéder à son occupation.

Au reçu de cette nouvelle nous nous sommes empressés d'écrire à son Excellence le Ministre d'Espagne à Tanger et protester contre cet acte, qui est contraire aux traités et conventions, particulièrement à l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Nous lui avons demandé également de nous indiquer les raisons de cette occupation. Déjà au moment de l'arrivée des deux bateaux de guerre espagnols, en rade de Larache, nous lui avons écrit pour protester contre cet envoi.

A la réception de notre lettre premièrement citée, son Excellence le Ministre d'Espagne est venu nous déclarer que les renseignements qu'il a reçus de son consul à Larache concernant le débarquement se résument ainsi: à la suite de l'attaque dirigée contre Alcazar dans la nuit de mercredi à jeudi dernier, il a été jugé nécessaire d'envoyer le tabor de la police de Larache à Alcazar et de la faire remplacer par une partie de la force espagnole qui était à bord des deux bateaux précités et dont le nombre s'élevait à 250 hommes, pour assurer la tranquillité de la ville et de ses environs.

Nous lui avons répondu, après l'avoir renvoyé au contenu de la lettre que nous lui avions précédemment écrite, que le port de Larache, la ville d'Alcazar, leurs environs et le Gharb jouissaient de la tranquillité et de la sécurité; que les caravanes circulaient dans les différentes routes de cette région sans être inquiétées ni molestées; que ce qui est arrivé à Alcazar était prémédité et dont l'origine est l'arrivée brusque dans cette ville de cavaliers ne dépassant pas la dizaine qui, après s'être approchés du poste de garde, ont tire quelques coups de fusil auxquels les hommes qui étaient de garde rispostèrent. Ces cavaliers furent de suito mis en fuite, poursuivis par ceux de la méhalla qui campaient à Alcazar, sans avoir pu retrouver une trace de leur présence, ce qui prouve d'une façon évidente que cet incident était préparé.

Puis dans la journée d'hier j'ai reçu, de la part de son Excellence le Ministre d'Espagne, une lettre où il attribue l'occupation par des troupes espagnoles de Larache et Alcazar à deux causes:—

1. L'assassinat du protégé espagnol Ahmed-ben-Malek-el-Masmoudi.
2. L'attaque dirigée dans la nuit de mercredi à jeudi, contre le poste de garde à Alcazar.

Quant à ce qui concerne la première raison, nous n'avons pas manqué de faire ressentir à M. le Ministre que la protection de Ben Malek n'était pas acceptée parce qu'elle était contraire aux conventions et traités, car le négociant qui lui a accordé la protection ne s'occupe pas d'affaires commerciales ni à Larache ni ailleurs pour pouvoir lui accorder la qualité de censal, étant donné que ce droit ne peut être dévolu qu'aux personnes exerçant un important commerce; en outre, la personne de Ben Malek était connue par ses méchantes intrigues et par ses procédés pour jeter le trouble dans la région, lui et ses fils; la preuve est qu'il était mokhalat d'un autre étranger et qu'il s'est vu retirer cette mokhalata à la suite de ces intrigues et qu'il était un des chefs de la révolte qui vient de prendre fin par sa mort de par la dispersion de tous les éléments de trouble, grâce aux troupes chérifiennes que le Makhzen a envoyées au début de la révolte, ainsi que cela est à la connaissance de tout le monde. Et, en supposant même que Ben Malek ait été assassiné injustement, son affaire aurait été solutionnée en la présentant au Makhzen, qui aurait été tenu de donner satisfaction aux demandes de l'Espagne, et non en occupant deux importantes villes de l'Empire chérifien.

Quant à la seconde raison, les réponses y relatives sont celles mentionnées au début de cette lettre et qu'ont été faites verbalement et par écrit à M. le Ministre d'Espagne.

Sans doute, l'occupation espagnole des villes précitées a été brusque et soudain sans qu'avis préalable ait été adressé au Makhzen verbalement ou par écrit et sans que ce dernier l'eût demandée; cette occupation a eu lieu contrairement aux déclarations souvent répétées par M. le Ministre d'Espagne, surtout à la veille du débarquement,

que son Gouvernement n'avait en aucune façon l'intention d'occuper un port quelconque de l'Empire chérifienne.

A la suite de cette occupation, les agents du Makhzen nous ont écrit plusieurs lettres, car ils furent brusqués ainsi que tout l'Empire chérifien par ce grand événement, qui viole toutes les conventions, met tout le monde dans le plus grand embarras et provoque des troubles graves, qui pourraient être la cause de la ruine complète du pays et des intérêts généraux.

Nous nous sommes empressés de répondre à ces agents en les exhortant à continuer à maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité, de crainte que des incidents plus graves ne se produisent; nous leur avons fait part que le Makhzen est en train de déployer tous ses efforts pour résoudre cette question avec le Gouvernement espagnol et de faire évacuer la région occupée.

Conformément à ce qui précède, nous prions votre Excellence de porter à la connaissance du corps diplomatique, dont vous faites partie, l'objet de cette protestation afin que chacun d'eux puisse la communiquer à son Gouvernement et faire le nécessaire auprès de lui pour attirer l'attention du Gouvernement espagnole sur la gravité de l'occupation des points qu'il vient d'effectuer dans l'Empire chérifien, occupation qui portera une atteinte profonde à l'intégrité du Maroc et qui sera un grand danger à la paix générale et aux intérêts publics.

Vous prierez les Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras d'obliger l'Espagne à retirer ses troupes des points occupés afin de respecter l'Acte d'Algésiras, qui a pour base l'indépendance du pays, la souveraineté du Sultan et la liberté commerciale.

Nous tenons à vous informer en terminant, que tant que les troupes espagnoles continuent à occuper le pays, le Makhzen n'assumera aucune responsabilité, et ne remplira aucun engagement financier ou autre, ancien ou récent, ou qui pourrait résulter de cette occupation.

[23802] No. 403.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 99.) *Rome, June 15, 1911.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that a question was asked in the Italian Chamber yesterday as to whether it was correct that France, on deciding to dispatch a military expedition to Morocco, had addressed a verbal communication on the subject to the signatory Powers of the Algeciras convention, and that these Powers had confined themselves to receiving the communication, but had not taken note of it.

The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs replied that the French Government had communicated a *note verbale*. The Italian Government had no reason to doubt the observance by France of the terms of the Algeciras Act.

I have, &c.
H. DERING.

[23882] No. 404.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 288. Confidential.) *Paris, June 18, 1911.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, containing particulars respecting the Lemta incident in Morocco, which, as I had the honour to inform you in my despatch No. 279 of the 15th instant, M. Cruppi promised to forward to me.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 404.

M. Cruppi to Sir F. Bertie.

EN réponse à la note de son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne en date du 15 de ce mois, le Département des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de préciser

les indications contenues dans ses récentes notes du 3 et du 10, au sujet du combat livré, le 21 mai, par les troupes marocaines de Fez. Il a reçu, en effet, un nouveau rapport du consul de France à Fez, ainsi que les explications verbales d'un agent de la légation qui arrive de la capitale chérifienne et s'y trouvait pendant le siège.

Contrairement aux suppositions du consul britannique à Fez, dont son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie a bien voulu communiquer une dépêche au département, les habitants, et particulièrement les Riffains du Lemta, se sont signalés par leur acharnement et leur cruauté au cours de l'investissement de la ville. Ils ont tué des courriers ou leur ont crevé les yeux. On a trouve, le 21, un soldat suspendu à un arbre depuis deux jours et agonisant. Ces actes de barbarie sont bien imputables aux gens du Lemta et distincts de ceux qu'ont commis les Beni-M'tir.

Cette population a continué ses attaques jusqu'au dernier moment, et il est inexact que, le 21 au matin, les combattants se fussent enfuis du camp de Sidi Ahmed-el-Bernoussi pour ne laisser sur place qu'un petit nombre de vieillards, d'enfants, de femmes et de gardiens inoffensifs des propriétés. Le combat a duré en réalité plusieurs heures; il a été très vif et il a nécessité l'entrée en ligne des contingents réguliers et de l'artillerie.

Il est regrettable que des habitants de Fez aient été victimes de cette opération. En ce qui concerne Ben Chekroun, il a été signalé que sa maison était une des principales positions occupées par les insurgés et un des centres de distribution de munitions; il aurait pris part au combat; on s'explique donc qu'il ait été atteint.

Les prisonniers ont été conduits à Fez et emprisonnés.

Le nombre des femmes et des enfants vendus clandestinement à Fez se réduirait à cinq ou six. Ils ont été rendus à leurs familles, sauf deux enfants: l'un n'avait pas été réclamé et on n'avait pas retrouvé ses parents; l'autre a été recueilli provisoirement, à la demande de son père, qui, blessé dans le combat, n'était pas en état de le reprendre.

Il a déjà été dit que le consul de France ne pouvait donner et n'avait pas donné à son collègue britannique des assurances de la nature de celles qu'a rapportées Mr. MacLeod. Il est également inexact que les faits rapportés par le consul anglais aient été reconnus par M. le Général Moinier et par M. Gaillard.

En définitive, les événements qui aurait pu mettre en cause la responsabilité des agents français sont de nature à ne justifier aucune accusation contre eux. Le Gouvernement britannique a bien voulu le déclarer, en ce qui concerne les instructeurs, dans la dernière note remise par l'ambassade, et le département apprécie la haute valeur de ce témoignage. D'autre part, les faits imputables aux habitudes de la guerre marocaine paraissent avoir été exagérés, et le département ne peut que se référer aux informations précises qu'il a eu l'honneur de communiquer à l'Ambassade britannique, d'après les rapports émanant des agents les mieux placés pour une enquête de ce genre. Le Gouvernement français désire, comme le Gouvernement anglais, la disparition des procédés inhumains qui ont été jusqu'ici de pratique courante au Maroc, et il ne cessera d'employer son influence à cet effet.

Paris, le 17 juin, 1911.

[24390] No. 405.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, June 21, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

I have been informed in confidence that a formal declaration as to the action recently taken by Spain was made to-day to the German Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the Spanish Ambassador.

According to this declaration the Spanish Government took action on account of an outrage committed against a Spanish protégé. The object of the action was to obtain reparation for the outrage and the punishment of the guilty; but the temporary measures which had been taken would cease when the normal course of things had been resumed and order had been restored.

It is understood that the above communication is interpreted by the Acting Secretary of State to mean that as soon as the French retire from Fez the Spaniards will evacuate the places which they have occupied.

[24391] No. 406.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, June 21, 1911.*

FRENCH chargé d'affaires informs me that the Spanish acting vice-consul at Alcazar has been taken to Laraiche on the way to Tangier, his [group undecypherable] being affected.

[? I have] asked the consular agent at Alcazar to report.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[22743] No. 407.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie

(No. 236.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 21, 1911.*

I HAVE received Sir F. Bertie's despatch No. 270 of the 11th instant, enclosing a copy of a communication from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the French operations in Morocco.

In the course of this communication M. Cruppi, quoting apparently the French consul at Fez, observes that Mulai Zin will be treated with indulgence, "bien que le vizir du prétendant, Mekouar, protégé anglais, se soit livré à une propagande anti-française acharnée."

You will be aware, from Mr. Lister's despatch No. 127 of the 25th May and the enclosures thereto, that in thus echoing the complaints of Sid Taib Mokri M. Cruppi is doing great injustice to Mikwar. As Mr. Lister points out in the above-mentioned despatch, and as was confirmed by the French chargé d'affaires at Tangier as late as the 25th May last, Mikwar has on the contrary rendered very good services to the cause of order and safety at Mequinez.

In a despatch (No. 154 of the 10th June) just received at the Foreign Office, Mr. Lister transmits despatches from Consul MacLeod enclosing further correspondence with Mikwar. It appears therefrom that on the 1st June anti-foreign disorders specially directed against French protected persons began to occur at Mequinez, and would inevitably have reached serious proportions but for the promptness and energy with which Mikwar and the other viziers suppressed them by arresting more that 100 of the ringleaders.

I should be glad if you would inform M. Cruppi of the above, pointing out that the account of Mikwar's proceedings which appears to have reached him is entirely at variance with that received by His Majesty's Government and quoting Mr. Lister's opinion of Mikwar's services. You should at the same time express the hope that the French Government will not too readily credit Moorish reports against British protected persons.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24163] No. 408.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rennie.

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, June 21, 1911.*

SPANISH Ambassador has communicated the verbal declaration which Spanish Government have made in regard to the presence of their troops at Alcazar.

You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that it appears to His Majesty's Government that the conditions enumerated in it would require an extended time to fulfil, and that the declaration holds out little prospect of an early withdrawal. His Majesty's Government would be glad if the Spanish Government would state that, if order is maintained in the district at Alcazar, the force will be withdrawn to Laraiche, leaving the settlement of the other questions mentioned for subsequent treatment by the usual diplomatic means. You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs confidentially that, after the declarations of M. Cruppi in the French

Chambers, it is evident that the French Government desire to withdraw their forces from Fez as soon as possible, and that the expression of a similar desire on the part of the Spanish Government would facilitate greatly the resumption of discussions at Madrid, which it is in the general interest should not be interrupted.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 155.)

[24407] No. 409.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Greg.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 101.)
Sir, *Madrid, June 17, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that to-day's "Gazette" publishes the text of a Bill granting a supplementary credit of 100,000 pesetas to the Foreign Office estimates for political expenses in Morocco, and an extraordinary credit of 250,000 pesetas to the Ministry of Justice to defray the expenses of transferring to the Peninsula the inmates of the convict establishment at Ceuta.

The preamble to the Bill states that the credit of 150,000 pesetas provided in the estimates for the agency at Fez and other political expenses in Morocco has become insufficient for the requirements of Spanish policy in that country, and "that reasons of international policy which outweigh every other consideration make it essential to transfer immediately to the State prisons in the Peninsula the inmates of the convict establishment of Ceuta, for which purpose the necessary works are being carried out."

I have, &c.
ERNEST RENNIE.

[24408] No. 410.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 103.)
Sir, *Madrid, June 17, 1911.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs, when I saw him this morning, appeared to be in good spirits and fairly satisfied with the general condition of the Morocco situation. He said he was glad to see that the polemics indulged in by the French and Spanish press—which now, however, fortunately appeared to be adopting a calmer tone—were not reflected in the relations between the two Cabinets. What chiefly seemed to concern him was the presence so near Alcazar of the French agent, M. Boisset, and of Captain Moreau. I remarked that Captain Moreau appeared to be with the Shereefian troops in the ordinary course of his duty, to which his Excellency replied that he had information that both that officer and M. Boisset were intriguing with the neighbouring tribes, and that if any collision occurred between them and the Spanish forces it would lead to serious complications. The statement, as well as the article published in to-day's "Imparcial," was more or less exact, and he had instructed the Spanish Ambassador at Paris to represent the matter to M. Cruppi, and to urge that these two officials should be given orders to restrain their zeal and to exercise due caution.

After referring to your conversations with Señor Villa Urrutia, I then enquired whether the Spanish Government proposed to make any declaration of policy with regard to their move on Alcazar analogous to that issued by the French Government previous to their march on Fez, adding that the only declaration as to their intentions that had been so far made was the verbal explanation given by the Spanish Minister at Tangier in reply to the written protest of the Makhzen. To this his Excellency replied that some such declaration would shortly be issued, within the next few days, but seemed rather disposed to think that this was not a matter of very urgent importance. I pointed out that it was very desirable that this statement should be made as soon as possible in order to clear up the present situation and to prevent misunderstandings. Señor Garcia Prieto finally said that he would urge the matter this afternoon on Señor Canalejas, who, he thought, would agree to a declaration being issued very shortly.

I have, &c.
ERNEST RENNIE.

[24410] No. 411.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 24.)

(No. 105.)

Sir, *Madrid, June* 18, 1911.

THE President of the Council made a statement yesterday to the representatives of the press regarding the situation in Morocco, which is reproduced in most of this morning's papers, and is to the following effect :—

He began by protesting against the rumour first started by the "Matin" that Spain would take Tangier on the 27th June ; the international character of that town was sufficient proof of the absurdity of this *canard*. As regards the recent debate in the French Chamber concerning Morocco, he concurred in the general lines of M. Cruppi's speech ; had he himself had to speak, he would not have said otherwise. All reports to the effect that Spain was going to move on Tetuan, Argila, or Tangier were ridiculous. He had already declared in the Cortes as clearly as he was able to do, and he would again repeat his statement—that Spanish action in Morocco had in view three objects, viz., to secure an expansion of Ceuta, in order to guarantee security in the zone outside the fortress ; to guarantee the same security at Melilla ; and to take steps so that within the zone of Spanish influence the Spanish police at Laraiche and Alcazar should be in a position to perform its duties. It was the firm resolve of the Spanish Government that their action should confine itself to the limits necessary for policing the Ceuta-Tetuan district and up to the Muluya-Kert line, which was necessary for the Melilla district. The expansion in these two directions as well as the reinforcement of the Laraiche police were obviously measures only of a provisional character.

Señor Canalejas went on to say that in order to avoid creating alarm the only troops that had been sent to Laraiche belonged to the marine infantry, which formed part of the crews of men-of-war. He then went on to state that, in spite of the explicit declarations that had been made, stories were current that 10,000 troops were about to be sent to Morocco, whereas, as a matter of fact, the number of men mobilised did not amount to 1,400. Nothing except rations, munitions, and other necessaries were now being sent to Laraiche. After the police system had been reconstituted, and when affairs in Morocco returned to a normal state, the Spanish Government would adopt the necessary attitude. It was true that a protest had been lodged by the Sultan, but this protest was merely a theoretical one and of little importance. He considered that the Government had merely performed a duty, and he was in no way afraid of having acted as he had done. He felt, however, called upon to dissipate the state of alarm that was continually being fostered by the French press. As regards the stories current in the foreign press regarding an alliance with Germany, he remarked that the "German international policy was well-defined, and that when that country had a duty to perform, it performed it."

I have, &c.

ERNEST A. RENNIE.

[24411] No. 412.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 24.)

(No. 106.)

Sir, *Madrid, June* 19, 1911.

TELEGRAMS from Melilla, published in this morning's newspapers, announce the occupation of Tauriet-Zag, a position which lies due south of the fortress on the further side of Mount Gurugu, and is said to command the upper part of the River Kert.

This fresh move is one of mainly strategic importance, and was foreshadowed in the declarations made to the press on Saturday by Señor Canalejas, when he stated that one of the three objects of Spanish action in Morocco was to secure the police district round Melilla as defined by the Muluya and Kert Rivers.

I have, &c.

ERNEST RENNIE.

[24395] No. 413.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 24.)

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, June* 23, 1911.

MOROCCO.

I have spoken to Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of your telegram No. 77 of 21st June.

Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that want of precision of last declaration regarding Alcazar was due to the fact that it had been drawn up by Council of Ministers, and that Spanish Government had been anxious to make some declaration without delay. He would consult Prime Minister, whose consent was necessary, with a view to making a further and more precise statement. I remarked that there should be little difficulty in making more precise declaration of intentions in view of Prime Minister's speech in Chamber yesterday. His Excellency concurred, and said that he would send me reply as soon as possible.

His Excellency said that he attached great importance to resumption of Madrid conversations, which would serve to avert misunderstandings, and should result in some formula being found which would be acceptable to both Cabinets.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[24704] No. 414.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 26.)

(No. 159.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 14, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that the French chargé d'affaires informed Mr. Lister a short time since that M. Tahir, who was chief of the former Turkish Mission at Fez, dismissed by the Sultan last summer at the demand of France (see Mr. Lister's despatch No. 101 of the 13th June), had been at Tangier in disguise with two companions for a few weeks past, having come to Morocco on behalf of Cherai Pasha and the Pan-Islamic Union Maghrebine. He was carrying on intrigue against the Sultan and against the French in this country, and had tried to get up to Mequinez to join Mulai Zin, but had not been able to do so.

M. de Billy said that the Moorish authorities proposed to expel M. Tahir, but he did not wish any action to be taken without the knowledge of this legation.

After consulting you on the matter, Mr. Lister informed M. de Billy that, if there were proof of the charges against Tahir, this legation would not intervene should the Moorish authorities deport him.

The following day M. Tahir called at this legation and informed me that he had heard that Sid Guebbas, at the instigation of the French and with the concurrence of this legation, was about to expel him from the country. He protested that he had given no cause for such action to be taken against him, stating that he had only arrived five days before from Egypt by the German steamer "Adolph Woermann," and had left for Algeciras the following day, having returned to Tangier only two days before ; he had thus only been in Tangier for three days in all. He added that he was here as correspondent of the Egyptian papers "Lewa" and "Moayyad," and had two companions, only one of whom had belonged to the former military mission. They were to assist him in his work, one going to Laraiche and the other to Rabat. He assured me he had no intention of intriguing in this country or of mixing himself up in political questions.

I said that if he came to Morocco merely as a correspondent of foreign papers and kept clear of political intrigues, giving no cause for complaint, I did not suppose that anyone would desire to expel him.

At Mr. Lister's request I called on the French chargé d'affaires and communicated to him the substance of the above conversation. M. de Billy said that he was convinced M. Tahir had been some time at Tangier, as the French agent at Cairo had telegraphed that Cherai Pasha had received a letter from him written from here. He was a dangerous man, and had been sent here with a considerable sum of money at his disposal for forwarding the objects of the Pan-Islamic Union Maghrebine, which had given much trouble in Algeria and elsewhere. M. de Billy said he had at the legation a number of copies of the "Moayyad" containing articles signed by M. Tahir violently attacking Mulai Hafid, who is called an infidel, and the French in Morocco. These

articles do much harm, as the "Moayyad" has a not inconsiderable circulation amongst the better classes in Morocco.

On the evening of the following day M. Tahir's companions called at the consulate and reported that he had been invited to go to the basha, and when there was arrested and placed in confinement. I sent the consulate gaoler to the Kasbah, to ensure that the prisoner was not subjected to any ill-treatment. The gaoler reported that, though he had not seen M. Tahir, he was satisfied that he was being properly treated. He was not in the prison, but was kept under guard in a separate room at the Kasbah. Though his companions had not been admitted to see him, he had been allowed to communicate with them, and had sent them a letter and about 30*l.* in cash. He was to be put on board a French steamer leaving next morning for Oran, and would there be set at liberty and be free to go where he wished.

Two days later M. Hilmi, one of M. Tahir's companions and a member of the late military mission at Fez, called at this legation and complained of the arrest of his chief, regarding whose fate he expressed some anxiety. I, however, reassured him on this point, informing him that M. Tahir was at Oran and free. M. Hilmi said he was embarrassed for want of funds, for, although they had a credit of 200*l.* at the German bank here, it was deposited in M. Tahir's name, and they could not draw on it. Upon my enquiring about the 30*l.* received from M. Tahir, he replied that it was all spent on paying their hotel bill, and, on my showing that that was impossible, he said it had been spent at cafés. His companion, however, incidently let drop that M. Hilmi had spent a considerable sum on a very long telegram he had sent. I informed him that I could not help him financially, and recommended him to telegraph to his friends if he was in need of money. I questioned him as to the date of the arrival of the party at Tangier, and he said they had all come by the "Adolph Woermann" third-class and travelling under their own names. I obtained from the agents a list of passengers landed here from that steamer, and find that their names do not appear on it. There can, I think, be little doubt that Tahir and his companions have been here longer than they are willing to admit.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[24706] No. 415.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 161.)

Sir, *Tangier, June 15, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting a conversation he had had with his French colleague with regard to the treatment to be accorded to Mulai Zin and the members of his Government at Mequinez. The attitude assumed by M. Gaillard does not seem to have been altogether satisfactory, but I do not think there is much danger of the French allowing the Sultan openly to disregard the assurances given. I cannot, however, help sharing Mr. MacLeod's fears in regard to Mulai Zin's fate should he be confined in Mulai Hafid's Palace—however comfortable his prison house may be.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 415.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 43. Confidential.)

Sir, *Fez, June 9, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's despatch No. 17 of the 3rd instant.

I called on the French consul, M. Gaillard, yesterday, alluded to the reports which are still current of the Sultan's intention of punishing the members of the Provisional Government at Mequinez, and inquired whether M. Gaillard had received the instructions, referred to in your Excellency's despatch No. 17, of the French Government.

M. Gaillard replied that he had received those instructions, and—though with some embarrassment—added that, of course, General Moinier and he would carry them out.

This fresh assurance and some of the rest of M. Gaillard's remarks are given in the letter I last night dispatched to M. Enyart, of which I beg to enclose a copy herewith, and to which I would invite attention.

M. Gaillard proceeded, however, to complain that the Makhzen and the French had been much annoyed by the later attitude taken up by Mulai Zin and his friends. They were alleging that various foreign Governments supported them, and this was stiffening opposition to the Sultan, and that they had been much encouraged by advice given to them by Sid Mehdi Menebhi, and particularly by my having sent (see last paragraph of my despatch No. 28 of the 4th May) a list of houses at Fez of British, American, and Portuguese subjects in need of protection should the insurgents enter Fez.

As regards the course which the Provisional Government were alleged to have been taking, I replied in the sense of my letter to M. Enyart herewith enclosed. It was, even if true, merely the surest method of attaining the desired ends until sufficient force reached Mequinez to restore Mulai Hafid's authority without bloodshed, plundering, &c.

As regards sending the said list I took full responsibility, and my reasons were :—

1. That it was the first duty of a consul to safeguard the lives and property in his charge by all means in his power.
2. That M. Gaillard had, at the very beginning of the crisis, and throughout, constantly assured me that the above considerations were the only ones, for the time, to be considered, and that "la politique reste suspendue."
3. That M. Gaillard had informed me that he himself had made arrangements with various insurgent leaders, with whom he was in correspondence, to send contingents to guard the French consulate, should they enter the town.

M. Gaillard seemed rather abashed by these reminders, which he could not deny, but added that in the last connection all he had really done was to detain a Beni Sadin friend of his in town in case perchance he might be useful as an intermediary.

I answered laughingly that of course these steps were, perhaps, not very convenient to recall now, and that what he had stated to me at the time was what I have given above. These things had all happened before the return of the Brémond column, and before we knew that a French intervention was to take place, and when we had nothing but local resources to look to for the safety of the European colonies, whether an intervention could take place could not—to us here, at that time cut off from communication from the rest of the world—be anything but matter of conjecture merely, and at any rate should such intervention occur, the mere taking of steps, in so—literally—vital a matter, against the opposite eventuality was merely common sense.

As regards Sid Menebhi, I was satisfied these reports were untrue. I had heard of them and made enquiries, but could find no evidence to support them. What I had learned quite accidentally, but from an absolutely disinterested and sure and wholly unofficial quarter, was that Kaïd Akka and some other tribesmen had some months ago gone to Tangier and related the Beni Mtir's grievances to Sid Menebhi. The latter (and possibly the ex-Sultan Mulai Abdelaziz) had represented these to the French Legation, but the latter had declined to intervene, whereupon Sid Menebhi had said to them, "I can do no more for you. Fend for yourselves."

As regards the present situation, I should be the last to suggest that force and severity had not sometimes to be used against Berber and such tribes, and that the Makhzen formerly had had the excuse that it had to make up by ferocity what it lacked in force. But that was now changed when the Makhzen had the military force of France to draw upon. With this M. Gaillard agreed, but pointed out that the local military resources were still small, and that even 500 men to garrison Sefroo could not just now be found.

As regards Mulai Zin, M. Gaillard some days ago said to me that he at any rate could hope for no more than chains and a cell at the Palace. To-day M. Gaillard changed this to a comfortable house at the Palace and to live in custody.

As I did not feel authorised to treat of such a matter I made no reply, but I would call your Excellency's attention thereto, very especially to the risks of such conditions for Mulai Zin, after all that has happened and in view of the Sultan's character.

In regard to M. Gaillard's information from Mequinez I would point out that he has to me on other occasions repeatedly deplored the fact that he has no reliable correspondent there, and only a few days ago he remarked that he would have

liked, had other considerations not outweighted it, to have gone to Mequinez to procure one.

His previous correspondent, a Moor named Bel Korah, a French protégé, became a member of the Provisional Government, and thereupon M. Gaillard ceased to correspond with him, and he has since been dependent upon Makhzen sources of information and upon some Jews, and the latter can and do only repeat street corner rumours as a rule. Under the circumstances, I suggest for consideration whether he would not have done better to retain his regular correspondent, even if doing so did entail a little plain explanation to the Sultan Mulai Hafid, but in any case, at the time, M. Gaillard entirely approved my continuing to correspond with Hadj Mohammed Mikwar, and asked me to recommend certain French protégés to him.

One other matter M. Gaillard mentioned was this, that the Moors hereabouts, and still more so at Mequinez, appeared to think that the British Government had taken up the anti-French course formerly followed by the German Government. This he knew, of course, was absurd, but it was awkward. I answered that some such native misapprehension might exist in some quarters, but it was not attributable to anything said or done by British officials or other British subjects in opposition to French policy. The latter had acted entirely otherwise, and I invited M. Gaillard to quote a single instance in which I, or any other British person hereabouts, had failed to support French action in anything asked of us. This M. Gaillard made haste to admit. Before I left M. Gaillard repeated, however, that it would be all right about Mequinez, as, later on, General Moinier and the Sultan had agreed that the policy of amnesty and oblivion was to be followed.

I would remark, however, that the wrong impression M. Gaillard mentioned does indeed exist, but it has been created by the French at Fez themselves. If the Moors draw unpleasant comparisons between the mildness of Kaïd Maclean and the unheard of severity of Colonel Mangin to the soldiers, who is to blame? When the French, instead of insisting, at the right moment, upon the resignation of the Grand Vizier Glawi, assented to the Brémond column going to Sherarda, under the nominal command of the son of the Grand Vizier instead of some harmless, benignant shereef, was it unreasonable for the tribesmen to conclude that the French supported the Vizier and his malpractices?

The so-called military executions of the 27th January and the recent outrages at Lemta are further instances of how the French here have allowed themselves to be exploited by the Sultan for the accomplishment of his own, often very bad ends.

So far as I have been able to see, none of the French here have, in practice, hitherto succeeded in understanding the carrying out of the course prescribed to them of upholding "the Sultan's authority." In Europe (I imagine) this means maintaining lawful authority and the public peace, whereas here it has, in practice, often been interpreted as entailing compliance with the Sultan's behests, however provocative they may have been and subversive alike of law and order.

I have, &c.

J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 415.

Consul MacLeod to M. Enyart.

Dear M. Enyart, *Fez, June 8, 1911.*

FOR your information and that of Hadj Mohammed Mikwar I write to say that the British Minister has informed me that, in reply to a representation of the British Government through the British Ambassador in Paris, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 30th May, stated that notwithstanding the attitude the Sultan Mulai Hafid was inclined to adopt, there was no need to entertain fears that the assurances of amnesty and oblivion given by the French consul through me in my letter to you of the 16th May would not be fulfilled. The French Government had telegraphed instructions, moreover, to General Moinier and the French consul not to do, or to consent to anything in contradiction of the said assurances given by the French consul.

I have seen the French consul to-day, and he says these instructions have been received by him. He hinted, however, that, according to his information, Hadj Mohammed Mikwar and others appeared to be conducting an anti-French and anti-Makhzen propaganda. I assured the French consul that this was not the fact, and that, on the contrary, Mikwar and his friends had most energetically adhered to the line prescribed to them of preserving public order, and never meant really to oppose the

re-establishment of the Sultan's authority. There was, however, a strong and active Hafidist party in Mequinez, who would, but for the course taken by Mikwar and his friends, probably have tried to re-instal the former administration before the necessary forces arrived, and thus might have brought about the very disorders it was so necessary to avert. The French consul and I had been agreed from the outset that what had to be avoided by all means was the occurrence of any interval between the ending of the Provisional Government and the resumption of power by Mulai Hafid's officials. To carry out the suggestions sent to Mikwar it was essential that he and his friends should remain in office, and, without humouring their supporters, they could not do so, and would have had to give up their powers to others who would not have listened to advice from anybody but the Berbers. It must be obvious further that any premature regaining of power by the Sultan Hafid's officials would have exposed all the officials of the Provisional Government to the unguided reprisals of the former, and would thus, quite possibly, have frustrated policy of oblivion and amnesty which the French Government desired to follow, and still are determined to carry out.

On the 3rd June the American Minister writes to me that he has seen the British Minister, and is in accord with him on this matter, affecting, as it does, the safety of his compatriots, who, like yourselves, live in Mequinez.

Of course, I need hardly point out that the assurances given will not hold should any opposition have been offered to Sidi Mohammed Amrani or General Moinier.

I am hopeful, however, that all will meantime have passed over quietly, but should there be any difficulties, doubtless Hadj Mohammed Mikwar or you may be seeing General Moinier, or one of his staff, and for the assistance of either of you who may do so, I enclose a copy hereof which may be left with General Moinier or his representative, if desired.

With kind regards, yours sincerely,

J. M. MACLEOD

[24708] No. 416.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 163.)

Sir, *Tangier, June 17, 1911.*

WITH reference to Mr. Lister's despatch No. 145 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report that the news of the appointment of Dris Ould Hadj Mennou to replace Hadj Thami el Glawi as governor of Marrakesh has been received with dismay at that place by all classes. Mr. Vice-Consul Lennox writes that "A worse choice could not have been made; he is the enemy and rival of the Glawi brothers here, and a most unsuitable man for the post. We are certain to have great trouble now, and I do not suppose that Dris will be able to come here without French support. . . . . everyone to whom I have spoken, European and Moor, agrees that he is not a suitable man. Even the enemies of Hadj Thami declare they would prefer him to this man." He adds that he has had a very long conversation on the subject with the French vice-consul, who fully concurred in his views, and informed him that he was doing what he could to prevent the appointment.

I took an opportunity of referring to the matter when speaking to the French chargé d'affaires, and I reminded him that Dris Ould Hadj Mennou was the man upon whom the Sultan had cast the responsibility for the horrible tortures inflicted upon the wife of Hadj Ben Aissa. M. de Billy said that he considered the appointment deplorable from every point of view, and that he had written strongly to Fez on the subject. He observed, however, that they were in a delicate position, as they were afraid of interfering too much in the details of Government lest they might give an opening for the charge that they had practically assumed the reins of Government.

It is unfortunate that M. Gaillard, the French consul at Fez, in many ways a most competent and excellent official, is very weak when dealing with the Sultan in matters not directly affecting French interests; he is very anxious not to displease His Majesty, and has not the courage to firmly object in such cases, however well he may know that Mulai Hafid is adopting a wrong course.

No greater incentive could have been given to the Glawi brothers at Marrakesh to defy the Maghzen than their simultaneous dismissal from their posts of governors of the town and Kasbah respectively, and the appointment of their hated rival, Dris Ould Hadj Mennou. Mr. Vice-Consul Lennox reports that Hadj Thami assured him that he would do his utmost to keep the south quiet, and would not give trouble; in

the meantime, however, both the brothers are sending off to their own country as much of their property as they can remove. Kaïd M'Tougi is on his way south with a mehalla to oppose the Glawis if they give trouble.

Since Mr. Lister's departure two letters have arrived for him from Hadj Thami Glawi begging for British protection. As a matter of fact he already has French protection, as an employé of the Union des Mines, but he told Mr. Lennox that he would prefer British protection. Upon receipt of the first letter, I requested Mr. Lennox, through whom it had been forwarded, to inform Hadj Thami that Mr. Lister had left before his letter arrived; that it would be quite impossible for British protection to be granted to him, and that I was sure he had no need to fear that he would suffer any injustice, especially as he said he already had French protection. I am requesting Mr. Lennox to deliver a further message in similar terms with reference to the second letter just received.

I beg leave to transmit herewith translations of the two letters in question.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

P.S.—Since closing this despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca copy of a letter he had received from the vice-consul at Marrakesh, giving news up to the 11th instant, from which it would appear that there may be trouble in the south. The oumana of the town waited upon the French vice-consul and requested him to use his influence in favour of retaining Hadji Thami as governor. The administrator of Government properties called upon Mr. Lennox to sound him on the same subject, and proposed that the consular officers should take joint action in favour of Hadj Thami. A deputation of the chief men of the city visited Mulai Mustafa, the chief cadi and a man of very high position, and the other cadi for the same purpose. Mulai Mustafa is himself very strongly opposed to the appointment of Dris Ould Hadj Mennou. Opinions are divided as to the line to be adopted, some favour an appeal to the Sultan, others open resistance to the new governor when he comes.

In the meantime Hadj Thami is busy receiving the important personages and deputations from the neighbouring tribes. The deputations went first to Mulai Mustafa, and drew up a protest to the Sultan against the appointment of Dris Ould Hadj Mennou.

H. E. W.

Enclosure 1 in No. 416.

Thami Ben Mohammed Mezwari to Mr. Lister.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.)

YOUR Excellency is aware of the affection that exists between us, which affection is known of all men, and which was strengthened by your visit, so that a rapprochement came about, through you, with this Government. This we treasured up until (the day of) need.

It has now become known that our brother, the Vizier at Fez, has been treacherously treated, and his services received in an unfitting manner. This has caused us to write to your Excellency to request from you the protection of your Government.

Now is the time when we need your friendship and affection.

Hasten the reply.

Peace.

THAMI BEN MOHAMMED MEZWARI.

Jumada II, 9, 1329 (*June* 7, 1911).

P.S.—What we desire is that no one may touch our belongings, or our sons. As for their appointments we have no need of them.

T. B. M. M.

Enclosure 2 in No. 416.

Cid Thami Ben Mohammed to Mr. Lister.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.)

WE have to inform your Excellency that since our Master appointed us to our Shereefian office we have been giving our steadfast obedience to orders, both with our person and with our wealth, giving our attention to duty, conducting ourselves well, dealing fairly in all matters with the people, and attending to the affairs of the merchants and the foreign consuls up to the present time.

We have heard that the Makhzen has dismissed your friend, our brother, Cid-el-Medani, from his post of Vizier at Fez, and has also appointed someone to proceed here to Marrakesh to take charge of our office, and that of our brother, Cid Hessy.

We are certain that all things are under the direction of God, and that there is neither movement or repose except by His order, nor is there anyone who may reverse His judgments.

Our mind is easy as to giving up these posts, seeing that it is so decreed by God, and we being obedient to the orders of the Makhzen. We are in no wise chagrined thereat, but only because it may be the intention to lay hands on us or upon our goods or our brethren.

You know, O Friend! that in such circumstances as these one needs the friends and brethren (whose friendship) he has stored up, to defend him. We know of no one on the face of this earth who is more beloved or faithful than you; and our affection for your Excellency has been witnessed by everyone. Praise be to God!

Your zeal on behalf of all those who look to you, and who are dependent upon you, is well known to all men. May God bless you, and increase your honour and respect! We take sanctuary with you, and God forbid that any injustice should overtake us with you!

We pray to God that by your good assistance and your care of us in all circumstances we may obtain tranquillity and safety.

We trust that you will hasten to us a reply which will render us joyful, and set us at ease.

Compliments.

THAMI BEN MOHAMMED

Jumada II, 10, 1329 (*June* 8, 1911).

[24709] No. 417.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 26.)

(No. 164.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 18, 1911.

HIS Majesty's consul at Fez informs me that the people of that city are delighted at the refusal of His Majesty's Government to receive the Moorish Mission on account of the Lemta incident, as the large majority of sufferers on that occasion were Fez people, their servants, and employés. I am told by Dr. Verdon, who has just arrived with his family from Fez, that many of the women and children brought in by the troops and sold in Fez were purchased by their own people or their employers. One girl, whose family had been wiped out, was taken into the Sultan's harem, possibly as an act of charity.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[24710] No. 418.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 26.)

(No. 165.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 17, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 151 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a further letter which Sid Guebbas has addressed to the doyen of the diplomatic body, complaining of the action of the Spanish troops at Alcazar, where, he states, they have camped in a cemetery surrounding a "saint house," thus greatly shocking the religious sentiments of the Mussulmans. He also

states that Captain Ovilo had ill-treated some Moorish soldiers detailed to guard the town and its neighbourhood, and had threatened to detain them as prisoners in the Spanish camp. Sid Guebbas adds that the Makhzen has not ceased enjoining upon its officials to maintain a prudent attitude and to prevent the occurrence of any disturbance, and he enters an energetic protest against the action of the Spaniards, and declares that the Makhzen declines all responsibility for anything that may occur in consequence.

No report has yet reached me from the consular agent at Alcazar in regard to the Spanish camp being pitched in a Moorish cemetery, but the French chargé d'affaires mentioned it to me yesterday. I have not received any particulars as to the other incident mentioned by Sid Guebbas. So far as I have been able to ascertain, an altercation arose in regard to the Makhzen guard, and Captain Ovilo demanded its suppression, but I had not heard that any of the guards had been ill-treated. I am informed that Captain Ovilo also demanded that one of the town gates should be left open at night so that the Spanish patrol could enter. Both requests were refused by the Moorish authorities.

Kaïd Sherkawi's mehalla, with Capain Moureaux, is encamped near Alcazar, but south of the river and outside the Spanish sphere, and other Moorish troops are in the neighbourhood. The Mesmouda and Sarsar tribes sent their notables to Sherkawi's mehalla and sacrificed bullocks, imploring pardon and engaging to pay for all damage done to the Beni Malek during the recent disturbances caused by the Pretender, who is said to have fled to the Beni Mesara tribe.

The Spanish are apparently preparing for a lengthened stay, and Colonel Silvestre, of the Casablanca police, has been sent to Alcazar to assume command. His Majesty's consul at Casablanca informs me that Colonel Silvestre was to have gone on leave a short time since, but received a cypher telegram instructing him to remain at his post, it having evidently been anticipated by the Spanish Government that his services would be required.

From such reports as have reached me it would seem that the presence of Spanish troops at Alcazar and Laraiche has given rise to little excitement, and the country remains perfectly quiet. This is doubtless owing in great measure to the action of the Makhzen and their officials, as well as the good advice given by the Europeans who have been consulted by the natives. The Makhzen could easily, had it desired, have stirred up a fanatical feeling amongst the natives, which would have given rise to serious disorders, but there is undoubtedly a feeling of satisfaction amongst the natives at the presence of the Spanish troops. Mulai Abdel Aziz mentioned it to me a few days since in conversation, and assured me that the feeling was very general in the northern districts, and private reports that have reached me confirm this. This feeling is caused, however, more by dislike and distrust of the French than by any real liking for the Spaniards. It is felt that the rivalry of France and Spain may be for the benefit of the country, and that, at any rate, the French cannot have it all their own way.

On the other hand, the principal Moors of Tetuan are in great fear as to what may happen to them and their property should the Spaniards occupy the town, and many of them, from the governor downwards, are begging for British protection, which of course cannot be extended to them.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 418.

Sid Guebbas to Doyen of the Diplomatic Body.

(Après les compliments d'usage.)

POUR faire suite à la protestation que j'avais, à la date du 13 courant, adressée à votre Excellence concernant le fait par le Gouvernement espagnol d'avoir occupé Laraiche et Elksar contrairement aux traités et conventions et à l'Acte d'Algésiras, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer aujourd'hui que j'ai appris d'une façon certaine que les troupes espagnoles ont établi leur campement au milieu du cimetière qui entoure le sanctuaire de Sidi Aissa-ben-Kâcem, à l'extérieure d'Elksar.

Votre Excellence n'ignore pas que cet acte porte une grave atteinte aux sentiments religieux ; il a extrêmement froissé les Musulmans habitant Elksar, lesquels attachent la plus grande importance religieuse à ce fait et le considèrent comme un mépris de

leur religion, et une atteinte à leur croyance à tel point que ceci a produit sur eux une fâcheuse impression qui aura des conséquences déplorables.

D'autre part, j'ai appris d'une façon certaine que le Capitaine Ovilo a maltraité un certain nombre de soldats chérifiens chargés d'assurer la sécurité de la ville d'Elksar et de ses environs, et les a menacés de les arrêter et de les détenir dans son camp, comme prisonniers.

C'est avec le plus grand regret que je vous informe que cette manière d'agir a vivement froissé le Maghzen chérifien ; celui-ci formule à cet égard une protestation énergique, attendu que le seul but poursuivi par l'établissement de cette garde est d'empêcher un incident quelconque de se produire dans ces parages. Au surplus le Maghzen ne cesse d'envoyer des ordres à ses agents à Laraiche, à Elksar et leurs environs leur prescrivant de se bien comporter, d'adopter une ligne de conduite prudente, et d'appliquer tous leurs efforts à éviter tout ce qui pourrait avoir atteinte à la tranquillité, susciter des troubles et des désordres dans ces régions.

En conséquence, le Maghzen décline toute responsabilité qui pourrait résulter d'un incident causé par ces actes regrettables.

J'ai cru devoir porter tout ce qui précède à votre connaissance afin que vous en informiez le Corps diplomatique dont vous faites partie pour en prendre acte.

MOHAMMED-BEN-MOHAMMED GUEBBAS.

Tanger, le 18 *Joumada* II, 1329
(*correspondant au* 16 *juin*, 1911.)

[24712] No. 419.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 26.)

(No. 167.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 19, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 163 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have just received from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca enclosing letters from the vice-consul at Marakesh up to the 14th instant. It is evident from what Mr. Lennox writes that Hadj Thami Glawi has no intention of submitting quietly if any attempt is made to molest him.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 419.

Consul Madden to Mr. White.

(No. 106.)

Sir, *Casa Blanca, June* 17, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith, for your information, copies of extracts from letters I have received from Mr. Vice-Consul Lennox, reporting on the state of affairs at Marakesh.

Mr. Lennox has not made the smallest suggestion in any of his letters as to there being any danger for Europeans in Marakesh, but I have reminded him of a suggestion I made to him some time ago that should he, being on the spot and best able to judge, consider there might be danger at Marakesh, it would be prudent to send women and children down to the coast for a time.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 419.

Vice-Consul Lennox to Consul Madden.

(Extracts.) *Marakesh, June* 12, 1911.

WHILE my soldier was waiting at the basha's all the people were turned out and the basha gave an address in Shillha to some 150 men who have come in from Glawa to guard his house. My soldier knows sufficient Shillha to make out the gist of his speech and their reply.

He told them he wished them to defend him and the sons of El Madani ; that

there was no faith in the people of Marakesh; that he could trust no one but them. They would be well supplied with rifles and cartridges, and if any rifle did not please anyone he would have it replaced, and there was plenty of food for them.

They replied swearing they would die in protecting him. One of the basha's soldiers told my soldier that there were a great many more coming.

I hear this evening, too, that there have come into the city a great number of Mtooga men.

Both Hadj Thami and Hassi have been releasing prisoners to-day.

It looks as if Hafid was trying every possible means to provoke trouble in the south.

Later.—More Glawi men have been coming in this morning.

ALAN LENNOX.

Marakesh, June 14, 1911.

The basha's brother-in-law, who has just returned from Rabat, visited me last night.

I conclude that the basha's plan is to quietly resign his post, and if he is not molested and none of his people imprisoned, and if he is allowed to retain all his property, grain, and animals, he will not resist; but, if not, he and the other Glawi will fight.

It is reported that El Mtoogi brings nine officials—kaïds for Rahamna, Zimran, and Oolad Delim and Menebhi; two bashas for Marakesh, Muthassib, and nadir of the Habas—and that they left Fez twelve days ago.

Kaïd-el-Ayadi is under orders to meet them at the river, and Mahboob of Hummar has sent for his horsemen to accompany him also to meet El Mtoogi.

The governor refuses to allow of specie being sent to Saffi to-day.

ALAN LENNOX.

[24713] No. 420.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 26.)

(No. 168.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 18, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez in regard to the surrender of Moulai Zin and his officials to General Moinier.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 420.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 46.)

Sir, *Fez, June* 13, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copies of two letters which reached me last evening from Hadj Mohammed Mikwar. It will be observed that in the event he and his friends succeeded in preserving public order, as prescribed to them, up till the last, although with considerable difficulty, Mikwar himself having been fired upon by a malcontent.

My letters of the 4th June (see my despatch No. 39 of the 5th instant) were given to a courier of Hadj Mohammed Mikwar, a Mequinez man on friendly terms with the insurgents, and I arranged with Sidi Mohammed Amrani that this courier should go with his column and be at his service. This courier was sent by Sid Amrani first to General Moinier, whose forces had opened fire* on the Amrani column near Jedida, mistaking them for insurgents. Thereafter Sidi Amrani sent the courier in to Mequinez twice with verbal messages to Mikwar of the approach of the troops, telling Mikwar what to do, and bringing back word of the state of affairs inside the city.

This same courier has brought the present letters to me from Mikwar, and explains that the delay in the opening of the gates and the coming out of the notables was due to the opposition of certain persons in the town who clamoured for opposition to be

* But happily without mishap.

made, and thereafter to the notables wishing to make absolutely sure that no stray Berbers or other insurgents remained in the neighbourhood of the gate.

Apparently General Moinier dismissed the members of the Provisional Government amicably to their homes, and took Mulai Zin into honourable custody at his camp with assurances of his good offices towards reconciling him with the Sultan.

In regard to the request of the Basha of Mequinez to Mikwar to accompany the deputation to Fez, I would point out that the hesitation of members of the Provisional Government such as Mikwar and Bel Korah—the former not, by strict law, a protégé, and the latter merely a French mokhalat—is not unnatural when they remember the Sultan's treatment hitherto of persons who had highly offended him, *e.g.*, the mutilation inflicted on the officials of the pretender Muli Mohammed (1908), the caging of Bu Hamara, and the mutilations of certain of his followers, the flogging to death of Kittany, and the treatment of the Basha Hadj Ben Aissa and torturing of his wife, and, only three weeks ago, the Lemta raid. Living so out of the world as they do, it is difficult for such men to realise the changes which have come to pass during the last three weeks, and the strength of the efforts now in work to prevent recurrence of such ferocities. Under the circumstances, and particularly in view of the opinion of your Excellency and the French chargé d'affaires that the Makhzen owe a debt of gratitude to Mikwar and others for the line they took, and after consultation with the French consul, I advised Mikwar to comply with the Basha's request, and I treat it as an honourable invitation.

I am sorry to say, however, that the French consul spoke somewhat grudgingly on the matter, insisting, impatiently, that it had nothing to do with him, and that it could not be forgotten that Mikwar was a member of an insurrectionary government.

Allowance has, in fairness, to be made for M. Gaillard's many worries these days, and for the fact that when I saw him he had just returned from an interview with the Sultan on the subject of the arrival of Spanish troops at Laraiche and Alcazar. Still one cannot but observe that such ideas seem strangely at variance with the policy laid down by the French Government, and which has been so carefully followed by General Moinier.

With regard to the last sentence of Mikwar's letter of the 10th instant, I defer comment until I ascertain from him what exactly is meant.

It will be seen from his letter of yesterday that the Beni M'tir and Zemmour have begun overtures for peace, and that General Moinier has marched to Zarhon with half of his troops, leaving the other half at Mequinez.

I have, &c.

J. M. MacLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 420.

Hadj Mohammed Mikwar to Consul MacLeod.

(Translation.)

Sir, *Mequinez, June* 10, 1911.

I AM glad to inform you that our fears are past and that the mehalla arrived and entered Mequinez without incident (on 8th instant). I am the more relieved now because at the last it appeared that some persons, even of the principal people, were opposed to our receiving it peacefully; and on the day of its arrival, while I was trying to restrain the unruly, a shot was fired at me but fortunately missed me.

We met the general outside the gate and were well received, and he spoke well to us, *i.e.*, of amnesty and oblivion for the past and that in the future oppression would not be permitted. And he asked that the city give a certain amount (see list attached hereto) as I herewith set forth. And we told him that the city was oppressed and that the tribes had sacked it; but he insisted, and the city gave the amount designated, and Mulai Zeen was required to go to the mehalla, where he now remains. Mulai Zeen explained to him that he had no desire to be Sultan, that he had no means, nor animals, nor weapons, and that the tribes had forced him to be Sultan, and said if he would not be made Sultan they would dig down the walls of Mequinez, and that his house was without food, and that had not I loaned him money for to buy food he would have been hungry. I loaned him some 1,040 dollars.

Your letter of the 8th instant arrived, and we thank you for all your words and for your nation's words in our behalf, and all the letters which I wrote favouring Mulai Zeen he required me to write, and asked that they be read to him and sent them on his own account, and he also says that the Berbers required him to write in that manner. All that was written was at his advice, and I was afraid for myself, that the

Berbers would kill me or eat up my house. I was afraid at that time of the Berbers more than I was afraid of Mulai Hafid or the French nation, and I was compelled to do that which would ensure me the greatest safety. And I knew that the nations and Mulai Hafid would surely act justly in a matter that was as plain as day, and of which those foreigners who were here were witnesses, and if it was not for this uprising I would not serve in the Government, although they would give me 50*l.* a-day, because I for forty-two years have been a merchant and do not know any other business.

And now that French forces have arrived, and I am able to sleep at nights without fear, from now on it will be seen by the Sultan or by the French whether I will longer work for the Government. For I did not take up that work except that the sword was upon me, and after my losses in shops eaten up amounted to 5,150 dollars, which I desire you to take note of that it may be repaid, for I have just made up my accounts and ascertained how much were my losses. People advised me to lay my claim before the French towards receiving payment, but I did not consent to do so, for my chief dealings are with the English.

To-day again I met the general and he said to me that truly the English Legation speak for you and like you much, but surely you must work with us, and we began speaking of other things, and I treated him with much honour and sent him food, and I asked him to leave us a strong guard of soldiers because we still fear the Berbers, and he said he would leave us all that we needed. And we thank him much for all he has done to secure peace and safety. He also said he would leave persons to judge with the Basha and Kadi, and said to us we not fear because we are under French Government, and that the Gharb (Morocco) from henceforth is our charge.

Sincerely yours,

HADJ MOHAMMED MIKWAR.

Enclosure 3 in No. 420.

List of Requisitions made by the French Army on the Town of Mequinez.

(Translation.)

300 camel loads of barley.
100 „ „ wheaten flour.
100 „ „ wood for fuel.
100 bullocks.
50 camel loads of onions and other vegetables.
3 „ „ sugar.
1 „ „ tea.
35 „ „ rice. (Only 5 loads of rice being procurable, 30 loads of wheaten flour were accepted in lieu of that quantity of rice).

Mequinez, 12*th Jumadi II*, 1329 (10*th June*, 1911).

Enclosure 4 in No. 420.

Hadj Mohammed Mikwar to Consul MacLeod.

(Translation.)
(After Compliments.)

GENERAL MOINIER'S column has gone to Zarhon and most of the tribe have come in. A courier from Beni M'tir arrived to say that to-morrow or the day after to-morrow their notables will come in.

The general's khalifa has asked me to visit him on Monday next. If it be about anything of importance I will let you know.

The general is residing at Dar Beida near the Agdal. Everything is quiet, thank God. I am now removing my goods to their usual places and feel confidence. I have been to the basha and he ordered twenty-five of the notables of Mequinez, myself included, to go to Fez to His Shereefian Majesty. The agent of the French consul is included too, but he refused, saying he must have an order from his consul, and the basha yielded. I thought it right to inform you as I have not promised to do so until I hear from you, as I feel there is now liberty. I have no desire to be employed by the Makhzen in any post. What I did before was only for the safety of the town and myself, which was the cause of the French entering without bloodshed. I shall need an answer by Tuesday night because the notables are leaving here on Wednesday morning.

Enclosure 5 in No. 420.

Consul MacLeod to Hadj Mohammed Mikwar.

(Extract.)
(After Compliments.)

I AM happy to hear that the basha has selected you amongst the notables to come from Mequinez to His Shereefian Majesty to congratulate him on the happy deliverance of the city, and as I am hoping to see you so soon it is needless to write to you further. Peace.

15 *Jumadi II*, 1329 (13*th June*, 1911).

[24714] No. 421.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 169.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 19, 1911.

WITH reference to Mr. Lister's despatch No. 151 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report that the Spanish Minister came to see me recently, and informed me that he had received the reply of the Governor of Ceuta, who declared that there had never been any intention of appointing Rouhan as head of the native police force being raised to take the place of the Spanish troops near Ceuta.

I expressed my satisfaction at receiving this assurance, and observed that it was extraordinary how the misunderstanding could have arisen on the part of the Basha of Tetuan, who had distinctly informed our vice-consul that the appointment was insisted upon by the Spaniards.

M. de Villasinda repeated to me the story of the forged letter reported in Mr. Lister's above-mentioned despatch.

I communicated to Mr. Vice-Consul Bewicke the declaration made to me by M. de Villasinda, and I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the despatch I have received in reply.

The governor, who had on two separate occasions informed Mr. Bewicke that the "Spanish were insisting upon the appointment of Rouhan" as head of the guard, has now apparently forgotten this. In any case there can, I think, be no doubt that the Spanish authorities have been making great use of Rouhan and his family, and that the belief is general that he is acting on behalf of the Governor of Ceuta, though the Spanish officer who accompanied him may not have been the governor's aide-de-camp. There can, of course, be no possibility now of his appointment as head of the police, but it will be interesting to see whether the Spanish authorities continue to make use of him notwithstanding his levying blackmail on the tribes as they say by means of a forged letter purporting to be from the Governor of Ceuta.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 421.

Vice-Consul Bewicke to Mr. White.

(No. 7.)

Sir, *Tetuan, June* 17, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 4 of the 13th instant *re* Rouhan-ben-Haddo's employment by the Spanish and their denial thereof.

I distinctly remember the governor telling me that he had protested against this appointment and that the Spaniards insisted on it, but when I saw him yesterday he was completely blank about it and I could get nothing out of him on the subject. He would refer only to the visit of a deputation from the Houz protesting against Rouhan's being over them, and who brought him a letter they had received from Rouhan. I transmit copy of this letter and another sent me by the governor.

The Khalifa was with the governor yesterday, and between them they informed me that the Houz deputation said Rouhan's letter, addressed to the Sheikh of the Houz and delivered at the village of Kidana, was brought by a Spaniard who said he was khalifa of the Governor of Ceuta, and who was accompanied by three of the Oulad

Haddo and some of the Spanish Riff police. They said the Spaniards told them that they must send two men to Ceuta to speak with the governor, and that they replied that they did not know the Governor of Ceuta, but would come and see their own governor.

The governor said that he sent the deputation with his secretary to the Spanish consul.

The governor says he believes Rouhan is still working for the Spaniards.

I have also seen Sid Erzini, who was also visited by the Houz deputation, and he thought that Rouhan was employed by the Spaniards.

The governor's secretary informs me that when he went with the Houz deputation to the Spanish consul they told the consul that they had suffered much from the thefts, &c., of the Oulad Haddo, and that the English still had a claim against them; that they should be glad if Rouhan were employed by Spanish, as each would then get his own rights, but they would not accept that any should be forced to serve as police; that the Spanish consul replied that the Governor of Ceuta did not wish for forced service but for voluntary; that the Spaniard who had gone to them was not the khalifa of the governor, and if Rouhan said so he lied; that if the people had claims against Rouhan of course they must have justice.

The deputation then said that if Rouhan steals or does anything wrong with the Spaniards they would not be responsible in any way or catch him.

I particularly asked the secretary whether the Spanish consul denied in any way that Rouhan was employed by the Spanish, and he said no. The secretary informed me that it was reported last night that Rouhan and other Oulad Haddo had gone to Ceuta, summoned by the governor.

I asked a man who knows people who go to the Houz to enquire about Rouhan. He reports that Rouhan is still employed by the Spanish, that some of the Haddos are serving as police at Monte Negro under Rouhan's khalifa, but that Rouhan was employed in escorting Spaniards about the district.

I have, &c.
W. S. BEWICKE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 421.

Copy of a Letter from Oulad Haddo (called Rouhan) to Sid Ibrahim Debdi.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.)

ON receipt of this letter we have to request you to come to us this day, either you or your son, or to send someone in your place, for the Governor of Ceuta has sent his khalifa to us on an agreeable matter in connection with you, and has ordered us to speak with your chiefs.

We have perceived that no one would be suitable for this matter except you, or someone (appointed by you) in your stead. He (the governor) has also ordered him (his khalifa) to visit you so that you may see him. We are sending our sons with him.

God is favourable to that which is for the good and benefit of the Moslems, and for the abandonment of the infidels to the path of the forsaken ones.

You must not turn away (from doing this).

May God direct you toward that which he approves. For to-morrow, Saturday, we shall be victorious. In sha'Allah.

You will come to us on receipt of this letter.

Peace.

Your friend,
MOHAMMED-EL-HADDAWI.

Enclosure 3 in No. 421.

The Assembly of the Beni Beya to Sid Abdeselam-ben-el-Hossein-el-Bokhari.

(Translation.)
(After usual compliments.)

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Rouhan, the chief of the evildoers, came from Ceuta in the night, and in the morning came to the Fekih Semaha and told him

to assemble the Kabile, in order that each village might furnish twenty-five soldiers—otherwise he would send for the Spanish police, who would do as he wished in the Kabile.

This is what we have to inform you of.

Peace.

By order of the Assembly of the Beni Beya.

[24715] No. 422.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 170.)
Sir, *Tangier, June 19, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of a letter addressed to the doyen of the diplomatic body by Sid Guebbas, stating that the Sultan intends to create a special board to give effect to the provisions of the Algeciras Act as regards the acquisition by foreigners of real property situated outside the 10-kilom. zone round the ports, and giving notice that the Makhzen will not recognise the validity of any purchases of land effected before the constitution of that board unless the special permission of the Sultan shall have been obtained.

The German Minister, in his annotation of the doyen's circular covering the letter of Sid Guebbas, draws attention to the error in the reference to article 63 of the Algeciras Act, which does not refer to the acquisition of real property. He suggests that explanations be requested on that point and also as to the composition of the board, the place in which it will have its office, and the date at which it will enter upon its functions, and also that a reservation be made as to the declaration of the Makhzen regarding the validity of the purchases already effected by foreigners, pending a thorough study of the question.

I have expressed my concurrence in the observations of Baron de Seckendorff.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 422.

Sid Guebbas to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Body.

Louange à Dieu seul.

(Traduction.) *Tanger, le 17 djoumada II, 1329*
(Après les compliments d'usage.) *(15 juin, 1911).*

JE fais connaître à votre Excellence que le Makhzen se propose de former une administration spéciale pour la mise en exécution des articles 60 et 63, visant la vente des propriétés situées en dehors de la zone de 10 kilom. des huit ports heureux (marocains). Sa Majesté chérifienne m'a donné l'ordre d'appeler l'attention du corps diplomatique, dont vous faites partie, à ce que, étant données les circonstances présentes, le Makhzen ne reconnaîtra pas, antérieurement à la création de cette administration, la validité de la vente des terrains pour lesquels une autorisation formelle de Sa Majesté chérifienne n'aurait pas été donnée (pour l'achat) en dehors de la zone de 10 kilom. auteur des huits ports et en dehors de 2 kilom. des villes d'Alcazar, Arzila et Azemour, et pour cela j'en ai informé votre Excellence.

Que vous soyez heureux!

MOHAMMED-BEN-MOHAMMED-EL-GUEBBAS.

[24716] No. 423.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 171.)
Sir, *Tangier, June 19, 1911.*

HAVING heard that doubts had been cast upon the accuracy of the reports of the Lemta outrages, His Majesty's consul at Fez has sent me some evidence on the subject in a despatch, copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 423.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 47.)

Sir, *Fez, June* 15, 1911.

I BEG to enclose herewith some notes of evidence given to me these days regarding the outrages committed by the Shereefian troops at Lemta on the 21st May.

This evidence must not be supposed to be exhaustive, for it is only what I have been able to gather in the short time at my disposal, and is sent in order to prove how untrue are the statements made in certain quarters that the reports sent of the Lemta outrages were either devoid of foundation or gross exaggerations.

The selling of the women and children was so open and notorious a fact at the time that it never occurred to me to suppose anybody would have the hardihood to deny it.

I have no doubt that a full enquiry would show the number of children and women carried off to be as many or more than at first reported.

The present evidence treats only of two or three out of the fourteen villages raided, but from these three villages it will be observed that six boys, eight girls, and three young married women were carried off.

A European gentleman resident here, and who is by no means predisposed against the Sultan, told me at the time that he was close by the Sultan when two messengers arrived to report what had occurred at Lemta and heard the Sultan express satisfaction on learning that these villages had been despoiled even of the inhabitants' children.

Besides the Lemta boy mentioned in the evidence as having been presented by the Sultan to the "hajib," I have heard of a Lemta girl who was added to the Sultan's harem on that occasion, but I have not yet got full particulars of this latter case.

I have, &c.

J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 423.

Some Notes of Evidence of Lemta Outrages.

Fez, June 12, 1911.—Alush Bazro, Rifi, of Zalagh, states that his son, boy of 7 years or so of age, named Bernusi, was taken prisoner by soldiers and was taken to the hajib. Alush sacrificed a sheep to hajib and besought return of the boy. Hajib replied: "The Sultan gave the boy to me, and I shall keep him."

Ali Wuld Nakkash, Rifi, of Zalagh, has daughter named Aisha, virgin, aged about 15 years, who was carried off by soldiers and sold to Sidi Mahommed Ben-el-Bokhari, miller, opposite Grand Vizier's house and French consulate, for 4 dollars (?), but Bokhari says 40 dollars and asks this sum for return of her.

Fez, June 13.—Miss Denison (North African Mission) says that a man from the farm of the Sharfa Wazzaniin at Lemta is looking for two adult daughters and his young wife, their step-mother. He had been to Sid Omar Barrada asking for his assistance.

Fez, June 15. Mimi Hlou, British protégé, states that his brother, Tahir Hlou, was at Bab-al-Geesa on afternoon of the raid and saw the soldiers returning, and saw at Wad-al-Mellah the soldiers selling a Rifi boy and two Rifi girls; all three were children in age. The boy was bought, charitably, by Sid Mahommed Ben Allal Benkiran (whose warehouse is in the Saga), a French protégé, who at once restored him to his parents. Witness does not know who bought the girls.

Mahommed Ben Allal, British mokhalat, states that his man, Bu Mediani-al-Hamiani, at Lemta was killed and his wife carried off by the plunderers, but has since been bought back from a kaid-al-mia of Asker, one Rahmani. The woman's two children, a boy and a girl, escaped with the above man's second wife with the fugitives and have since been found.

Mahommed Ben Mahommed Guezzenayi, Rifi, of Ain Seherij, Lemta, states that he is brother of Ali Wuld Nakkash, already referred to. Witness confirms statement of Alush Bazre *re* boy taken to palace, and of Ali Wuld Nakkash as to girl Aisha. He

also states that Mimona, wife of witness's brother Ali above referred to, was fired upon and wounded in the arm by soldiers when holding on to her daughter Aisha above mentioned, with whom she did not wish to part. The arm is still unhealed and much swollen. (Told witness to take this woman to Miss Mellett, North African Mission.)

From witness's village of Ain Seherij Jenan Lota alone eight children and one married woman were carried off by the soldiers and were either sold or are still retained in the mehalla by the soldiers. The names are:—

Woman: Miriam Bint Hadoo, married, childless, 18 years old. Her husband, Ben Milud Hamiani, was killed by soldiers.

Boy: Bernusi Wuld Alush (see p. 1).

Boy: Mhemed Ben Ali Ben-al-Fdel, 16 years old.

Boy: Oman Wuld-al-Hasnowi, Rifi, about 6 years old. Father is searching for child in town.

Girl: Hasna Bint Messaud, virgin, 10–11 years old.

Boy: Mahommed. 4 years old, brother of above girl. These two were found in the mehalla, in Ben Jellali's regiment. They were seen there as lately as five days ago.

Does not remember the names of the other children.

Witness's father, Mizzian, very old man and scarcely able to work, unable to run away, was taken by the soldiers from his hut and is still in Zebballa prison.

Fez, May 26.—Mahommed Ben Hadj Mahommed Lazarac, of Fez, stated that two of his servants, aged men (about 80 years old) and one of them blind, named El Hassan-el-Jebali and Mahommed Raba, who had been left out at Lemta to take care of certain olive groves, &c., were seized by the soldiers and thrown into prison. (They have since been released after representations from His Majesty's consul.)

[24717] No. 424.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 26.)

(No. 172.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 20, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of a letter received yesterday by the doyen from Sid Taib-el-Mokri, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Fez, and translated at a meeting of dragomans this morning.

Sid Taib-el-Mokri protests on behalf of the Sultan, and in much the same terms as Sid Guebbas, against the landing of Spanish troops at Laraiche and the occupation of Alcazar. In this letter, however, it is clearly stated that the Makhzen's refusal to carry out its treaty obligations refers only to the treaties and agreements with Spain, whereas in the letter of Sid Guebbas it appeared to refer to treaties with all Powers in general.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 424.

Sid Taib-el-Mokri to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Body.

(Traduction.)

(Après les compliments d'usage.) *Le* 16 *jumada II*, 1329 (14 *juin*, 1911).

J'AI l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence que Sa Majesté chérifienne ayant appris le fait du débarquement des troupes espagnoles à Larache et l'envoie d'une partie de celles-ci à Alcazar, en a été extrêmement affectée. En effet, Sa Majesté ne s'attendait pas à un acte semblable de la part d'un Gouvernement qui, comme le Gouvernement espagnol, est lié au Makhzen chérifien par les traités anciens et récents; dans les territoires duquel ont été conclu premièrement la convention internationale de Madrid, et ensuite la Conférence internationale d'Algésiras; qui, a une connaissance certaine de l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriales de l'Empire chérifienne; qui sait, d'autre part, que cette indépendance et cette intégrité sont les deux bases sur lesquelles repose l'Acte d'Algésiras, souscrit par les délégués des Puissances civilisées, et, dont, par conséquent, le respect s'impose et qui doivent être préservées en acte et en parole, de toute atteinte ou infraction.

L'étonnement de Sa Majesté chérifienne a augmenté du fait que le Gouvernement espagnol a occupé Larache et Alcazar sans prendre en considération ces conventions internationales ni les autres accords particuliers ; sans prêter attention ni aux protestations élevées au nom du Makhzen par le représentant du Sultan à Tanger par écrit et verbalement auprès du M. le Ministre d'Espagne contre les principes des actes de son Gouvernement, ni à l'opposition formulée par Sid Guebbas contre les mouvements des troupes espagnoles aux alentours des limites de Ceuta ; et même sans appuyer sur aucun motif cette occupation ; en effet, Larache et ses environs, Alcazar et ses alentours, ainsi que tout le Gharb, jouissent du calme et de la tranquillité ; et il ne s'y manifeste aucun indice de troubles, comme il est notoirement connu, et ce dont témoigne le passage de caravanes et de toutes sortes de voyageurs circulant sur les routes de cette région ; et même si des désordres y étaient survenus, ceux-ci auraient été supprimés par les forces makhzeniennes stationnées dans ces parages pour faire face à cette éventualité. Le fait est que le Makhzen dispose d'une force suffisante pour réprimer des désordres s'il venaient à s'y produire.

Le Makhzen n'a notifié ni au Gouvernement espagnol ni à aucun autre que son secours lui était nécessaire dans cette région ; il n'a adressé aucune demande dans ce sens là-bas. Au contraire, il a, par l'intermédiaire de son représentant à Tanger protesté auprès du Gouvernement espagnol dans tous les actes auxquels celui-ci s'est porté et constituant une atteinte aux droits du Makhzen et à l'intégrité de son territoire.

Notre maître—que Dieu le rende victorieux !—m'a ordonné d'exposer tout ce qui précède à votre Excellence pour que vous en preniez connaissance et pour que vous en informiez tous les représentants des Puissances respectées, afin que vous sachiez tous que le Makhzen chérifien décline la responsabilité de toutes les conséquences des actes du Gouvernement espagnol qui sortent du cadre des traités et conventions et qui constituent une infraction aux dispositions de l'Acte de l'Algésiras, souscrit par les représentants des Puissances civilisées.

Je viens demander, au nom du Makhzen, aux représentants signatoires de l'Acte d'Algésiras de faire connaître au Gouvernement espagnol que son occupation d'un des ports ouverts au commerce général, d'une des villes importantes de l'intérieur, et d'autres points du territoire indépendant constitue un acte tout à fait contraire au droit établi du Makhzen—droit originel et consacré par l'Acte d'Algésiras, souscrit par les représentants des Puissances du monde civilisé.

Je demande de même aux représentants des Puissances d'appuyer le Makhzen, qui demande avec insistance au Gouvernement espagnol de retirer les troupes de Larache et d'Alcazar et des autres points du territoire marocain et d'en hâter l'évacuation sans retard ; et qu'il sache que le Makhzen, à la suite du fait de cette occupation, ne peut rien exécuter des clauses des conventions et traités existant entre lui et le Gouvernement espagnol, et notamment des derniers accords concernant la question du Riff.

Le Ministre par intérim des Affaires Étrangères
de Sa Majesté chérifienne,
TAIB-EL-MOKRI.

[24718] No. 425.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 173.)

Sir, *Tangier, June 20, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting the Sultan's reception of the Mequinez notables. Mulai Hafid appears to have especially singled out Hadj Mohammed Mikwar for abuse, and were it not for the restraining influence of General Moinier and the French consul, His Majesty would undoubtedly wreak his vengeance on him in a manner of which one does not like to think.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE

Enclosure in No. 425.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister

(No. 48.)

Sir, *Fez, June 16, 1911.*

REFERRING to my despatch No. 46 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to report that General Moinier, with such of his troops as he had not left at Mequinez, reached here yesterday morning from Zarhon.

Yesterday afternoon the Mequinez notables arrived, and, on nearing Fez, Hadj Mohammed Mikwar sent me word of their arrival, said they were going to the French camp, and General Moinier was arranging for their interview with the Sultan.

I answered that they could not be in safer hands than those of General Moinier, and that, under the circumstances, it would be better that I should not see Hadj Mohammed Mikwar or any of them until after their reception by the Sultan. (I felt that otherwise I should probably be thought by the Makhzen and the French to be intermeddling where there was no need.)

This morning the Sultan received the notables. The Hajib introduced them, and they were accompanied by the French consul and a reporter of the Arabic newspaper, the "Saadah," and, at their earnest request, by General Moinier.

The Sultan reproached them generally for what had happened at Mequinez, and then singled out Hadj Mohammed Mikwar for a furious tirade, told him he had behaved very badly, had persistently agitated against the Sultan and against the French, and between the English, the French, and the Makhzen. He merely wanted to be a vizier, &c. To this Hadj Mohammed Mikwar replied with much spirit that he had done nothing wrong, had aimed at and succeeded in preserving the city from destruction until help should arrive, that he was a loyal subject of the Sultan and a friend of both the French and the English. What other course had been open to him? The Sultan answered that he should have quitted Mequinez when it became tainted with rebellion, and was proceeding with more abuse when the French consul interposed quietly that this was enough, &c., and by-and-by the Sultan dismissed them quietly.

Mulai Zin had been previously received by the Sultan privately, and has been given a house at the Palace.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

P.S.—Mikwar and the rest of the deputation then separated, and are staying with their respective friends.

I propose to call on the earliest opportunity and thank General Moinier for his kind offices in the whole matter at Mequinez as far as it concerns us.

J. M. MACL.

[24667] No. 426.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 96.)

Sir, *Vienna, June 20, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a statement was published in the "Politische Correspondenz" last night which is in complete harmony with the language recently held by Count Aehrenthal and the Marquis Pallavicini to His Majesty's Ambassador on the subject of Morocco, and is evidently intended to show that up to the present at least the Austro-Hungarian Government do not desire to find fault with the policy which is being pursued by France. This paragraph runs as follows :—

"The gist of the declarations made by M. Cruppi in the French Senate and Chamber amidst great applause is to the effect that no acquisition of territory is contemplated, and that there is to be no kind of departure from the principle of maintaining the integrity of Morocco, the sovereign rights of the Sultan, and the open door for all. From this it can be deduced that the expeditionary corps, in the absence of unforeseen occurrences, will be withdrawn in the near future. In order, however, to prevent the recurrence of disturbance and to avoid the necessity of a second and more costly expedition, it will be necessary, before the withdrawal of the corps, to complete the organisation already commenced of the 4,000 to 5,000 strong mehalla of the Sultan. It will further be necessary to establish fortified posts to ensure the

security of communication between Fez and the Shawia on the one hand and Tangier on the other. Assurances have been given to the effect that the French Government would sooner see the fulfilment of their pledges accelerated than retarded."

Though the above is no official communiqué, it has been unmistakably published with the full concurrence of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, with the object of ventilating in public the view which has more than once been expressed within the precincts of the Ballplatz.

I have, &c.
THEO RUSSELL.

[24967] No. 427.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 108.)
Sir, *Madrid, June 24, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the final debate on the Morocco question promised by Señor Canalejas took place yesterday in the Congress.

The President of the Council, in replying to Señors Villanueva and Soriano, stated that their speeches would give the impression that Spain was on the eve of a conflict with France. Nothing could, however, be further from the truth. The Spanish Government were determined to follow in Morocco, with the same spirit of loyalty as had bound the two countries up to the present, their policy of co-operation with France.

The Spanish Government harboured no thoughts of conquest in Morocco. They had not even permitted the Spanish flag to be hoisted over any building or over any camp occupied by their troops either in Laraiche or Alcazar. The Moorish authorities continued to carry out their administrative functions in both these places. They did so in complete harmony with the Spaniards, and daily proof was being given of the sentiments of respect and affection with which they were animated towards the latter.

There had been some talk of anti-war meetings. If such meetings were held with the genuine object of combating the idea of war he, Señor Canalejas, would attend them. If, however, their object was to deny the right of the nation to carry out the responsibilities undertaken by the Government, he sincerely hoped that they would not be held. No one desired war either with Morocco or with any other Power. The Government were entirely opposed to the idea of war and to any policy of adventure.

With regard to Spanish action at Laraiche and Alcazar, unexpected events had occurred at the moment of the naval demonstration off the former port. There had been no previous intention on the part of the Government either of disembarking men or of advancing on Alcazar. A proof of this was the fact that only marines had been employed in the movement, and that they had been landed without any of the equipment of organisation necessary for carrying on war. Spain, in fact, had no intention of making a forward movement on Moorish territory. She would not, on the other hand, fail to preserve intact the territory which belonged to her. From all the other districts she would withdraw as soon as the conditions laid down in her treaties with the Makhzen in the Act of Algeciras and in the other international instruments had been re-established. There was no foundation for the rumour that an occupation of Arzila was contemplated.

In referring to the fact that the session of the Cortes would terminate on the following day, Señor Canalejas promised that, in the unlikely event of a serious crisis, he would not fail to consult the representatives of the people, whose sense of patriotism would in such a case doubtless prevail over their desire to pass the summer in retirement.

It seems pretty clear that, in arranging that the debate on Señor Villanueva's interpellation should be continued, Señor Canalejas had in his mind the possibility that an attempt might be made to force his hand by the "forward" party in the country after the Cortes had ceased to sit. The "Liberal," commenting on the debate, remarks that the President of the Council had been evidently anxious to have an opportunity to say, not actually to the Chamber but to certain persons outside the Chamber, something which it was important to have clearly laid down before the close of the session.

Speaking to-day to an English gentleman who frequently sees him, Señor Canalejas remarked that he had probably noticed that the Socialists, while disapproving in principle of the Government policy in Morocco, are nevertheless jealously sensitive of any French advance that might threaten Spanish interests in those parts, and that they fully understand that the various forward movements undertaken by Spain had been forced upon her by the French action.

Señor Canalejas expressed to my informant his appreciation of the conciliatory attitude of His Majesty's Government and of their friendly action in trying to smooth over the difficulties between the two Cabinets.

I have, &c.
ERNEST A. RENNIE.

[24968] No. 428.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 109. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, June 24, 1911.*

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday afternoon, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram No. 77 regarding the Spanish declaration respecting the occupation of Alcazar, and pointed out that His Majesty's Government considered it to be very necessary that a more precise indication of intentions should be given by the Spanish Government.

Señor Garcia Prieto said that the communication that had been made to the Powers had been drawn up, not by himself alone, but by the whole of the Cabinet sitting in session. He seemed inclined to admit that it was vaguely worded, explaining that this might have been due to the fact that they had been anxious to make their declaration without delay, but he said he could now issue any further declaration without consulting his colleagues. I urged on him that it seemed very desirable that a more precise statement should be made, and pointed out that this should now present comparatively little difficulty in view of the speech delivered the previous day by the President of the Council, and of the statements made earlier in the week to the assembled journalists (see my despatch No. 105 of the 18th instant).

Señor Garcia Prieto ultimately promised that he would consult Señor Canalejas, and said that he trusted that the President of the Council would see his way to agreeing to make a further declaration on the lines suggested by His Majesty's Government.

During the course of the conversation, Señor Garcia Prieto stated that he attached great importance to a resumption of the conversations that had lately been held in Madrid. He was apprehensive lest misunderstandings should arise if the exchange of views ceased, and he seemed to be of the opinion that there ought to be little difficulty in arriving at some formula which would satisfy the views of both Cabinets.

The French Ambassador, who is proceeding to-morrow on leave of absence for about three weeks, tells me that he had a friendly conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs when he went yesterday to take leave of him. Señor Garcia Prieto had also spoken to him regarding the desirability that the conversations should be resumed. To this M. Geoffray had replied that the need did not seem so very pressing, as it was not a bad thing that time should now be allowed for reflection. He seemed inclined to think that the Spanish Government would be unwilling to make the withdrawal of their forces from Alcazar in any way dependent upon the retirement of the French troops from Fez. He also appeared to be of the opinion that the Spanish Government would be found to be unwilling to effect that withdrawal previous to resuming the conversations.

I have, &c.
ERNEST A. RENNIE.

[25112] No. 429.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, June 27, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

My telegram No. 52 of 23rd June.

I have just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs reply to personal *aide-mémoire* embodying substance of your telegram No. 77 of 21st June, which I left with his Excellency on 23rd June. Communication is termed personal, and I am asked to communicate it to you.

"The Powers having made no observations on first declarations of the Spanish Government, latter in making their statement of 20th June were inspired by their desire to be agreeable to His Majesty's Government, in whose opinion it appeared useful that a fresh statement should be made of Spanish intentions to attribute a purely provisional character to measures taken at Alcazar. Declaration was adapted to this spirit and to position assumed from the beginning by the Cabinet of Madrid; it makes the limit of those measures dependent on steps which will not require an extended period for application provided that Makhzen are animated by sincere feelings of friendship.

"On hypothesis, never positively put forward by the Spanish Government, of an analogy between Spanish action at Alcazar and French action at Fez, it is evident that French Government will not conclude their action without full and positive guarantees for establishment of normal conditions.

"If Makhzen, instead of helping towards a settlement, has adopted an attitude which makes it increasingly difficult for Spanish Government to withdraw from their legitimate attitude, and if French Government consider it necessary to suspend conversations at Madrid, which, since beginning of May, Spanish Government have urged should be held, no blame should be attributed for this to Spain, who is always ready to serve general interests by showing a conciliatory spirit."

Above is almost literal translation of communication, which is very vaguely worded.

Copy by post to-night.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[23997] No. 430.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rennie.

(No. 63.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 27, 1911.*

THE Spanish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 16th instant, and was informed by Sir A. Nicolson of the suggestion which I instructed you in my telegram No. 77 of the 21st instant to make to the Spanish Government, namely, that they should make a declaration to the Powers similar to that which had been issued by France. His Excellency intimated that he did not think that his Government would make any difficulty on this point, as they had already stated that the measures which they were taking were simply police measures, and purely provisional.

Señor de Villa Urrutia observed that M. Cruppi was showing a very conciliatory disposition, and was anxious that the recent protests of the Makhzen should not lead to the Morocco question being brought before the Powers. M. Cruppi apparently considered that the protest was ill-timed and not couched in happy terms, and he seemed to think that the French agents in Morocco were too zealous.

No trouble would, in the Ambassador's opinion, be caused at Alcazar by the tribes, who were well disposed and tranquil; moreover, the Spanish authorities were in excellent relations with Raisuli, who was a quieting element. The danger lay in the presence of the mehalla under Captain Moreau at Alcazar and in the activity of the French vice-consul there. These two officers might create trouble between the mehalla and the Spanish forces, or stir up the tribes; and his Excellency hinted that it would be well if His Majesty's Government could say a word to the French as to instructing their military and consular officers at Alcazar to be quiet and careful. The Spanish

Government would, no doubt, be glad to see the withdrawal of the mehalla from the neighbourhood of Alcazar.

His Excellency remarked, in conclusion, that he would like to rectify an error. The Spanish Government were reproached for having taken under their protection a man who had been discarded by the Germans. Confusion had been made between two individuals. The man discarded by the Germans was Abdala ben Malec. The murdered man was a Spanish protégé named Ahmed ben Malec el Mesmudi.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24163] No. 431.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rennie.

(No. 64.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 27, 1911.*

THE Spanish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 19th instant and handed to Sir A. Nicolson a memorandum, a translation of which is enclosed herewith, respecting the action taken by the Spanish Government at Laraiche and Alcazar.

Sir A. Nicolson observed that, if the Spanish troops were to remain at Alcazar until all the conditions stated in the memorandum were fulfilled, their stay would hardly be a provisional one. He also enquired whether in any case the Spanish troops would not be withdrawn when the French withdrew from Fez.

Señor de Villa Urrutia doubted whether this would be possible, as the French would only retire to the Shawia. Their recent action at Fez and Mequinez and their intention to undertake the organisation of the Moorish army would render them complete masters over the Sultan, who would be a puppet in their hands.

Sir A. Nicolson stated, in conclusion, that the best thing would be to resume the discussions at Madrid.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 431.

Memorandum communicated by Señor de Villa Urrutia.

(Translation.)

IN order to emphasise the nature and scope of the measures taken at Laraiche and Alcazar, the Spanish Government think it well to repeat what they stated from the beginning, namely, that those measures are dictated by the necessity of obtaining reparation for the murder of the Spanish-protected person Benmalek and his sons, and of punishing the guilty parties, as well as of ensuring the tranquillity of the district. When once this object has been attained and an effective guarantee has been secured for the maintenance of order and normal conditions, these provisional measures will come to an end.

June 20, 1911.

[25264] No. 432.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, June 28, 1911.*

IN a despatch dated the 25th instant the consular agent at Alcazar informed me that considerable excitement had been caused by the Spanish cavalry marching through the town with their swords drawn. They proceeded to reconnoitre in the direction of the hill tribes. I spoke to M. de Villasinda on the subject, and drew his attention to the danger of creating an incident by such manœvres. He said in reply that, according to the reports he had received, the effects of the reconnaissance had been good, but that he would nevertheless communicate on the matter with Colonel Silvestre.

I am now informed by Mr. Carleton that a squadron of cavalry rode out again in the direction of Gibel Sarsar under the command of the above-named officer, professedly to fetch fuel for the camp. Mr. Carleton fears that expeditions of this nature are likely to create disturbances.

(Sent to Madrid.)

[25382] No. 433.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, June 29, 1911.*

CAPTAIN MOREAUX, who has just arrived at Tangier from Alcazar, has stated to M. de Billy that Colonel Silvestre's reconnoitring party crossed over to the south side of the River Loukkos, and passed quite near to the camp under his (Moreaux's) command.

He added that the Moors are much exasperated at Spanish troops marching through the midst of standing crops, and that he fears there will be disturbances. M. de Billy is much annoyed at Spanish action in that district.

[25399] No. 434.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 111.)
Sir, *Madrid, June 27, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 109 of the 24th June, I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy and translation of a communication which I have to-day received from Señor Garcia Prieto regarding the intentions of the Spanish Government as to the occupation of Alcazar.

In the course of my conversation on the 23rd June, I had left with his Excellency a personal *aide-mémoire* in order that there should be no doubt as to the nature of the statement which His Majesty's Government would be glad to receive. The reply now forwarded is marked "personal," and is enclosed in a private letter from the Minister, with the request that it should be communicated to you.

I have, &c.
ERNEST RENNIE.

Enclosure in No. 434.

Señor Prieto to Mr. Rennie.

(Translation.)
(Personal.)

THE Powers having made no observations on the first declarations of the Spanish Government, the latter, in making their statement on the 20th June, were inspired by the desire to be agreeable to His Majesty's Government, in whose opinion it appeared useful that a fresh statement should be made of Spanish intentions to attribute a purely provisional character to the measures taken at Alcazar. The declaration was adapted to this spirit, and to the position assumed from the beginning by the Cabinet of Madrid; it makes the limits of those measures dependent on steps which will not require an extended period for application, provided the Makhzen are animated by sincere feelings of friendship. On the hypothesis, never positively put forward by the Spanish Government, of an analogy between Spanish action at Alcazar and French action at Fez, it is evident that the French Government will not conclude their action without full and positive guarantees for the establishment of normal conditions. If the Makhzen, instead of assisting towards a settlement, has adopted an attitude that makes it increasingly difficult for the Spanish Government to withdraw from their legitimate attitude, and if the French Government consider it necessary to suspend the conversations at Madrid, which since the beginning of May the Spanish Government have urged should be held, no blame should be attributed to Spain, who is always ready to serve the general interests by showing a conciliatory spirit.